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Abstract
Abstract
The thesis analyses the negotiations at the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) of the European Union (EU) and outlines an array of ideas, interests and issues 
at stake for the actors involved. The thesis has three objectives: (1) to explain the 
1996-97 IGC negotiations which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, (2) to identify the key 
players throughout this process and (3) to examine the concept and characteristics of 
the EU IGC. This thesis aims to provide both breadth and depth in its analysis, 
presenting an overview of almost all the significant topics on the IGC agenda while 
focusing on three major issue areas: institutional reform, Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the same it concentrates 
on the governments of Britain, France and Germany, while outlining the positions of 
all other governments and the European institutions.
The thesis has three basic lines of argumentation. The first argues that the 1996-97 
IGC was an incremental process where member governments often had poorly 
defined objectives, leaving the process to drift along with little direction for the 
greater part of the sixteen months. In turn governments either drifted into agreement 
without being fully aware of the consequences of their decisions, or they postponed 
taking decisions on difficult and divisive issues until a future IGC or the post­
negotiation phase. The second argument relates to the key players in the IGC process. 
While all member governments played a role in the IGC process the most influential 
actor was the Dutch Presidency, followed by the Irish Presidency and the French, 
British and German governments. Given that the Presidencies played such an 
important role it is also possible to gain some insight to the ‘behind the scenes’ role of 
the Council Secretariat. Finally, there were also occasions when the Commission also 
proved influential. The third strand of argumentation relates to the concept of the 
IGC, arguing that since the first Conference the IGC has evolved, being gradually 
institutionalised into the European Union.
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INTRODUCTION 
OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, STRUCTURE, 
ARGUMENT AND SOURCES
The 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU) was 
the third major constitutional reform of the treaties within an eleven-year period. The 
subject of this thesis is the IGC which was convened in late March 1996 by the 
European Council of Turin and which culminated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, with 
the conclusion of the IGC by the European Council of Amsterdam on 18 June 1997. 
The final text of the treaty was signed by Foreign Ministers of Member States on 2 
October 1997, but the focus of this thesis ends at Amsterdam.
1. OBJECTIVES
The thesis has three objectives.
1. The first and primary aim is to explain the 1996-97 process of negotiations which 
led to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997.
2. Secondly, and related to this examination of the process, it aims to identify the key 
players throughout the negotiations.
3. Thirdly, the thesis aims to examine the concept of the EU IGC as it has developed 
since the first conference on the European Coal and Steel Community.
There are three reasons for writing this thesis. Firstly, research on the previous 
Intergovernmental Conferences has tended to focus more on the end game and the 
results of the process. There have been few attempts to analyse the negotiations from 
the start of the IGC to its end, taking on board the various range of proposals submitted 
by governments. This thesis attempts to provide a holistic analysis of this IGC, starting 
with the Maastricht treaty up until the formal conclusion of the negotiations at 
Amsterdam in June 1997. Secondly, the literature dealing with IGCs has tended to be
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limited in its analysis, both in terms of the number of Member States and the number 
of issues under negotiation at the Conference. This thesis aims to provide both breadth 
and depth. It provides an overview of almost all the significant topics on the agenda, 
from the setting of the agenda in the post-Maastricht stage up until the conclusion of 
the Amsterdam Summit in June ’97 while focusing on the three major issue areas of 
institutional reform, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). At the same it concentrates on the governments of the three 
largest Member States: Britain, France and Germany, while outlining the positions of 
all other governments and the European Commission (CEC) and European Parliament 
(EP). In the detailed negotiations on the three case studies reference is made to all 
players that proved influential in shaping the final treaty. Thirdly, this was the third 
IGC in a ten-year period and the final set of treaty amendments at Amsterdam made 
reference to another IGC in the near future.1 Therefore there is a need for further 
research on what has evolved into a frequent process. This thesis attempts to contribute 
to the literature.
2. METHODOLOGY
Qualitative research techniques have been employed in carrying out and writing up the 
research.2 Two methods were used. Firstly, the wealth of data on the IGC was 
analysed. As described below in the section on Sources, this included material from 
primary and secondary sources, ranging from official publications from both the 
Member States and the institutions to newspapers articles. This allowed for a general 
understanding and explanation to be built up on the 1996 IGC. Once the general 
framework of the negotiations was constructed, it was possible to look at the details of 
the data which in turn filled in the bigger picture, while raising a whole series of 
questions as to the objectives of different governments and the reaction of others. It 
was at this stage that the second technique of qualitative research, namely, 
unstructured interviewing, took effect. The interviewing of those officials involved in 
the negotiations and the preparation of positions for the delegations of their respective 
governments and the Commission was crucial in understanding the ‘twists and turns’
1 See Protocol No.7, TEU.
2 See G. King, R.O. Keohane and S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
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to the IGC. It provided a ‘sense and feeling’ of what actually went on in the 
negotiating rooms and the less formal settings. However, given that the thesis deals 
with the three large areas of institutions, JHA and CFSP, it was important to have 
identified specific issues to discuss with the IGC negotiators. I have carried out over 
forty interviews in Dublin, London, Paris, Bonn, Brussels and The Hague. (See 
appendix 1).
In meeting the three objectives as outlined, the thesis deliberately divides the empirical 
from the theoretical analysis. The aim here is to have the greater part of the thesis 
focus on an empirical analysis of the negotiations. The theoretical implications of these 
empirical findings are dealt with in the final chapter. While the primary objective is to 
explain the 1996-97 IGC negotiations, the thesis is clear in its criticism of the two 
previous theoretical approaches that have been used to explain IGCs, namely rational 
choice perspectives (focusing primarily on Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovemmentalism) and the more idealistic neofunctionalist perspectives. The 
empirical findings of the thesis suggest that the process of an IGC is neither as clear 
cut nor as structured as the above two theories suggest, but rather is an incremental 
process.
3. STRUCTURE
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part contains two chapters dealing with 
the concept of an IGC. The second part has two chapters which consider the pre­
negotiation stage, while providing an overview of the negotiations. The third part 
includes three chapters which explore the negotiations on three areas: on the 
institutions, justice and home affairs, and common foreign and security policy. The 
fourth and final part has one chapter, drawing together the findings of the previous 
analysis into a series of conclusions.
The thesis focuses in particular on the approach of the governments of Britain, France 
and Germany, given that successive French and German governments have provided 
the impetus for European cooperation, while successive British governments have
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seemed indifferent or hostile to the proposals that flowed from this impetus.3 However, 
the approaches and attitudes of the governments of the other Member States and the 
Commission are considered where relevant, particularly those of the Dutch and Irish 
Presidencies. In this respect the thesis aims to provide an assessment as broad as 
possible on the IGC negotiations and the players involved while not compromising on 
the depth of the analysis. The contents and structure of the following chapters aim to 
strike this balance.
Chapter I  aims to come up with a series of defining features for the IGC. In doing so it 
also examines how the process of the IGC has evolved and has gradually become 
institutionalised into the EU. Throughout the thesis the institutionalisation of the IGC 
relates to the process whereby the Conference is becoming a regular part of the 
European Union, occurring side-by-side to the normal business of policy-making 
within the EU. This chapter captures the basic features of an IGC and it allows for the 
examination of the process of previous IGCs in the following chapter, while also 
setting the thesis up to return to consider what the 1996-97 IGC tells us about the 
further evolution and institutionalisation of this process.
Chapter II  aims to examine the previous IGCs. In doing so it firstly considers the 
rational choice approach by Andrew Moravcsik and the neofunctionalist approach 
adopted by Ernst Haas et al. in explaining the IGCs. It then goes on to look at the 
participants and process of negotiations at previous IGCs, critiquing Moravcsik’s 
approach and that of the neofunctionalists. It is at this stage that the four defining 
features, as outlined below, can be identified from previous negotiations. The chapter 
proposes that these four features define the negotiations at the 1996-97 IGC. 
Therefore, this chapter provides the roadmap for the rest of the thesis.
Chapter III considers how the agenda for the 1996-97 IGC was set. It takes a close 
look at most of the issues that made it on to the agenda while examining the attitude of 
the British, French and German governments along with the European Parliament and 
Commission in the run-up to the start date of the Conference on 28 March 1996.
3 On France and Germany see P. McCarthy (ed.) (1993) France-Germany 1983-1993, London: 
Macmillan, 1994; F.R. Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1963, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press; References on British Hostility; On Britain and EC see Stephen George, An Awkward 
Partner: Britain in the European Community, OUP, 1994.
Introduction 5
Chapter IV  presents an overview of the negotiations on most of the major issues. It 
describes the mechanics of the process, looking at the levels of negotiation, the key 
meetings and individuals, and the general development of the Conference agenda. It 
also briefly examines the style of the negotiation process. Finally, the chapter places 
the IGC in context with the other business of the EU, while at the same time taking on 
board domestic distractions that pre-occupied governments, particularly the French, 
German and British governments. This chapter is important in providing an 
introduction to the negotiations before moving into the detailed examination in the 
third section of the thesis.
Chapter V is the first of the three chapters focusing on the detail of the negotiations. 
This chapter aims to explain the negotiations on four of the main areas of institutional 
reform in the first pillar: the extension of QMV, a re-balancing of the voting 
arrangements in the Council, Commission re-sizing and the extension of co-decision. 
As with the Chapter VI & Chapter VII the chapter focuses on the positions adopted 
by the British, French and German governments before going on to consider the main 
events of the negotiations, primarily under the Irish and Dutch Presidencies.
Chapter VI focuses on justice and home affairs under the third pillar of the Treaty of 
European Union. It outlines the negotiations behind the communitarisation of certain 
parts of the third pillar through the creation of an area of free movement and security 
under what is now Title IV TEC. It examines the approach governments took on 
shaping the remainder of Article K, Title VI TEU, in what was described as the 
flanking measures to Title IV, with a focus on judicial and police cooperation and anti­
crime measures. Finally this chapter examines the incorporation of the Schengen 
acquis into the European Union, a process that was closely related to both of the 
previous issues.
Chapter VII is the final chapter of this third section. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the negotiations on WEU-EU relations, the common strategy, the policy 
planning capability, Mr. CFSP and the decision-making within the second pillar. 
Throughout the three chapters in this section the four defining features as outlined in 
Chapter //prove very useful in explaining the process of the negotiations.
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Chapter VIII - Conclusions summarises the argument of the thesis bearing in mind 
the three objectives as set out above. It attempts to demonstrate how ineffective both 
neofimctionalism and intergovemmentalist perspectives are in explaining this IGC. In 
turn this reinforces the incremental nature of this IGC. The chapter also examines the 
contributions that the 1996-97 IGC makes to the evolution and institutionalisation of 
the IGC. Finally, it considers the implications of the thesis findings on European 
integration and policy-making.
4. ARGUMENT
On the first and primary objective of explaining the process of negotiations at the 
1996-97 IGC negotiations, this thesis argues that there were four features that defined 
this process. It was not a case of these four features being present in the same 
proportion or manner across the three main areas of reform that the thesis focuses 
upon. There was variation depending on the particular issue. These four defining 
features were as follows:
1. Ambiguity of Objectives -  This appeared in two forms. Firstly, member 
governments had often poorly defined objectives on specific issues. They would 
express support on something, for example an extension of QMV, without 
outlining the details of this support in a non-paper. Secondly, there was no well- 
defined overall theme or grand objective that drove the negotiating process along.
2. Lack of Direction -  With poorly defined objectives on both the ‘grand’ level and 
on specific issues there was a lack of direction in the negotiations. Lack of 
direction relates to an absence of negotiations on a particular issue that would 
move the process along in some direction from what had been previously 
discussed. This was usually due to the lack of initiatives from the delegations of 
member governments that would provide some detail and substance on which to 
negotiate, or an inability or unwillingness of the Presidency in Office to take the 
initiative and provide direction.
3. Unintended Outcomes -  Given that member governments often held unclear and 
contradictory objectives, with little direction on certain issues, it was often a case
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that governments drifted into agreement, without fully appreciating both the 
precise contents of that which they had agreed to, and the domestic implications of 
their decision. In other words, for some governments the outcomes on certain 
treaty articles was something that they had not intended or anticipated.
4. Postponement -  There were other issues during the IGC negotiations that were too 
sensitive for governments and their negotiating delegation not to give due attention 
to. However, again as a result of having poorly defined objectives or due to the 
absence of a consensus, governments postponed taking a decision on an issue, 
postponing it for another IGC or until the post-negotiation stage. This left 
governments disguising their fundamental differences in treaty language that meant 
something different to each participant.
The thesis argues that the presence of these four features gave rise to an incremental 
style of negotiating. The member governments were involved in an incremental 
process, slowly sorting out their priorities with later positions contradicting earlier 
ones as they edged their way to a final package at Amsterdam, sometimes drifting into 
agreements or postponing issues for another time.
As the negotiations on the range of issues are examined over the following chapters, a 
variety of circumstances explains why these features arise: the timing of the IGC; 
political distractions at the domestic and European level; the negotiating styles of 
certain member governments, to the timing of general elections. Though, as is 
tentatively revealed in the examination of previous IGCs in chapter II, and as is argued 
in the final section of the thesis it was also due to the special nature of EU IGC 
negotiations. Governments, along with the European institutions, operate within an EU 
system with a reasonably well-established process of policy-making.4 However, during 
an IGC member governments are continually called upon to renegotiate on the rules of 
policy-making and the agenda of integration in what is a state-to-state process of 
negotiation. Therefore, governments are caught between acting for a sovereign state 
and as an actor in a confederation like the EU. Indeed, they play both roles at once. 
While the confederation has a well-established process of policy-making there is not a
4 On policy-making in the EU see for example Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union, London: 
Macmillan, 1994; Laura Cram, Policy-making in the EU, Routledge, 1997; Helen Wallace & William 
Wallace, Policy-making in the European Union, OUP, 3rd Edition, 1996.
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similar structure to the IGC negotiations, or consensus among governments on what 
the EU entity, as a whole, is evolving into. Therefore governments are left muddling 
through such treaty reform processes in the manner described in the following 
chapters.
On the second objective relating to the key players at the IGC the thesis presents six 
arguments.
1. The Dutch Presidency was a key player in the process. Across the three main areas 
discussed in the third section of this thesis the Dutch Presidency was involved in 
most of the big initiatives. The Irish Presidency was also influential on certain 
issues but it had the tendency to avoid taking the initiative or pushing for further 
negotiations on the more divisive and difficult issues on the IGC agenda. While at 
times this reflected the lack of initiatives from the member governments there were 
the occasions when the Irish gladly side-stepped sensitive issues leaving them for 
the Dutch. Throughout what was the longest IGC so far, it is also possible to get a 
feel for the role that the Council Secretariat played in this process in helping the 
Presidencies carry out their duties.
2. The only other player to match the Dutch Presidency in launching initiatives was 
the French government and its delegation. Nevertheless, it was to prove largely 
unsuccessful in shaping the treaty along the lines it desired, given a series of 
internal divisions and domestic distractions at the crucial stages in the process.
3. The British government’s role for much of the process was rather limited, given the 
deep divisions within the Conservative government over Europe. Yet, the timing of 
the British general election and the extent of the divisions within the Conservative 
party were strongly influential in shaping the overall negotiations, notably the 
length of the negotiations, and the approaches of other governments to outlining 
their objectives, particularly on institutional matters.
4. The German government was at its most influential in the later stages of the 
process reflecting the nature of German style of negotiating, and also the extent of 
the domestic political divisions and constraints that undermined the German
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negotiating team’s attempts to present a coherent position in the earlier stages of 
the Conference.
5. The detailed analysis across the three main issues discussed in Section III also 
reveals that there was no substantive Franco-German partnership that proved 
influential on any particular issue or in the overall dynamics of the Conference, 
while the European Commission’s influence was limited and the European 
Parliament’s almost non-existent.
6. Finally, there were also times when no player was taking the initiative or acting as 
the principal negotiator shaping an issue, until the conclusion at Amsterdam. This 
ties in with the lack of direction in the process.
On the third objective relating to the concept of the IGC the thesis argues that since the 
first Conference on the ECSC the IGC has evolved, being gradually institutionalised 
into the EU. The 1996-97 IGC contributes to this evolutionary process, further 
institutionalising the Conference to the extent of making it a regular part of the EU. 
The evolutionary nature of the IGC is something that is firstly raised in Chapter I and 
returned to again in Chapter VIII.
5. SOURCES
The greater part of the research for this thesis was carried out shortly after the 
conclusion of the IGC in Amsterdam in June 1997. In attempting to describe the IGC 
process and understand its mechanics, four basic sources were used: (1) Conference 
documentation and official publications from Member States and the Institutions, (2) 
news material, (3) academic books and articles, and (4) interviews with negotiators and 
other observers of the IGC process.
1. The official documents and position papers from the Member States and 
institutions provide the back-bone of the analysis. Particularly crucial were the 
CONF documents that the Member State delegations presented throughout the 
negotiations. The CONF documents usually outlined a government’s position and 
proposals for reform or a proposal from a Presidency. It was government officials
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together with those from the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat which provided copies of CONF documents and other sensitive 
and confidential materials. Without their generosity this thesis would be much the 
poorer.
2. Agence Europe (AE) and European Report (ER) provided a daily and twice-weekly 
account of the happenings at the IGC meetings of personal representatives, foreign 
ministers and within the capitals of the Member States. These reports were backed 
up by, at times rather limited but none-the-less useful, reports from the quality 
press services from several of the Member States and the institutions, (see 
Bibliography)
3. The secondary sources of books and articles were especially useful when 
considering previous IGCs and devising the theoretical framework. There have also 
been several publications that have touched on the IGC negotiations and these also 
proved useful in the empirical analysis.
4. As briefly mentioned above, the primary and secondary documentation has been 
supplemented by over 40 interviews. Every interview was conducted on the basis 
of anonymity so the thesis in no way attributes or footnotes a particular 
interviewee, though a list is attached in Appendix 1. It has been possible to validate 
the information that was gathered through the interviews in a number of ways. 
Firstly, interviews were only carried out after a detailed understanding of the 
negotiations was established. Therefore it was possible to tell when an official 
knew what he was talking about. Secondly, information from one official was 
always cross-referred with other officials. In that way it was possible to identify the 
bias of certain officials and any slant which they may have deliberately put on their 
account of the negotiations.
P A R T I -
Chapter I
CHAPTER I 
DEFINING AN IGC
INTRODUCTION
This is the first of two chapters that look closely at the concept of an IGC up until, and 
including, the Maastricht IGC. The aim of the chapter is to define an IGC. In doing so 
it also examines how the process of the IGC has evolved. From the start it is necessary 
to be clear that this chapter and the following are only concerned with what can be 
described as EU IGCs, that is, IGCs from the European Coal and Steel Community 
onwards. It suggests that three types of IGCs are identifiable: the legal IGC, the 
specific IGC and the constitutional IGC. The central argument of the chapter is that 
there has been an institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC, the 1996 Conference 
being the third such IGC in a ten-year period. By firstly defining what constitutes an 
IGC, this chapter provides the necessary background for the next chapter, which takes 
a closer look at the defining features of the negotiations at an IGC. Secondly, given 
that the IGC is being described as an evolutionary process, the final chapter of the 
thesis returns to consider what the 1996-97 Conference tells us about the process.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter defines and briefly 
considers the legal and specific IGCs. The second part examines the development of 
the constitutional IGC up until Maastricht. The final part of the chapter re-caps on how 
the constitutional IGC has been institutionalised into the EU framework.
1. DEFINING AN IGC -  THE THREE CATEGORIES 
Legal & Specific
In defining an IGC it is necessary to commence with a consideration of the treaty 
article upon which this acronym has been and continues to be based. Initially this was
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Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome, since repealed and replaced with Article N at 
Maastricht.1 Article 236 TEC provided for ‘a conference of representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States’ that would determine ‘by common accord the 
amendments to be made to this treaty’.2 From this and other treaty articles it is possible 
to recognise three different forms of ‘a conference’, later dubbed an IGC.
The first relates to a narrow legalistic definition of the process confining itself to the 
words of Article 236, and any change to the treaty pursuant to the said article. By this 
definition any use of Article 236 constituted an IGC. Examples of such IGCs would be 
the series of brief meetings during the 1960s and 1970s e.g. the 1962 Convention on 
the Netherlands Antilles and the 1975 protocol on the European Investment Bank. By 
adopting such a definition certain conferences lasted only hours, for instance that on 
the Merger Treaty. The bulk of the work had been carried out before the formal 
convening of the IGC. It was a similar case with the 1970 and 1975 budgetary 
treaties.3
The second form of an IGC rests on those articles that make specific reference to 
possible treaty amendments. From the Rome Treaty as amended up until the TEU there 
are several examples of such articles. Article 33(8) TEC allowed for the possible 
amendment of Article 33 regarding global quotas and measures having equivalent 
effect. Articles 165 and 166 allowed for an increase in the number of Judges and 
Advocates-General. Amendments pursuant to these two articles in turn required 
changes to paragraphs two and three of Article 167 respectively. Given the precise 
wording in these two articles it was not actually necessary to call for a Conference 
under Article 236. Article 228(5) on agreements ‘between the Community and or more 
States and international organisations’ called for the use of Article N should the same 
agreement require treaty changes. Prior to Maastricht it was Article 238 that dealt with 
such change pursuant to the then Article 236. The Maastricht treaty also introduced a 
series of Articles referring to a specific treaty amendment. Article 189b(8) TEC, 
Article B TEU and Article J.4(6) TEU referred specifically to Article N(2).4 However
1 Now Article 48 TEU.
2 Treaties establishing the European Communities, Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1987.
3 See Geoffrey Edwards & Alfred Pijpers (eds.) The Politics o f  European Treaty Reform, Pinter, 1997 
p.5; Roy Pryce, The Dynamics o f  European Union, Routledge, 1987, p. 139.
Article J.10 also seemed to make tentative reference to the same Conference.
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actual changes to these articles came within the third type of IGC. (See Below) Finally, 
and most importantly Article O made reference to the amendments that would be 
necessary on enlargement. Prior to Maastricht such amendments came pursuant to 
Article 237. The successive enlargements of the Community and Union have been the 
most commonly convened of the second type of IGC.5
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IGC
This third form of an IGC was first convened, under Article 236, with the IGC on the 
Single European Act.6 It has been developed further by the Maastricht IGC up until the 
1996 conference. From the SEA and Maastricht IGCs it is possible to describe this 
IGC as having a dual purpose which provides the substance for its definition. By 
means of a series of treaty changes it firstly sought to outline a set of policy objectives 
to be pursued over the years, while secondly providing the necessary institutional and 
procedural changes for the realisation or the effective functioning of these same 
objectives.
The Single European Act, as its name suggests, brought together under one roof the 
economic aspects of the European Community and the foreign policy and anti-terrorist 
procedures of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which had grown up over the 
previous fifteen years. At the same time it provided a framework setting out the 
guidelines on future Community action in both policy areas under Article 8a TEC 
(now Article 14 TEC) and Title III (Article 30) of the SEA. Guidelines for future 
policy directions were flanked with a series of institutional changes, for example the 
introduction of Article 149 (now 251 TEC) on cooperation procedure and Article 100a 
(now Article 95 TEC) introducing QMV for matters under Article 8a. A similar 
scenario was evident at the Maastricht IGC. There was a framework outlining the three
5 Loukas Tsoukalis, The EC and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981; Lyn 
Gorman and Maija Liisa Kiljunen, (ed.) The Enlargement o f  the EC: Case Studies o f  Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, London: Macmillan, 1983; Jurgen Donges, The Second Enlargement o f  the European 
Community: adjustment requirements and challenges for policy reform, Tubingen: Mohr, 1982; 
Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace, A wider EC?: issues and problems o f  further Enlargement, 
London, 1976; John Redmond (ed.), The 1995 Enlargement ofEU, Aldershoot: Brookfield, 1997.
6 The italics is to place an emphasis on the fact that this was the first time a constitutional IGC was 
convened under Article 236 but as is shown below it was not the first constitutional IGC.
7 Juliet Lodge also places such an emphasis on the institutional reform flanking ‘other guiding 
principles’. See Juliet Lodge, ‘Intergovernmental Conferences and European Integration: Negotiating 
the Amsterdam Treaty’, International Negotiation 3, 1998a, p.357.
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stages of EMU in 102a -  109m TEC (now Article 98 -  124), while the newly created 
pillar II established a Common Foreign and Security Policy pursuant to Article J TEU. 
At the same time as defining new policy directions governments negotiated on the 
necessary changes to the workings of the institutions, for example the co-decision 
procedure was introduced under Article 189c and there was a further extension of 
qualified majority voting, e.g. Article 103 (now Article 99), Article 7b (now repealed) 
and 7c (now Article 15).
Both IGCs involved much more than mere treaty changes. This form of an IGC can be 
described as a ‘constitutional IGC’, its definition under Article 236 resting on the two 
features as described above; a policy initiative(s) flanked by institutional reform. By 
describing this type of IGC as a constitutional reform reflects the present situation and 
thinking as regards the treaties. Whatever the intentions of the founding fathers, what
O
has since developed resembles a constitution much more than an international treaty. 
Article 236 - An Insufficient Definition
However, confining the definition of an IGC to Article 236 leaves a large gap in the 
explanation of the process of European integration. It suggests that there were no 
constitutional IGCs prior to the Single European Act. Therefore the definition of the 
IGC has to be taken further, extended beyond Article 236. But in moving beyond 
Article 236 it is necessary to extend on the definition as it stands. For a process to be 
classified as a constitutional IGC prior to the first convening under Article 236 there 
also had to be a clear attempt to either amend the existing Treaties of Rome or 
formulate a new treaty. Therefore a constitutional IGC has three characteristics. It is a 
process that either amends the existing treaties or formulates a new treaty, which in 
turn outline policy objectives to be implemented along with a series of institutional 
adjustments. By this definition it is possible to recognise four constitutional IGCs prior 
to the SEA, two of which were successful in creating a treaty and two of which failed 
to do so.
8 See J. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, The Yale Law Journal 100:8, 1991, pp.2403-2483; JH. 
Weiler & U. Haltem “ Constitutional or International: The Foundations o f the Community Legal Order 
and the Question o f Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, in A.M. Slaughter, A. Stone & J.H.H Weiler (eds.), The 
European Courts and National Courts. Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing), 1997; E. 
Stein ‘Lawyers, Judges and the making of a Transnational Constitution’, The American Journal o f  
International Law 75:1, 1981, pp. 1-27.
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Two Successes -  ECSC & EEC
The negotiations on the ECSC and Treaties of Rome were conducted through 
intergovernmental conferences. The three defining features of the process had a strong 
presence throughout the negotiations. While the various participants involved in the 
negotiations from the six Member States had their own perspectives as regards the 
policy objectives of the ECSC, the negotiations aimed to establish a treaty and in the 
end this treaty did set out the basis for the pooling of sovereignty and establishment of 
a common economic community on what at this time were acknowledged as the 
primary resources for waging war.9 The sixth paragraph of the preamble claimed that 
the six were ‘Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential 
interests; to create, by establishing an economic community . . . ’. Article 2, having legal 
effect, made similar claims. The same paragraph was equally clear, as was Title Two, 
that these policy objectives would only be achieved if  flanked with the necessary 
institutional structure. Article 3 ECSC outlined the general functions that the 
institutions should pursue.
The Spaak Report was presented as the basis for treaty negotiations at the Conference 
of Foreign Ministers in Venice in May 1956. The negotiations that would eventually 
culminate in the Rome Treaties were officially opened on 26 June 1956 in Brussels. 
The Report, the approach taken by governments during the negotiations and the 
eventual treaties suggest that this was an IGC. The Spaak Report proposed ‘that an 
overall integration of the economy should be the aim, with the exception of the atomic 
energy sector, for which a separate organisation was to be created’.10 The eventual 
treaties were a reflection of the mix of policy and institutional initiatives during the 
Conference. Article 2 ECT remarked that via the establishment of a common market 
there would be ‘a harmonious development of economic activities’. Article 3 ECT 
proceeded to outline the areas where this cooperation would arise, e.g. the removal of 
obstacles to the free movement of persons, service and capital; the pursuit of a 
common policy in agriculture and transport. The necessary institutional framework to 
fulfil ‘the tasks entrusted to the Community’ were listed in Article 4 EEC Treaty. A
9 See Pierre Gerbet, ‘The Origins: Early Attempts and the Emergence o f  the Six (1945-52), in Pryce, 
1987, pp.35-52.
10 Hanns Jurgen Kiisters, ‘The Treaties o f Rome (1955-57)’, in Pryce, 1987, p.85.
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similar scenario can be found in Articles 2 & 3 of Title One of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community.11
Two Failures -  EDC/EPC & Fouchet Plan
The project to establish a political and defence community from approximately 1951- 
1954 and the Fouchet Plan negotiations from 1960-62 showed signs of the three 
features of a constitutional IGC despite failing to provide for either the ratification of a 
new treaty or a series of amendments to the existing Treaties of Rome. Firstly, most 
governments involved in both processes negotiated with the shared understanding that 
the aim was the formation of a new treaty. On the EDC Cardozo remarked that ‘A 
treaty-making diplomatic conference was eventually convened in Paris on 15 February
1 71951 In turn pressure, notably from the Italian government, for a political
dimension to the defence project lead to the start of further negotiations in early 1953 
on another potential treaty between the same six governments and ECSC members on 
a political community.13 It was a similar case with the French lead negotiations on the 
Fouchet Plan despite the hostility of the then Dutch and Belgian governments.14 
Secondly, both processes sought to break new ground providing a framework for 
future policy decisions. Thirdly, these policy initiatives were to be flanked with the 
necessary institutional machinery. For example Parts II & III of the ‘Draft Treaty 
embodying the Statute of the European Community’ March 1953 dealt with 
institutional issues and policy respectively.15 It was this treaty with a series of position 
papers from the governments that was to act as the ‘essential reference point’ in the 
negotiations on EPC that were to last from September 1953 to March 1954.16
The French proposal in 1961 with the Fouchet Plan included provisions on common 
foreign and defence policy, and cooperation on scientific and cultural matters. There 
was also an institutional framework. Being purely intergovernmental it was be 
constituted by a Council of Heads of State and Government, Council of Foreign
11 See Treaties, 1987, pp.393-4.
12 See Rita Cardozo, The Project fo r a Political Community (1952-54), in Pryce, 1987, pp.49-77; Also 
see E. Furdson, The European Defence Community: A History’, London, 1980.
13 Ibid.
14 Pierre Gerbet ‘A Search o f Political Union: The Fouchet Plan Negotiations (1960-62)’, in Pyrce, 
1987, pp. 109-12.
15 Assembly Document 15R, March 1953.
16 Pyrce, 1987,pp.64 -71.
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Ministers, a Political Committee and the EC’s parliamentary assembly. The proposed 
inclusion of the parliamentary assembly in the institutional make-up re-emphasises that 
while this process in no sense involved the Treaty of Rome it was closely related to the 
extent of incorporating the EC’s parliament. The presence of these three defining 
features suggests that these processes were IGCs. A series of other features further 
strengthens this description.
The 1950s project on the political community involved 64 individuals from the various 
member governments, from experts to the actual ministers that would make the final
1 7decisions. The everyday affairs of the Fouchet Plan negotiations were managed by 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Union. As Gerbet remarked such 
meetings were ‘chaired by diplomats ... who were to seek to reconcile opposing ideas 
but were not in a position to make final decisions’.18 This is typical of the procedures 
during the SEA, Maastricht and Amsterdam IGCs, the diplomats moving the process 
along before handing over the final package to the Foreign Ministers and Heads of 
State and Government. These two features were also present during the Fouchet 
negotiations. For example on 18 July 1961 a meeting of Heads of State and 
Government at Bad Godesberg sought to breathe new emphasis into the process.19 By 
19 October France had submitted a draft treaty. Some time later in January 1962 the 
other five member governments made further submissions.20
Moving Away from the Constitutional IGC
The attempt to create a new treaty with the Fouchet Plan epitomised the nature of 
European integration at this time. There was not a consensus on the present 
Community-oriented path under the Rome treaties. More specifically the French 
government was not satisfied with the approach being taken by the other five. This was 
what had prompted the Fouchet plan; a French attempt to organise European 
cooperation along French lines that would have placed the state at the heart of the 
process. The failure of the Fouchet plan entrenched a long-standing opposition 
between the French and the other five members. It made difficult any future
17 Ibid.
18 See Pryce, 1987, p. 115.
19 Ibid. pp. 117-118.
20 Ibid.
Chapter I 19
constitutional compromise resulting in a situation where up until the early 1980s there 
was an absence, at any one time, of the three features of the constitutional IGC; that is 
treaty formation or reform that aimed to outline a set of policy objectives flanked by 
institutional reform. Yet, it was the very developments up until the 1980s that provided 
the basis for the start of an institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC into the 
European Community process at the SEA IGC.
Despite the extensive divisions among member governments -  after the Fouchet 
debacle -  on the principles upon which European cooperation would proceed, member 
governments would on occasion come close to holding an IGC, only for one of the 
three defining characteristics to be missing. The European Summit meetings, later the 
European Council, provided the basis and focus for a variety of proposals. The Hague 
Summit of 1-2 December 1969 set the process in motion. Described as the triptych 
Summit it focused on completion, in the sense of putting the Community’s funding on 
a more concrete basis, furthering the process of European integration, and finally 
enlargement. At the meeting agreement was reached on the financing of the 
Community by its own resources by 1975. Further development was to be pursued on 
two fronts; with instructions to the various Foreign Ministries to table proposals on 
political unification, in essence a common foreign policy, by July 1970, and similar 
instructions on EMU. The final declaration at the Summit remarked that ‘the 
Community has today arrived at a turning point in its history’.21 The resulting Werner 
Report of October of the same year advocated a phased approach to EMU, with the 
necessary institutional changes.
Therefore the Hague Summit outlined policy objectives or directions, launching what 
was termed European Political Cooperation and getting EMU underway. At the same 
time it established a semi-formal institution in the form of the European Summit 
meeting. However, any discussion on its institutional implications or the possibility of 
incorporating this within the existing treaties or a new one was avoided. At best it 
could be described as an informal IGC.
The Paris Summit meeting of October 1972 continued the reflective process. The 
creation of a European Union by 31 December 1979 was proposed with the completion
21 EC Bulletin, 1/1970.
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of EMU by 31 December 1980. It suggested the creation of a European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund by April 1973 and a Regional Development Fund to be established 
by end of 1973. Improvement in the Community’s decision making procedures was 
also to be realised by mid-1973. The Paris Declaration of 19-20 October 1972 
suggested that ‘all the relationships between Member States were to be converted into 
a European Union’.22
The Paris Summit of 1974 saw the institutionalisation of the European Summit 
meeting with the creation of the European Council. This institutional development did 
not require any changes to the treaty. Indeed given that the creation of the European 
Council was a French led project it had undertones of Fouchet, attempting to bring a
9^stronger intergovernmental element into the dealings between the Member States. 
With the more Community oriented Member States suspicious that this new institution 
might compete and undermine the role of the Commission any treaty change would not 
have been forthcoming. The same Summit meeting continued with the probing into the 
various approaches on integration. It called on Leo Tindemans, the then Belgian Prime 
Minister, to draft a report on the characteristics and requirements of a European Union.
Tindemans’ final report called for a break from both the Community structure and the 
political cooperation that had since developed. It advocated a new phase in European 
integration with the possibility of a new treaty.24 The Tindemans report outlined the 
three necessary features of a constitutional IGC; treaty change or creation, guidelines 
of a future policy or policies approach, and the institutional mechanisms necessary to 
realise these policies. However, the economic and political conditions at this time were
9 cnot conducive to any attempt to embark on such a serious constitutional exercise. 
Indeed the Community had failed to reach agreement in respect of areas under its 
competence and this did not bode well for any further steps forward at that moment. 
There was also a further complication in any potential constitutional reform process. 
The 1973 enlargement and the membership of the United Kingdom and Denmark had 
introduced another two intergovemmentalist members.
22 EC Bulletin 10/1972; Also see Pyrce, 1987, p. 131.
23 See Alain Guyomarch et al., France in the European Union, Macmillan Press, 1998, p.27.
24 Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council, ‘European Union’, EC Bulletin, Supplement, 
1: 1976; Jacques Vandamme, ‘The Tindemans Report (1975-76)’, in Pryce, 1987, p. 159.
25 Ibid., p. 166.
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Despite this, the process of assessing the need for reform of the European 
Communities continued with the Brussels European Council of December 1978 
requesting ‘three wise men’ to prepare a report on the political reform of the EC. 
However, two features of this request reflected the cautious mood that continued to 
exist. Firstly, while being invited to make recommendations this was confined to the 
Community’s decision-making process. Secondly, the proposals were to be made ‘on 
the basis of, and in compliance with, the Treaties’. This was taken to mean that the 
European Council was not anticipating any treaty changes.27 Its comments at 
Luxembourg on 1-2 December 1980 epitomised the approach that was taken regarding 
such reports. The Heads of State and Government remarked that the report would 
‘continue to be a fertile seedbed of ideas and suggestions on which Institutions and the 
Member States may draw’. Tindemans, the Three Wise Men, and later the Genscher- 
Colombo initiative were attempts to seek out a common or new ground that would 
bring some form of reconciliation to the differences between member governments.
The reflection on the workings of the European Communities and EPC continued with 
the Genscher/Colombo proposals on European Union. This initiative was taken outside 
any institutional framework or indeed the forum of the European Council. Instead the 
initiative was launched by the German Foreign Minister at the FDP party conference 
on 6 January 1981 with the Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo lending his name 
and support to the project at a later stage. As was the case with the previous 
committees and reports the eventual ‘Solemn Declaration on European Union’ that was 
concluded at Stuttgart provided further momentum that would eventually culminate in 
the convening of the first constitutional IGC under Article 236. From the initiative’s 
launch Genscher seemed to have adopted a realistic approach, remarking in his speech 
that the aim was to contribute a further building block to an eventual union of the 
Community and that of political cooperation.29
26 EC Bulletin, 12 -  1978, p.97.
27 See A.N Duff, ‘The report of the Three Wise Men’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies (JCMS), 
14:3, March 1981.
28 See ^£,03/12/1980.
29 Niels von Hansen, ‘Plaidoyer fur eine Europaische Union’, Europa Archiv no. 5/1981, pp.141-8.
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The initiative did display certain defining features of a constitutional IGC. There was a 
simultaneous consideration of both policy and institutional reform. In what became 
established procedure with the IGC on the SEA, it was not Coreper or the Political 
Committee that handled the negotiations leading to the final Solemn Declaration, but 
rather an ad hoc group of personal representatives of the Foreign Ministers that 
reported directly to the ministers.31 Nevertheless, it was clear from the attitudes of 
most governments that from the outset and indeed throughout there was no 
fundamental or common basis for treaty reform. Firstly, the proposal was down­
graded from its initial description as an act to a Solemn Declaration. Secondly, there 
was strong opposition to some of the proposed institutional reforms which would have 
required treaty reform.33 As with the Three Wise Men’s Report there was an 
understanding that suggestions would remain inside the framework as provided by the 
existing treaties. The eventual report called for a greater respect of the decision-making 
procedures as laid down in the treaties.34 However, the Declaration in its final 
provisions stated that ‘not later than five years from signature’ the Heads of State and 
Government should review the Declaration considering ‘whether the progress achieved 
should be incorporated in a Treaty on European Union’.35 Again it hinted at a pursuit 
of treaty reform or creation sometime in the near future.
The resolution of the long-standing British budgetary problem at Fontainebleau on 25- 
26 June 1984 and the extent to which this facilitated for further consideration of the 
future of the European Communities was reflected in the establishment of an ad hoc 
committee, generally termed after its chairman as the Dooge Committee. It was given a 
mandate ‘to make suggestions for the improvement of the operation of European 
cooperation in both the Community field and that of political, or any other, 
cooperation’.36 Again it displayed certain features of a constitutional IGC. The 
committee discussed both policy objectives and the means and methods to achieve 
these objectives. The final report reflected this. It was divided into three sections; the
30 See Pauline Neville-Jones, ‘The Genscher/Colombo Proposals on European Union’, Common Market 
Law Review(CMLR), 1983, 20: 659-660 & 663-683.
31 Ibid., 1983, p.662.
32 Ibid. pp.657-699.
33 See Bonvicini in Pyrce, 1987, p. 184; Ferdinando Lay (ed), L ’iniziativa italo-tedesca per il rilancio 
dell’Unione europea. Origini e sviluppi della dichiarazione di Stoccarda, padova, 1983.
34 Solemn Declaration on European Union EC Bulletin, vol. 16, 6/83, pp.24-29.
35 Ibid.
36 >*£,28/06/84.
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first dealing with ‘priority objectives’ i.e. substantive policies, the second dealt with 
decision making and the third was pre-occupied with an outline for implementing the
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report, in essence, on achieving the policy objectives previously outlined.
The attitude and expectations of a number of governments at the time of establishing 
the committee certainly suggested that the process was aiming to achieve more than 
the previous procedures that had given rise to Tindemans’ Report and the Three Wise 
Men’s Report. The European Council in its conclusions at Fontainebleau had remarked 
that the committee would consist ‘of personal representatives of the Heads of State and 
of Government, on the lines of the Spaak Committee’. However, this procedure must 
again be seen differently from a constitutional IGC. As before, the committee was not 
convened to make treaty amendments or establish a new treaty. Rather the Dooge 
Report under its third and final section dealing with the methods of realising the 
Committee’s findings called for an intergovernmental conference as the appropriate 
approach.39 This recommendation was taken up by the European Council at the Milan 
summit meeting on 28-29 June 1985 with the unprecedented decision to convene the 
first constitutional IGC under Article 236. Again the ‘Dooge process’ was a step 
towards an eventual IGC. At best it could be described as an influential component of 
the pre-negotiation process.
At the same time as the initiatives from the various European Councils contemplated 
the need and form of any future constitutional reform the European institutions, 
notably the European Parliament and its 1984 Draft treaty on European Union, also fed 
into the eventual SEA IGC. The Draft Treaty was endorsed by five national 
parliaments, with this positive reception contributing to an emerging acceptance of the 
need for treaty change.40 Equally important in shaping the consensus that some form of 
treaty change was necessary was the further enlargement of the Community from nine 
to twelve. This made institutional reform an imperative, especially the extension in the 
use of QMV.
37 Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs, Interim Report to the European Council (Dublin, 3-4 
December 1984); Report to the European Council (Brussels, 29-30 March 1985).
38 Ibid.
39 See ‘The Dooge Report’, Report to the European Council, Ad hoc Committee for Institutional 
Affairs, Brussels: OOPEC, 1985.
40 Richard Corbett, The European Parliament's role in closer EU  Integration, Macmillan Press, 1998; 
Christopher Greenwood, ‘Constitutional Reform in the EEC’, Cambridge Law Journal, 46:1, March
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Table 1 -  Constitutional IGC
1. Seeking to initiate or 
amend policy, setting 
out the agenda for 
Secondary Measures.
2. Includes Institutional 
reforms generally 
perceived as 
necessary to make the 
policy amendments 
possible.
3. Aims to amend or create a 
treaty.
3. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IGC
The failure or inability of the governments to act on the Tindemans Report’s 
suggestion for a new treaty saw an increase in the likelihood that any potential future 
changes would take the form of amendments to the Rome treaty.41 At the same time 
the development of the European Council as the directing body for both the economic 
and political approaches to European cooperation suggested that there would 
eventually be some form of change to bridge the gap between the two levels. The 
report of the Three Wise Men, the Solemn Declaration on European Union and the 
Dooge Report together with various proposals from Member States, e.g. the London 
Report 1981, called for a greater degree of harmony/cooperation between the two 
spheres of the Community and that of EPC.42
The Dooge Report marked the high point of the years of constitutional reassessment 
that avoided or teetered on treaty amendment. The conditions for this change were ripe 
by the mid 1980s. After Fontainebleau there was a sufficient degree of agreement 
among governments to embark on treaty reform. Yet, despite the previous calls for 
treaty reform there were few expectations from Member States that the substantive 
negotiations would be carried out based on Article 236. This was understandable since 
this was the first constitutional IGC under Article 236. In fact this deft move by the 
Italian Presidency caught the British government, in particular, unaware. The British 
along with the Greek and Danish governments opposed the convening of an IGC based
1987; Juliet Lodge, ‘The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-Dynamism?\ JCMS, 24:3, 1986 
p.207.
41 See Vandamme, in Pyrce, 1987, p. 159.
42 On London Report see D. Allen, R. Rummel, W. Wessels, (eds.) European Political Cooperation, 
London: Butterworth, 1982.
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on Article 236. However, given that an IGC could be convened by a majority vote, the 
three governments eventually had to go along with the process.43
This use of Article 236 to initiate the SEA Conference marked the beginning of an 
institutionalisation or regularisation of the constitutional IGC process into the EU. The 
constitutional IGC was now rooted in the treaties. Article 102a paragraph 2 of the SEA 
referred to a future IGC in the context of EMU. The wording of the same paragraph 
reconfirmed the role of this process. The outlining of a future policy matched with the 
necessary institutional changes was reflected in the statement that ‘Insofar as further 
development in the field of economic and monetary policy necessitates institutional 
changes, the provisions of Article 236 shall be applicable’. Article 30 paragraph 12 on 
EPC also called for the ‘High Contracting Parties’ to ‘examine whether any revision’ 
of the title on EPC after five years from entry into force of the treaty was required. The 
Maastricht IGC five years later delivered on these words.
The TEU further institutionalised this IGC process on three levels. The first level 
concerned the manner in which future IGCs would be convened. Based on the 
Maastricht treaty it might be necessary to consult the ECB ‘in the case of institutional 
changes in the monetary area’, a carry over from the SEA. The second level of 
institutionalisation was the shift away from the loose wording of Article 102a as 
regards the timing of the future conference to the date fixing of Article N(2). The third 
level of change saw Maastricht shaping the agenda of a future Conference, e.g. through 
Article 189b TEC (now Article 251) on the institutions and Article J.4(6) (now Article 
17) and J.lOTEUon CFSP.
This process of institutionalisation of ad hoc levels of decision making has not been 
confined to the IGC. As briefly mentioned the meetings between Heads of State and 
Government have been gradually institutionalised to form the highest level of policy­
making in the EU. The European Summit meetings were given semi-institutionalised 
status in 1974. The normalisation of this new institution continued firstly, with an 
evolution in its role. While being ‘a sort of European Ministerial Court of Appeals for 
the difficult issues that normal Council meetings were unable to solve’ it established 
itself as a forum for setting objectives on the general direction of European
43 See Corbett, 198, pp.212-215.
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integration.44 Secondly, it has become a regular part of the EU policy-making machine. 
Heads of State and Government meet in June and December of each year as a Member 
State’s six months as President of the Council draws to a close. There are also anything 
up to a further two informal European Council sessions during these six month 
periods. This has led to a codification in this level of policy-making, with Article 2 
SEA making the first treaty reference to the European Council. The Maastricht Treaty 
extended on its role, for example through Article J.3 TEU. Therefore within the EU 
policy-making process there is a tendency for certain ad hoc procedures such as the 
European Council or IGC to evolve, being integrated alongside the other procedures of 
the Union.
Figure 1 -  Evolving IGC 
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to identify the defining features of an IGC. In doing so it 
claimed that it is possible to recognise three types of IGC; legal, specific and 
constitutional. The constitutional IGC is most relevant for this thesis given that the 
1996-97 IGC falls into this category. Therefore the development of this constitutional
44 Guy de Bassompierre, Changing the Guard in Brussels, The Washington Papers/135, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies Washington, 1988, p.78; also see Johnston, Mary Troy, The
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process was considered. It was argued that with the SEA and the TEU IGCs there has 
been a growing institutionalisation of the constitutional Conference. This is reflected in 
the frequency of these Conferences since the return from the constitutional rift of 
Fouchet in 1961. There have been three in the past ten years, or four since there were 
technically two at Maastricht, EMU & EPU. The language of certain treaty articles and 
the use of Article 236 and Article N45 also suggests that the process is being 
institutionalised. Having arrived at a definition of the IGC it is possible to take a closer 
look at the defining features of the negotiations during this process. The following 
chapter takes up this theme. At the same time the institutionalisation of the process is 
returned to in the final chapter which considers what the 1996-97 IGC tells us about 
the evolutionary nature of the process.
European Council: Gatekeeper o f  the European Community, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994.
45 Now Article 48 TEU.
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CHAPTER II 
SETTING A FRAMEWORK ON 
THE IGC NEGOTIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The concept of an IGC having been defined, and its development since the first 
Conference described, this chapter aims to establish a framework upon which to 
examine the 1996-97 IGC. It intends to do this by examining how the negotiations of 
previous IGCs have been explained by focusing on the two theoretical frameworks 
from a rational choice perspective, primarily Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovemmentalism, and that with a more idealistic perspective, namely 
neofunctionalism. Explanations of the actual negotiations at an IGC have for the greater 
part drawn from either one of these two theories. It should also be noted that this 
section is not attempting to provide a complete overview of the previous constitutional 
IGCs as identified in the previous chapter. Rather as the title suggests the aim is to 
establish a framework upon which to examine the 1996-97 IGC.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first two parts examine the central features 
of intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism and how they explained previous IGCs. 
The third section sets out to consider the defining features of the negotiations at 
previous IGCs while at the same considering the accuracy and usefulness of the 
previous two theoretical approaches.
This chapter argues that despite the institutionalisation of the IGC and the presence of 
certain features common to negotiations within the Community framework the IGC 
remains largely unregulated by any body of rules of procedures. This undermines the 
usefulness of the rational choice perspective of liberal intergovemmentalism and 
neofunctionalism in explaining the negotiating process at an IGC. Instead the chapter 
goes on to argue that the negotiations at an IGC have been defined by four features; an 
ambiguity or lack of clarity on objectives, a lack of direction, unintended outcomes and
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postponement. These four features reflect the incremental nature of the IGC process. In 
turn the fluidity as regards participation at an IGC also contributes to this incremental 
style.
1. RATIONAL CHOICE
A rational choice explanation of the previous IGCs depicts an ordered process with 
actors making informed and calculated decisions, pursuing well-defined objectives. 
This was how Milward explained the process giving rise to the 1957 Rome Treaties.1 
The frameworks of the Rome treaties allowed European nation states, weakened by the 
war, time to re-organise and re-develop. But their goal was not a federation, it was a 
more historically specific coalition of self-interests. It provided a politico-economic 
framework to control a renewed Germany, after American pressure had ensured that a 
weak Germany was a non-runner. For France the Treaty of Rome promised, perhaps, a 
chance to control German renewal more subtly than occupation ever could. For 
Germany it was a dignified ascent towards respectability and renewal after the abyss of 
fascism. For the Benelux countries it was a promise that there would be no return to 
the pre-war protectionism that had so devastated their export based economies. For the 
Belgians it was a look away from simmering internal division. For Italy it was a means 
of attaining French and German markets so badly needed to recover. Therefore the 
creation of the Treaty of Rome was for reasons of national self-interest, with 
governments able to define these interests and achieve them.
Andrew Moravcsik provides the most comprehensive explanation, based on a 
rationalist framework, of the negotiations at the intergovernmental Conferences 
leading to the Rome Treaties 1957, the Single European Act 1986 and the Treaty on 
European Union 1992. He remarks that ‘European integration resulted from a series of 
rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic 
interests’. Moravcsik says ‘national leaders’, as his emphasis is on Member States. As 
will be shown, he describes the role of supranational institutions as minimal. Initially 
he employed the term ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’ to explain the bargaining
1 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation State, London: Routledge, 1992; Milward, Brennan 
& Romero, The Reconstruction o f  the Nation State, London: Metheun, 1984.
2 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice fo r Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, 1998, p.3.
Chapter II 30
process at the SEA IGC. Intergovernmental institutionalism was made up of three 
components: intergovemmentalism, lowest common denominator bargaining, and 
attempts to limit any transfer of sovereignty away from the state. 
Intergovemmentalism left Heads of State and Government, together with ministers, 
initiating and negotiating the ‘major initiatives’ of the EU. In negotiating, these 
governments view ‘the EC through the lens of [their] own policy preferences’, leaving 
Moravcsik to describe EC politics as ‘the continuation of domestic politics by other 
means’.3
As regards the nature of this negotiation Moravcsik claims that ‘the bargains struck in 
the EC reflect the relative power positions of the Member States’.4 This leaves the 
smaller states being ‘bought off with side payments’ with the bargaining being reduced 
to ‘the lowest common denominator of large state interests’, essentially between 
France, Germany and Britain.5 He perceives it as inevitable that the governments of 
these states, in negotiating, aim to ‘safeguard their countries against the future erosion 
of sovereignty’, by maintaining a unanimity requirement on ‘sovereignty-related 
reforms’ and ‘avoiding] open-ended authority to central institutions that might 
infringe on their sovereignty’.6
He builds and extends on this with his notion of liberal intergovemmentalism. 
Moravcsik describes this approach as a combination of ‘a liberal theory of national 
preference formation and an intergovemmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining and 
institutional creation’.7 Again Moravcsik depicts a rational process with governments 
firstly defining their interests, and then engaging in a bargaining process to realise 
those interests. He says ‘Intergovemmentalist theory seeks to analyse the EC as the 
result of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of their
Q
preferences and power’. The rational actions of these governments are ‘constrained at 
home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment’.9
3 Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the 
European Community’, International Organization, 45:1, Winter 1991, p.25.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. p.25-26.
6 Ibid., p.27.
7 Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist 
Approach’, JCMS, 31:4, 1993, p.38.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. p. 474; Also see Cram, 1997, p.24.
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Moravcsik’s more recent explanation (1998) of the process of European integration up 
until Maastricht again suggests that it has been an ordered process with clearly defined 
stages. Based on his five case studies, three of which included the IGCs on the Rome 
Treaty, the Single European Act and Maastricht he claims that
collective decisions of national governments can be analyzed by 
assuming that each first formulates national preferences, then 
engages in interstate bargaining and finally decides whether to 
delegate or pool sovereignty in international institutions’.10 
Moravcsik claims that ‘influence [of an actor] cannot be analyzed 
without first knowing what underlying objectives actors seek to 
realize.11
In effect, the bargaining process consisted of three stages. Firstly, governments framed 
well defined national preferences. Secondly it was on the basis of these preferences 
that governments engaged in interstate bargaining. Thirdly, Moravcsik says that 
‘governments debate institutions only once they strike a substantive bargain’.12 Again, 
such an explanation highlights the rational nature of Moravcsik’s perspective.
As to the framing of the national preferences this involves ‘domestic political systems 
generating] a set of stable, weighted objectives concerning particular “states of the 
world” which governments pursue with the maximum efficiency afforded by available
1 'Ipolitical means’. On the factors that shape national preferences he claims that it is ‘a 
question of what is the precise nature and relative weight of geopolitical and economic 
motivations’.14 Moravcsik concluded that ‘the most persistent and powerful sources of 
varying national preferences concerning integration ... has been economic in particular 
commercial interest’.
During the negotiations themselves Moravcsik considers the Member States as unitary 
actors vis-a-vis other states. Even when disaggregated with competing and 
contradictory positions being promoted from different agents of the state, he claimed 
that the unitary actor perception of the state still applied if divisions did not
10 Moravcsik, 1998, p.473.
11 Ibid., p.21.
12 Ibid., p.22.
13 Ibid., p.23.
14 Ibid.
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‘significantly alter their respective influence on the national negotiating position’.15 He 
claimed that even in Germany where these contradictions among ministries and 
agencies are most apparent that it has a ‘stable net position on something like monetary 
discussions’.16 Moravcsik claims that his case studies supported his 
intergovemmentalist approach. He says ‘the historical record consistently confirms 
intergovernmental theory’. Again the underlying features of this intergovernmental 
theory reinforces the rational nature of the negotiating processes. Moravcsik says that 
‘information and ideas ... were widely available and symmetrically distributed among
1 7states’. Governments acted as effective entrepreneurs with ‘national negotiating 
positions ... following] ... a steady path toward compromise’.18
On the outcome of the negotiations Moravcsik claims that ‘negotiation agreements 
appear to be efficient ... because preferences were transparent’.19 Moravcsik goes as 
far as claiming ‘I can identify not even one single case in EC history in which the 
interstate bargaining outcome was, given the preferences across outcomes actually held 
by national governments, Pareto-suboptimal’.20 The distributional outcomes of the 
negotiations ‘mirrored the relative bargaining power of governments’. He concludes 
that ‘Governments were consistently constrained by credible threats to veto which 
reflected the domestic ratifiability of agreements’.21 As negotiating tools governments 
used threats of exit and exclusion, ‘which altered the negotiated outcome to the extent
77those threats were credible and costly’. Finally he claims that tactical linkages or 
package deals were not a common feature of the negotiations, being used ‘to balance
7 ^
out benefits rather than to impose losses’.
As to why governments pooled and delegated sovereignty in common institutions 
Moravcsik claimed that his ‘five case studies reveal strong support for an explanation 
resting on the need to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments with a 
secondary yet significant role for ideology’.24 Again it is a rational calculated decision
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p.479.
18 Ibid., pp.67 & 497.
19 Ibid., p.481.
20 Ibid., p.482.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p.483.
24 Ibid., p.486.
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with the emotional ideological influence being confined to decisions where risks and 
consequences are modest. Governments are aware of what they are doing and the 
consequences and implications of their decisions both on a domestic and European 
level. He describes on the SEA how governments ‘have carefully calculated the 
consequences of delegation and pooling for their substantive interests’.
2. NEOFUNCTIONALISM
Moravcsik in outlining the case for his rational explanation of European integration
Oftaims to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the neofunctionalist approach. 
Neofunctionalists built on the functionalist writings of David Mitrany. The latter 
claimed that interdependence and the increasing inability of states to provide welfare 
satisfaction to their populations would lead to function specific supranational
77organisations. The neofunctionahsts argued that competing expectations and goals 
among sovereign nations could be satisfied on the basis of concession swapping on a 
variety of sectors. Hence the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Rather than this being a 
case of mere cooperation between nation states, it was a process that would culminate 
in an international organisation that would move ‘beyond the nation state’.28 The two 
most prominent theorists Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, differed on certain aspects of
• 70this process. The former placed greater emphasis on the transfer of loyalties, the 
latter on decision making. Despite these differences the two approaches shared certain 
important traits. Both saw integration as a process requiring institution building with 
changes in the actions and expectations of the political actors. Central to the 
neofunctionalist perspective was the notion of spill-over. Corbett remarks that
the central argument of neofunctionalism is that integration in one sector 
will automatically spill over into integration in other sectors and that as 
this process continues, political actors will incrementally shift the focus of
25 Ibid., p.487.
26 See Moravcsik, 1993, pp.30-36; Moravcsik, 1998, pp.489-494.
27 It should be noted that Mitrany was more concerned with peace and not regionalism or federalism. He 
feared that this would merely give rise to the dangers of nationalism on a larger scale. See D. Mitrany, A 
Working Peace System, London: RIIA and Broadwater Press, 1944, pp.5-7; D. Mitrany, 'The Prospect 
o f  Integration: Federal or Functional’, JCMS, 4:2, 1965, pp. 123-34.
28 Leon Lindberg & S. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp.l 18-9.
29 Ernst Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57, London: 
Stevens, 1958; Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics o f  European Integration, Stanford, CA: 
Princeton University Press, 1971; Leon Lindberg and S. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration, 
Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1971.
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their activities, their expectations and even their loyalties to the new 
integrated institutions and procedure.30
Therefore, while Moravcsik referred to ‘rational choices’ with governments pursuing 
‘weighted objectives ... with the maximum efficiency afforded by available political 
means’, a neofunctionalist perspective claims that governments’ behaviour is shaped by 
the consequences from prior integration or cooperation on an issue area, some of which 
may have been unforeseen or even unintended. This is termed functional spill-over, a 
process ‘whereby successful integration in an area of lesser salience would lead to a 
series of further integrative measures in linked areas so that the process would become 
increasingly involved with issues of greater political importance’.31 For the 
neofunctionalists the process of European integration does not begin and end with the 
rational pursuit of ‘weighted objectives’. The new central authority, namely the 
European Commission would have a key role to play in this process of spill-over. The 
Commission would build up direct links to interest groups, politicians and 
bureaucracies by putting direct pressure on national governments, while at the same 
time political parties, government departments and interest groups would defend the 
previously integrated areas and push for further integration.32 This spill-over process 
was described as one of ‘incremental decision making’, Taylor remarking that ‘Most 
politicians, ... hav[ing] no overall plan ... were, therefore, vulnerable to the pro­
integration pressures which had been generated within their national administrations’, 
as the integrative process edged along.33
Sandholtz and Zysman adopted some of these features in their explanation of the 
negotiating process of the Single European Act.34 The factors that have received 
particular focus have been the role of EC institutions, transnational interest groups and 
somewhat related to the supranational institutions, the role of individual leaders such as
30 Corbett, 1998, p.23.
31 Paul Taylor, The Limits o f  European Integration, London: Croom Helm, 1983, p.9.
32 For further accounts on neofunctionalism see J.S. Nye (ed.), International Regionalism, Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1968; Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, London, 1973; 
Paul Taylor, ‘New Dynamics o f EC Integration’, in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and 
the Challenge o f  the Future, London: Pinter, 1989; Dorette Corbey ‘Dialectical functionalism: 
stagnation as a booster o f European Integration’, International Organization, 49:2, Spring 1995.
33 See again Taylor, 1983, p. 10.
34 For other examples on using neofunctionalist model see T. Pederson, ‘Political Change in the 
European Community: The Single European Act as a Case o f System Transformation’, in M. Kelstrup 
(ed.) European Integration and Denmark’s Participation, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies 
Press, 1992, pp. 184-209; G. Ross, ‘European Community Politics and the New Europe’, Cambridge 
Mass., mimeo, 1992.
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Commission President Jacques Delors and Internal Market Commissioner Lord 
Cockfield. Sandholtz and Zysman remark that ‘First, 1992 emerged because the 
institutions of the European Communities, especially the Commission, were able to
O r
exercise effective policy leadership’. They then go on to say that ‘To be sure the 
Commission did not act alone; a transnational industry coalition also perceived the 
need for European-level action and supported the Commission’s efforts’.
Ken Endo remarks that ‘An examination of the process running up to the adoption of 
the SEA showed that Delors as Commission President was deeply involved in drafting 
the SEA and thus helped to lift ... the unanimity rule m the Council meetings’. 
Endo’s conclusions on the SEA support other features of the neofunctionalist 
perspective. He refers to what can be described as close collaboration between the 
Luxembourg Council Presidency, the Bonn-Paris axis and the Institutional Group 
within the Commission.
Finn Laursen considers the usefulness of both the intergovernmental institutionalist and 
supranational institutionalist approaches in explaining the Maastricht IGC. On 
Moravcsik’s approach he initially agrees that ‘it seems to explain important parts of the 
outcome of the Maastricht negotiations’.38 However, he goes on to claim that ‘an 
intergovernmental realist model is insufficient for an explanation of at least parts of the 
Maastricht Treaty’.39 Laursen then goes on to consider the usefulness of a variety of 
other approaches, (each with a supranational flavour). For example he claims that the 
relentless nature of Ernst Hass’ neofunctionalist ‘spill-over’ played its part in shaping 
the agenda, approach, and ultimately the outcome of the IGC.40 Nevertheless, during 
the IGC Laursen admits that the Commission’s role was limited.41 Ken Endo’s 
explanation of the Commission’s role in the Maastricht negotiations depicts a similar 
scenario. He refers to an overcrowded agenda at Maastricht that constrained the setting
35 W. Sandholtz & J. Zysman, ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’, World Politics, 46, 1989, p.96.
36 Ken Endo, The Presidency o f the European Commission under Jacques Delors, Macmillan Press, 
1999.
37 Laursen & Vanhoonacker (eds.), The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (1992) 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 229.
38 Ibid., 1992, p.232.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 1992, p.238.
41 Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, pp. 118-9; Laursen & Vanhoonacker (eds.), 1992, p.243; Also see 
Robert Wester, ‘The United Kingdom and European Political Union’, in Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 
1992, pp. 189-205.
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of priorities. This did not cater for the necessary close network between officials of the 
Commission, the Council Presidency and Secretariat that a neofunctionalist perspective 
prescribed. Indeed at one stage Endo refers to Delors being ‘virtually excluded from a 
sweeping treaty revision’.42
3. DEFINING FEATURES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT A
CONSTITUTIONAL IGC
Introduction
The third and final section of the chapter considers the features of the negotiations of 
previous constitutional IGCs. Given that there has been a gradual institutionalisation of 
the Conference it firstly commences with a consideration of the Community features of 
the process. It then goes on to consider participation at a Conference before concluding 
with a set of features that define the negotiations as an incremental process. Throughout 
the analysis below there will be a critique of both the intergovemmentalist and 
neofunctionalist explanations outlined in the first and second sections. It should also be 
noted again that this section is not attempting to provide a complete overview or 
explanation of the previous constitutional IGCs as identified in the previous chapter. 
Rather as mentioned in the introduction the aim is to establish a framework upon which 
to examine the 1996-97 IGC.
Community features
An IGC is a multilateral negotiation, not a one-off negotiation but rather, as 
demonstrated by the previous chapter, a recurring process. Using the terminology of 
Ruggie (1993) it fits the criteria of what he describes as restricted multilateral 
negotiations.43 Restricted multilateral negotiations involve a limited number of 
participants, with a degree of intimacy and mutual familiarity among these same 
participants. Therefore the process in certain respects resembles or includes some of the 
features that have been described as typifying negotiations within the European
42 Endo, 1999, p.215.
43 John Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: the theory and Practices o f  an Institutional Form, New  
York Columbia University Press 1993.
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Community.44 For example it is largely the same group of officials from the Foreign 
Ministries and the Commission and Council Secretariats involved in both Community 
processes and IGCs. As is mentioned in further detail in Chapter IV, the central group 
of negotiators, the Group of Representatives of the Foreign Ministers, included several 
Permanent Representatives of the Member States who also meet at least once a Week in 
COREPER II. Therefore it is important to remember that the IGC process takes place 
simultaneously with other EU business. To a certain degree it is like having another 
issue on a week’s agenda for both ministers and officials. Indeed at times the other 
issues on the agenda of governments both at a domestic and European level can prove 
to be considerably distracting, taking away from the IGC negotiations. This was 
particularly the case at the 1996-97 IGC. However, despite the similarities with normal 
EU negotiations there remains within the process a degree of fluidity that is not the case 
with normal EU policy-making. As mentioned, an IGC is largely unregulated with no 
detailed set of procedures or rules outlining in any precise manner how the negotiations 
should proceed, as would be the case with say taking a decision under the cooperation 
procedure or co-decision procedure within the EU structure. This has the potential to 
give rise to an unstructured process of negotiation and it is this fluidity that is very 
much apparent during this IGC.
Participants at an IGC
From a reading of Article 236 TEC or Article N TEU the central role clearly rests with 
the group of ‘representatives of the governments of the Member States’ which is 
convened by the Council Presidency with the aim of ‘determining by common accord 
the amendments to be made to those treaties’.45 It is an intergovernmental Conference 
and therefore the governments of the respective Member States should play the leading 
role. Indeed taking a look at the structure and organisation of the negotiations during 
the SEA IGC and the TEU IGC the Member States dominated at all levels. For 
example at the 1985 IGC one working group made up of the Permanent 
Representatives to the EEC worked on the reforms of the ECT while another involving 
the political directors of each Foreign Ministry worked on EPC. At the TEU ‘personal
44 See Juliet Lodge, ‘Negotiations in the European Union: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, 
International Negotiation, 1998b, 3: pp.486-8; Helen Wallace & Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, The Council o f  
Ministers, Macmillian, 1997, pp.253-4.
45 Now Article 48 TEU.
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representatives’ of the Foreign and Finance Ministers carried out the detailed work. At 
both the SEA and Maastricht IGCs the Foreign Ministers were generally responsible 
for the proceedings up until when the final package was handed to the Heads of State 
and Government for final political agreement to the new treaty amendments.46
Though, the same article makes reference to the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Central Bank. The Commission may submit proposals on amending the treaty and 
thereby initiate the process. Equally the European Parliament and, where necessary, the 
Commission and the Bank have to be consulted. While there are no guidelines outlining 
the role and extent of the Commission and Parliament’s influence there are equally no 
specific restrictions setting out the limitations of the same institutions. This has 
therefore meant that even with the more recent institutionalisation of the Constitutional 
IGC, a fluidity persists as regards the players involved in this process and those having 
an influence on the final outcome.47
Commission & Parliament
While the central role rests with the Member States it was not surprising that, given the 
role played by the Commission and Parliament at other levels of policy-making in the 
EU, this would extend to the IGC. The role of both institutions in the process has 
depended on a variety of other factors, notably the personalities in both institutions, the 
amount of room that governments have been willing to allow them, and the extent to 
which the governments and in particular the Presidencies take the lead as regards 
tabling proposals and pushing a key proposal to the centre of the negotiations. For 
example the European Parliament’s 1984 European Union Treaty contributed to the
A*  ^ #
process leading to the SEA. This was the culmination of years of work lmtiated by the 
‘Crocodile Club’ and pursued under the leadership of Altiero Spinelli in the European 
Parliament’s institutional Committee 49 Despite the lack of any formal role for the 
Parliament in the IGC process the MEPs attempted to push their ambitious proposals by
46 See Richard Corbett, ‘The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European Act’, in 
Pryce, 1987; See, Corbett, 1998.
47 See Thomas Christiansen & Knud Erik Jorgensen, ‘Negotiating Treaty Reform in the European 
Union: The Role o f the European Commission’, International Negotiation, 3, 1998, p.440.
48 Pierre Pescatore, ‘Some Critical Remarks on the Single European Act’, CMLR, 24 pp.9-18; See Juliet 
Lodge, JCMS, 24: 3, p.207; J.W. De Zwann, ‘The Single European Act: Conclusion o f a Unique 
Document’, CMLR, 23 p. 73; Richard Corbett, ‘The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single 
European Act’, in Pryce, 1987, pp.238-72, esp. p.238 & 267.
49 See Otto Schmuck, ‘The European Parliament’s Draft Treaty Establishing The European Union 
(1979-84)’, in Pryce, 1987, pp.188-217.
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lobbying national parliaments, in some instances meeting with success.50 The 
Parliament’s influence also manifested itself in the ratification stages of the SEA. It 
expressed its opinion on the results of the IGC in a Resolution of 16 January 1986. 
While its final position on the process did not in any way prevent the changes from 
being introduced, the reception given by the Parliament was important for those 
Member States that attached conditions to their acceptance of the Single European 
package. For example, the Italian government made it clear that its acceptance 
depended not only on what its national parliament said, but also on the MEPs.51
As the neofunctionalists have suggested, the Commission has played a vital role in the 
process.52 Cockfield described the first Commission that Delors presided over as a 
Golden Age.53 While the Internal Market Council was set up in January 1983 it failed 
to acquire a high profile.54 Instead it was the 1985 Commission White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market that proved most decisive. At an early stage in the 
negotiations the Commission also concluded a document calling for the ‘ Unicite’ of the 
conference proceedings. It called for the formal incorporation of European Political 
Cooperation into the treaty structure. While the Commission’s suggestions initially met 
with reservations among the Member States the concept of ‘ Unicite’ was endorsed at 
the ministerial conference on 16 and 17 December 1985 in Brussels. With the 
conference only lasting from September 1985 to January 1986 the Member States were 
slow to lodge their official positions. Instead for a considerable part of the time they 
relied on the Commission to initiate and instigate action. The latter submitted many 
position papers on the internal market, research and technological development, the 
environment, cohesion, culture and monetary policy. Indeed the final provisions on the 
internal market, cohesion, the environment and on research and technology were for the 
greater part modelled around Commission proposals.55 The Commission also appealed 
directly to individual agents as means of gaining and nurturing support.
50 See House o f Lords (1984-1985), European Union HL 226 (London: HMSO); Interview.
51 See Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 555.
5i de Zwann, 1986, p.754; Lodge, 1986, p. 209; Axel Krause, Inside The New Europe, New York: 
Harper Collins, 1992; Collette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and 
Negotiations to Create a European Union, Garland, 1997.
53 Lord Cockfield, Bilan d ’une renaissance Le Programme 92, Address to the Seance Acaemique, 
Brussels, 17 December 1992.
54 Ibid.
55 See Corbett in Pryce, 1987, pp.247-250.
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Moravcsik attempts to dismiss the role of the European Commission and Parliament. 
Firstly he asks ‘why is the SEA the only major example in EC history in which ... the 
Commission and Parliament proved influential’.56 As regards the Commission and 
Parliament’s role at previous Conferences the answer is straight-forward. This was the 
first successful constitutional IGC since the Treaties of Rome. It was not possible for 
either Commission or Parliament to influence the EEC and EAEC IGCs since they did 
not exist. The High Authority and Common Assembly established under the ECSC 
Treaty were only a few years old. However, the ECSC’s Common Assembly did play a 
role in the EDC/EPC negotiations. Together with members from the Council of 
Europe’s Consultative Assembly it drafted and agreed to a treaty that formed the basis 
for negotiations between governments in early 1953.57 As for the Fouchet Plan in 1961 
the very objective of what were French-led negotiations was to steer future cooperation 
away from an institutional set-up with a strong supranational characteristic to an 
intergovernmental structure. As mentioned, the influence that the European 
Commission or European Parliament can wield depends on the attitudes of the 
governments. At the Fouchet IGC there was no room for the European Commission, 
while the European Parliament was still very much a fledging institution only being 
directly elected for the first time in 1979. Also, given that the SEA IGC was the first 
constitutional IGC convened under Article 236, the reference to the Commission in this 
Article strengthened its case for involvement. Moravcsik’s description of the 
supranational entrepreneurs of the Commission and Parliament during the SEA IGC as 
‘ “managers” of domestic and transnational “social networks” devoid of ‘any unique 
ability to intervene at an international level as policy initiators and mediators’ fails to 
recognise the influence of the Commission throughout the process in moving the 
negotiations along and providing, as mentioned, the basis of many treaty amendments. 
It is true that it also played a role as a “manager” of “transnational networks” such as 
interest and business groups but its role was not confined to this.
At the same time it would be wrong to suggest that with the institutionalisation of the 
constitutional IGC and the greater use of Article 236 that the Commission or 
Parliament would necessarily have an influential role in future Conferences. The IGC 
does not have the clearly defined set of procedures as the co-decision or cooperation
56 Moravcsik, 1998, pp.483-4.
57 See Cardozo, 1987, pp.54-61; Also see Raymond Rifflet, La Communaute Politique Europeenne, 
Conseil Beige du Mouvement Europeen, Bruxelles, 1957.
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procedure in normal EU business, which outlines in detail the role for both institutions. 
The IGC is much more fluid than this. This was aptly demonstrated at the IGCs leading 
to the Maastricht Treaty where neither the European Commission nor the European 
Parliament projected the same influence as during the SEA. Ken Endo’s assessment has 
already been mentioned. Similar assessments have been given by others. Middlemas 
remarks that ‘Having been hyperactive in the preparatory period, the Commission 
appeared to miss several chances of imprinting its own agenda, possibly because Delors 
and the college were preoccupied with the many separate issues . . . \ 58 Christiansen 
and Jorgensen claimed that its involvement in negotiations on EPU ‘proved 
counterproductive’.59 The series of European Parliament reports, including the Martin I 
& II reports did not have the same impact in this IGC as had been the case during the 
SEA IGC.60 The same could be said for the business groups that worked closely with 
the Commission and proved influential on the internal market programme, largely 
through the European Round Table in the earlier period from 1982-84. Business groups 
did not seek to exert the same influence and interest in the Maastricht process.61 
Middlemas remarks * ... managements across Europe did not seek direct inputs to the 
IGC and appear not to have followed their course in detail’.
Council Secretariat
The intergovernmental and the neofunctionalist perspectives both ignore the influence 
of other institutional actors in the IGC, particularly the Council Secretariat and the 
Office of the Presidency. Neither of these actors are mentioned in Article N TEU, or 
what is now Article 48 TEU, rather their influence has evolved. Since a Conference 
proceeds simultaneously with other levels of policy-making it is an extra strain for the 
already over-burdened Foreign Ministries of the Member States. This has, in particular, 
provided the Council Secretariat with the ability to leave its mark on the conference
58 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics o f  European Union 1973-1995, 
Fontana Press, 1995, p.191.
59 Christiansen & Jorgensen, 1998, p.443.
60 Toussaint Report on the Democratic Deficit, Catherwood Report on the Cost o f Non-Europe, 
Garaziani report on the First Year’s Application of the SEA, culminating in the Herman Report on 
European Union.; Minutes o f the EP, 14 March 1990 OJ C96 p. 114; Minutes o f the EP, 22 Nov. 1990 
(OJ C324); Emile Noel ‘Reflections on the Maastricht Treaty’, Government and Opposition, 27:2 pp. 
148-158, esp .pp .l52&  154.
61 See Middlemas (1995), pp.137-138; ‘Europe’s Internal Market’, Economist, July 9, 1988; Europe 
1990, Brussels: Chez Philips S.A.; See Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989; A. Krause, ‘ Many Groups Lobby 
on Implementation o f Market Plan,’ Europe, July/August 1988; R.V. Tulder & G. Junne, European 
Multinationals in Core Technologies New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988, pp.214-15.
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proceedings given its close liaison with the Presidency on the drafting of the treaty 
articles. Firstly, it is the Council Secretariat that makes the first draft of a Presidential 
paper on an IGC issue which is then passed to the Presidency for its comments and 
returned to the Secretariat for rewriting. These Presidential papers usually form the 
basis for negotiations during the IGC, incorporating the suggestions from the other 
governments and the Commission. Secondly, with its depth of expertise and greater 
knowledge and understanding of the intricacies and complexities than most Member 
State Foreign Ministries, the Secretariat, while again with a largely undefined role, has 
sufficient leeway to pursue its own interests. As one official remarked during the 
1996-97 IGC the Presidency ‘relies significantly -  if  it is sensible -  on the expertise, 
legal knowledge, experience and commitment of the Council Secretariat’.64
Its influence as an actor in the process depends on other factors, particularly the nature 
and size of the Member State holding the Presidency. The presence of the smaller 
Member States in the Presidency’s chair, as was the case during both the SEA and 
Maastricht, has seen over-stretched Foreign Ministries becoming somewhat dependent 
on the Secretariat.65 The Commission itself recognises the influence that the Council 
Secretariat wielded in the negotiations. However, given the difficulty in researching on 
its precise role at an IGC negotiation there is a lacuna in the literature on the Council 
Secretariat. While this thesis focuses primarily on the role of Britain, France and 
Germany in the 1996-97 IGC negotiations the influence of the Council Secretariat is 
noted where relevant.66
Presidency
Similarly the Office of the Presidency cannot be overlooked when considering the 
participants that may shape an IGC. While diverse assessments exist on the influence of 
the Presidency on policymaking in the EU, previous IGCs have shown that a 
Presidency can leave its mark, (see below) For Member States and particularly for a 
smaller Member State the primary objective is a successful Presidency. This firstly
63 Interview, Also see Bobby McDonagh, Original Sin in a Brave New World, Dublin: Institute of 
European Studies, 1998.
64 Ibid., p.77.
65 Interviews.
66 For a good account o f the Council Secretariat’s role in the negotiations on flexibility at the 1996-96 
Intergovernmental Conference see Alexander C.G. Stubb, Flexible Integration and the Amsterdam 
Treaty: Negotiating Differentiation in the 1996-97 IG C \ PhD, London, 1998.
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requires it to ensure that ‘the basic technical tasks of management [are] carried out with 
thoroughness and care’.67 This calls for a business-like approach, ‘keeping the machine 
turning smoothly’. With an IGC on top of the usual duties of the office this can be a 
demanding task. However, failure to execute the managerial and administrative duties 
would certainly see a Presidency leave its mark on the results of an IGC for all the 
wrong reasons.
While a Presidency is limited in what it can pursue and achieve by a variety of factors, 
e.g. current Community context, domestic preoccupations, administrative resources 
available, and international commitments, it will also have its agenda and list of 
priorities that it aims to deliver upon.69 Again when presiding over an IGC in a tactful 
manner, it can steer the negotiations in a particular direction. Tact and subtlety are 
essential when attempting to mould IGC negotiations. It is less a case of the Presidency 
actually setting an agenda that the others follow, and more a case of engendering 
support on an issue that it feels can be successful.
An example of where the Presidency attempted to change the course of an IGC without 
the necessary preparation to ensure that there would be support for its new approach 
was the Dutch proposal, during the Maastricht IGC, abandoning the Luxembourg 
Presidency’s pillar structure of the treaty, replacing it with a unitary structure.70 In what 
was later described as Black Monday the Dutch proposal failed to gain support from 
other governments except Belgium.71 While this lack of support was for practical rather 
than ideological reasons -  a consensus that at such a late stage in the process there was 
insufficient time to use a new draft as a basis upon which to negotiate -  it was an 
example of an attempt by a Presidency to take the Conference in another direction. In
67 Geoffrey Edwards & Helen Wallace, The Council o f Ministers o f  the European Community and the 
President-in-Ofjfice, A  Federal trust Paper, London, 1977, p.20.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, pp.63-73; also see Johnston, Mary Troy, The European Council: Gatekeeper o f  the European 
Community, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994.
70 See Wester, ‘The Netherlands and European Political Union’, in Laursen and Vanhoonacker, 1992, 
pp. 163-72.
See ‘The Dutch Draft Treaty towards European Union’, Europe Documents, No. 1734, 3 October 
1991; D. Buchan and D. Gardner, ‘Dutch to Reassess Political Union Plan’, Financial Times (FT), 
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this case the insensitivity of the Dutch approach sharpened differences between the 
member governments rather than acting as a basis for eventual agreement.72
There are more positive examples of Presidential influence. The Italian Presidency, 
during the SEA IGC, proved itself adept at reading the mood and sensing the majority 
support that existed among member governments for significant treaty changes. Its call 
for an IGC under Article 236 proved successful. Though, as already mentioned, the role 
and influence of a Presidency during an IGC depends on a variety of factors. For 
example it can be particularly difficult for a government of a large Member State to use 
the Presidency in an attempt to function as an honest broker seeking a consensus. This 
is a task that a smaller Member State can deliver on. While the Presidency deserves to 
be recognised as a participant in its own right it is not possible to define in any precise 
terms its exact role and influence at an IGC. Again the process is too fluid for such 
precision.
Franco-German Axis
Finally, any attempt to understand the nature of IGCs would be wholly incomplete 
without examining the role that the Franco-German partnership has played. The 
Franco-German partnership that has lain at the heart of the present European structure 
since its inception has also sought to provide the lead and initiative during an IGC. 
However, due to the characteristics of the relationship its influence can be somewhat
• 73unpredictable. Successive French and German governments have been committed to 
‘leading’ Europe. There is a common acknowledgement of the special place of the 
relationship in the European integration project. Despite this, the governments of both 
Member States have disagreed rather deeply on what they wanted ‘Europe’ to become, 
both working from a different set of assumptions. Therefore this underlying 
contradiction in the relationship has meant that the initiatives at the IGC have been 
rather loosely defined, in an attempt to use vague language to cover inherent 
disagreements. For example the defence initiative at the Maastricht IGC and the 
eventual Article J.4 of the TEU with its commitment to ‘a common defence policy ...
72 See Buchan & Gardner, 1 October 1991; David Buchan & Ronald van de Krol, ‘Dutch EC plan goes 
into the bin’, FT, 03/10/91.
73 On Franco-German relations see Simonian, Haig, Privileged Partnership: Franco-German relations 
in the European Community (1969-84), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; Wolfgang Wessels, (eds.) 
Motor fuer Europa? Deutsch Bilateralismus und europaesiche Integration. Bonn, Europa Union Verlag 
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which might in time lead to a common defence’ disguised the French and German 
differences over the role of NATO in this project.
Franco-German papers have been a repeated feature in the three IGCs since 1986. At 
the Milan Summit in June 1985 a draft Franco-German text on European Union was 
referred for consideration to the General Affairs Council. By Dublin I European 
Council meeting on the 28th April 1989 Kohl and Mitterrand had written a letter 
proposing a second IGC on European Political Union. In December 1990 Kohl and 
Mitterrand had written a letter to the Italian Presidency calling for a ‘true security 
policy that would ultimately lead to a common defence’.74 This structure would be built 
around the rejuvenated WEU, which would eventually merge with the EC/EU.
There was a keen sense of awareness between Kohl and Mitterrand during both the 
SEA IGC and that on Maastricht of the importance and influence of their role. As the 
two IGCs in 1991 culminated in the Maastricht treaty Kohl remarked ‘For myself and 
the President [Mitterrand], it is clear: we want the ratification of Maastricht. The 
process must not be stopped. We want to expand but also deepen the Community.’75 He 
continued ‘While we are both alive, Francois and I have to make Europe’s unification
• • 7 f%irreversible ... our successors will never manage it.’
However, there have been times when the deep divisions are more apparent and this 
can compromise the relationship’s influence at an IGC. At the 1985 IGC Dinan 
questioned the usefulness of the relationship claiming ‘that neither France and 
Germany collectively nor France and Germany individually provided much leadership 
in 1985, the crucial IGC year’.77 While Mitterrand and Kohl made a public display of 
their commitment to European unification on the eve of the Maastricht summit, without 
of course specifying on the details, in the run up to the commencement of the IGC the 
mood was completely the reverse. At the end of a Franco-German Summit in October 
1990 Mitterrand remarked that ‘there will be no lack of conflicts, rivalries and 
misunderstandings [in the future],’ going on to say ‘Indeed, I don’t know why I speak
74 See ‘La Lettre commune de MM. Kohl et Mitterrand’, Le Monde, 9-10/12/90.
75 ‘Bonn and Paris pile on the Pressure’, Guardian, 23/9/92.
76_Der Spiegel, 28/09/92. p. 18.
77 Desmond Dinan, ‘Reflections on the IGCs’, in Pierre-Henri Laurent & Marc Maresceau, The State o f  
the EU Vol.4: Deepening and Widening, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.27.
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in the future tense’.78 Despite the three Franco-German letters and other bilateral 
initiatives that provided an impetus to the TEU negotiations the French and German 
governments remained divided on the definition of political union throughout.79
The Franco-German relationship also involves cooperation across ministries and 
between officials that functions somewhat independently of the elites’ relationship, 
thereby providing for a degree of stability and continuity. Yet, strained relationships 
between elites constrains cooperation at other levels, just as difficulties between 
ministries and officials would similarly impose constraints on the elites. The 
effectiveness of the partnership at the IGC also depends on the state of relations 
between the various levels. Therefore, while on the surface German and French 
governments assume the leadership mantle it is a much more complex set of relations 
beneath the rhetoric that determines their influence.
Summary
Article 236 TEC as it was before Maastricht, Article N TEU as it was after Maastricht 
and Article 48 TEU as it is now clearly state that at an IGC the Member States and their 
representatives are the primary participants in the process. However, this has not meant 
that the European Parliament and Commission have not played a significant role. At the 
same time any examination of the key participants should not begin and end with these 
two institutions and the Member States. Instead the Council Secretariat, the Presidency 
and the Franco-German axis also have to be considered as participants in an IGC 
process. Nevertheless, the role that each of these actors play in an IGC process has 
varied. It has varied given that the roles are undefined and therefore subject to change. 
Given that there is a degree of fluidity as regards the participants in an IGC it is not 
surprising that a similar fluidity is identifiable in the negotiations.
Negotiations at an IGC
Ambiguities
In describing the process of IGC negotiations both the intergovernmental and 
neofunctionalist approaches are undermined by the deterministic character of their
78 ‘A Relationship in the Balance’, Economist, 6/10/90, p. 53.
79 See Mazzucelli, 1997, p. 170.
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explanation. Moravcsik refers to governments making rational choices, with these 
choices being defined as national preferences, which were followed by interstate 
bargaining. When this rational bargaining process begins governments pursue their 
well-defined objectives with ‘maximum efficiency’. The neofimctionalist claim that 
the agenda and negotiations are determined by the spill-over effect of cooperation on 
another issue, with both national and supranational officials recognising the necessity 
of further cooperation and integration on these new issues. However, neither national 
nor supranational officials embark on a negotiating process such as an IGC with clearly 
defined objectives suggesting that the negotiations will be rational and ordered, or one 
where actors recognise and accept the inevitability of further integration. Lindberg’s 
critique of Moravcsik stresses this point. He says
All of these approaches of a rationalist kind tend to reason 
backwards: the outcome is obvious once you understand 
the underlying distribution of preferences, or of preference 
ordering. I really do not think this is the case. I think that 
governments perhaps do not really know what their 
preferences are. Even if they do it is not clear that they can 
find an area of agreement. We know that preferences are not 
stable. We know that in certain cases a proposal, a 
well-chosen proposal from the Commission, can change the 
whole structure of bargains and bring in new issues’.8
Lindberg’s suggestion is particularly appropriate for this thesis where governments 
rarely defined their preferences and on occasion the Commission took the initiative, 
prompting the Presidency into action. At the same time it is misleading to consider the 
negotiations of previous IGCs such as those on the ECSC and EEC as undisputed first 
steps towards a European federation. Corbett takes this line when he claims ‘Initially, 
there can be no doubt that the ECSC was set up by a determined federalist push ... as a 
first step toward European federation’.82 William Wallace takes a more measured 
approach than Corbett’s suggestions of ‘no doubt’. Wallace claims that ‘a certain 
mythology has grown up around the “grand design” of European integration allegedly
80 See Moravcsik, 1998, p.23.
81 See Leon Lindberg, ‘Comment on Moravcsik’ in Simon Bulmer & A. Scott, Economic and Political 
Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context’, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, 
pp.83-84.
82 Corbett, 1998, p.41.
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shared by the “far-sighted” statesmen who negotiated and signed the Treaties of Paris 
and Rome’.83
There has been a certain degree of ambiguity to successive IGC negotiations. This has 
been represented in two forms. Firstly, member governments have embarked on 
negotiations without having clearly defined objectives; rather, these are formed as the 
negotiations proceed. Secondly, governments embark on the process without a grand 
design or agreement on the overall theme that drives the negotiations, or in some cases 
without a consensus on the underpinning objective of these negotiations, apart from
OA
aiming to amend existing treaties or establish a new one. While there is a reasonably 
well established process of policy-making within the EU, governments have not 
negotiated the treaty amendments to this policy-making structure on the basis of a 
blueprint or a vision mapping out the future direction that the EU is to take. Indeed Jean 
Monnet in his historic declaration on the 9 May 1950 remarked that ‘Europe will not be
Of
made at once or according to a single overall plan’. Referring back to Wallace again 
on the Treaties of Rome the former says ‘In reality, the Treaties registered a limited 
consensus among the signatories . . . ’. Certain individuals or agencies within a 
government may have well constructed ‘grand designs’ such as Belgium’s Henri Spaak 
at the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome. However, this did not mean that such a 
perspective was consistently and rationally pursued as a government’s position. Indeed 
at the 1996-97 IGC there were similar individuals with ‘grand designs’ such as the 
Dutch junior Foreign Minister Michel Patijn, but this did not mean that the Dutch either 
as a national delegation or a Presidency consistently pursued a clear line.
There are further examples of this kind of ambiguity, or lack of clarity, in the objectives 
of governments at the other IGCs. The very failure of both the EPC/EDC IGC and the 
Fouchet plan was, not only a reflection of the absence of any consensus on a 
compromise treaty, but also of governments that had not thought through their positions
83 William Wallace, ‘Less than a Federation, More than a Regime’, in Wallace et al. Policy-making in 
the European Community, Wiley, 1983, p.411.
84 This is not to suggest that the there were no proposals on the table that sought to outline in a new 
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institutional reform.
85 See Gerbet, 1987, p.46; also see Jean Monnet, Memoirs, London: Collins, 1976.
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with a clearly defined bottom line that they were confident of having incorporated in a 
final treaty and, most importantly, agreed to by national parliaments. For example on 
the EDC the Netherlands did not participate fully in the negotiations until some nine
oo
months after the convening of the Conference in February 1951.
While two decades after the constitutional rift at the negotiations over the Fouchet Plan 
there was a growing consensus on the necessity for a new round of treaty amendments, 
governments in the early stage of the process were ambiguous as regards the specific 
objectives. As mentioned above this played into the hands of the Commission. Indeed, 
Pescatore remarked on the SEA negotiations
As for the Governments, none of them followed a clear line: some 
seemed to be moderately inclined towards the Parliament’s plans, 
others were concerned with high technology and research, others 
with environment and all had to cope with acute problems of 
unemployment and economic crisis.89
The description of the final act as ‘a flood of verbose vagueness ... the worst piece of 
drafting I have come across in my practice of European Affairs’ was a consequence of 
the loose and rather jumbled negotiations.90 Helen Wallace claimed that on the eve of 
the SEA IGC ‘the signals emanating from Brussels and national capitals were 
ambiguous and contradictory’.91 It was not until the post-negotiation or implementation 
stage that governments, through the Council, were clearer on the economic aspect of 
the SEA project. By 1990 over half of the Cockfield proposals on the Commission’s
Q91985 White paper on the Internal Market had been agreed to.
Indirection & Unintended Outcomes
As a consequence of this ambiguity as regards participants’ objectives and the overall 
theme of the negotiations the IGC process has also been characterised by a sense of 
indirection or drift. Kiisters remarks on the Treaties of Rome that ‘The negotiations
88 Cardozo, 1987, p.51.
89 Pescatore, 1987, p.14.
90 Ibid. p. 15; Also see Pierre Pescatore in de Ruyt, L ’Acte Unique Europeen, Universite Libre de 
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91 Helen Wallace, ‘Making Multilateral Negotiations work’, in William Wallace (ed.) Dynamics o f  
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92 Ibid. p.221.
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themselves gained momentum only slowly’.93 This has left governments on occasion 
either agreeing to outcomes that were not always intended or anticipated, or postponing 
an issue in delicately-phrased treaty language until another IGC. For example the 1957 
IGC concluded with two treaties, the better known treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and the less well-known European Atomic Energy Community. 
Member governments intended to establish a common market on nuclear materials, 
with the promotion of research, uniform safety standards, free movement of nuclear 
specialists and capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy. (Article 2, Title I) 
Yet, the outcome was very different. The EAEC was a non-starter, a failed treaty from 
a successful IGC. The unintended outcomes persisted for some years afterwards, 
perhaps most dramatically when looking at Article 9(2) of Chapter I, Title 2 of the 
Treaty on the promotion of research on nuclear activities. This article called for ‘An 
institution of university status [to] be established; the way in which it will function 
shall be determined by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission’. This institution was eventually established in 1972 but not as a 
research centre on nuclear activities but rather as the EUI on social sciences.
There are other examples of negotiations culminating in unintended outcomes. With the 
IGC on the Treaties of Rome there was sufficient consensus among negotiators leading 
to an eventual treaty. This was not the case in 1953 or 1961 during the negotiations to 
establish a political and defence community. When embarking on the Fouchet Plan 
despite the early reservations from certain governments and lack of clarity among 
governments on the objective of the negotiations none expected an outcome that would 
exasperate and consolidate the divide between the French government and the other 
five members on the fundamentals of European Cooperation.
Given the rational nature of Moravcsik’s explanation he seeks to dismiss any likelihood 
of unintended outcomes. He claims that ‘the historical record reveals that the 
consequences of major decisions were in fact foreseen and desired by national 
governments’. He goes onto say that ‘even where this was not the case, my analysis 
reveals, nearly all government were generally well aware of the likely short -  and long 
-  term policy consequences of integration, good and bad’.94 Again resorting back to
93 Kiisters, in Pryce, 1987, p.88.
94 See Moravcsik, 1998, p.491.
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Lindberg and Wallace’s earlier comments suggesting that in hindsight, almost by a 
process of reverse engineering, or ‘reason backwards’ the mythology of rationality can 
be constructed. Moravcsik claims that the Thatcher government during the SEA IGC 
carefully calculated ‘the likely voting outcomes of all 279 proposals in the Single 
Market white paper’. While he correctly remarks that the Thatcher government 
conceded to the extension of QMV under Article 100 to achieve its economic 
objectives, it did not or could not anticipate the outcome of its agreement, namely that 
the momentum built up with the construction of the internal market would strengthen 
the basis for a single currency. This is certainly not a case of a government being ‘well 
aware’ of ‘the long term policy consequences of integration, good and bad’.95 The SEA 
made reference to a potential IGC on EMU under Article 102a(2) but again a British 
government did not anticipate or intend this to form the basis for another IGC in 1991. 
In her memoirs Thatcher remarks how at the Luxembourg European Council in 
December 1985 she was ‘dismayed’ that the Germans had ‘shifted ground’ to include 
monetary matters in the treaty.96 However, she goes on to say that ‘I was ... able in a 
side discussion with Chancellor Kohl to reduce the formula to what I considered 
insignificant proportions which merely described the status quo, rather than set out new
07 * •goals’. This sits uneasily with Moravcsik’s claims that governments ‘almost never 
misperceived the direction of future change’.
While the EMU IGC was rather technical and reasonably well ordered, based on the 
text prepared by the Delors Committee of Central Bank Governors the negotiations on
ORPolitical Union were ambiguous and at times lacked direction. There was no real 
consensus on what was meant by the term Political Union.99 Any attempt to define the 
concept would have revealed the depth of the differences between governments, most 
probably delaying the conclusion of the process. Without established parameters on the 
notion of Political Union, governments simply packed the conference agenda with a 
plethora of issues. Dinan proposed that ‘Progress at the IGC was impaired ... by the 
number and diversity of agenda items’.100 An insight into some of the approaches 
adopted can be found in the words of one German civil servant who described German
95 Ibid.
96 Thatcher, 1995, p. 555.
97 Ibid.
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efforts as aiming to get ‘as much as possible for Europe’.101 Forster and Wallace 
claimed that ‘Given the length and complexity of the IGC process, the outcome of the 
year long negotiations could scarcely be described as the product of rational actors 
pursuing defined national objectives’.102 They go on to say that ‘no governments had
■I
entirely coherent positions’. Mazzucelli remarked that ‘Throughout 1991, the 
personal representatives were faced with an unwieldy conference agenda that hindered 
their ability to draft a coherent text’.104 This was reflected in the final text at Maastricht. 
It included protocols on the acquisition of second homes in Denmark, on interest-free 
credit facilities in the Portuguese territories of Azores and Madeira, and a protocol 
proclaiming that the none of the treaties would ‘affect the application in Ireland of 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland’ on the protection of the unborn.105 Certain 
attached declarations were equally bizarre, for example, those on cooperation with 
charitable associations, the protection of animals and the use of languages in CFSP. 
While it may be the case that the attached protocols and declarations allow ‘member 
governments to avoid the appearance of failure’, the trivial or rather odd content of 
some reflect the lack of clarity in the process.106 This was again reflected in some of the 
last-minute adjustments that were made. For example before the ratification of 
Maastricht but after the conclusion of the IGC, governments felt obliged to somewhat 
qualify Protocol No. 17 on Article 40.3.3 with a Solemn Declaration signed by the
1 0 7foreign ministers. This was due to the change in the domestic situation in Ireland. It 
was little wonder that De Boissieu, a key participant for the French at both Maastricht 
and the 1996 IGC remarked on the absence of any ‘balance’ to the negotiations.108
Postponement
Given the ambiguity in objectives and the indirection, notably in the earlier stages of 
the process, the IGC also presents itself as a mechanism for postponing disagreements 
by shelving clearer definitions of treaty compromises until a later date, very often
101 Ibid. p. 170.
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another IGC or as the treaty provision is implemented. Examples of this can be found 
in both the SEA and the TEU. Article 99 TEC (now article 93) introduced by the Single 
European Act postpones confronting the differences on tax harmonisation, with 
member governments only obliged to take decisions so far as they are necessary ‘to 
ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market’ while any measure 
requires unanimity in the Council. Article 3b of the TEU on subsidiarity avoided 
providing a detail-specific outline on where the Community was to act and where the 
Member States held jurisdiction. At the same time the openness of the definition 
allowed for both British and German governments to be sufficiently satisfied that their 
perception of the EU had been provided for within the new treaty amendments. For the 
British Article 3b represented a reassertion of national influence, a direct challenge to 
the previous claims by Commission President Jacques Delors that within ten years 
‘80% of economic legislation, perhaps even tax and social will come from the EC’.109 
For the German government the principle of subsidiarity was a central feature of a 
federalist form of governance, another part of Chancellor Kohl’s objective of an 
economic and political union.
The Member States at the SEA avoided confronting the issue of setting out the specific 
objectives of EPC. A somewhat similar scenario prevailed at Maastricht on defence 
matters pursuant to Article J.4. The objectives of the newly-‘established’ CFSP were 
vaguely set out in Article J.l(2) but without any prioritisation as regards the Union’s 
interests. In the same title Article J.4 referred to ‘the eventual framing of a CDP, which 
might in time lead to a common defence’ but without any details on how this would be 
realised. There have been other uses of this postponement mechanism outside of the 
IGC framework, most notably in the period between the failure of the Fouchet Plan and 
the convening of the SEA. For example, the Werner Plan outlined a three-stage process 
for EMU, leaving the third stage to be defined precisely at a later date.110 As mentioned 
this has also been a tool used in Franco-German bilateral relations and it has become 
increasingly apparent with the enlargement of the EEC from six to nine, from nine to 
twelve and from twelve to fifteen. Indeed as examined in the following chapter, the 
Maastricht treaty’s Article N.2 and the related articles were an explicit
109 See Jacques Delors, Speech to European Parliament, 6/7/88; Charles Grant, Delors: Inside the House 
Jacques Built, Brealy, 1994, p.88.
110 See William Wallace, ‘The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European paradox’, Political Studies, Special 
Issue, Summer 1999.
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acknowledgement of the discussions and decisions governments had postponed during 
the IGC. As the negotiations of this IGC are examined in detail a similar scenario is 
also revealed.
At the final meeting of an IGC member governments sign up to a package, with certain 
new amendments, which they have not yet fully appreciated, or perhaps understood. As 
well as this being the basis for difficulties when it comes to giving effect to a treaty 
provision, it is also the basis for successful policy implementation and further 
integration. The following chapters on the 1996-97 IGC show that despite the 
ambiguity, lack of direction and unintended outcomes that characterised the process 
when Amsterdam was finally agreed, the treaty did make significant or at least 
potentially significant changes.
An Incremental Process
These four defining features of the IGC also suggest that the process is a fluid one. 
Unclear objectives from governments leaves the process lacking direction particularly 
in the earlier stages. At the same time there may be instances when the early fog in the 
negotiations does not lift on a subject under discussion and participants drift into an 
agreement without fully appreciating or comprehending the implications of their 
decision. On other issues governments opt for loose language rather than coherent 
definitions, in essence postponing agreement on the fundamentals for another IGC or to 
the post-negotiation or implementation phase. The IGC process is rarely a forum where 
governments or institutions embark on ‘grand designs’ or with well defined objectives 
which they can pursue with ‘maximum efficiency’ in an ‘interstate bargaining’ process 
that culminates in a substantive agreement which is in turn followed by debate on 
institutional reform. Wallace captures it eloquently when he says of European 
negotiations that ‘Reality is of course, never as neat as this; politics is always messy 
.. .’.ni An IGC is a messy process. As one participant in the 1996-97 IGC remarks
governments and their negotiators do not always know 
what they want and the situation changes unpredictably 
with the dynamics of the negotiations where written and 
oral proposals are floated around the table by all the
111 See Wallace, in Helen Wallace et al., 1983, p.415.
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participants at frequent intervals112
The member governments are involved in an incremental process, slowly sorting out 
their priorities. In sum this incremental style of negotiating with ambiguity, lack of 
direction, unintended outcomes and postponement that winds its way to an eventual 
package of treaty amendments, some of which were notably significant will run as a 
leitmotif throughout the analysis of this IGC. It will explain how the negotiators arrived 
with the final package at Amsterdam. In turn, this will allow for a more detailed look at 
the weaknesses of an intergovernmental or neofunctionalist approach in explaining an 
IGC process at a later stage in the thesis.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter had two aims. The first aim has been to examine the defining features of 
the IGCs defined in the previous chapter. Secondly, in establishing a set of features, the 
chapter sets out a roadmap for the rest of the thesis on how the 1996-97 negotiations 
proceeded. It began with a consideration of the rational choice explanations, primarily 
that of intergovemmentalism expounded by Moravcsik and the more idealist 
explanation by neofunctionalism. This allowed for a benchmark against which the later 
framework could be developed. After setting out the approach by these two theories the 
chapter turned to examining the defining features of the previous Conferences. In doing 
so it was firstly possible to identify the weaknesses of the supranational explanation of 
neofunctionalism and particularly the rational choice explanation by Moravcsik. 
Secondly, out of these criticisms a fluid process of negotiations was identified. This 
depicted the IGC as a process where there was a high degree of fluidity as regards 
participation and the role of an influential actor at a Conference. In turn it suggested 
that IGC negotiations are an incremental process, with governments edging along to a 
final treaty. Rather than it being a case of governments setting out to construct 
supranational designs or with clearly-defined objectives which they pursue in a rational 
and ordered manner to the final treaty, IGCs have been characterised by ambiguity, 
indirection, unintended outcomes and postponement. It has not been a case of these 
features being equally distributed across all issue areas or from each and every 
participant. There is variation in this but they are recurring features in the negotiations
112 See Stubb, 1998, p.32.
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that in turn leave the participants edging along, giving the overall incremental style to 
the process.
As the thesis proceeds in its examination over the next two parts it is these four features 
and this incremental process that proves to be the way that yet another IGC negotiation 
proceeds. The final chapter will consider the added value of this approach with a 
further comparison with Moravcsik’s intergovemmentalism and the neofunctionalist 
perspective.
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CHAPTER III 
THE PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE: 
SETTING THE AGENDA AND DEFINING THE
APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
This IGC differs from all previous Conferences in that it has been the only one that has 
had its timing predetermined by another treaty, namely by Article N(2) of the 
Maastricht Treaty. This chapter has three aims. The first is to consider how the agenda 
for the 1996-97 IGC was set. The second aim is to take a close look at the issues that 
made it onto the agenda and the third and final aim is to exam the attitude of the 
British, French and German governments along with the European Parliament and 
Commission in the run up to the start date on 28 March 1996. There is a focus on 
Britain, France and Germany given that the thesis throughout concentrates on these 
three Member States, while the European Commission and Parliament have been 
particularly influential in the pre-negotiations at previous Conferences, notably the 
SEA.
The central argument of this chapter is that member governments had little enthusiasm 
for holding an IGC in 1996. They were committed to it by Maastricht. As a result there 
was a lack of interest when it came to setting the agenda. Therefore there was 
ambiguity, firstly in the overall theme or objective of the IGC, and secondly among the 
member governments in outlining their positions on the specific issues that should be 
discussed at the Conference. Governments did not prioritise effectively when it came 
to setting the agenda; rather a more open approach was taken. This was hardly 
surprising given the domestic political situations that left some of the governments 
distracted in their preparations for the IGC. Indeed, even before the IGC had started, 
there was talk of postponement, with certain officials commenting on a ‘Maastricht
n r .
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The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines how the Maastricht 
negotiations and eventual treaty began the agenda setting process. In doing so it takes a 
look at the specific treaty articles through which member governments postponed a 
particular issue until the 1996 Conference. It also considers the influence of the 
Maastricht ratification process in shaping governments’ approach in preparing for the 
1996 Conference. Finally it examines the reports of the Council and Commission on 
the functioning of the Treaty on European Union and their general failure to make 
clear suggestions on what should be included in the agenda for amending at the 
Conference. The second part of the chapter considers in more detail the issues that 
governments focused upon in preparation for Turin. It examines how enlargement 
failed to become the overall theme that would drive the preparations while considering 
the role of the Reflection Group, and notably, its failure to provide for a more focused 
set of conclusions on how to go about making changes rather than merely documenting 
the differences between governments. Finally it looks at the specific topics dealt with 
by the Reflection Group, the official position papers from the member governments 
and the European Commission and Parliament. The third and final part of the chapter 
looks at the attitudes of Britain, France, Germany, the Parliament and Commission 
towards the IGC. In doing so it focuses more on how these actors perceived and 
approached the IGC, having already dealt with their objectives on the specific issues in 
the previous section.
1. THE MAASTRICHT INFLUENCE
Specific Articles
As described in Chapter /, one of the features of the IGC negotiations was the 
tendency to postpone disagreements by leaving a clearer definition of a contentious 
issue until a later date. Therefore it was during the Maastricht negotiations that the 
framework for the 1996 IGC began to evolve. Article N(2) demanded the convening of 
a conference to examine the provisions as specified throughout the TEU. The decision 
to include Article N(2) was taken late on in the Maastricht debate.1
1 Mazzucelli, 1997, p. 169.
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The specific articles from the TEU Treaty revealed the careful construction of 
compromises between the contradictory positions at Maastricht. Article J.4(6) stated 
that ‘the provisions of this Article [J.4] may be revised as provided for in Article 
N(2)\ With Article J.4 dealing with defence aspects of CFSP, it would mark a return 
to the debate on relations between NATO, WEU and the EU. Article J.lO’s reference 
that ‘on the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4’, the 
IGC ‘shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions 
relating to the common foreign and security policy’ brought the whole nature of CFSP 
onto the agenda, reflecting the expectations at this time for CFSP to be a central issue 
on the agenda of the next IGC. However, since Article N(2) referred to a general 
Conference, further references to a range of issues can be identified in the treaty 
language.
Article 189b(8) suggested that the powers of the European Parliament could ‘be 
widened, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article N(2) . . . ’, marking a 
return to the debate on the power struggle between the Council and the European 
Commission and Parliament. Article B placed the pillared structure of the Union on the 
agenda, the 1996 Conference having to assess ‘to what extent the policies and forms of 
cooperation introduced by this treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring 
effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community’. This would 
re-open a debate on the merits of the ‘temple’ structure as opposed to the tree structure, 
a discussion that member governments had avoided at the Maastricht IGC. When the 
Dutch Presidency introduced their revised approach replacing the Luxembourg pillar 
structure with a unitary structure there was little time for member governments to 
discuss the two options. Therefore all member governments, except the Belgian, 
rejected the proposal. But, not all of them were opposed to a unitary treaty structure in 
principle, rather, most of them felt that the introduction of such a proposal so late in 
the negotiations could jeopardise their ability to successfully conclude with a set of 
treaty amendments. This struggle between the pillars, community and 
intergovernmental would underpin the negotiations on the third pillar at this IGC.
Article N(2) itself left a considerable scope for the 1996 conference since the revision 
was to be ‘in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B’. These 
objectives included the promotion of ‘balanced and sustainable’ economic and social
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progress through EMU, an effective foreign policy, a stronger sense of citizenship, and 
closer cooperation on justice and home affairs. This loose language of the treaty left a 
lot of room for manoeuvre when it came to setting the agenda. Finally Declaration 1 
and Declaration 16, attached to the Maastricht Treaty, earmarked civil protection, 
energy and tourism together with a hierarchy of Community acts for consideration 
during the 1996 negotiations.
Ratification Crisis
Maastricht proved crucial in shaping the approach and agenda of the 1996 IGC in two 
further ways. Firstly Article N(2) had not anticipated the ratification crisis and the 
ensuing consequences. The creation and inclusion of this article was based on the 
original assumption that in 1996 governments would be reviewing a TEU that had 
been three to four years in operation. The ratification crisis that hit the Maastricht 
project completely undermined this assumption. The rejection by the Danish people of 
the treaty in the first referendum forced its government, and indeed the other member 
governments, to reshape the package that would be presented in a second referendum. 
In the end the TEU only came into effect by November 1993, months behind schedule. 
For the member governments the question became -  how was it possible to identify the 
range of issues that needed reforming after only two years since its implementation? 
This was particularly difficult with CFSP and JHA, which the Member States had been 
slow to use.3
Secondly the force of post Maastricht shocks left governments more cautious about 
embarking on further treaty reform. Shocks were not confined to the initial Danish 
‘No’ vote. The French electorate agreed to Maastricht only by a one percent majority, 
though this was somewhat a reflection of the dissatisfaction with President Mitterrand, 
who became personally involved in the campaign in support of the treaty.4 The final 
result left divisions across the political spectrum and society on the merits of the 
Treaty and it certainly did not whet the French political elite’s appetite to return to a
2 See Finn Laursen ‘Denmark and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’, in The Ratification o f the 
Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future Implications, edited by Finn Laursen & Sophie 
Vanhoonacker (eds.), EIPA, 1994, p.61-86.
3 See chapter VI, pp. 174-77 & pp. 195-96; chapter VII, pp. 216-20.
4 See Philippe Keraudren & Nicolas Dubois, ‘France and the Ratification o f the Maastricht Treaty’, in 
Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1994, p.61.
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‘Maastricht II* negotiation. Chirac’s Rassemblement Pour la Republic (RPR) which 
took office in 1994 with the Union pour la Democratic Frangaise (UDF), while 
officially supporting the treaty, was considerably divided over it, with convincing and 
determined opposition coming from Philippe Sequin and Charles Pasqua, divisions 
which would reappear in the pre-negotiations to the 1996 reform.5 (see below). The 
German government was similarly not keen to embark on another set of reforms. The 
Federal Constitutional Court had been clear as regards the need for a strengthening of 
the democratic basis of the EU before there could be further integration.6 The 
Bundesbank and public associated giving up the DMark with the Maastricht treaty, 
while the Lander began to question more openly and vigorously the erosion of their 
domestic powers, demanding a greater role in the decision-making process related to 
EC matters.7 In Britain Prime Minister John Major was left to strong-arm the Euro- 
rebels within the Conservative party into accepting the treaty or run the risk of a defeat 
in a confidence vote, and ultimately a general election.
The ratification did not pass off smoothly in some of the other Member States. For 
example, facing unemployment of more than 20%, and after making several 
devaluations to the peseta, Spaniards increasingly questioned the benefits of EU 
membership.9 While the ratification passed off without much debate in The 
Netherlands, some claimed that ‘proof of a similar kind of endorsement by the Dutch 
population at large [was] more difficult to find’.10 In Portugal the possibility of holding 
a referendum on Maastricht divided the politicians before being eventually dropped. 
The ratification process also brought to light divisions between the political parties 
over the European Union that had not been apparent up until this time, the eventual 
opposition to the treaty by the Christian Democrats coming somewhat as a surprise.11
5 Ibid., 1994, p. 155.
6 On ratification o f Maastricht in Germany see Rita Beuter, ‘Germany and the Ratification o f the 
Maastricht Treaty’, in Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1994, pp.87-112.
7 Ibid.
8 Economist Intelligence Unit -  1st Quarter 1995.
9 See Sophie Vanhoonacker ‘From Maastricht to Karlsruhe: The Long Road to Ratification’, in Laursen 
& Vanhoonacker, 1994, p.7. For detailed account on the ratification o f the treaty see in same edition 
Alberto Gil Ibanez ‘Spain and the Ratification of the Maastricht treaty’, pp. 129-47.
10 See Arthur den Hartog, ‘The Netherlands and the Ratification o f the Maastricht Treaty’, in Laursen & 
Vanhoonacker, 1994, p.225.
11 See Clotilde Lopes Marinho, Portugal and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty’, in Laursen & 
Vanhoonacker, 1994, pp.231-244.
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Most governments did not want this IGC, and would have preferred to reschedule for a 
later date.12 However, this would have required an amendment to Article N(2) -  a legal 
IGC -  and therefore unanimous agreement. The Conference’s postponement would 
have suggested crisis within the Union, a perception that all governments wanted to 
avoid in the wake of Maastricht. This was particularly the case given that the 
Conference was billed as a preparation for enlargement. (See below). While such an 
overall theme to the negotiations did not develop, the postponement of the IGC would 
have been a very public and dramatic confirmation of the lack of consensus among EU 
governments on this crucial issue. The second option was to continue the drift towards 
the IGC with an open approach as to what would be discussed at the Conference. In 
effect governments took up this option. Therefore they drifted towards the IGC
1 3without an overall theme to the negotiations. This left certain senior diplomats 
predicting that the Conference would be Tong, slow and small’, speculating that there 
would be a ‘Maastricht III’ in 1999-2000.14 Even before ‘Maastricht II’ had begun to 
deal with the postponements from ‘Maastricht I’ there was talk of another IGC, a 
Maastricht III.
Functioning of TEU
The Council and Commissions’ reports on the functioning of the TEU in late 1995 
were very tentative in their assessment of the Maastricht Treaty, providing little in the 
way of direction or feedback on future reforms. On CFSP the Council’s report 
remarked that ‘assessments of the initial performance of the CFSP differ’.15 On 
decision making within the second pillar governments merely remarked that ‘the 
procedures are still at an early stage and must be improved’.16 Governments did agree 
on making ‘better use of the General Secretariat of the Council’ on CFSP matters. On 
security and defence it merely remarked on the projects the WEU had been involved in 
through CFSP. On JHA a similar picture was painted, the report stating that ‘the
12 Interviews.
13 Ian Davidson, ‘The absent agenda: EU Member States have failed to reach agreement on the aims of 
next month’s intergovernmental conference’, FT, 21/02/96; Lionel Barber ‘Who’s afraid o f the IGC?’, 
FT, 09/10/95; ‘Message from Messina’, FT, 02/06/95;
14 Lionel Barber ‘Opportunity for fine-tuning” , FT, 10/05/95; Edward Mortimer ‘Detour on the road’, 
FT, 22/11/95.
15 Report o f  the Council on the functioning o f  the Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg: OOPEC, 
1995, p.29.
16 Ibid. p.31.
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matters covered by the Title (asylum, border controls, immigration, combating 
international crime and police cooperation) are very sensitive and time has been very 
short to allow a true assessment’.17 The report went on to say that ‘Extremely limited 
use has been made of the new instruments provided for in Title VI’.18 On the 
efficiency of the EU’s institutional structure the report claimed that ‘the continued 
extension of qualified-majority voting is a positive factor’ without going on to explain 
how this was so. However, it did claim that ‘the juxtaposition of a large number of 
procedures sometimes makes it difficult for the functioning of the Union to be properly 
understood by the outside world’.19 The report made a similar assessment as regards 
the European Parliament and co-decision, and claimed that the usefulness of this 
procedure was being undermined by its complexity.
The Commission’s assessment of Maastricht’s implementation made similar references
0(\to ‘the unavoidable running-in period of a treaty which has not long been in force’. It 
was more forthright in identifying failures in the treaty, notably failure to use QMV in 
CFSP, the complexities of the decision making procedures, and the inadequacies of the
91provisions on justice and home affairs. It also made similar criticisms as the Council 
on the complexity of the decision-making system, calling for greater simplification of 
the procedures, the one single area where both reports made similar recommendations, 
though without going into detail.
2. EVOLUTION OF THE AGENDA
Enlargement -  An Overall Theme?
The one ‘grand idea’ that governments may have seized upon in defining an overall 
objective or theme for the negotiations was that of Eastern enlargement. There had 
been attempts to use this to provide a focus for the negotiations, as the Conference that 
prepared for enlargement. All the governments and the institutions in their official 
position papers made reference to a future enlargement, but usually in an imprecise
17 Ibid. p.35.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. p. 15.
20 Commission o f the European Communities (CEC), Report on the operation o f  the Treaty on 
European Union, Brussels, 1995 pp.63-72.
21 Ibid. pp.47-50.
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manner. For example the French paper made no specific reference to enlargement, 
while the Belgian, Irish, British, Austrian and Portuguese simply referred to the 
concept of enlargement. The Netherlands and Germany emphasised the importance of 
an ‘Eastern expansion’ while the Nordic members claimed that the Baltic states were 
equally important. Italy and Greece feared that pre-occupation with enlargement to the 
East may mean that Mediterranean enlargement is ignored, while Luxembourg called 
for a case by case approach to all applications.22 The timing and extent of any 
enlargement was still some way in the future.23 As one senior Commission official 
remarked ‘We don’t know whether we should be designing a Union for 18 members or 
25 members. It makes a big difference.’24 The Spanish government suggested that it
'y c
was not a question of when enlargement would take place, but rather how. This 
required the IGC to deal with the issues at hand. However, the ‘how’ would only be 
decided with a clearer picture on the ‘when’. Malcolm Rifkind’s words to the House of 
Commons reflected the extent of the differences on enlargement when he claimed that 
‘it is not because in 7 or 8 years we will be admitting new Member States that we
Of* •should change our rules today’. The uncertainty and deep differences between 
governments on enlargement, as to when it would occur and its extent, undermined the 
possibility of it becoming the driving theme.27
European Councils
Instead the lack of an overall theme and the loose nature of the Maastricht references 
left the governments continuing with their open approach on setting the IGC agenda. 
The agenda was enlarged at various European Council meetings. The Presidency 
conclusions at the Brussels European Council in December 1993 included a 
Declaration on the necessity of the 1996 IGC to examine QMV and Commission
22 See EP, White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II, Luxembourg, OOPEC, 
1996.
23 Lionel Barber, ‘Brussels keeps shut the gates to the east’, FT, 16/11/95; Lionel Barber, ‘Bonn seeks to 
limit next round o f EU expansion’, FT, 14/12/95; Caroline Southey, ‘Compromise on expansion’, FT, 
18/12/95; Lionel Barber & David White, ‘Kohl summit success on enlargement’, FT, 18/12/95; Quentin 
Peel & David White, ‘Gonzalez warns EU on enlargement plan’, FT, 06/12/95.
24 ‘Countdown to 1996: EU returns to launch pad for take-off, FT, 02/06/98.
25 The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: starting points fo r  a discussion, 02/03/95.
26 AE, December 1995
27 ‘Just do it -  Germany’s attitude to eastern Europe joining the EU and NATO’, Economist, 15/07/95; 
‘The EU goes cold on enlargement’, Economist, 28/10/95; ‘Arguments for enlargement’, Economist, 
03/08/96; ‘For a bigger, better Union: The European Union needs to speed up its opening to the East’, 
Economist, 03/08/96.
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98membership. A similar proposal was made in another Declaration at the informal 
meeting of the Council of Ministers at Ioannina in March 1994 that was convened to
90deal with the crisis on the size of the blocking minority. At the Madrid European 
Council meeting on 15 and 16 December 1995 the Council called for a focusing of the 
IGC ‘on necessary changes’ rather than ‘a complete revision of the Treaty’. The 
meeting reiterated the three main areas for reform similar to the Cannes European 
Council of 26 and 27 June 1995: Europe and the citizen with emphasis on security, 
solidarity, employment and the environment; institutional reform, the goal being to 
improve the efficiency and democracy of the union; and external action, that would be
on
dominated by the second pillar on CFSP. Maastricht’s influence is clearly 
recognisable across the three areas. The promotion of Europe and the citizen was a 
response to the ratification crisis. It was an attempt to make the Union more accessible 
and relevant to the citizen and bridge the gap that many governments believed to have 
arisen between the public perception, understanding and purpose for the EU and that 
held by the political elite in national capitals and Brussels.31 On CFSP and institutional 
matters Maastricht had made direct references, while the European Council meetings, 
as described above, extended on some of these issues.
Reflection Group
Further to the additions made by the various European Councils, the Heads of State 
and Government in Corfu in June 1994 agreed to the establishment of ‘a Reflection 
Group to prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, to begin in a years
• 99 •time. It is important to recognise that this group was not given a mandate to negotiate 
but rather as the Group itself remarked it was to identify the ‘real’ problems facing the
99EU and suggest various options for dealing with them at the IGC. It was a think-tank. 
Both the approach and eventual results of the Group reflected the unfocused nature of 
the IGC agenda, the extent of the divergence and ambiguity within government 
positions, and their unwillingness and inability to provide the necessary clarity on
28 See Presidency Conclusions, European Council o f Brussels, December 1993.
29 On the blocking minority see Economist, 26/02/94, p.51; Economist 19/03/94, p. 64; Economist, 
02/0494, p.55.
30 See Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council 15 and 16 December 1995
31 See ‘The Challenge’, Reflection Group Report (SN 519/95 Reflex 20).
32 European Council o f Corfu, 1994, p. 15.
33 See Reflection, 1995.
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which the negotiations would be based. Just as the post-Maastricht phase left 
governments unsure of their approach, the Reflection group was a continuation of this 
drift in the pre-negotiation process.
The Reflection Group consisted of a representative from each Member State, the 
Commission and two MEPs. (See Appendix 2) The Irish, Spanish, French, Dutch, 
Swedish and British governments appointed Ministers of State. The Danish 
government appointed a former Secretary General of the Council, the Greek a retired 
ambassador, the Finnish a former minister, Luxembourg and Austria appointed a 
serving ambassador and permanent representative respectively while Italy sent a senior 
foreign ministry official. Both the Portuguese and the Belgian governments appointed 
academics. The diversity of the group is important since it did not engender any form 
of cohesion in the group. The academics were keen to reflect in depth, the politicians 
to score political points that would have a domestic use while the foreign office 
officials more or less towed the government line, setting out early on their positions of 
negotiations for the IGC.34 The European Parliament was successful in securing a 
place in the group given that the group was not established to negotiate or to officially 
set the agenda for the negotiations.
The convening of the group in June 1995 coincided with the Spanish Presidency of the 
second half of that year, though it officially started in the final month of the French 
Presidency. The group was chaired by Carlos Westendorp, the Spanish European 
Affairs minister. The Spanish Presidency had identified eight areas for consideration 
by the group. These included the challenges and objectives facing the Union and the 
IGC; an institutional balance that proved adaptable in an enlarged Union; the necessary 
changes to each institution; development of concept of European citizenship; 
development of cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs; improving coherency of the 
EU’s external policy through a strengthened CFSP; the examination of existing 
European security and defence dimension and a reconsideration of the instruments at 
the Union’s disposal. The group met three times a month, usually in Brussels. 
Throughout the first two months of June and July the topics were addressed on the 
basis of a questionnaire drawn up by the Presidency. By August the Spanish
34 See Stubb, 1998, p. 131.
35 See McDonagh, 1998, p.36.
Chapter III 68
Presidency on its own initiative drafted an interim report which formed the basis for 
the rest of the meetings. The final report was completed on 5 December 1995 and 
submitted to the Madrid European Council of the same month. It had two parts to it. 
The first and shorter part was titled A Strategy for Europe. This part introduced the 
issues that would be expanded upon in the second part of the paper. The second and 
lengthy part was titled An Annotated Agenda. It was divided into the three areas that 
the Madrid European Council reconfirmed as the focus for the IGC which also 
represented an amalgamation of the eight areas that the Spanish had identified at the 
start of the Group’s work; making Europe more relevant to its citizens; enabling 
Europe to work better and preparing for European enlargement -  essentially 
institutional reform -  and giving the Union a greater capacity for external action.
While the European Council at Madrid described the report as ‘a sound basis for the 
work of the Conference’(p.41) it was a further reflection of the lack of consensus 
among member governments on a more focused agenda, with clear objectives for the 
Conference. This was something that the representatives avoided yet again. The final 
report shied away from placing an emphasis on any series of options that the IGC 
should pursue. Rather it was left with outlining the differences using formulations such 
as ‘a broad majority’, ‘some members’ or ‘one member’, which was usually Britain. 
This did not augur well for the IGC.37
Criticism of the Group’s performance and results came from its own members. The 
Belgian representative Franklin Dehousse remarked that there was not a lot of 
‘reflection’ within the Group, with most representatives being ‘satisfied with 
explaining -  and repeating, repeating, repeating -  their national position’. He claimed 
that ‘the preparation of the enlargement was not ambitious enough’. One observer 
suggested that this was due to the fact that most members were junior Ministers, State
'1Q
Secretaries or Ambassadors unwilling to ‘upset their more senior political masters’.
36 Ferdinando Riccardi, ‘Work in advance o f the 1996 Conference does not encourage optimism’, AE, 
September 1995; Ferdinando Riccardi, ‘The report by the Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC is 
disappointing in that it can but reflect the disappointing result o f its work’, AE, December 1995.
37 Lionel Barber ‘Splits surface over report on EU future’, FT, 06/12/95; Lionel Barber and George 
Parker ‘Divisions surface over plans for EU enlargement’, FT, 05/06/95; Lionel Barber, ‘Countdown to 
1996’, FT, 01/08/95.
38 F. Dehousse, ‘The enlargement of the European Union and the institutional reforms’, in G. Herolf 
(ed.), E U  Enlargement and Flexibility, Stockholm: Swedish Institute o f International Affairs, 1998.
39 Youri Devuyst, ‘Treaty reform in the European Union: the Amsterdam process’, Journal o f  European 
Public Policy (JEPP), 5:4, December 1998, p.616.
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Indeed at the very first meeting the chairman Carlos Westendorp reminded members of 
the group that they were personal representatives of foreign ministers and should 
speak on a ‘personal’ basis as much as possible, especially given that it was a process 
of reflection than negotiation.40 Dehousse’s criticisms did not end with the process but 
extended to the results. On the Group’s report he claimed that ‘From the standpoint of 
prospects, [it] is very bad ... It demonstrates that the Member States are not ready to 
proceed with the reforms they advocate’. His forecast that ‘This conference will be 
extraordinarily difficult to manage ....’ was an accurate description of what was to 
come.41 Bobby McDonagh, an official from the Irish Foreign Ministry, while 
acknowledging the usefulness of the process in clarifying important issues also 
admitted that during the sessions he felt ‘there was no sense of an agenda being driven 
from any particular direction.42 He went on to say ‘I had no sense of a clear overall 
Franco-German approach which in the past has often acted as a “motor” for the 
development of the European Union’.43 Such was the disdain with the result and 
approach by the Reflection Group expressed by some that it was suggested that a 
separate treaty or protocol on political union be formed by those genuinely willing.44
National Positions
Introduction
Further to the Reflection Group Report all governments, the European Commission 
and Parliament published either one or a series of position papers outlining their 
objectives and aims for the IGC. This following section considers the approach of all 
governments and the institutions on most of the major issues that were mentioned in 
their position papers and which fell under the three subject areas specified by the 
Cannes and Madrid European Council and the Reflection Group Report. Given that 
this chapter aims to provide such breadth in its analysis, the contents of the Reflection 
Group Report, rather than being considered separately, are mentioned where relevant 
in the headings below. The following analysis of member governments’ positions not
40 See McDonagh, 1998, p.34.
41 La Libre Belgique, 08/12/95.
42 McDonagh, 1998, p.42.
43 Ibid. p.37.
44 ‘Emile Noel Launches The Idea Of A Distinct Treaty On Political Union’, AE, 27/11/1995; For an 
alternative perspective o f the Reflection and the IGC see Josef Melchior, ‘Crafting the Common Will: 
The IGC from an Austrian Perspective’, International Negotiation 3: p.378.
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only reveals the extent of the differences in their approaches on the issues, but also a 
situation that would persist well into the IGC where governments acknowledged the 
necessity of change or reform, while, at times, failing to outline in any detail how this 
could be achieved.
Institutional Reform
All governments considered some form of institutional reform necessary to maintain 
an effective and democratic structure in an enlarged Union.45 A clear majority did call 
for an extension of QMV.46 However, it was a case of avoiding any recourse to details. 
On the possible alternatives to an extension of QMV in Title V and VI such as a super­
qualified majority, positive abstention, a qualified majority with a minority 
dispensation or consensus minus one the Reflection Group admitted that ‘None of 
these have been explored in depth’. (Para. 101) Any attempt to define in a specific way 
the areas would have revealed considerable differences. For example the Irish (March 
’96), Italian (March ‘96), Luxembourg (June ’95), French (February ’96), German 
(March ’96), Dutch (March ‘96), and Portuguese (March ’96) position papers were not 
specific on the areas where any extension of QMV would apply. The Commission and
45 See Government policy paper addressed to the Belgian Parliament on the 1996 IGC; Memorandum on 
the IGC from the Governments o f  Benelux, 1 March 1996; The Netherlands, European Cooperation in 
the fields o f  Justice and Home Affairs. Third Memorandum for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(23 May 1995); Communication of March 1996: ‘From Madrid to Turin: the Netherlands’ priorities for  
the 1996 IGC; Germany, Germany’s objectives for the Intergovernmental Conference, 26 March 1996; 
CDU, CSU and FDP coalition agreement for the current legislative period. Point VIII on ‘Europe and 
Foreign Policy - Security and Defence’, 11 November 1994; Joint declaration o f 15 July 1995 by the 
German and Italian Foreign Ministers regarding the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference; Italy, Position 
o f  the Italian Government on the IGC for the revision o f the Treaties, 18 March 1996; Austria, Austria's 
positions o f  principle on the Intergovernmental Conference, 26 March 1996; Portugal, Portugal and the 
IGC fo r  the revision o f  the Treaty on European Union - Foreign Ministry document, March 1996; 
Sweden, Communication o f  the Swedish Government o f 30 November 1995 on the 1996 IGC; Denmark, 
Agenda fo r  Europe: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Report o f  the Danish Foreign Ministry, 
June 1995; Bases fo r  negotiations: an open Europe. The 1996 IGC. Memorandum o f  the Danish 
Government, 11 December 1995; Greece, Towards a citizens’ Europe - democracy and development: 
Memorandum for the 1996 IGC, January 1995; Memorandum o f  the Greek Government o f  24 January 
1996 on the IGC: Greece’s positions and comments; Spain, The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: 
starting points fo r  a discussion, 2 March 1995; Elements fo r  a Spanish position at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference, 28 March 1996; France, ‘Memorandum on France’s guidelines for the 
1996 IGC’, Le Figaro, 20 February 1996; Ireland, White Paper on Foreign Policy: ‘External challenges 
and opportunities’, 26 March 1996; Luxembourg, Luxembourg Government memorandum o f  30 June 
1995 on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference; Finland, Memorandum o f  the Foreign Ministry o f  18 
September 1995 on the views o f  the Finnish Government concerning the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference; Finland’s starting-points and objectives fo r the 1996 IGC  - report o f the Finnish 
Government, 27 February 1996; Britain, A Partnership o f Nations: The British Approach to the 
European Union Intergovernmental Conference, March 1996.
46 ‘Mr Westendorp’s interim report notes that a majority of the reflection group supports extension of 
qualified majority’, AE, 04/09/1995.
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EP called for a general extension but again no specifics were mentioned.47 The Belgian 
(July ’95) and Finnish papers (February ’96) were equally unclear on its extension, 
referring only to social and environmental issues. Denmark (December ’95) and 
Sweden (November ’95) referred only to environmental matters, while the Spanish 
paper (March ’96) was adamant that unanimity would remain the rule on the 
environment, going on to list some of the other exceptions to any extension, e.g. 
decisions of a fiscal or social character, decisions on Structural Funds and ‘quasi­
constitutional decisions’, while implying that this was not an exhaustive list. Only the 
Belgian (December ’95) and Italian (March ’96) governments referred to a possible 
extension to fiscal matters. The Greek paper (January ’96) was similarly vague taking 
a rather cautious approach of not dismissing an extension as long as there was also an 
extension of co-decision. This was a marked shift from the earlier Greek position in 
1995 that called for the replacement of the present system with the ‘federal state 
model’ (as exists in the US). The Austrian government called for a partial revision, 
article by article, while the British Conservative government opposed any extension on 
the grounds that unanimity is not incompatible with effective decision-making and is 
the best means of preserving vital national interests.
The Parliament and Commissions’ Opinions had made clear that any extension of 
QMV would require some method of reform of the voting system in the Council. The 
logic behind this argument was that the addition of small-and-medium sized Member 
States would see a decline of representativeness in terms of population, i.e. the minimum 
percentage of the Union population needed to achieve a qualified majority would 
continue to decrease, undermining the influence of the bigger, more populated Member 
States as well as the democratic principles of the Union’s most powerful institution. 
The lack of consensus on the details of this reform was stark. Germany (1996), The 
Netherlands (1995), Italy (1996) and Denmark came down in favour of a double 
majority, though the Dutch government was a little more reserved in its March ‘96 
paper. However, the Finnish (September 1995 & February 1996), Luxembourg (1995) 
and Swedish (1996) governments’ position papers opposed placing an emphasis on 
population criteria, claiming that the European Parliament was the institution that
47 CEC, Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing fo r  Enlargement. Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1996; 
European Parliament, Resolution on Parliament’s opinion on the convening o f  the Intergovernmental 
Conference. Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1996.
Chapter III 72
AO
represented the people. Spain (1996), France (1996) and Britain (1996) expressed 
support for a re-weighting of the vote distribution. The Spanish government came the 
closest to providing details on any future approach with its proposition that two extra 
votes be given to Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain, and with the next 
enlargement Poland. The Irish (1996) government’s paper was unclear on the approach 
to be taken, while the Portuguese and Austrian papers were explicit in their support for 
maintaining the smaller states’ extra representation. Both the Belgian and Finnish 
governments suggested that there was no need to change, maintaining the existing set­
up until the next enlargement. Even before the negotiations officially commenced 
postponing any decision was being mooted as an option.
A similar diversity existed on reducing the size of the Commission. While there was 
recognition on the need to maintain an efficient Commission in an enlarged Union it 
was a case of open-ended agreement on a vague principle with little attempt to tackle 
the details. The Reflection group report cited a combination of the positions that 
governments and institutions outlined in their official papers.49 Denmark and 
Luxembourg saw little need to reduce its size, which was hardly surprising, given that 
both states feared losing their right to nominate a commissioner. Indeed, the Irish 
government White Paper, rather than outlining an approach on reforming the 
Commission, simply stated its opposition to forgoing its right to appoint a 
Commissioner. Fears such as these from the governments of the smaller Member 
States were made all the more real given that the British government had proposed 
restricting the automatic right to appoint a representative to the five larger Member 
States. The European Parliament was clear in opposing this but offered no alternative. 
The Spanish, Italian (March 1996), French and Dutch governments’ papers considered 
having a future Commission with fewer members than states. The official position 
papers from the German, Greek, Dutch, Austrian, Portuguese, Finnish, Belgian and 
Swedish governments supported having one Commissioner per Member State. 
Though, there were further divisions on this option. For example the Italian 
government’s paper from June 1995 claimed that a situation where there was one 
commissioner per Member State would require senior and junior members, somewhat 
similar to another suggestion from the British Conservative government of voting and
48 See Reflection Para. 104-105; Also see Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, El Pais, 
17 April 1995.
49 See Reflection, Para. 116-118.
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non-voting members or Commissioners without portfolio. However, the Finnish 
government had come out strongly against any ranking, for fear, as a new comer, of 
being among the second rank.
On the reform of the European Parliament, and, in particular, the likely extension of 
the co-decision procedure, the pre-negotiating trend was similar to that which was 
maintained throughout the IGC until the change in government in Britain. All the 
Member States agreed to some form of extension, though they differed on the 
specifics, except for the then British government that opposed such suggestions on 
principle. The Danish, Irish, German, French, Austrian, Swedish and Italian papers 
were notably unclear on the extension of the procedure. The Austrian government’s 
papers (1996) only mentioned extending to environmental matters. Both the Italian and 
German Foreign Ministers had earlier signed a joint declaration calling for co-decision 
on all legislative matters. Yet, neither of the later official positions from the respective 
governments referred to this. The Greek, Finnish and Portuguese governments in 
principle expressed support for an extension, while claiming that there would be some 
exceptions. However, they failed to be specific on where these restrictions would 
apply. The Spanish and Dutch simply and without any qualification referred to 
replacing the cooperation procedure with that of co-decision, while the Luxembourg 
paper called for its application to all areas in which the Council decides by qualified 
majority.
Flexibility and the Core Europe
On flexibility and the core Europe it is worth taking a more detailed look at 
governments’ positions for two reasons. Firstly, in the run up to the start of the IGC in 
March 1996, it was the one issue that struck a debate between governments on the 
direction of the EU. Secondly, it epitomised the extent of ambiguity on this issue and 
in the pre-negotiations in general, with governments failing to think through their 
positions, acting in a reactive manner, with very different conceptions of the same 
issue.
The debate on flexibility was launched by what can be described as a skilfully drafted 
paper from two high ranking CDU/CSU politicians, Wolfgang Schauble and Karl
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Lamers.50 The September 1994 paper was skilfully drafted because it succeeded in 
gaining a reaction from the other member governments, forcing them into setting out 
their positions on the nature of future integration. There were two key components to 
the Schauble and Lamers paper. Firstly the paper called for the institutionalisation of 
flexibility with the strengthening of a ‘hardcore’ of the EU. The paper claimed that any 
other approach would give rise to a la carte integration. The paper placed monetary 
union and integrated defence cooperation at the core of both economic and political 
union. In doing so it claimed that only five members would form part of this core; 
Germany, France and the three Benelux countries. This point proved particularly 
controversial. The objective for Schauble and Lamers was to allow the process of 
European integration to continue without being held up by Member States that were 
either not willing or simply not able. Therefore taking the two core policies of 
monetary and defence union it was possible to recognise the future structure of 
Schauble and Lamers EU. Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria would be both willing 
and able to meet the EMU criteria, while opting out on defence. At the other end of the 
spectrum Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal would be willing and able to continue with 
deeper political integration but would not meet the Maastricht criteria on EMU. Finally 
the UK would be unwilling to join the core. The second important objective outlined 
by the paper was to ‘raise the quality of the Franco-German relations to a new level’.51 
This was a particularly astute move. With Franco-German cooperation lying at the 
heart of the ‘hardcore’ this was an attempt to reassert the importance of this 
partnership while at the same time asking questions of the French. Indeed the paper 
asked questions of all governments.
The British Prime Minister responded to the Schauble and Lamers paper in September 
1994 where he called for a ‘Europe that works’ with a desire for ‘greater flexibility’ 
and a Europe with ‘a strong sense of shared purpose and common enterprise’.52 Major 
even referred positively to the Schauble and Lamers paper that also spoke of the 
importance of flexibility. Though, he warned of the danger of a ‘hard core’ EU. He 
claimed that ‘there ... should never be an exclusive hard core either of countries or of 
policies. No Member States should lay claim to a privileged status on the basis of their
50 See ‘Uberlegungen zur europaischen Politik’, position paper o f CDU/CSU; Also see Blatter fur 
deutsche und internationale Politik, 10/1994, pp. 1271-80.
51 Schauble & Lamers, 1994, p.4.
52 John Major, ‘Europe -  A Future That Works’, Leiden, 7 September 1994.
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participation in some of them’. His position was echoed in other sections of the 
Conservative elite. Leon Brittan at the Conservative Party Conference in October 1995 
remarked that ‘The notion that you can select ... a small group of Member States 
which take the lead in everything, and whom the other Member States must either 
simply follow or else aspire to join, is clearly not going to be accepted’. A paragraph 
on flexibility was included in the government’s White Paper while the Foreign 
Secretary in a speech in March 1996 re-emphasised the necessity and usefulness of 
flexibility, making reference to the Leiden speech.54 In essence the British government 
wanted a flexible Europe without the hardcore. While recognising the usefulness of 
this approach from a domestic perspective -  flexibility would give Britain an opt-out 
ability, there was a fear that on the European level Britain might be locked out of key 
issue areas in the future.
The French also responded with their conception of a flexible Europe with Prime 
Minister Bahadur’s concept of Europe structured around three circles.55 This provided 
for a circle of the EU members, a smaller circle within this involving certain EU 
Member States, allowing for closer and better structured cooperation e.g. on EMU or 
defence matters. A Member State would join a group when they were able to do so. 
The final circle would include those countries outside the EU, operating within a 
framework based on a series of agreements. This approach had more of the flexibility 
behind it than the more fixed nature of the hard core approach. Bahadur’s proposals 
were consistent with the traditional Gaullist policy on Europe.56 Whatever the number 
of concentric circles France would be at the centre of ah levels and not merely the 
core. At the same time, Bahadur’s paper and, indeed, the French political elites’ 
reaction to Schauble and Lamers was an attempt to reassert some leadership in the 
Franco-German partnership.
It was not only a case of Britain and France adopting a different perspective on a 
flexible approach. The Benelux members, as core members, were divided on what
53 See Leon Brittan 12 October, Speech/95/203; Also see Vaughne Miller, The 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference: Background and Preparations, Research Paper 94/115, 21 November 1994 p.15.
54 See Malcolm Rifkind, House Of Commons, 21 March 1996 IGC White Paper Debate.
55 See Eduoard Balladur in Le Figaro, 30/08/94; Eduoard Balladur, ‘Pour un nouveau traite de l’Elysee’, 
Le Monde, 30/11/94.
56 R. Tiersky, ‘France and European Integration: A Few Thoughts on Gaullism and Giscardism: 1962- 
1981’, paper delivered at the fifth ECSA International Conference, Seattle, Washington, 1997.
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exactly Schauble and Lamers had meant. The Luxembourg government had little to 
say on it, accepting the paper while registering some concerns on the nature of the
57 • *core. The Belgian government’s thinking was closer to that outlined by Balladur in 
that it stressed that the core should be open to other governments.58 The Dutch were 
concerned about the potentially negative consequences to the internal market, while 
acknowledging that some form of flexibility was necessary.
By the start of the IGC in late March there was general support for the concept from a 
majority but without a clear understanding on what this would mean in practice. While 
no government supported an a la carte approach, the government papers from Spain 
(1995), Greece (1996) and Portugal (1996) were more or less opposed to flexibility. 
The Finnish (1996), Italian (1996) and Austrian (1995) papers recognised the necessity 
for flexibility but they outlined strict criteria that would apply to its usage. The 
Benelux paper (1996) also called for the fulfilment of certain conditions.
Common Foreign and Security Policy
On CFSP, government papers firstly outlined a variety o f reasons explaining the 
ineffectiveness of CFSP since its implementation. For the Irish and Dutch (1995) 
governments it was due to the lack of running-in time of a new part of the treaty after 
Maastricht. The German, Greek, Dutch and Luxembourg governments along with the 
European Parliament had claimed that it was ‘a lack of political will and inertia of 
attitudes’ that proved the problem. The governments of Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and Finland together with the Commission went further, 
faulting the institution’s input and the whole pillar structure, the first four members 
calling for the communitarisation of the second pillar.
There were also marked divisions on reforming this pillar. For example it is possible to 
group the Member States into essentially three positions as regards decision making. 
Greece, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Italy and The Netherlands favoured a 
general extension of QMV, excluding military matters. Sweden and Britain saw no 
need for any change as regards extending on the use of QMV. The French government 
in its official position did not call for any extension in the second pillar while signing
57 See Stubb, 1998, p. 112.
58 See Jean-Luc Dehaene, Speech at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw, 13 January 1995.
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up for a greater use of QMV in Franco-German declarations, most notably at Freiburg. 
This kind of contradiction was an inherent part of the Franco-German partnership, 
which is examined below. A variety of other ad hoc arrangements were considered. 
For example Spain and Luxembourg proposed the introduction of constructive 
abstention, should the general rule on unanimity be maintained. The Dutch 
government as well as supporting QMV proposed taking certain decisions by 
consensus minus one. The Portuguese government was also cautious, opposing a 
general extension, preferring instead that member governments select a number of 
subjects to which QMV would apply. The Austrian government’s paper proposed a 
staged move to QMV for joint actions, starting with unanimity minus one.
The Reflection Group and several member governments in their separate position 
papers referred to the possible personification of CFSP, an earlier French idea that 
sought to raise the profile of European foreign policy. A detailed account of French 
objectives is given in chapter VII. While the Reflection Group Report referred to the 
possibility of this being an exclusive role for the Commission, no government was so 
emphatic in its official position paper. In fact the position papers of the Belgian, 
Danish and German governments failed to mention the position. The other 
governments outlined a variety of options.
While preference for placing any new position within the Council was generally 
expressed governments were divided on whether to create an office for a potentially 
high profile political figure, or to vest any new functions in the office of the General 
Secretariat of the Council. The Netherlands (1996), Germany and the EP opposed the 
concept of a political ‘Mr or Mrs CFSP’ or High Representative, while Finland 
claimed that such a position would not be helpful. Ireland called for the Council 
Secretariat to take up a higher profile. Similarly for Luxembourg, Austria, Britain and 
Greece it was to be a Secretary-General, an official, accountable to the Council. 
Sweden did not oppose representation by a personality but shared similar concerns as 
the Finnish government that this position should not create confusion or divisions 
within the existing institutional structures. Italy and France were willing to see a 
‘personality’ take the position and play a higher profile. Portugal along with Spain and 
the Commission expressed support for giving the Commission a greater role in what
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amounted to a ‘joint Commission-Council High Representative’.59 The diversity within 
positions had left the Reflection group admitting that ‘There is no consensus on the 
personification of CFSP’.
There was a general consensus on the usefulness of some sort of a policy planning and 
early warning capability; without the right of initiative, located within the Council and 
with close links to the General Secretariat of the Council. However, there was little 
consensus on the details of the unit. Only the Greek, Austrian, Portuguese, Irish, 
Swedish and Luxembourg papers along with the Commission called on the European 
Commission to be closely associated with this process, while only the Luxembourg 
paper, the Franco-German paper at Freiburg, the Benelux Memorandum and the 
Commission Opinion specifically mentioned involving the WEU. Neither did the 
Reflection Group or the Member States and institutions make any concrete reference 
as to the number of participants in such a unit, a decision that would ultimately 
influence the way in which the unit would function. Some governments were 
particularly unclear in their opinion papers, barely mentioning the unit, notably the 
Belgian, Spanish, and Danish. This was also the case with the European Parliament’s 
opinion. At the other extreme the Italian government put considerable thought into this 
issue with some of its papers containing the most novel suggestions. In its paper of 23 
May 1995, it proposed that an elected representative nominated and approved by the 
European Parliament would chair the General Council meetings. This would relieve 
the Presidency of its immediate and direct responsibility over CFSP, though the 
elected representative could be assisted by a Vice-Presidency from the Member State 
holding the Presidency. In its March 1996 paper the Italian government had dropped 
this idea, proposing instead a European External Policy Committee involving the 
Presidency, Commission and CFSP Secretary General.
On defence a majority of Member States proposed in various forms significant changes 
in the relationship between the WEU and the EU. Again it is possible to identify three 
position groups; Denmark effectively favoured the status quo; the Portuguese, Finnish 
and UK papers called for what was described in the Reflection Group as ‘reinforced
59 The Commission had opposed the idea in mid 1995 before coming up with an alternative in December 
1995, see ‘European Commission Distances Itself From Mr Chirac’s Idea O f Giving European Council 
“A Face And A Voice”, AE, 01/09/95; ‘Commission Prefers “Council/Commission Duo” Rather Than 
Mr Or Mrs CFSP’, AE, 06/12/95.
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partnership’ and the final group, including Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and Austria 
that called for the WEU to remain autonomous while the Union took on a greater role 
in the Petersberg tasks. Given the sensitivities surrounding its neutral status the Irish 
government’s paper concluded that it was too early to establish a negotiating position, 
confining itself to the loose commitment to play a constructive part in revising what it 
considered as the relevant parts of the treaty. While a majority of member governments 
expressed support for the eventual merger of the WEU and EU, there were differences 
over the pace at which this would proceed. Government papers from Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and The Netherlands along with the European 
Parliament sought to promote convergence between the EU and WEU, with full 
integration as the final goal. However, a memorandum from the Benelux countries and 
the Commission’s official opinion suggested that IGC could set a timetable for full 
integration.60 The Benelux paper went a great deal further than the government’s 
separate position papers, and in the case of The Netherlands it was a reflection of the 
divisions within the government that were felt during the IGC.
Europe and the Citizen
The other issues which governments focused upon generally fall under what was 
described at the Cannes and Madrid European Councils as ‘Europe and the citizen’. 
This emphasis was a response to the Maastricht crisis, an attempt in the words of the 
Reflection Group Report ‘to make Europe the affair of its citizens ... serving the 
citizens’ interests and perspectives for the future should be the main guiding principle 
for the envisaged reform’.61 The issues that received the most attention in member 
governments’ position papers were third pillar matters, employment, openness and 
transparency, human rights and equality.
Third Pillar
On third pillar matters all governments recognised ‘a demand on the part of the public 
for greater security’, that the State by itself could not ‘fully guarantee the internal 
security of its citizens’, and that again it was ‘the citizens calling for better handling of 
the challenge posed to the Union by the growing migratory pressures’.62 All 
governments accepted that the framework provided for under the third pillar had not
60 Commission Opinion, Feb. ‘96, Para. 35.
61 See Reflection, Paragraph 29.
62 Ibid. pp. 24-26.
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been effective in some way during its admittedly short period of implementation.63 
But, governments could not agree on the reasons for this. Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Portugal, Austria the 
Commission and Parliament claimed it was a problem ‘that some provisions of this 
Title are inadequate and clearly deficient in operation’.64 Denmark, Britain, Sweden 
and Finland claimed that in what was an area of particular national sensitivity ‘the lack 
of progress was not necessarily attributable to the intergovernmental nature of 
cooperation’. Even within these groups there were stark differences. For example the 
Conservative government’s White Paper essentially saw a streamlining of the complex 
Maastricht framework as the way to resolve the many difficulties and facilitate for a 
better functioning pillar.65 The Swedish and Finnish papers, while not recognising 
anything inherently wrong with the pillar structure, called for a stronger role for the 
institutions.
The transfer of certain third pillar issues to the first, which is termed as 
communitarisation throughout this thesis, was referred to by most governments. 
However, support for such a move was diverse. For example, the governments of 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Portugal, along with the 
Commission and Parliament had called for matters relating to the crossing of external 
frontiers to be transferred to the first pillar. The Austrian paper seemed to go further 
suggesting that matters relating to action against crime, terrorism and drug trafficking 
‘should be dealt with on the basis of supranational co-ordination of legal and police 
authorities’. While the French paper also supported communitarisation it suggested 
that police cooperation should remain part of the third pillar. Denmark, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg and Finland hinted at the possibility of transferring but 
their position papers were unclear on the specifics. The British government wished for 
no transfer at all. On the prioritising of the agenda any serious consideration of 
Schengen’s incorporation into the European Union was suggested by only six 
governments; Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Austria. This 
stands in stark contrast to the closing months of the negotiations under the Dutch
63 Ibid.
64 See Reflection, Para. 45.
65 Ibid.
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Presidency when the incorporation of the acquis moved centre stage in the 
negotiations.66
On police and judicial cooperation in the fight against crime all government papers 
made reference to this but in an imprecise manner. For example the Belgian, Spanish 
(1995 & 1996), Dutch, French, Luxembourg, Austria and Swedish papers along with 
the Commission’s Opinion called for greater police and judicial cooperation on 
fighting crime but they failed to provide any details on giving effect to this objective. 
The Danish and Italian papers were particularly vague. The Irish paper merely stated 
that Dublin had not yet arrived at a position on reforming the procedures in the fight 
against crime. Only the German and Finnish governments along with the European 
Parliament (1995) referred to the need to fully adopt and implement the Europol 
Convention with the objective of eventually having in place a fully operational 
Europol. This stood in stark contrast with the British paper which acknowledged the 
growing importance of Europol but only in a support capacity to national police forces. 
However, there was support for the introduction of some Community features on these 
police and judicial matters. Belgium, Benelux, Greece, Spain, France, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, the EP and Commission called for the Commission to 
have a right of initiative on criminal matters and police cooperation, while Belgium, 
Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal suggested a role for the Court of Justice, though 
the papers were unclear as the nature of this role.
Employment’-  At the Madrid European Council, Heads of State and Government 
remarked that employment ‘creation is the principal social, economic and political 
objective of the European Union and its Member State’ building on the strategies 
outlined at Essen and the Cannes European Councils.67 This was a response to the 
increasing levels of unemployment. Increasingly austere economic packages from 
governments that sought to meet the qualifying criteria for the 3rd stage of EMU left 
most governments along with the Commission and EP acknowledging the need for a 
greater balance in the EU’s economic policy, with the possible introduction of an 
employment chapter into the treaties. Indeed Italy, Austria & Sweden called for it to be 
a main theme at the IGC negotiations. The position papers from these three member
66 See chapter VI, pp.204-13.
67 European Parliament, Briefing no 37: Employment and the IGC , OOPEC, 1996.
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governments along with those from the Finnish, Portuguese, Spanish and Danish 
governments called for greater coordination between finance and employment 
ministries. Yet, position papers from the German, French and Irish governments barely 
mentioned a new employment chapter. Indeed the German and Irish were very 
sceptical of the idea while the British Conservative government was completely 
opposed to it. Even within the group of members supporting the chapter there were 
considerable differences. The Finnish government went as far as suggesting that 
careful consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing new funds for 
these initiatives. The Spanish and Austrian governments suggested that the objective of 
creating a high level of employment be incorporated into the objectives of the Union, 
while the Danish government took it a step further calling for a provision that pledged 
to keep unemployment below a certain level.
T ransparencyIn an effort to make the dynamics of the EU more understandable for 
the general public, a more transparent European Union was an issue that most 
government position papers expressed support for in some form. Again it was a 
concept with a variety of different meanings for the different governments. For the 
Finnish and particularly Swedish governments is was an important issue that required 
‘an openness of administrative action’, with council meetings in public when acting as 
a legislator, clarity in decision-making and open access for the public to EU 
documents, and a simplified treaty structure. The Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, Danish, 
Italian and Irish papers made similar suggestions but with no details on the type of 
documents that there would be greater access to, or the manner in which the treaty 
would be simplified, apart from reducing the number of decision-making processes. At 
the same time as the French and German position papers made little mention of the 
issue, the British government warned that complete openness could lead to real 
negotiations being conducted in the ‘corridors of power’.
Human Rights:- The Austrian, Finnish, Swedish and Italian governments were also 
keen to strengthen the treaty articles on the protection of fundamental human rights. 
Governments differed on the detail. The Finnish, Austrian and Swedish papers also 
expressed support for a treaty provision ensuring gender equality while recommending 
EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Belgian and Spanish 
papers were more flexible being equally open to a list of fundamental rights and
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freedoms to be incorporated in the treaty. The Commission and EP wanted both 
options. Italy and Greece expressed support for this option, while Denmark wanted any 
list confined to the preamble of the treaty. The Dutch (1995 & 1996) papers supported 
strengthening the treaty provisions but called for caution. The German and French 
government’s papers on the eve of the Conference did not refer to the matter while the 
Irish government’s White paper was noticeably unclear. The British Conservative 
government expressed opposition to the creation of any new EU guaranteed rights.
Environment: Environmental protection was a particular concern for Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Austria, the Netherlands along with the Commission and EP. Their 
papers called for the integration of environmental policy into other Community 
policies with the principle of sustainable development underpinning future EU policy 
in all sectors. However, other government papers were unclear on providing for a 
better level of environmental protection, most notably the Greek, Italian, Luxembourg, 
Portuguese and Belgian. The Irish government paper seized on the nuclear issue and 
concerns over the safety of British nuclear reactors. The French, German and British 
papers were open on the matter failing to mention the need for higher standards, while 
the Spanish claimed that there was no need for change to the existing provisions.
Subsidiarity’- This principle was somewhat similar to flexibility in that there was a 
diversity among governments as to what precisely it meant. For example the Greek, 
Luxembourg and Irish papers along with the Commission and EP were unclear on how 
to proceed with any reform. The German and Danish (June ‘95) papers referred to a 
‘subsidiarity list’, while Spain and Portugal opposed this idea. France and Austria also 
called for a strengthening in the principle, claiming that it was for the national 
parliaments to be consulted on all matters relating to the principle, while the Dutch felt 
in applying the principle it required the Commission to argue its proposals more 
effectively. Italy feared that over-emphasising the principle could undermine the 
Commission’s powers to submit proposals. Finland and Sweden saw no reason to 
change the current definition and terms of the principle as set out in Article 3B TEU, 
while Denmark in its March ‘96 felt it needed to be better defined. Finally the British 
government’s White Paper was imprecise on its objectives merely stating that it would 
put forward proposals on entrenching the principle in the Treaty as the negotiations 
progressed.
Chapter III 84
Tourism, Energy and Civil Protection'- Despite Maastricht’s reference placing 
tourism, energy and civil protection on the IGC agenda little interest was expressed 
from the member governments or the institutions on these issues. Position papers from 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, France, Germany, Ireland and the Commission failed 
to mention the areas at all. The British, Belgian, Dutch, Finnish and British 
governments’ papers expressed opposition to any such extension to these areas. The 
Spanish paper on the eve of the IGC felt it was unnecessary to include such new policy 
areas in the treaty. The Italian, Greek and Portuguese governments were vague in their 
support for treaty articles on all three areas, providing no details. The Austrian 
government also acknowledged its support for new Community powers on energy and 
civil protection while rejecting any need for a treaty article on tourism. (June 1995) 
Only the European Parliament (March 1996) presented a position of note on energy, 
calling for the energy aspects of ECSC Treaty and Euratom Treaty along with other 
considerations to be integrated into a common energy policy framework.
Hierarchy of A c t s There was a similar lack of interest on Declaration 16 on the 
hierarchy of Community acts. Once again most member governments paid no attention 
to this. Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, France, Germany, Ireland, Greece and The 
Netherlands (1996 Paper) along with the Commission failed to mention the issue in 
their position papers. The British and Spanish government expressed opposition to the 
idea while the European Parliament, Austria, Finland, Belgium and Portugal called for 
the IGC to consider it but without providing any detail on the structure of any future 
hierarchy. Only the Italian government as it had done at Maastricht provided any detail 
on the nature of its proposed hierarchy. (March 1996)
Summary
The previous two sections of this chapter firstly considered the influence of the 
Maastricht Treaty, including its ratification and implementation, on shaping the agenda 
for the 1996 IGC. Secondly, it examined how the agenda was set focusing on the 
conclusions of the relevant European Councils, the Reflection Group and the position 
papers adopted by the member governments and institutions. This revealed the extent 
to which the Maastricht process left governments unsure of the objective of this IGC. 
It lacked an ‘overall theme’, enlargement failing to inspire governments. In turn a 
rather open approach was taken on setting the agenda with both the Reflection Group
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Report and those from the governments dealing with a broad range of issues. The 
Reflection Group failed to provide any impetus in the pre-negotiations, being more of 
a reflection of the differences between Member States that were further highlighted in 
comparing the positions of each government across the various issues, positions that 
were very often poorly defined and lacking in detail.
3. ATTITUDES AND APPROACHES TO THE IGC
Introduction
Having dealt with the shaping of the agenda and the issues that governments were 
focusing on during the pre-negotiations, the following and final section considers the 
attitude of the French, British and German governments to the IGC, together with the 
European Parliament and Commission. It has already been explained above, that the 
thesis throughout focuses on the British, French and German governments. The 
following section also considers the attitude of the Parliament and the Commission in 
an attempt to gain an insight into the approach of the two supranational institutions to 
the IGC. Two characteristics are identifiable in the following section. Firstly a series of 
domestic political divisions left the British, French and German governments 
considerably distracted in their preparations for the IGC. In turn the Franco-German 
partnership also failed to provide any impetus or leadership in the run up to the 
Conference. Secondly while the Commission’s approach towards the IGC limited its 
role in the pre-negotiations, the European Parliament spent much of the time in the 
run-up to the start of the IGC attempting to carve out a role for itself in the eventual 
Conference.
Britain
The British government had been deeply split on European institutions and policy ever 
since Maastricht and the fall of Margaret Thatcher on this emotive issue. Given the 
gradual erosion of the government’s majority and the leadership challenges, it was 
very often held to ransom by a vocal, organised, and considerably disruptive minority
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of ‘Eurosceptics’.68 Therefore Prime Minister John Major’s Conservative government 
played down any expectations it had for the conference.69 This manifested itself on two 
levels, reducing the importance of certain chapters of reform and playing down the 
relevance of the whole process. Doubt was in particular expressed on the need for 
institutional and procedural reform in the second pillar. Foreign Secretary Malcolm
70Rifkind remarked that the defence debate had to remain ‘rooted in the real world’. 
This meant that ‘any proposals for change’ should be ‘workable and effective’ or 
‘credible and practical’, as well as ensuring that the recommendations on wider
• 71institutional and procedural reform remained modest.
Given the questioning of the importance of the content on the IGC agenda, it was 
inevitable that the significance of the whole debate was similarly questioned. Rifkind 
remarked that it was ‘not likely to be the defining event for the European Union in the 
1990s’, lacking ‘a big idea’. John Major made similar remarks saying ‘I do not believe 
that it will make huge changes ... I doubt whether any serious significant changes will 
be proposed’.72 This was confirmation of his previous claims that ‘the high tide of 
federalism...is now on the decline. I have no intention of adding to it in the 1996 IGC 
. . . \ 73 Former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd remarked that the IGC ‘will not be the 
defining event of the 1990s’.74
The government White Paper made similar suggestions though in a different tone, 
describing the IGC as a ‘preliminary step’ on the new agenda before devoting a 
paragraph to the other areas not on the agenda but requiring reform, and the ‘sensible’ 
approach that should be taken at the IGC.75 The government’s low-key approach was
68 See EIU Country Report -  United Kingdom -  2nd Quarter 1994; EIU Country Report -  United 
Kingdom -  1st Quarter 1995; EIU Country Report -  United Kingdom -  3rd Quarter 1994; See Heather 
Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, ‘The British Debate’, in The 1996 IGC  -  National Debates (2), Discussion 
Paper 67, RIIA, 1996, pp. 51-53.
69 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996; For Labour party see Kevin Brown, ‘Blair to urge early 
enlargement o f EU’, FT, 30/05/95.
70 Malcolm Rifkind, ‘Change And New Challenges in Foreign Policy’, The Lord Mayor’s Easter 
Banquet, Mansion House, London, 17 April 1996.
71 Ibid.
72 Hansard, 1 March 1995 ccl052-1154; Vaughne Miller, Tom Dodd & Fiona M. Watson, Towards the 
IGC: Enter the Reflection Group, Research Paper 95/76, 20 June 1995 p. 13
73 ‘Major Confirms his Opposition to a “Constitutional” change in 1996’, AE, 09/01/95; Also see ‘UK 
government begins organizing for Maastricht revision’, AE, 27/01/95.
Speech to Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Aussenpolitik, 28 February 1995, p. 17; Also see Kevin Brown 
‘Hurd Sets Out Five-Point Plan For EU Conference’, FT, 22/06/95.
75 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996.
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met with criticism.76 The Prime Minister’s reluctance, along with other senior cabinet 
members, to publish a white paper on the IGC confirmed the full extent of the 
divisions within the party.77 The ‘Eurosceptics’ within the party wished to see the 
government provide a clear outline of its position, which it could be held to. The 
eventual decision to publish the report reinforced the perception, particularly of the 
Prime Minister, as continually ceding ground to the ‘Eurosceptics’ within the party.
Germany
As was the case throughout the IGC there was no coherent position from the federal
7Qgovernment during the pre-negotiations. In framing its position, it was not simply a 
case of the federal government devising the German approach. The Lander had their 
own list of demands, pushing for a strengthening in the principle of subsidiarity with a 
clear separation of competencies, including those under the third pillar.80 Neither was 
it simply a case of submitting such positions to the federal government; the Lander 
were represented by Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate in the German IGC delegation. 
As shown in the following chapters, on certain issues the Lander were effective in 
leaving their mark on the final treaty.
Kohl’s emphasis bore certain similarities with the approach taken during the 
Maastricht IGC, namely an IGC with the two heads of EMU and EPU. Kohl on several 
occasions reiterated the importance of the link between monetary and political union
• Q1
that formed the basis of the German government’s thinking at the Maastricht IGC. In 
the Franco-German joint position on Europe on 11 October 1995 published in Le 
Monde and Frankfurter Allegemeine Kohl remarked that ‘In the final analysis, popular
76 ‘The “European Policy Forum” Calls on the British to form an Anti-Federalist Alliance with Paris’, 
AE, 09/01/95.
77 Robert Peston ‘PM reluctant to detail UK’s negotiating stance’, FT, 15/12/95.
78 Robert Peston, ‘Major concedes white paper on EU stance’, FT, 19/01/1996.
79 On German preparation for the IGC see Josef Janning & Franco Algieri, ‘The German debate’, The 
1996 IGC -  National Debates (1), Discussion Paper 66, RILA, 1-22.
80 See ‘EnstchlieBung des Bundesrates, Forerungen der Lander zur Regierungskonferenz 1996’, 
Bundesrat, Drucksache 667/95 (BeschluB), 15 December 1995; Also see Europaministerkonferenz, 
1995, 11. Europaministerkonferenz am 14-15 September 1995 in Berlin. TOP 3.2. Forderungen der 
Europaminister und -senatoren zur Regierungskonferenz ‘96, Berlin, p. 14.
81 The Economic and Monetary Union -  The goal is a political union. Progress toward economic 
convergence Special No. 4424 (e) 15.03.1996; Also see Lionel Barber, ‘New shapes in the stars: 
Changes in EU decision-making and institutions will be on the agenda at the Turin conference that 
opens on Friday’, FT, 26/03/96; ‘Kohl gegen den Wahrungspopulismus der SPD’, in Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung, 09/11/95.
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approval of Economic and Monetary Union will depend on the ability of the 1996
50Inter-Governmental Conference to achieve parallel political progress’. This 
suggested that the Maastricht goal of monetary and political union that had been only 
tentatively developed was to underpin the thinking of his IGC. However, domestic 
pressures would force the Chancellor to revise his approach at a late stage in the 
process.
The more ‘Eurosceptic’ CSU took a measured approach. Theo Waigel called for a 
cautious extension of QMV.83 The CSU was forced to adopt this more ‘Eurosceptic’ 
stance given the situation in its stronghold Land of Bavaria. The CSU Prime Minister 
of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber was taking a more critical line on certain elements of the 
federal government’s European policy, notably the application of the criteria for the 
third stage of EMU. This criticism struck a note with the Bavarian and German public 
while introducing tension between the CSU and CDU. While emphasising the link 
between institutional and general treaty reform and ensuring that the policy-making 
process was more efficient the FDP Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was also cautious 
in his description of the IGC as ‘only the first step’.85 Yet, key figures within the 
German government approach continued to promote the more ambitious approach.86 
For example the CDU’s influential foreign policy spokesman, Karl Lamers, in an 
interview with Le Soir remarked that an IGC result lacking in comprehensive reform of 
the EU could bring into question plans for monetary union, a philosophical approach 
that was similar to that held by Kohl. Yet, the array of signals coming from Bonn 
continued, with some officials suggesting that the IGC as a whole should be 
postponed.87
The Schauble and Lamers paper as discussed above precipitated tensions and divisions 
within the federal government. The CDU/CSU’s partners, the FDP expressed public 
dislike to the suggestion of such a clear divide in the Union. Their leader Klaus Kinkel
82 Also see Vaughne Miller & Tom Dodd, Towards the IGC: Weighing the Options, Research Paper 
95/123, 05/12/95.
83 ‘Waigel urges restrictions in EU majority voting’, FT, 13/06/95.
84 ‘Helmut Kohl’s one-man band’, Economist, 07/09/96; ‘Stoiber Criticises France, Italy, EU 
Commission in Single Currency Row’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 08/11/96.
85 Speech by Klaus Kinkel, The European Union in the 21st century -  more o f  the same?, Oxford, 17 
January 1995; Also see Klaus Kinkel, Declaration, 21 February 1995.
86 ‘Pale reflections: The argumentative European Union’, Economist, 10/06/95.
87 ‘According To Bonn, Intergovernmental Conference Will Begin In 1996’, AE, 14/02/95.
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found it irresponsible for Germany to be sending out such signals as regards a two 
speed Europe as the EU prepared to enlarge.88 This was despite the fact that the FDP 
would similarly recognise the need for different speeds of integration, though in a 
more subtle manner.89 Kinkel’s pro-integration deputy, Werner Hoyer, in an attempt to 
placate the British government remarked that at both the Reflection Group and the IGC 
he would oppose any thinking on flexibility that worked from the premise that ‘If they 
don’t want to, we will go ahead anyway’.90 Kohl was cautious in the early days after 
the paper was released but he tentatively supported the paper and its objectives while 
criticising the choice of words. Indeed another position paper from the CDU/CSU, a 
year later avoided using the word ‘hardcore’.91
France
In the immediate post-Maastricht stage the French right was preoccupied with securing 
the Presidency after their success in the Parliamentary Assembly. The RPR and UDF 
coalition government’s term was not due to end until 1998. Nevertheless, the internal 
wrangling had begun as regards the RPR and UDF’s choice of candidate for the 
Presidential election. Fielding two candidates in Balladur and Chirac confounded splits 
and divisions in the right, divisions that would eventually undermine the new 
government under President Chirac and Prime Minister Juppe. Struggling to reconcile 
the electoral promises to fight unemployment and social exclusion with his 
determination to qualify for the third round of EMU, together with the ever increasing 
criticisms from within the government Chirac was forced into change. In an attempt to 
heal old divisions, in early November 1995 he formed a new and more streamlined 
government. Alain Juppe remained as Prime Minister but there were several pro- 
Balladur ministerial appointees. Yet, these attempts to shore up confidence in an RPR 
led government proved unsuccessful.
88 See Handelsblatt, 22 September 1994; See Miller, Paper 94/115, 1994.
89 ‘The FDP in favour o f “gradual integration”, AE, 28/03/1995.
90 Quentin Peel ‘Germans seek four-year EU agenda’, FT, 13/09/95.
91 Edward Mortimer, ‘Euro-structures under one roof: The EU needs a single foreign ministry, not the 
half-baked compromise set out at Maastricht’, FT, 03/05/95; Judy Dempsey and Michael Lindemann, 
‘CDU seeks majority voting in EU foreign policy’, FT, 14/06/95; ‘Tactful Germany’, FT, 14/06/95; 
‘Ever closer, more tactfully: Germany and the EU’ Economist, 17/06/95.
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09The approach on ‘Europe’ was one of the divisive issues between the RPR and UDF. 
The divergent assumptions between the more Gaullist oriented RPR and the more 
integrationist UDF contributed to the poor preparations in the government’s approach 
on the EU on the eve of the IGC. The French political elite had attempted to define 
its position in the wake of the strong federalist tenets of Schatible and Lamer’s 1994 
paper. In an interview with Liberation the structure of Chirac’s outline of French 
concerns on Europe related to the Conference in only a vague manner.94 He described 
the first concern of the government was that of renovating the European architecture 
making reference to CFSP, the institutions and reinforced cooperation. The second aim 
was the realisation of EMU and the third a fulfilment of the social aspirations of the 
people. Both the first and the third aims were IGC related. However, in a further 
interview in Le Monde Chirac described three problems that would arise with any 
future enlargement; economic regarding the measure of support the new states would 
require on membership; financial as regards the nature of the budget and finally the 
institutional questions as to how the decisions will be made in such an enlarged 
Union.95 Only this last issue was firmly on the IGC agenda. A further reflection of the 
lack of focus on the IGC from the French political elite was the absence of significant 
changes to the government’s official position paper from its circulation to political 
leaders and experts in November 1995 and its publication in February ‘96.96
In an effort to cultivate the image of a French government committed to holding a 
successful IGC Michel Bamier, as Minister of State for European Affairs, on repeated 
occasions referred to difficulties that would have to be overcome during the 
Conference. In January 1996 he remarked that ‘This conference will be difficult, there
q  n
will be, perhaps, crises’. It was Bamier again who warned at the debate before the 
French National Assembly on 13 March that the ‘The risks of blockage are
QO
numerous’. At the same time, he called for French resolve in defending and pursuing
92 See Keraudren & Dubois, in Laursen & Vanhoonacker, 1994, p. 154; See Guyomarch et al., 1998 
pp.83-88.
3 David Buchan, ‘French set to air some grievances’, FT, 11/03/96.
94 Liberation, 25/03/96.
95 Le Monde, 24/03/96.
96 For an account on the development of the French position in the pre-negotiation stage see Laurent 
Cohen-Tanugi, ‘The French Debate’, The 1996 IGC -  National Debates (1), Discussion Paper 66, RIIA, 
1996, 23-36; A. Menon, ‘France and the IGC o f 1996’, JEPP, 3:2, 1996.
97 Une interview du Ministre des Affaires Europeenes, ‘II ne faut surtout pas construire deux Europe’, 
Le Figaro, 11/01/96.
98 Debat A L’assemblee Nationale Sur La CIG Discours Du Ministre Delegue Aux Affaires 
Europeennes, M. Michel Bamier Declaration Du Gouvemement, Paris, 13 March 1996.
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what the French government sought to present as its ambitious programme for 
reform." As would also be the case throughout the IGC there was a gap between the 
government’s rhetoric and its ability to take the lead throughout the negotiations. This 
was reflected in the section devoted to Europe in Prime Minister Juppe’s government 
programme that was presented to the National Assembly on 23rd May. He remarked 
that the IGC may not deal with issues that were of greater priority.100
There were also contradictions within the French approach. For example on the eve of 
the IGC the Foreign Minister’s outline on France’s position on Europe proposed the 
evolution towards ‘two Europes’. This was a more simplified version of former Prime 
Minister Edouard Balladur’s concentric circles approach, an approach endorsed by 
Chirac and RPR.101 One Europe would bring together all the countries of the continent, 
the second one being a ‘more active pole, more welded together, going further and
i  r i j
faster, probably more integrated’. However, there was an element of uncertainty as 
to the exact meaning and applicability of this approach. Several weeks after de 
Charette’s outline, Michel Bamier, as minister of state, opposed the idea in a similar 
interview with Le Figaro. While admittedly he was referring to France’s desire to 
avoid building a superior Europe vis-a-vis an inferior, the Quai d’Orsay felt the need to 
clarify stating the primacy of the Secretary of State over a minister of state while 
stipulating that ‘France does not have two foreign policies’.
Franco-German Partnership
The Franco-German axis around which much of the past achievements and progress on 
integration had been realised also failed to provide the necessary dynamism or 
leadership, even in the sense of agreeing bilaterally and attempting to draw some of the 
other governments along. Szukala and Wessels remarked that on the eve of the 
Conference within the French and German political elite of both Member States that
99 For French positions see above on ‘National positions’. Also see Chapters V, VI & VII.
100 ‘Mr Juppe announces proposals to strengthen the council, clarify relations with the Commission and 
step up democratic control, with greater involvement of National Parliaments’, AE, 24/05/95.
101 See Eduoard Balladur in Le Figaro, 30/08/94; see Balladur, Le Monde, 30/11/94.
102 Herve de Charette, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle’, Le Figaro, 20/12/95; Also see European Daily Bulletin 
(EDB), N°6651 -  24/01/1996.
103 Une interview, 11/01/96.
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‘there was little clarity and considerable muddle’.104 While there have always been 
differences on the detail and emphasis, there was a trust and implicit understanding 
between Kohl and Mitterrand. Kohl’s comments at the Maastricht IGCs highlighted 
this trust.105 One of the features of this partnership has been the close relations between 
the French President and the German Chancellor. This has attempted to cover deep 
differences between both governments’ approaches on Europe, while providing a 
continual driving force for European integration. However, the degree of trust and 
understanding that provided a basis for these successive partnerships was at this stage 
absent between President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl. As the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) commented in early 1996 ‘Mr. Kohl’s greatest problem is that France is 
unlikely to be as trusty an ally under Mr. Chirac as it was under Mr. Mitterrand on the 
majority of German concerns’.106
There were many issues, unrelated to the IGC, which strained Franco-German relations 
and ultimately any co-ordinated approach to the IGC. During the pre-negotiation 
period the German government on several occasions expressed concern as regards the 
French government’s willingness and capability to meet the Maastricht criteria on 
EMU. In late 1995 the EIU remarked that ‘Relations with France continued to absorb a 
great deal of attention ... and considerable concern reigns in Bonn as to the 
sustainability of the franc fort policy’.107 The fundamental basis of the EMU project 
and ultimately Franco-German relations would be considerably undermined should the
1 ORFrench be left behind. Bonn’s concern was at times justifiable. For example, at the 
Cannes European Summit, Chirac proposed to establish a committee to consider the 
consequences of a two-speed process towards monetary union. This proposal came 
after bilateral talks with John Major where Chirac sounded circumspect about the 
EMU timetable.109 Yet, with Juppe as Prime Minister, over time Kohl and Waigel’s 
concern shifted from questioning French willingness towards the project to their ability 
to qualify.
104 For a good synopsis on Franco- German relations since Maastricht see Andrea Szukala & Wolfgang 
Wessels, ‘The Franco-German Tandem’, in Edwards & Pijpers (eds.), 1997, pp.74-100.
105 See Chapter II, pp. 44-46.
106 EIU Country Report 1st Quarter 1996, p. 14
107 Ibid.
108 Judy Dempsey, ‘Germans seek pointers on French policy’, FT, 18/05/95.
109 EIU Country Report, 3rd Quarter 1995, p. 12.
Chapter III 93
Chirac’s decision, on coming into office, to test French nuclear weapons on French 
Islands in the South Pacific also proved embarrassing for the German government, the 
latter being forced to steer the line between condemnation and condonation, though 
officials within the Auswartiges Amt. did little to hide their disdain towards this 
action.110 This not only saw a direct strain on Franco-German relations but given the 
open criticism from the European Parliament and Commission, the German 
government was under significant pressure to adopt a similar line.
The concern that surrounded Chirac’s arrival presented a further preoccupation 
hindering Franco-German attempts to gather momentum in the pre-negotiation stage. 
Chirac’s gesturing to John Major’s government, particularly his comments ‘I know and 
understand the British analysis and view of the single currency’, and his description of 
the Franco-German alliance as necessary but insufficient was met with concern in 
Bonn.111 Chirac also commented on the common ground that both the British and 
French governments shared on institutional matters and CFSP. Given the close 
cooperation on Bosnia, with French and British troops serving under each other’s 
military command, and in light of the British government’s sympathetic stance 
regarding the French nuclear testing, there was certainly a recognition at the Franco- 
British summit in November 1995 of a common basis on foreign policy issues with the
WOpotential for further cooperation. As one British official commented ‘Our aim is to
1 1 1
guide, to turn it [France] more to British interests’. As with the other issues, referred 
to above and below, it facilitated for a certain unease at the highest level of the Franco- 
German relationship.
While there has been a certain depth to the Franco-German relationship, thereby 
ensuring continuous cooperation at various other levels, independent of relations at the 
highest level, the latter sets the mood and atmosphere within which the overall 
relationship operates.114 Indeed, even at the official level there was a recognition of the
110 ‘Toute seule en Europe?’, Economist, 14/10/95.
111 David Buchan, ‘France and Britain to co-operate more on EU’, FT, 12/06/95.
112 Lionel Barber ‘All to play for in EU love triangle: Is Britain forging a relationship with France to 
rival the Bonn-Paris axis in the European Union’, FT, 04/11/95; Also see Dominique Moisi, ‘A French 
balancing act -  France will have to work on a bilateral basis with Germany if  the UK threatens an EU 
stalemate’, FT, 22/03/96; Also see ‘The British government plan for the IGC -  debate in the French 
Parliament next year’, AE, 22/06/1995.
113 Ibid.; For the futility o f such attempts see ‘An uncertain partnership’, FT, 31/10/95.
114 See Peter Norman ‘MPs unite to deepen Franco-German relationship’, FT, 13/10/95.
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difficulties in the relationship. Several high ranking French officials commented that 
they did not have common interests or positions but they work closely with the 
Germans since they continue to recognise them as the strongest in the Union, going on 
to describe the relationship as ‘a marriage of convenience’.115
There was a rhetoric of cooperation.116 In his ‘L ’Europe Nouvelle’ article, Herve de 
Charette outlined the two objectives of the French government’s European policy, the
117fulfilment of the second resting on continued French and German cooperation. 
Michel Bamier in the months preceding the IGC said of the Franco-German 
relationship that it ‘is of paramount importance, justifiably because it alone is capable
11  o
of convincing and rallying all Europe, . . .’. Similarly Chirac’s pledge at the 
Strasbourg summit, days after his coming to office, to maintain the strong franc was a 
further attempted gesture to reassure the German government of continued French 
support for EMU.
On core IGC issues there were attempts, as with the previous IGCs, to arrive at a series 
of common positions. In an interview with Le Figaro in early October Foreign 
Minister Kinkel remarked that ‘We will be in Paris very soon for intense preparation of 
this position’.119 In the more immediate lead up to the IGC Kohl and Chirac tried to 
strengthen their relationship with a Franco-German position on the IGC at their 
meeting on 25 October. They aimed to have this ready by the Madrid European 
Council in December. At a meeting in Baden-Baden on 7 December 1995 Chirac and 
Kohl advocated the introduction of a flexibility clause to allow those that desire further 
integration to pursue their goals.120 The approach hammered out for the Madrid 
European Council focused on four issues; CFSP, justice and home affairs, institutions
171and the citizen. Yet, there was little substance and depth to this initiative. On CFSP 
the paper commented that ‘the Union must be able to have a common foreign and
115 Interviews.
116 Point VIII on ‘Europe and Foreign Policy -  Security and Defence’ in Federal Government’s 
European Policy Guidelines 1994. Also see ‘Kohl opens his arms for union’, The Economist, 27/05/95.
117 Herve de Charette, ‘L’Europe Nouvelle’, Le Figaro, 20/12/95.
118 See ‘Une interview’ 11/11/96; Also see EDB, N°665, 24/01/96.
119 AE, 09/10/1995; Also see ‘Juppe and Kinkel reaffirm that France and Germany would speak as one’, 
AE, 12/01/1995; Le Monde, 12 January 1995; Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12/01/95.
120 David Buchan, ‘France and Germany gear up for next IGC’, FT, 02/12/95; Also see Ian Davidson 
‘Orthodoxy reversed: The big idea at the EU Intergovernmental Conference will be a move towards 
faster integration for an inner core’, FT, 06/03/96.
121 ‘President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl propose including General Clause in treaty for greater 
Cooperation between states with will and capacity’, AE, 12/95.
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security policy that is more visible and determined ... an approach that better ensures 
the effectiveness, continuity, coherence and solidarity with its action’. On delivering 
such a policy it merely acknowledged that ‘thought will have to be given to the 
adjustments that would enable giving the CFSP the means and instruments 
corresponding to our ambitions . . .’. The bland rhetoric was even greater on JHA, 
calling for the ‘the creation of a uniform area in Europe where freedom of movement is 
guaranteed by a common approach’. Similar language was used on institutional 
reform, describing the need for change as ‘indispensable’ but failing to expand on the 
nature of this change.122
This lack of detail on the specific mechanics was a typical feature of these attempted 
common positions, again an attempt to cover the underlying differences between the 
two governments. For example it was widely reported that the Chirac and the 
foreign ministry were much more sympathetic to the extension of QMV. Yet, Chirac 
was merely committed to the ‘generalisation’ of QMV. The Minister for Europe, 
Michel Bamier, when pushed for more specifics, whose response while positive was 
imprecise, stated ‘We are very open to majority voting in virtually all areas’.124 Even 
his support for the principle stood awkwardly with his comment months earlier 
suggesting that the British and French governments were ‘in agreement’ on their 
opposition to the extension of QMV’s usage.125
At the Freiburg summit on February 27 1996 both agreed to submit a joint initiative on 
CFSP in Turin on 29 March.126 This included the German formula termed the 
‘coalition of the willing’ that would allow the EU to launch operations under CFSP 
without the agreement of all Member States. While a Member State would not be 
forced to participate if it disagreed with the majority on a peacekeeping mission, it 
should not block the action and, more controversially, should contribute towards its 
costs. Kinkel said the initiative showed again that Franco-German cooperation was the 
driving force of European integration.127
122 Ibid.
123 Peter Norman, ‘Chirac to find relief in spa town’, FT, 07/12/95.
124 See EIU Country Report, 4th Quarter, 1995, p. 11.
125 See Buchan, 12 June 1995.
126 See EDB, N°6676 -  28/02/1996; N°6677 -  29/02/1996.
127 Ibid.
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Despite these initiatives there were still considerably different perceptions on CFSP 
matters. For example in the text from the Freiburg summit reference was made to 
‘overcom[ing] the rigidity inherent in unanimity’, with ‘recourse to qualified majority
• • * 198 •voting for decisions at the implementation stage’. The federal government in its 
March 1996 IGC paper referred to a general extension of QMV, with ‘unanimity being
1 90retained for certain areas, such as the projection of operational capacities’. At the
same time the French government’s official stance on CFSP at the IGC failed to
110mention any extension on QMV. The Freiburg conclusions also proposed the setting 
up of an advanced research and analysis unit, which would comprise staff from the 
Member States, the Commission and the WEU Secretariat and would be attached to 
the Council Secretariat. The French paper failed to mention this, concentrating instead 
on having a strong personality as a Mr./Ms. CFSP, something that was left deliberately 
vague in Freiburg conclusions that merely referred to a ‘new post’. Finally while the 
February paper and the German government’s position paper made reference to 
incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the EU, this went unmentioned in the French 
paper.
European Commission
One of the principal characteristics of the SEA IGC was the important role played by 
the Commission in both the pre-negotiations to the process and during the Conference 
itself. However, the Maastricht IGC had also demonstrated the extent to which as 
Middlemas described it, a ‘hyperactive’ Commission during the pre-negotiations was 
notably ineffective during the negotiations. This left the Commission under the 
leadership of Jacques Santer adopting a different approach and attitude to the 1996-97 
IGC. Rather than perceiving of the IGC as another opportunity to pursue a grand
vision under the public limelight as at Maastricht, the Commission deliberately opted
1^1for a more subtle strategy behind the scenes. As will be shown across the following 
section on the negotiations there were limited occasions when this paid off. Though, at 
a time when member governments were reluctant to embark on another set of treaty 
reforms the Commission under its new President Jacques Santer was defining a more
128 Ibid.
129 See, Germany’s Objectives, 1996.
130 See, Memo, 1996.
131 Interviews.
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low key approach that meant it would be less active than it had been during the pre­
negotiations of the two previous IGCs.
Indeed on the several occasions when Santer acknowledged the importance of the
Conference it was usually within the context of the ‘great debates’ or the ‘quadruple
1 ^challengefs]’ that the Union faced as the end of the century approached. When 
Santer attempted to raise the profile of the Conference and stave off thinking along the 
lines of holding what was described as a ‘light IGC now’ followed by a further 
Conference before enlargement, it was not matched by the activism from the 
Commission that had been the case in the past. In turn this led to suggestions that 
the role and influence of the Commission was being undermined by Santer’s style of 
leadership.134
European Parliament
It is possible to describe the European Parliament as presenting the most coherent and 
constructive approach in the pre-negotiation stage. This was firstly due to the united 
and focused front that was presented by Elmar Brok and Elisabeth Guigou at the 
Reflection Group and throughout.135 At the same time the fact that this stage would 
represent the height of the parliament’s influence throughout the process, it was to be 
expected that they would aim to make the most of it. As with previous IGCs the 
parliament provided much intellectual background with a series of reports and papers: 
European briefings on almost every major issue on the IGC agenda and related to it, 
Resolutions on the convening of the IGC, the progress of the Reflection Group, and the
1 TAparliament’s position itself.
132 Speech By Jacques Santer to the European Parliament, Work Programme, Strasbourg, 15 February 
1995; Speech by Jacques Santer to the Transatlantic Policy Network, Le Cercle Royal Gaulois, 30 
November 1995; Speech By Jacques Santer to Davos World Economic Forum, Switzerland, 28 January
1995.
133 See Address by Jacques Santer to the Corporation Of London ‘Europe’s Future -  My Vision’, 
London, Guildhall, 4 May 1995; Address by Jacques Santer to the Confederation of British Industry, 
London, 16 May 1995; Address by Jacques Santer President o f the European Commission to the Trade 
Union Congress Brighton, 11 September 1995.
134 ‘In Santer’s style: Europe’s Commission. Is Jacques Santer too nice?’, The Economist 07/13/96.
135 Interview.
136 Caroline Southey, ‘Strasbourg calls for more power’, FT, 18/05/95.
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However, the EP was not merely focusing on the agenda for the IGC. It was to spend 
much of its time from late ‘95 up until Turin in March ‘96 attempting to gain a place at 
the negotiating table. The limitations on the Parliament’s influence became apparent 
with its failure to gain observer status for the duration of the Conference. This was 
despite having a place at the table during the Reflection Group. Initially in its 
December 1995 resolution it was somewhat vague on the precise nature of its 
involvement, merely stating that it should be ‘to the greatest possible extent’. Yet, 
President Hansch stated the position clearly at a later stage, that ‘ ... the European 
Parliament, can help to make the outcome more acceptable to citizens ... the European 
Parliament must be allowed to send observers to the Conference’. This was also one 
of the pre-occupations of the Italian Presidency and the European Commission, in the 
form of its President and the Commissioner responsible for IGC matters, Marcelino 
Oreja, in the weeks preceding Turin.138
The main opposition to the Parliament’s involvement in the IGC process came from 
the French, British and for a time Portuguese governments. On several occasions the 
European Parliament’s President Hansch remarked that the European Parliament had 
the support of thirteen members to send observers to the IGC meetings of personal 
representatives, referring implicitly to the opposition from the British and French 
governments. Despite President Hansch’s claims that the majority of governments 
were in favour of the EP having observer status at the Conference no government in its 
position paper made reference to the EP’s role during the IGC. This was also the case 
with the Reflection Group Report which actually made specific reference on how the 
Conference should proceed.139
In the weeks preceding the convening of the Conference in Turin the Italian Presidency 
through its Foreign Affairs Minister, Susan Agnelli pushed strongly for observer status 
for the Parliament. The Commission was equally supportive while at the meeting of 
foreign ministers in early March 1996 Klaus Kinkel regretted the position of the 
French and British. The German and Italian governments have in the past been 
supportive of the European Parliament, the Italian government declaring at Maastricht
137 EDB, N°6687 -14/03/1996.
138 See EDB, N°6658 -  02/02/1996; EDB, N°6687 -  14/03/1996; EDB, N°6696 -  14/03/1996; See also 
Speech by President Santer to the European Parliament (17/1/95).
139 See ‘Section D -  What Kind of Conference’, Reflection Group Report, 1995.
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that it would refuse to ratify the treaty unless the Parliament supported it.140 The 
French objected for two reasons. Firstly, it was a consequence of Gaullist tendencies 
within the government that were an underlying influence throughout the negotiations, 
at times shaping the French position on certain issues, and in this instance minimising 
the role of the European Parliament. Secondly, French objections lay in the nature of 
the policy-making process of the Fifth Republic. A weak national assembly was 
determined not to see the European Parliament have more rights than national 
parliaments on participation. The desire of the French national assembly to exert its 
influence on the European stage as compensation for its weak standing at home saw 
the French government adopting an ambitious position on the role of national 
parliaments.141 British objection had somewhat similar ideological undertones, while 
being shaped by the disproportionate influence of the Tory Euro-sceptics. Malcom 
Rifkind said at the informal meeting of foreign ministers at Palermo on 11 March that 
he was comfortable with the Parliament being briefed as well as forwarding its 
proposals, but participation in the conference was not warranted as the process was 
intergovernmental as its name indicated. The final compromise package provided a 
once a month meeting between the IGC personal representatives and the European 
Parliament’s personal representatives.142
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter had three aims. Firstly, it sought to examine how the agenda for the 1996- 
97 was set. Secondly, it aimed to describe the issues that made it onto the agenda. 
Thirdly, it attempted to outline the attitudes of the British, French and German 
governments along with the European Commission and Parliament towards the start of 
the IGC in Turin on 28 March 1996.
The central argument of the chapter was that governments did not want to have this 
IGC. Maastricht or more specifically Article N(2) TEU required them to hold a 
Conference in 1996. Therefore there was ambiguity in the pre-negotiation stage on the 
two levels. Firstly, there was no overall theme or objective that provided a focus for
140 See Thatcher, 1995, p.555.
141 See, Memo, 1996.
142 See EDB, N°6696 -  27/03/1996 for full details o f EP involvement.
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governments. Enlargement came close but failed to provide the spark. Secondly 
governments were often ambiguous as regards their objectives on the broad range of 
issues that formed part of the agenda.
The broad range of issues that made it onto the agenda was a result of the open 
approach taken by governments. While the lack of an overall theme was one casual 
factor in governments taking such an approach, the ratification crisis and delayed 
implementation of Maastricht also left governments unsure and somewhat weary as 
they embarked on this third round of constitutional reform within a ten year period. 
The result was that governments did not prioritise effectively either through the 
Reflection group or their official position papers.
The attitude of the French, German and British governments together with the 
Parliament and Commission towards the IGC provides further explanation on the open 
approach on setting the agenda. The three governments, in particular, had to contend 
with considerable domestic distractions that undermined their efforts for a more 
focused approach in the run up to the IGC. In turn, there was even talk in the pre­
negotiations of the possibility of postponement for another IGC should the Conference 
encounter difficulties on certain issues.
Therefore, to conclude, the pre-negotiations showed signs of ambiguity in defining 
objectives and a lack of focus, if not even direction, in shaping the agenda. In turn 
certain officials mooted the possibility of postponing issues for another IGC. These are 
the defining features that chapter II concluded would be strongly present throughout 
the IGC process. The manner in which governments set the agenda and the attitude and 
approach they adopted in the run up to the agenda reinforces the likely presence of 
these features in the negotiations. The following chapter introduces the IGC 
negotiations across all the issues setting the thesis up for the detailed examination in 
Section III.
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CHAPTER IV 
OVERVIEW OF THE IGC PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The IGC began with the convening of the negotiations at the meeting between Heads 
of State and Government together with the Foreign Ministers in Turin, Italy on the 28 
March 1996. The Conference concluded in Florence, Italy in the early hours of 
Wednesday morning, 17 June 1997. This chapter presents an overview of the IGC 
process. In doing so it has two aims. Firstly, it aims to outline the development of the 
mandate presented at Turin, focusing on the issues that governments were committed 
to, and which dominated the agenda. Secondly, it aims to describe in general terms the 
nature of the negotiations over the sixteen months, while at the same time also 
attempting to identify any significant meetings or individuals which stood out as 
particularly influential in the process. This sets up the thesis for the more detailed 
examination in the following section. These two aims are dealt with in the second and 
third sections of the chapter. Before going on to present this overview the first section 
of chapter introduces the three levels of negotiations and outlines the negotiating styles 
of the three member governments; Britain, France and Germany, which are the focus 
of detailed examinations in Chapters V, VI and VI.
The central argument based on the second and third sections is that, even with a 
general overview of the process, it is possible to recognise the four features that 
defined the negotiations; ambiguity in governments’ objectives, a continuation from 
the pre-negotiations; a lack of direction in the process which in turn left governments 
drifting into unintended outcomes or postponing issues for another IGC. At the same 
time it is also possible to recognise the influence of key individuals, notably those 
within the Dutch Presidency and to a limited extent the Irish presidency that proved 
skilful in bringing the negotiations along, even though only a small number of member 
governments provided detailed papers of their positions on key issues.
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The fourth and final section of this chapter presents another equally important 
argument. In chapter II the importance of placing the IGC in context with the other 
business of the EU was emphasised, while at the same time taking on board domestic 
distractions. Indeed this was also important in explaining the pre-negotiations as 
described in the previous chapter. With the 1996-1997 IGC it is crucial in 
understanding the structure and flow of the negotiations that a series of both distracting 
and overshadowing events, domestic and European, are noted. In fact events such as 
the timing of the British general election and the divisions within the British 
Conservative government proved to be considerably influential in shaping the IGC. 
The fourth section considers the influence of the general elections in Britain and 
France along with the effects of the race to qualify for the third stage of EMU, the 
EMU/employment debate and the BSE crisis. As well as this section proving important 
in explaining the general dynamics of the negotiations, it is useful as a reference point 
for later chapters where the influence of these events on the IGC process is mentioned 
where relevant.
1. BACKGROUND
Three Levels of negotiation
Before considering how the negotiations at the 1996-97 IGC were conducted it is 
necessary to describe the different levels at which the negotiations took place.1 There 
were three levels in all: Heads of State and Government in the form of the European 
Council, the foreign Ministers, and finally the personal representatives of the Foreign 
Ministers. The highest level was that of the European Council which shaped the 
agenda in the pre-negotiation stage and had the final word on any reform at 
Amsterdam. The second level was made up of the Foreign Ministers of each 
government. This group met once a month, as provided by the Madrid European 
Council. The Foreign Ministers had ‘responsibility for all proceedings’ no matter 
what the issue at hand, the objective being to maintain a coherency and, in the
1 McDonagh, 1998, pp. 17-21.
2 See, Madrid, 1996.
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negotiations, a coherency it was felt would have been undermined if responsibilities 
were divided across a range of ministries.3
The bulk of the work was carried out by Ministers’ representatives to the IGC, along 
with a representative from the Commission, Marcelino Oreja. (See Appendix 3) As 
with the Reflection Group there was a diversity in the make up of the group of 
personal representatives. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden 
appointed Ministers of State; Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Britain 
and later France their permanent representatives; Denmark, a former permanent 
representative, Greece for a time an MEP and later a Foreign Office official, Italy a 
former Foreign Office official. This formed the third level in the process, one that also 
had its foundations in the conclusions to the Madrid European Council in December 
1995.4 The representatives met for one day about every two weeks during the Italian 
Presidency, from the convening of the Conference in Turin on 28 March until the 
Florence Summit in mid-June. The Irish Presidency intensified the pace of the 
negotiations with the personal representatives meeting for up to two days per week. It 
was this level that proved most influential in gradually shaping the package, given 
their frequent dealings with it. The monthly meeting of the Foreign Ministers reviewed 
what had been negotiated in the previous weeks and the general direction that the IGC 
was taking across the various areas of reform. As mentioned in the previous chapter 
the European Parliament was not an actual participant at the IGC.5 It made its 
contributions through a once-a-month meeting between the IGC personal 
representatives and the Parliament’s IGC Representatives, Elmar Brok MEP and 
Elisabeth Guigou MEP. The Presidencies also kept the Parliament informed, 
organising regular briefing sessions with the same representatives. Finally the 
President of the Parliament consulted with Heads of State and Government at 
European Council meetings and with Foreign Ministers at General Affair Council 
meetings.6 However, no officials from any of the member governments described the 
Parliament as exceptionally influential on any of the issues including co-decision.7 
Indeed one official from the Finnish declaration remarked how the note-takers would
3 McDonagh, 1998, p.20.
4 See, Madrid, 1996.
5 Chapter III, pp. 96-98.
6 Ibid.
7 Interviews.
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lay down their pens when the EP’s representatives entered the negotiating room to 
express its opinion.8
Negotiating Styles
Given that the thesis focuses on the approaches of the German, French and British 
governments it is necessary, for two reasons, to briefly outline the negotiating styles of 
the three Member States. Firstly, not only does it provide a context which enhances our 
understanding of the negotiating approaches of the three governments but secondly 
these negotiating styles also shaped the four features which defined the negotiations. In 
examining this style particular attention is given to the manner in which the 
administrative systems of the three Member States formulate and present a national 
position on an EU issue.
German Style
When commenting on the IGC negotiations one German official remarked that the 
federal government held a deliberately incoherent position for much of the process. 
This is consistent with the German negotiating style at the EU level. The structuring of 
the policy-making system places an emphasis on the diffusion of power.9 In a federal 
system this provides for an influential state level of government or in the German case, 
the Lander.10 The German Constitution, through Article 23 of the Basic Law provides 
the Lander with a significant role in European policymaking, particularly after the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, with an effective veto over any further 
sovereignty transfers to the EU institutions and a much greater role in framing 
European policy in Germany.11 This was also reflected in this IGC with officials from 
Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg representing the Lander on the German IGC 
delegation. As is shown in the following chapters the Lander were particularly 
influential throughout the negotiations. However, it is not simply a case of a division 
of power and influence between the Land and federal level but also across the federal 
ministries and indeed within the various ministries. Under the principle of ministerial
8 Stubb, 1998, p. 19.
9 See Simon Bulmer & William Paterson, The Federal Republic o f  Germany and the European 
Community, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 17.
10 Ibid., pp. 185-200.
11 See Charlie Jeffrey, ‘The Territorial Dimension’, in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson & Stephen 
Padget, (eds.) Developments in German Politics 2, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, pp.91-2.
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autonomy (Ressortprinzip) with such powerful ministries there tends to be a series of
1 9conflicting and contradictory positions on a single issue. It is only towards the end of
a process such as the IGC, as it reaches its climax, that it is possible to recognise a
coherent German position rising out of the earlier contradictions. In a process such as
an IGC, Chancellor Kohl had been instrumental in the final stages in bringing together
previously competing positions or, indeed, rising above some of them and defining 
11another approach. While at this IGC there was a considerable degree of incoherency 
and contradictions in the German position, Kohl was not able to rise above these 
competing domestic constraints as he has done in the past and as will be shown in the 
following chapters. This caught several of the other delegations by surprise.
French Style
The French negotiating style lies at the other end of the spectrum to the open and 
contradictory German approach. While there may be internal conflicts within and 
between ministries as is often the case between the Quai d’Orsay and the Elysee, the 
manner in which the French define and present their policy positions differ in two 
distinct ways from that of Germany. Firstly, while there is usually an inter-ministerial 
discussion on defining a French position on a foreign policy matter -  on European 
issues the coordinating role falling to the Secretariat General du Comite 
Interministeriel (SGCI) -  in practice the Presidency is generally pre-eminent in foreign 
and defence policy.14 Secondly, should it be a case of the Elysee having to impose its 
thinking on the Foreign Ministry or other ministries it is often difficult to recognise 
any divisions within a French position. Officials are very keen to present a united front 
despite disagreeing or being wholly against what they are defending. There is not a 
similar style of open contradiction or incoherency as is the case with the German 
negotiators.
Yet, this is not to suggest that there is no incoherency at all in the French system. 
Given that it is very tightly structured around the Elysee a French policy position can 
be prone to sudden shifts that may leave a later position at odds with an earlier one. 
There were examples of such incidences during the IGC when President Chirac took a
12 Ibid., pp.27-31.
13 Ibid., p.27 & pp.37-39.
14 See Guyomarch et al., 1998, pp.43-72; Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward & Howard Machin, 
Developments in French Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994, pp.201-204.
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different line from what French officials and ministers had spent months developing 
and defending. One Dutch official remarked how the French position on Commission 
resizing, which had been reasonably well defined early on in the IGC, was dropped 
after Chirac took up a different position during the Noordwijk Summit in May 1997. 
There have been previous examples of the French Presidency upsetting the balance at 
IGC negotiations with sudden shifts. For example during the Fouchet IGC agreement 
seemed possible in the early days of January 1962 until De Gaulle on 18 January 
suddenly hardened his position on a political union to the opposition of the other 
negotiating governments.15 An even more dramatic example during this IGC that 
impacted on the French government’s approach on the WEU was Chirac’s public 
request that with the Europeanisation of NATO the command of AFSouth should be 
reserved for a European. This would blow open what had been a very cautious and 
gradual return over the previous years of the French military into NATO. Also the 
Elysee tends to be less concerned about the details of a proposal and the possibility of 
a successful implementation, focusing instead on presenting a ‘grand ligne’, cultivating 
the perception among other states of an active French foreign policy.
British Style
The British style lies between the tight rigour of the French and the more open 
approach of the Germans. Responsibility for the conduct of British foreign policy lies 
with the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
However, the actions of the Foreign Secretary are subject to approval by the Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister.16 The FCO, along with the whole Whitehall structure has been 
described as an ‘official machine with a political layer on top’. While the ‘official 
machine’ usually strives to “know their minister’s mind’ and to take his assumed 
preferences into account in formulating and implementing policy’, the administration 
also aims to maintain a continuity in British foreign policy irrespective of the changes
1 7in government. The Foreign Office aims to formulate and implement policy in an 
efficient business-like manner; co-ordinating with other Departments in Whitehall and 
presenting a coherent position on an issue.
15 Gerbet, in Pryce, 1987, pp. 120-123.
16 See William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, London: RIIA, 1976, p.21.
17 Ibid., pp.51-52.
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Though, for much of this IGC there were deep contradictions between this normal 
approach by the administration and that taken by the ‘political layer on top’. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter the Conservative government was deeply split on 
European institutions and policy, a vocal and well organised minority of ‘Eurosceptics’ 
making it very difficult for the Cabinet to present a coherent European policy that 
could be presented and defended by the IGC negotiating delegation from the foreign 
office. As several of the members on the negotiating delegation claimed it was difficult 
to identify what could be termed as the government’s mandate, being resigned to 
sticking closely to what was a bland White paper or as one official remarked saying
1 o #
‘no, no, no’ to everything. Therefore the Conservative government’s internal 
divisions brought an unusual twist to the normal business-like manner in which the 
Foreign Office operates. While the Labour government’s positions on certain issues, as 
described over the following chapters, were at times similar to those of the outgoing 
Conservative party, it re-introduced a sense of normality and stability in the manner in 
which British European policy was formulated and presented by the foreign office and 
its team of negotiators at the IGC. The Foreign Secretary’s reference to ‘constructive 
engagement’ sat comfortably with the business-like approach of the Foreign Office.
2. THE ISSUES AT THE CONFERENCE
Introduction
This section presents an overview of the issues on the IGC agenda. Firstly, it considers 
how the mandate for the negotiations was set. It then goes on to outline in detail the 
contents of the mandate. Finally, it outlines the broad range of issues that governments 
expressed interest in during the negotiations. This analysis reveals that firstly, 
governments were slow in defining the mandate. Secondly, when the Italian 
Presidency eventually presented the mandate at Turin it was open-ended in a manner 
similar to the Reflection Group’s report. It merely listed the issues that the Conference 
would deal with, failing to be more focused on how the IGC should go about making 
reforms. Governments could not be more focused on how they were going to deal with 
these issues since most at this stage had not sorted out their priorities. Finally, as has
18 Interviews.
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been the case with previous IGCs, the agenda became over crowded with governments 
tabling proposals on issues that were not mentioned in the mandate.
Arriving at a Mandate
The Italian government assumed the Office of the Presidency in January 1996. The 
approach taken by the Italian Presidency in setting the agenda for the IGC to be 
convened at the Turin Summit was similar to that of the Reflection Group, three broad 
areas of reform focusing on Europe and the citizen, the institutions and external 
relations. As mentioned above, the European Council at Madrid in December 1995 had 
called on the Conference to focus on these three issues. Though, such were the 
differences between member governments that the summit conclusions only outlined 
the general objectives for the Conference. Once again it was a case of postponing 
agreement on the details for the IGC mandate until a later date under the Italian 
Presidency.
On the 8 January 1996 the European Union’s Secretariat of the Council received from 
the Italian Presidency a draft for revising the Maastricht treaty. This marked the 
launching of the formal procedures that would initiate the conference. The Italians 
went on two trips of the national capitals in an attempt to gather the opinions of the 
different members on the IGC mandate so an agreed document would be in place by 
the Turin Summit. However, at the Council of foreign ministers meeting on February 
26 the members were still split over preparations for the Turin Summit.19 On March 9- 
10 at the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Palermo the Presidency 
remained unclear on the mandate for the start of negotiations.20 In fact, it was not until 
the Turin Summit that the Presidency managed to define the mandate.
It was possible to get an insight to the Presidency’s priorities and the shape of the 
mandate from the speech of Foreign Affairs Minister, Susanna Agnelli, to the 
European Parliament on the 13 March. She described the priorities of the IGC as 
citizens, institutions and CFSP. She called for the IGC to make a ‘better list’ of 
citizen’s rights and duties with a deepening of ‘the European model of society’.
19 ER, 18/02/96.
20 ER, 13/03/96.
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Particular emphasis was placed on employment and the need to ‘apply the classic 
Community model to certain third pillar issues’. She described it as impossible to 
‘maintain such a high number of areas for which unanimity is required’, describing 
QMV as the norm except for a few ‘constitutional’ exceptions. Reform of the 
Commission and the voting procedures, as well as a simplification of the treaties, were 
also emphasised. The inevitability of flexible integration was acknowledged. On CFSP 
Agnelli called for better ‘visibility’ on CFSP representation and implementation and 
the need to move away from the ‘rigidity of unanimity’ as a ‘growing consensus’ 
emerges on a planning and analysis instrument. She said the merger of the WEU into 
the EU framework was necessary before calling for the EU to become more like the
91US ‘in terms of cohesion and common foreign policy’.
The eventual mandate was divided into the three sections on Europe and the Citizen, 
institutional reform and External Action. Under the title of Europe and the Citizen it 
called on the IGC to consider whether and to what extent to strengthen the protection 
of fundamental rights by the European Union. On Justice and Home Affairs the 
mandate provided little insight as to the direction that the negotiations should take. 
Instead it merely called for better defined objectives, methods and instruments, better 
protection against international crime, and coherent and effective asylum, immigration 
and visa policies. On employment it called on the IGC to ‘examine how the Union 
could provide the basis for improved cooperation and coordination aimed at 
reinforcing national policies’.22 It also placed ‘compatibility of competition with the 
principles of universal access to essential services in the public interest’ on the agenda, 
together with a re-examination of the status of the remote territories and islands of the 
Union. These issues had been particularly promoted by the Spanish and French 
governments, respectively. The mandate briefly mentioned the need for the IGC to 
consider how to make environmental protection more effective and coherent at the 
level of the Union, with a view to a sustainable development. Finally it called on the 
IGC to ‘ensurfe] the most suitable application and realization of the principle of 
subsidiarity’ while introducing greater transparency and openness in the workings of 
the Union with the possibility of ‘simplifying and consolidating the Treaties’.
21 EDB, N°6687 -  14/03/1996.
22 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Turin European Council, SN 100/96, 29 March 1996.
23 See again Starting Points, 1995 ; Elements for, 1996; Memo, 1996.
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Under the title The Institutions in a more democratic and effective Union it called on 
the Conference to consider simplifying and making more transparent the legislative 
procedures, widening the scope of co-decision, the role, membership and election of 
the European Parliament, the role of national parliaments, the possibility of extending 
QMV, the weighting of votes in the Council, the composition of the Commission and 
the role of the Court of Justice and Auditors. It also suggested examining the means ‘of 
improving the clarity and quality of legislation and of stepping up the campaign 
against fraud’. Finally, it called on the governments to study the possible introduction 
of a flexibility clause. On this the Italian Presidency set out several conditions or 
markers for the negotiators. Any discussions on closer forms of cooperation was to 
proceed on the basis of being open to all, compatible with the Union’s objectives and 
acquis communautaire, avoid discrimination and respect the single institutional 
framework in existence.
Under the heading Reinforcement of the Union’s capacity for external action the 
mandate firstly set out the objectives of CFSP, which included developing the Union’s 
political weight to equate with its economic strength, a coherency in external policy 
across all pillars, while respecting the role of the Commission and a readiness to 
develop a common defence policy in the framework of pursuing a common defence. It 
called on the negotiators to consider the possibility of appointing a Mr./Ms. CFSP 
while at the same time enhancing the ‘tools’ or the machinery of the pillar in achieving 
the specified objectives of CFSP. On defence matters the Italian mandate was a little 
more specific. It called for a clearer definition of the relationship between the EU and 
the WEU, the aim being to improve the operational capacity of the Union with specific 
reference to the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks. Finally it referred to the potential for closer 
cooperation on armaments.
Overall the Turin mandate was very open as regards the direction that IGC should take. 
The fact that it made few suggestions on the more specific approach that the 
Conference should take within the three broad areas reflected a continuing lack of 
consensus among governments on the details for reform. In this sense it was similar to 
the Reflection Group, but even less certain in that it only made tentative suggestions 
on the possible directions for goyemments in one area, namely WEU-EU relations and 
the ‘improvement of the operational capability’ of the Union with ‘specific reference
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to the ... Petersberg tasks’, while setting out several conditions on discussing 
flexibility.24
Development of the Mandate
The Conference proceeded with delegations tabling proposals mostly on those issues 
mentioned in the Turin mandate. However, the submission of position papers on 
nuclear energy (CONF/3877/96 -  Ireland), animal protection (CONF/3887/96 & 
CONF/3983/96 -  Britain), political parties (CONF/3920/96 -  Greece), young people 
(CONF/3812/97 -  Greece), culture and multilingualism (CONF/3819/97 -  Greece), 
sport (CONF/3917/97 & CONF/3927/97- Portugal) and the family (CONF/3924/97 -  
Spain) reflected the extent to which governments did not feel confined to the Turin 
mandate, as has been the case with previous IGCs, notably that on EPU back in 1991.25 
Also, just as chapter III referred to the diversity of declarations attached to the 
Maastricht Treaty the final treaty at Amsterdam included an equally diverse range with 
fifty seven declarations annexed to the final text and the Conference taking note of a 
further eight, including issues such as sport and the status of churches and non­
confessional organisations. In another sense, the diversity of the submissions to the 
Conference and the contents of some of the final declarations again depicted the lack 
of a well-defined theme to the negotiations and how the process had evolved from the 
more limited suggestions of Articles 189b(8) and J.4(6) TEU and the two attached 
declarations; Declaration No.l on civil protection, tourism and energy and Declaration 
No. 16 on the hierarchy of Community Acts. Indeed governments failed to act on the 
Maastricht recommendations in the two declarations as had generally been the case in 
the run up to the IGC. There was little to no discussion on either topics. Only Greece 
made a submission on tourism (CONF/3933/96), Belgium (CONF/3992/96) on energy 
and Spain on civil protection (CONF/3929/96).
As becomes apparent over the following chapters very often the submissions by 
delegations were little more than a repetition of what had previously been outlined in 
governments’ position papers on the eve of the Conference. Depending on the 
Presidency’s approach a government paper may be discussed at a meeting between
24 ER, No. 2131, 03/04/96, p.5.
25 See again Macuzelli, 1997, p. 171.
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personal representatives, though generally each Presidency preferred to draft their own 
paper on a specific issue that reflected the various options on the table. Appendix 4 
provides a list of the main documents submitted by the member governments across 
the main areas of the agenda as the IGC proceeded. It is possible to get an overall 
perspective on the various issues that some member governments were committed to.
While negotiations on CFSP, JHA and the institutions are discussed in the third section 
of the thesis, a brief outline is given of those governments that submitted papers on 
these and other issues during the sixteen months. On justice and home affairs the Irish 
government submitted two papers dealing with social exclusion. The Spanish 
delegation on two occasions submitted a very similar paper on internal asylum. As is 
shown in chapter VI the British Conservative government was keen to maintain the 
existing arrangement under the third pillar, while the French submitted a very detailed 
paper in February 1997. The German government was particularly committed to 
ensuring the communitarisation of customs cooperation, while both the Commission 
and the Benelux submitted papers before the end of 1996 outlining a new title on 
justice and home affairs in pillar one. On CFSP the British Conservative government 
submitted proposals on two key areas of Mr. CFSP and the policy planning capability. 
This was an attempt to make good on Douglas Hurd’s words four years earlier on 
showing that an intergovernmental CFSP was workable. The other big initiatives came 
from the group of five (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany and Spain) on WEU- 
EU relations; the French delegation on Mr. CFSP, and the Finnish and Swedish on the 
Petersberg Tasks.
On institutional reform the member governments submitted few papers of note. The 
differences over enlargement, as mentioned in the previous chapter, meant that it failed 
to provide the inspiration among governments to reform the institutional structure. The 
few key papers were the Commission’s outline on co-decision and its own 
restructuring and the French delegation’s on the composition and organisation of the 
Commission. Instead governments left much of the work to the Dutch Presidency, 
which attempted to reach a compromise on an area where governments showed little 
enthusiasm. The British and German governments continued their Maastricht debate 
on subsidiarity, culminating in a Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The British and French governments were keen to
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have a clearer outline on the role and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, while it was 
the French government that pushed on a role for national parliaments though it did not 
submit any further official papers during the Conference to re-emphasise its earlier 
position. Amsterdam introduced a new draft Protocol on the role of national 
parliaments. On flexibility, which should have seen a widespread submission of papers 
from governments given the potential implications of any treaty amendment, the 
debate was largely confined to a few key players, notably France, Germany, Britain, 
Italy and the Dutch Presidency. The final result at Amsterdam was a sophisticated 
combination of three forms of flexibility; the general enabling clauses from Articles 
43-45 TEU and the specific enabling clauses on the first and third pillars (Article 11 
TEC) and (Article 40 TEU); the constructive abstention through Article 23 TEU on 
CFSP and the pre-defined flexibility under Protocols No.2 on incorporating Schengen, 
Protocols No.3 on UK and Ireland on border control, Protocol No.4 on the UK and 
Ireland in Title IV and Protocol No.5 on the position of Denmark.
Moving into the other areas of the negotiations, on transparency in the operations of 
the EU’s institutional mechanisms, on ensuring greater public access to official 
documents and simplifying the treaties, it was a case of the Nordic members (Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland) pushing the hardest on these issues as their earlier position 
papers had signalled. Sweden tabled three papers on the subject with the other two 
states along with the British government also submitting a negotiating paper. The 
result was an amendment to what is now Article 1 TEU and the creation of Article 225 
TEC requiring the Council to outline within two years the procedures on gaining 
access to documents. Declaration No.39 also requires the institutions to set out 
guidelines to improve the drafting of Community legislation. It was a somewhat 
similar pattern on strengthening the environmental protection provisions of the treaty, 
the same four, Denmark, Sweden, Britain and Finland submitting negotiating papers 
along with the Belgian and Austrian delegations. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the Danish delegation was particularly keen for changes on this topic.26 The 
end result was changes to Article I TEU and the inclusion within Article 2 TEC of ‘a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ as a 
principle of the European Community. There were also a series of amendments to 
Article 95 TEC on the Approximation of Laws.
26 See Chapter III, p.82-3.
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As expected and as their governments had made clear in the run up to the Conference 
Austria and Sweden were committed to creating an employment chapter. The Belgian 
government was also keen on this and while the French government did not submit a 
paper on it, the arrival of the Jospin government brought a new dimension to this part 
of the agenda, as is described below. The result was a new title, Title VIII TEC on 
employment. The Austrian government, participating in its first IGC, also submitted a 
further four papers along with Italy, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Germany and Finland on 
strengthening the existing provisions on the protection of fundamental human rights 
and non-discrimination between men and women. The amendments at Amsterdam 
included a new Article 7 TEU on suspending the voting rights of a Member State in 
breach of Article 6(1) TEU which describes human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as principles upon which the Union is founded. The final draft also included a 
corresponding amendment to Article 7 TEU within the European Community (Article 
309 TEC).
3. OVERVIEW OF NEGOTIATIONS FROM TURIN TO DUBLIN
TO AMSTERDAM
Introduction
While the previous section focused on the issues on the IGC agenda this section does 
two things. Firstly it presents a general overview of the negotiations under each 
Presidency and secondly it attempts to identify what could be described as key 
meetings and individuals of the sixteen months’ process. This section presents several 
arguments. Firstly, for much of the Italian and Irish Presidencies the negotiations 
lacked direction on the key issues such as institutional reform, flexibility, JHA and 
WEU-EU relations. Governments were slow in outlining their objectives, or rather 
they were slow in providing the necessary detail to their rather vague positions 
outlined in the weeks and months running up to the Conference. Secondly, this left 
some governments mentioning postponement and another IGC. Thirdly, on some 
issues, notably institutional reform, the lack of direction persisted in the early months 
of the Dutch Presidency. This made postponement almost inevitable. However, the 
Dutch Presidency was astute at moving things along on other issues but often at the 
expense of clarity on what was being discussed and what were the intentions of other 
governments. Fourthly, over the sixteen months it was difficult to identify any series of
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decisive meetings that turned the negotiations one way or another, except for the 
meeting between Heads of State and Governments at Noordwijk on 23 May ‘97. The 
general absence of these kind of meetings reflects the extent to which the process was 
an incremental one, the negotiations slowly edging along, rather than there being many 
sudden twists and turns. It also reflects the extent to which the negotiations were 
shaped by meetings on other issues and events that did not form part of the IGC 
agenda. The final section of the chapter focuses on this. Finally, as was the case with 
previous IGCs, there were individuals who did stand out, proving influential in what is 
very often a dull process.
Italian Presidency
The Italian Presidency laid the ground work for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies. The 
overall goal was to hand over to the Irish Presidency with the preparatory work 
complete and the stage set for a draft treaty by December 1996. The Italian Presidency 
lost momentum with a general election in April 1996. At a time when the “Clean 
Hands” investigation was shown not to be completely successful -  with the uncovering 
of a corruption scandal in the state railway system -  Italian concerns were focused on 
the shape of the next government and its ability to survive.27 While weak coalitions 
have been a characteristic of post World War II Italian politics, even after the 1993 
electoral reform, familiarity did not mitigate against the negative effects on the Italian 
Presidency. A change in personnel in mid stream of a Presidency always left the 
incoming administration struggling with the issues and the process in general.
One official described the Italian Presidency’s approach on the IGC as similar to that 
of treading water, a lot of effort with little forward movement.28 The Italian Presidency 
during its three months went over all the items on the agenda. This amounted to little 
more than governments repeating their previously outlined positions.29 Much of the 
IGC under the Italian Presidency involved a continuous rehearsing of positions. As 
regards the general attitude of the delegations towards the negotiations it was a case of 
avoiding any serious engagement on the details. The lack-lustre performance was 
acknowledged from those involved in the process. One official remarked that ‘At Turin
27 See Patrick McCarthy, ‘Italy at a turning Poin/’, Current History, March 1997.
28 Interviews.
29 Ibid.
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things just seemed to die, it was a watershed, people’s ambitions had just seemed to 
drop’. Chirac called for the conference to ‘change into a higher speed’ requesting the 
draft treaty in December to have ‘options’ while at the same time being ‘sufficiently 
precise’. Santer remarked at the European Parliament session in Strasbourg on 19 June 
1996, ‘Let’s be frank, the outcome so far is hardly dazzling. The Italian Presidency 
began work with a great deal of commitment, and it is not its fault if the process is
O 1
lacking in dynamism’. He questioned the negotiators’ clarity of objectives and the 
urgency which they approached the IGC. He made a similar warning as did 
Commissioner Oreja regarding the necessity to avoid becoming entrapped in the belief 
‘that we have lots of time’. He concluded with a call ‘to move into a higher gear’.
Despite the lack of direction, the Italian Presidency at the Florence Summit remarked 
that the Florence Report on some issues ‘identified] first solutions’. This was the 
comment of the new Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Piero 
Fassino, on 18 June in Florence. He went on to say that it facilitated for the next 
Presidency to have in place a draft text of the eventual new treaty by December 1996.32 
A similar perspective was given in the Presidency’s conclusions. It described the 
‘analysis of issues’ as being ‘sufficiently advanced’ that it was now time to seek 
‘balanced solutions’.33
Irish Presidency
The slow start to the Conference and the little headway that was made by the Italian 
Presidency was evident from the assessment of the incoming Irish Presidency. For the 
Irish Presidency it was a case of starting from ‘largely a blank piece of paper’.34 While 
acknowledging the ground work carried out by the Italian Presidency, the discussions 
under the Irish Presidency were not based upon an Italian text.35 In fact, Bruton 
commented that the immediate aim of the Irish Presidency was to get the Union’s
30 Ibid.
31EDB, N°6752 -  20/06/1996.
32 EDB, N°6754 -  22/06/1996.
33 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Florence European Council, SN 300/96, 21-22 June 
1996; See supplement to ER N°2143 -  26/06/96.
34 Interviews.
35 Ibid.
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‘decision-making [process] moving again’.36 The Irish Presidency sought to push the 
process along to actual negotiations, moving towards genuine trade-offs or providing 
the basis for such trade-offs in the future.37 While the Irish Presidency would provide 
for some direction on certain issues, it also avoided the more difficult and controversial 
ones, leaving them for the Dutch Presidency. Indeed this is a feature that will be very 
apparent in the following section of the thesis. The Presidency would repeatedly use 
the argument that the negotiations were not ready for any significant move on the 
sensitive issues such as decision making procedures, often citing the British 
Conservative government as an obstacle. However, as is mentioned in the final section 
of this chapter and throughout part III of the thesis, the British often presented 
themselves as a useful scapegoat behind which other member governments could hide 
their lack of clarity and ambiguity on their objectives.
The mandate at Florence to submit a draft treaty to the Dublin Summit in December 
did provide a focus for the Conference. The Presidency’s approach and attitude was 
geared towards delivering on this draft treaty. There was some consensus within the 
Irish team that it was more than merely an issue of concluding a draft treaty. While the 
document in one sense reflected the current state of the negotiations, the chairman of 
the Group of Representatives Noel Dorr claimed that the aim was also to move beyond 
this, recognising and setting the foundations for agreement in certain areas that would 
be realised under the Dutch Presidency.39 Dorr’s deputy in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Bobby McDonagh claimed that the Irish Presidency sought to capture the 
‘upper-end of realism’ in the December draff.40 Similarly the Taoiseach John Bruton 
remarked that the process had to ‘unblock some decisions’ all of which may not occur 
within the period of the Irish Presidency but ‘it could move things forward quite a bit 
afterwards’.41
36 ‘Building up a New Momentum’, Irish Times (IT), 02/07/96. For similar positions see Dick Spring, 
T.D., Speech to the IBEC Kerry region annual general meeting The 1996 IGC and beyond: The future o f  
the European Union from an Irish perspective, 22 May, 1995; Dick Spring, Ireland’s Presidency o f  the 
European Union: A Mid-term Perspective, 7th November, 1996, Chatham House, London.
37 Anna-Carin Svensson, The IGC 1996-97 -  The Role o f  the Presidency, Presented at 26th ECPR, 
Warwick, March 23-28 1998,
38 Interview
39 Interviews; also see ‘Irish Presidency Releases Its Paper On The Main Points Of The New Treaty’, 
AE, 6/12/96; Anna-Carin Svensson, 1998, p.21
40 Interviews.
41 ‘Bruton keen to convey EU aims in simple terms’, IT, 03/07/96.
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Noel Dorr described the Presidency’s tool of negotiation as one of ‘successive 
approximation’.42 This entailed the Presidency presenting papers to the delegations 
that reflected and took into account the results of the previous meeting on the topic 
with further suggestions aiming to secure a greater acceptance among the delegations, 
each text getting closer to one on which there would be general agreement.43 The 
Taoiseach remarked that, after clearing the backlog arising from the BSE dispute (see 
below), the Presidency would then persuade Member States with divergent views on 
Europe’s role to ‘approximate them to a greater degree’.44 However, this approach 
came in from some criticism from the other governments. Firstly, there were the claims 
from other delegations, particularly the French, that ‘successive approximation’ was 
not a process of negotiation. The criticisms ranged from claims that the Presidency’s 
papers were presented as fait accompli, unwilling to incorporate changes or 
suggestions from other delegations to accusations that it was overly influenced by the 
Council Secretariat or the domestic implications of a rift with the British 
government.45
It was certainly the case that there were mixed results from this successive 
approximation approach. The November 18-19 meeting of personal representatives 
saw the Presidency putting on the table a new title on ‘An Area of Freedom and 
Security’, to be followed by changes on police cooperation in the third pillar. While 
this reflected one of the first signs of a significant step forward on a major issue, it also 
epitomised the extent to which the Presidency allowed the negotiations to drift on the 
more sensitive issues. Firstly, as was reflected in the December draft, the Dutch 
Presidency would be left to complete the more sensitive matters on the third pillar, 
such as the role of the institutions and the place of any new title within the treaty 
structure. Secondly, by focusing on the third pillar, little was achieved on the other two 
chapters on institutional reform and CFSP. The Presidency’s papers on CFSP largely 
repeated those of the Italians, except on decision making, while a suggested approach 
on a reformed rule of co-decision amounted to the only significant paper on 
institutional reform. (See Below)
42 Interview, see Svensson, 1998.
43 Interviews.
44 See again IT, 02/07/96; Dick Spring, 22/05/95; Dick Spring, 07/11/96, London.
45 Interviews.
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The draft treaty of December 1996 told a similar story. It divided CFSP into two 
chapters, one on objectives, means and structures, and a second on Security and 
Defence. Of the first of these chapters the most significant changes suggested included 
a stronger role for the Commission under Article J.5, a Declaration on policy planning 
and early warning capability, and the new Article J.8a on decision making that would 
bear much similarity with the final outcome in Amsterdam, making room for 
consensus-minus-one, easier access to QMV but with the national policy card in the 
form of the Luxembourg Compromise always available. On implementing instruments 
three suggestions were made; systematic cooperation, common positions and joint 
actions.46 As is shown over the following chapters the draft treaty talked around the 
issues on security and defence, a sensitive matter for a neutral Member State as 
Ireland.47
The lack of progress on institutional matters was reflected in the absence from the draft 
treaty of proposed provisions on the sensitive issues of institutional reform; size and 
composition of the Commission, extension of qualified majority voting, weighting of 
votes in the Council. This was also the case with flexibility. On such institutional 
matters Dorr claimed that the aim was to strike a balance between a non- 
confrontational paper and an approach limited to the smallest common denominator, 
the suggestions on institutional matters representing the extreme end of the former 
example.48
The Presidency’s reluctance to tackle in a vigorous manner these contentious issues 
also reflected the continued unwillingness among the other governments to engage in a 
frank discussion at this stage in the negotiations.49 As mentioned in the pre­
negotiations, and as the mandate for the Conference was outlined, governments for the 
greater part had not thought through in detail their exact positions and objectives. They 
had not sorted out their priorities. This was still the case on many of the issues at this 
stage in the negotiations. For example on JHA only eight papers were submitted by the 
Netherlands, Benelux, Britain, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Belgium and the
46 See CONF 2500/96, pp.67-76.
47 Ibid. pp.80-86.
48 See ‘New Treaty’, AE, 06/12/96.
49 Ferdinando Riccardi, ‘The Reform of the Treaty gains Little ground in Dublin’, Europe, December 
1996.
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Commission. No papers were submitted on the institutions, while Britain submitted 
two of the nine papers on CFSP, Italy, Greece, Finland, Germany and Sweden taking 
the rest. On flexibility only the French, German and Portuguese governments 
submitted proposals of any detail. In turn the Franco-German joint letter from early 
December offered nothing new on these key areas, the vague and contradictory 
language disguising fundamental differences between the two governments.50 Member 
governments and the Presidency seemed more comfortable with the ‘softer’ issues on 
the agenda such as transparency, strengthening the provisions in protecting human 
rights and the environment and a more rhetorical chapter on employment. The 
provisions in the draft treaty on these issues were very similar to those in the final 
treaty at Amsterdam. Yet, the fact that these issues were pushed by few member 
governments Austria, Sweden Denmark and Belgium on the Employment chapter,51 
Austria and Italy pushing on human rights provisions and Sweden on transparency, 
with few submissions to come during the Dutch Presidency reflected the extent to 
which the other governments were not particularly focused or interested in these 
issues.52
Even though this process was to a large extent a continuation of Maastricht, 
governments were showing little determination to address these difficult issues. 
Indeed, the inherent feature of these constitutional bargaining processes to postpone 
confronting divisive issues was yet again apparent even at this stage in the 
negotiations. Kohl referred to the possibility of holding a third IGC ‘if all the problems 
are not resolved with Maastricht II’.53 Santer and the Commission again expressed 
concern at the lack of pace to the whole process, as did the President of the European 
Parliament, who particularly regretted the talk of another IGC in the middle of the 
present one.54 In late October, Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaene of Belgium 
commented on how ‘Negotiation is taking place in a conservative, if  not reactionary, 
atmosphere, some wanting to go back to earlier decisions’.55 Dehaene’s dismay came
50 Press and Information Office o f the Federal Government, 13 December 1996.
51 The arrival o f the Jospin government in early June complicated the final deal on employment but did 
little to change the substance o f the chapter. (See below)
52 Interviews.
53 ‘Helmut kohl envisages a “Maastricht in ’” , AE, 03/10/96.
54 ‘Concerned by the Slowness and Certain Developments in the Work o f the IGC, the European 
Commission Intends to take New Initiatives’, AE, 04/09/96; ‘Hansch shares in Santer’s Perplexities over 
a “second” IGC’, AE, 19/09/96.
55 ‘For Prime Minister Dehaene, the IGC takes place in a “Conservative, if  not Reactionary 
Atmosphere’, AE, 22/10/1996.
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after the informal European Council meeting in Dublin in October ‘96 that aimed to 
provide an impetus and focus to the negotiations. However, as explained below such a 
negative perception of the progress could be somewhat expected given the pre­
occupations at this time; the conclusion of the stability pact on EMU, the continual 
struggle to meet the Maastricht criteria and the continually antagonistic approach of 
the British Conservative government on a range issues from BSE, and the Working 
Time Directive to fishing quotas.56
At the Dublin II summit on 13-14 December ‘96 Heads of State and Government were 
generally robust in their defence of the process so far, Chirac’s remarks on the draft 
treaty ‘You’ll see, it will work’ epitomising this. Though, only days earlier the 
French Foreign Minister had described the Irish proposal as the ‘exact reflection of the 
mediocrity of the work so far’, declaring that ‘Things are not going well’ and that
co
France would not accept ‘pseudo-reform’. Indeed the fact that John Major described 
the Council meeting on the draft text as ‘the most substantial’ discussion he had heard 
on the content of the Intergovernmental Conference reflected the lack of substantial 
progress on a range of issues across all pillars.59 This was a reflection of the close 
cooperation between the British and Irish governments in the weeks before the Dublin 
draft. Both governments were all too aware of the negative impact a fall-out on the 
European agenda would have on both governments attempts to manage the peace 
process in Northern Ireland.60 As one Irish minister remarked Major was willing to do 
the Irish a favour, and minimise the attacks on their draft treaty.61 The looseness of the 
treaty language and the absence of any detailed proposals on the hot institutional issues 
meant Major could be kept on board. However, as is shown over the next three 
chapters it also suited the Irish Presidency not to push for change on these sensitive 
issues.
56 See below for BSE and Working Time Directive; On fishing quotas see ‘The United Kingdom firmly 
raises the problem o f quota misappropriation’, AE, 10/06/96; ‘Spanish shipowners feel Britain is 
exaggerating the quota hopping problem’, AE, 26/07/96.
57 Ibid. p.5.
58 ‘Opening o f the “Conclave” on the Irish Presidency Document’, AE, 07/12/96.
59 ‘European Council in Dublin’, AE, 06/12/96 p.2; Also see ‘EU/IGC -  Draft Treaty’, AE, 10/12/96.
60 Interviews.
61 Ibid.
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Dutch Presidency -  Moving to the End Game
The Dutch Presidency’s bottom line was securing a treaty by Amsterdam, no matter 
the substance. The diplomatic embarrassment of Black Monday at Maastricht was 
particularly influential on the overall Dutch approach. This left the Dutch Presidency 
keen to ensure that they would handle the whole process much more efficiently this 
time around. In an attempt to avoid a similar debacle at this Conference they 
restructured their internal organisation. The Prime Minister’s office charged itself with 
the over-all co-ordination of the negotiations, with the Secretary General for Economic 
Affairs (Geelhood) acting as Kok’s overall supervisor. While the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs managed the IGC on a daily basis, in the lead up to Amsterdam the Prime 
Minister office’s became more involved in the detail of the process.
The Presidency recognised the difficulty of the task of concluding at Amsterdam. In its 
programme for the IGC it claimed that it would ‘do everything in its power to 
accomplish the task it has been set’ but at the same time acknowledged that this was 
‘not enough to guarantee’ that the IGC would finish on time.64 This was a recognition 
of the considerable differences that continued to exist over essential issues, the lack of 
progress and direction on key issues such as the institutions and CFSP during the 
Italian and Irish Presidencies. It was also an acknowledgement of the continued 
uncertainty in the end game. This uncertainty related to firstly, whether there would be 
a change in government after the British election expected in early May, and secondly, 
given this change, the likelihood of securing agreement in such a short time period 
from early May to mid-June, the suggested time that the Turin Summit made as 
regards the IGC’s conclusions. The Dutch Presidency was very keen to have the 
Conference conclude under its supervision, not having to reschedule for a later date 
during the Luxembourg Presidency.
The general approach of the governments had not changed sufficiently in the early 
stages of the Dutch Presidency. At the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome the Presidency declared it their intention to complete the reform of the 2nd and 
3rd pillars within a month leaving institutional matters for the final days. This was as
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 See ‘Programme o f Dutch Presidency’, AE, 20/12/96.
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much a recognition of the lack of consensus among member delegations as it was a 
recognition of the futility of negotiating with the British administration on such a 
sensitive matter. Dutch Foreign Minister van Mierlo admitted as much when he 
claimed that the institutional matters would only be decided by the heads of 
Government and State. He said, ‘The Heads of State and Government, who perhaps 
have more authority, will have to find a solution’.65 He spoke of handing to the 
European Council ‘manageable dilemmas’.
On justice and home affairs it was a case of some deft manoeuvres from the Dutch 
Presidency that laid the way for an eventual agreement. Indeed it was the lack of focus 
from certain governments due yet again to domestic distractions that allowed the 
Dutch Presidency to reach agreement. As is shown in the following chapters, this was 
particularly the case on the incorporation of Schengen and also on the extent of the 
communitarisation of third pillar matters. At the same time the Presidency pressed 
hard to provide sufficient ‘opt-outs’ for those governments, notably the British, Irish 
and Danish that continually expressed a lack of interest or general reservations on core 
changes to the third pillar. Internal divisions within the Dutch government did not 
allow it to take a similarly active stance on CFSP matters as on JHA.
Some time after the government concluded its four official position papers in 1995 the 
right wing liberals, the W D , began to adopt a more sceptical approach towards the 
European Union. On EMU they feared the implications of joining with the weaker 
currencies such as the Italian Lira and the Spanish peseta.66 As regards the integration 
of the WEU, the government in its position paper had made it clear that it supported 
this approach. However, as the IGC proceeded the VVD drew back from the previous 
official position. This was particularly evident during budgetary debates in the Dutch 
parliament where certain members of the W D , claimed that the WEU could in effect
fiHbe abandoned or its development forgotten about. On the institutional front there 
were similar signals of reluctance. Within the VVD there was a certain unwillingness 
as regards extending QMV and the possible negative implications that this could hold.
65 EDB, N°6966 -  01/05/1997.
66 Interviews; On the Dutch preparations for IGC see M. Kwast-van Duursen, ‘The Dutch Debate: A  
Shifting Policy on Europe’, in The 1996 IGC National Debates (1), Discussion paper 66, London: RIIA,
1996.
67 Interviews.
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This more pragmatic or sceptical form of thinking from the W D  was expressed by 
Michel Patijn. Responsible for European matters in the Dutch foreign ministry he ran 
the Presidency and the IGC on a daily basis. While Dutch vigour would not by itself 
have delivered an ambitious treaty on these particular issues the domestic situation and 
internal divisions weakened any attempt to do so.
As the end game approached, there was a collective awareness among governments of 
the negative implications of failing to meet the June deadline and concluding with a 
‘successful’ treaty. Yet, even at this stage there was not a great deal of reaction from 
governments. There was no concerted submission of detailed negotiating positions 
from member governments, either on JHA, institutions or CFSP. Indeed this was also 
the case on the other IGC issues. On the employment chapter there were no further 
position papers. On human rights there were only two papers, from the Italian 
government and the European Parliament. Britain was the only government to push on 
subsidiarity and Finland on transparency.
Therefore, the Dutch Presidency was given a particularly free hand in presenting draft 
proposals to the other delegations. This raises the question on whether these proposals 
were adequately discussed by the delegations. One Austrian official estimated that, in 
the final draft presented by the Dutch, 80% of the provisions had not been consented 
to, and in some cases, not even discussed beforehand. Indeed, as is shown in the 
following section of the thesis, the Dutch Presidency was particularly astute at 
presenting papers and bringing member governments along without there being 
common agreement or awareness of the implications that would arise with the changes.
The weakness of the IGC approach on making treaty changes was mentioned at the 
Amsterdam European Council.68 The nature of the IGC to postpone dealing with 
divisive issues was directly addressed by the Irish Prime Minister John Bruton. He 
criticised the increasing tendency of postponing decisions and problems until a later 
IGC. He suggested that such a culture was very much precipitated by Maastricht. He 
described such an approach as a mistake creating ‘false expectations’ on the Member 
States’ ability to settle particular issues. He was resigned to the comment that
68 ‘Severe Judgement from most Political Groups which note the Intergovernmental Negotiation method 
is limited’, AE, 19/06/97.
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‘unfortunately, it is the way we proceed in these negotiations’. He said ‘it is necessary 
to review the way intergovernmental conferences function’ with the need to avoid 
leaving the European Council to do so much in such a short period.69 The frustrations 
expressed by the Dutch Presidency, Chirac and Dehaene amounted to a similar 
criticism of the approach that the governments had taken throughout the IGC, lacking 
in direction that left the negotiations drifting to a confusing conclusion and postponing
70decisions.
Key Meetings & Individuals
Despite the fact that there were three levels to the negotiations; Heads of State and 
Government, the Foreign Ministers and the personal representatives, there were few 
meetings that can be singled out as particularly influential. Starting with the European 
Council there were two further summit meetings in Dublin on 5 October 1996 and 
Noordwijk in May 1997 to complement those at Dublin in December 1996 and 
Amsterdam in June 1997. The Dublin I summit was built up as a means of providing a 
fresh impetus to the process where Heads of State and Government would engage in 
what President Jacques Chirac described as a ‘frank discussion’, on issues from the 
three major areas of the Conference: Europe and the citizen, institutional reform and an 
effective external policy. To facilitate for this openness and ‘frank discussion’ the
• • 71meeting finished without making formal conclusions. The May meeting at 
Noordwijk was necessary given the tendency of the member governments to postpone 
any serious negotiating on sensitive issues, most notably institutional matters, until 
after the 1 May British elections. (See Below) Therefore there was a heavy workload 
to go through within a six to seven week period. As is shown in chapter V the meeting 
at Noordwijk was particularly crucial in shaping the final position on the future size of 
the Commission and the re-weighting of council votes.
The absence of any meetings between Foreign Ministers that could be described as 
major turning points for the Conference reflected the rather limited role that the 
Foreign Ministers’ once-a-month meeting played in the whole process. Squeezed 
between the Heads of State and Government that had the final say on the package,
69 ‘The Fifteen Reach Consensus on “Amsterdam Treaty’, AE, 18/06/97.
70 Ibid.
71 ER, No. 2162, 02/10/96, p.3.
Chapter IV 126
while providing over-all direction, and the personal representatives that would have a 
better grasp on the nuances of the negotiations, the Foreign Ministers failed to carve 
out an influential role for themselves.72 Indeed, the one meeting of note confirmed this. 
At the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March ’97, the Dutch Foreign 
Minister, Hans van Mierlo, remarked that sensitive issues such as institutional reform 
were better dealt with by the Heads of State and Government that had the authority to 
make decisions.
It was less a case of any one of the series of meetings between the personal 
representatives acting as a major turning point in the Conference. The very role and 
function of the personal representatives was not to provide dynamic shifts and turns to 
the process. Rather the weekly meetings, which aimed to have in place a document 
reflecting the agreement, reached on the range of issues on the agenda. This was then 
handed over to the Heads of State and Government for their further amendments and 
final political approval.
The ensuing detailed examination of the negotiations on CFSP, the institutions, and 
justice and home affairs reveals that at certain moments in the process and on certain 
issues there were influential individuals. For example, Noel Dorr as the chairman of 
the group of personal representatives during the Irish Presidency was generally 
acclaimed by officials from most of the Member States and the Commission and 
Council Secretariat as an astute manager of the process, moving the negotiations along 
to a draft treaty by the Dublin European Council meeting in December 1996. The 
Dutch Minister of European Affairs, Michel Patijn also left his mark on the process in 
the same position as chairman of the group of personal representatives from January 
1997 to the conclusion of the negotiations. However, his personal touch extended 
beyond managing the meetings and the progress of the Conference to taking the lead 
for the Dutch Presidency on the incorporation of the Schengen acquis.73 As the 
negotiations reached their climax in June ‘97 the politicians took on the key roles. The 
Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok as the President in Office gradually became more 
involved in the day to day operations of the IGC as Amsterdam approached. As 
becomes apparent over the rest of the thesis, the French President and Prime Minister
72 On this point see McDonagh, 1998, p.20.
73 See chapter VI, pp. 204-13.
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Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the British 
prime Minister Tony Blair would all play their part in shaping the final treaty.
4. THE OVERSHADOWING EVENTS
Introduction
Over the following three chapters the detailed nature of the negotiations on a selection 
of topics from the three areas on institutions, CFSP and JHA are examined, revealing 
the extent of the lack of direction of the Conference, the ambiguity that left 
governments drifting into agreement or postponing issues for another Conference. 
However, before proceeding with this analysis it is important that the IGC negotiations 
are placed in context.74 The necessity of doing so has already been mentioned in 
Chapter II when considering the defining features of the negotiations. Certain domestic 
and EU situations shaped the very structure of the IGC and at times these issues 
eclipsed the very negotiations, helping to explain the presence of the four features in 
the negotiations, particularly why there was a lack of focus from governments and 
ultimately indirection. Any examination of the twists and turns to the IGC needs a 
much broader focus than the specific IGC meetings. This following section considers 
the influence of the British and French general elections the qualification for the third 
stage of EMU, employment and EMU and the BSE crisis.
British & French Elections
An understanding of the British and French domestic politics in the run-up to the 
parliamentary elections is essential in explaining the development of the Conference. 
The British general election was critical to the approach taken by governments and 
their delegations. It shaped the whole IGC process in several ways. The expected 
change of administration and the arrival of a more united and less confrontational 
Labour government left the other governments less inclined to push for agreement and 
reveal their negotiating hand on the more sensitive issues early on in the IGC. Officials 
claimed that there was no incentive to push the negotiations along on institutional and
74 Juliet Lodge places a similar emphasis on considering the IGC negotiations in context. See Juliet 
Lodge, 1998a, pp.482-6.
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CFSP matters since most realised that this would be detrimental to the whole IGC 
process, given the continually weakening position of the British Prime Minister.75 It 
was in no government’s interest to precipitate an unnecessary crisis in Westminster, 
something that an early draft proposal with significant extensions, say, in the use of 
QMV was likely to give rise to. One official suggested that the IGC could have been 
completed by December 1996 but for the ‘British situation’ and the realisation that 
even fewer significant changes would have been agreed to under the then Conservative 
administration.76 Yet, the timing of the British general election also presented an 
excuse for governments behind which they could hide their poorly defined objectives. 
The arrival of the Labour government exposed the extent to which there was lack of 
consensus among governments on their priorities on certain issues. Finally because 
governments adopted this approach of waiting for a Labour government it left them 
with much to do at a late stage in the negotiations.
Throughout the IGC the French government was beset with internal divisions and 
wrangling as in the pre-negotiations. There was further opposition to the government’s 
economic programme. While this was at its most visible with the striking French lorry 
drivers, much of the opposition very often came from the RPR’s coalition partner, the 
UDF, and from within the back-bench ranks of the RPR. On May 28 1996 Balladur 
organised a public debate about economic policy. In attendance was Phillippe Seguin, 
president of the National Assembly. Both claimed that an alternative approach was 
required to that which was being pursued by the Juppe government. But, there was no 
form of unity in this opposition, with Seguin calling for a greater role for the state, and 
Balladur a more restricted one.
Considering the French commitment on EMU and the realisation that further tough and 
austere measures were necessary for France to qualify, and given the expected 
opposition from certain sectors of the public and from within the RPR itself, President 
Jacques Chirac decided that an early general election scheduled for May 1997 was 
necessary for an RPR government to have a clear mandate as regards meeting the 
Maastricht criteria. The inevitable loss of seats would be offset by a more streamlined
75 Interviews.
76 Ibid.
Chapter IV 129
77and united government. Chirac was attempting to consolidate the government’s 
weakening position. By early May a series of polls had indicated that the French left
70
were level with the government parties. The eventual success of the Socialist party 
and the arrival of the Jospin government while late in the negotiations added a further 
dimension to the IGC process.79 Firstly, the Socialist government upped the stakes in 
the already intense debate on EMU, as is described below. Already proving the most 
demanding issue on the EU agenda at the level of Head of State and Government, at 
ministerial level and other levels it further dominated in the final stages of the IGC 
negotiations, a crucial time in any negotiations but especially with this IGC with much 
of the delicate negotiations left to late on in the process. Secondly, there was a last- 
minute change in approach of the French negotiation team and the French government 
as regards certain issues on the IGC agenda. The most obvious example of this was the 
employment chapter. This added to the already overcrowded list of issues that needed 
resolving during the Amsterdam Summit, though in the end there was little substantive 
change in the chapter from what had been set out much earlier in the negotiations. In 
the more general sense there was an unhelpful air of uncertainty as to what the overall 
French position would be and how the two heads of the executive would operate.80 
This was not only confined to the IGC but also extended to all European issues and in 
particular EMU. Again, it was an added burden at a critical stage in the process. 
Thirdly, as is shown in later chapters the results of the general election were 
unexpected, especially the magnitude of the Socialist win and the collapse of the RPR, 
leaving the French political elite in a state of shock, and yet again distracted at a 
crucial stage in the IGC process.
Qualifying for EMU
The Maastricht IGCs were the highlight of the long-standing link between the political 
and economic and monetary aspects of the process of European integration. However, 
at this IGC it was not only a case of that link being somewhat weakened, rather the 
very implementation of EMU overshadowed the IGC. There were several dimensions
77 See EIU Country Report -  France -  2nd Quarter 1997; Lara Marlowe, ‘Coalition presented as force of 
modernity’, IT, 23/04/97.
78 David Buchan, ‘French polls: Left level with coalition’, FT, 06/05/97.
79 Barry James, ‘Right Faces Living With the Left’, International Herald Tribune (IHT), 26/05/97, p.9.
80 Interviews.
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to the EMU debate. Firstly, there was the question of the ability of Member States to 
meet the qualifying criteria. There were several similarities in the situations faced by 
the French and German governments. The doubts as regards the ability of either 
members to meet the Maastricht criteria heightened.81 Both governments responded by 
means that precipitated further criticism. The Juppe government shifted pension funds 
into government coffers, while attempting to sell off state shares. The German 
Finance Ministry in an attempt to meet the 3% figure on the budget deficit initially 
proposed a privatisation of the greater part of Deutsche Telekom. This was followed 
by the much more controversial proposal from Theo Waigel’s finance ministry to re­
value German gold reserves. This met with stiff opposition from the Bundesbank and a
tense stand-off that in effect ended in defeat for the government’s proposal, less than
0-1
four weeks before the Amsterdam Summit in June ‘97.
The pressure on the German government with its, at times, mixed defence of the strict 
Maastricht criteria was particularly great.84 This left Chancellor Kohl particularly 
constrained, unable to coordinate and pursue the political end of European integration 
at this IGC. Even his announcement on 3 April ‘97 of his intention to run for the 
chancellery in 1998 was met with open criticism from within the ranks of the CDU.85 
By this stage, with the IGC reaching a climax, he was unable to rise above, or bring 
together, the domestic differences as he had done so often in the past, for fear of 
exasperating the delicate position on EMU.86 The manoeuvring and refining by the 
SPD of its position on the Euro in particular the Gerhard Schroeder element in the 
party together with the earlier criticisms from the CSU and Edmund Stoiber was to 
undermine the federal government’s efforts. While recognising that outright opposition 
to the Euro amounted to electoral suicide Schroeder and Stoiber were determined to 
have it both ways, welcoming the Euro, while criticising the federal government’s
81 ‘Germans look for EMU flexibility’, IT, 28/03/97; Barry James, ‘France to Freeze Budget to Meet 
Maastricht Limits’, IHT, 08/08/96.
82 Barry James, ‘EU Allows France To Juggle Budget: Single-Currency Maneuver Disturbs Germans 
and Others’, IHT, 01/11/96; Barry James, ‘Giscard Gives Conditional Nod to France’s EMU Deal’, IHT, 
11/10/96.
83 Stephanie Flanders, ‘Germany’s cross o f gold’, FT, 02/0697.
84 See ‘Bavarian Authorities want Pre-EMU Convergence “Monitoring”’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
13/11/96; Peter Norman, ‘Bonn increases deficit forecast to 2.9%’, FT, 27/01/1997; ‘Germany hoping 
for the best’, FT, 29/01/97.
85 EIU Country Report -  Germany 2nd Quarter 1997, p. 12; See John Schmid, ‘Much Distress in Europe’, 
IHT, 30/04/97.
86 Interview; ‘Poll shows lack of support for Kohl’s re-election’, IT, 05/0497.
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approach. Much of this criticism focused on the consequences of the fudged 
qualification criteria.88 More specifically the fear among the public, the opposition and 
Bundesbank was that the acceptance of the less rigorous Southern European Member 
States, namely Italy, Spain and Portugal, could undermine the credibility of the project 
and give rise to a soft Euro. The German government had to recognise and understand 
these fears while at the same time balancing them with the Trojan efforts made by 
Spain, and Italy, in particular, to meet the magic figures of Maastricht.89
The debate as regards monetary discipline extended beyond the final stages of the 
transfer to the Euro, concern focusing on the willingness and ability of certain Member 
States to maintain similarly rigorous control on public spending and budget deficits. 
This fear was particularly expressed from within Germany.90 The worry as before, was 
the possibility that the Euro would be undermined with a more relaxed approach from 
those Member States, particularly Italy, that had taken exceptional steps to meet the 
criteria. The submission of the Stability and Growth Pact, to the Dublin European 
Council in December 1996 sought to deal with this issue.91 Indeed the conclusion of 
this pact after two years of negotiations was an equally major preoccupation for the 
Irish Presidency as preparing the draft treaty.92 Again it was a case of the deep 
differences between the French and German approach to European integration having 
to be reconciled. For the French it was a case of having to swallow the bitter pill of 
German monetary policy, an independent central bank. The French put greater 
emphasis on the growth side of the pact, while the German government emphasised the 
stability which it would provide. The German government was adamant about the 
need for a tough enforcement mechanism that would ensure that Member States kept
87 EIU Country Report (Germany), 2nd quarter, pp. 10-12; EIU Country Report (Germany), 3rd quarter 
1996, p.10
88 Ibid.
89 ‘Kohl on Italy’, AE, 07/02/97; Andrew Hurst ‘Odds Shorten Dramatically on Italy ERM Move’, 
Reuters, 22/11/96; ‘Italy pins EMU hopes on mini-budget’, IT, 19/04/97; Edward Luce, ‘Odds shorten 
on Rome joining front-runners in EMU Stakes’, FT, 15/07/97; Barry James, ‘Spain’s New Leader Vows 
to Meet Criteria For Single Currency’, IHT, 04/05/96; ‘Smiling Spain’, FT, 09/04/97; David White, 
‘Spain: Recovery helps prospects for membership of EMU’, FT, 11/06/97.
90 Lionel Barber & John Kampfner, ‘Germany: Tough terms set for EMU deal’, FT, 13/12/96.
91 ‘From Stability Pact to EMS 2 ’, AE, 30/11/96.
92 Interviews.
93 ‘Kohl and Chirac still divided on stability pact’, Telegraph, 14/06/97.
Chapter IV 132
their government deficits and their inflation rates low.94 The French government was 
less eager to push for such strict criteria.95
EMU & Employment
A further feature of the EMU debate that was to heighten tensions between the French 
and German governments with a direct spill over into the IGC negotiations related to 
the issue of employment. The high levels of unemployment across many of the EU 
states had left several governments, as described above, calling for an EU initiative to 
tackle this problem, with a specific employment chapter providing a basis for future 
policy. There was also the ideological argument that it would provide a balance to the 
monetary orientation of the treaty. Indeed this justification was tentatively presented 
by the new Labour government in Britain in its support for a new chapter on 
employment.96 However, the arrival of the Socialist Jospin government in early June 
1997 further complicated the negotiations on the employment chapter and the progress 
to the third stage of EMU, at a time when the IGC was reaching its climatic end.
Entering office on the back of pledges to tackle unemployment and promote growth, 
the Socialist government expressed difficulties with the Growth and Stability Pact that 
was agreed in principle in Dublin six months earlier.97 The legal text of the pact was 
due for final approval at the Amsterdam Summit meeting. While not calling for a 
renegotiation, France’s Finance Minister and Prime Minister suggested a ‘new 
balance’ was needed between the old pursuit of monetary stability and the requirement 
to tackle the unemployment problem.98 There were similar calls for greater co­
ordination in economic policies, as required by Articles 102 and 103 of the Maastricht 
treaty.99 On the proposed employment chapter for the treaties the French suggested that 
it allow for the creation of funding or subsidy programmes. There was not sufficient 
support among governments for this form of an employment chapter. The German and
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Robert Taylor, ‘Britain ready to sign employment chapter’, FT, 29/05/97.
97 Lionel Barber ‘Budget rules: Paris seeks EMU pact delay’, FT, 10/06/97; Lionel Barber, ‘Jospin 
signals doubts over EMU’, FT, 09/06/97.
98 Ibid.; Edmund Andrews, ‘France Puts Brakes on the Euro: Paris Won’t Be Ready to Ratify Pact Next 
Week’, IHT, 10/06/97.
99 Patrick Smyth ‘French seek time to ratify currency stability’, IT, 10/06/97.
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the new British government agreed to the principle of the chapter but on condition that 
it made no such commitments to spending.100
The German government also agreed at the Amsterdam Summit to a resolution 
fleshing out existing provisions in favour of greater co-ordination of macroeconomic 
policies via EU finance ministers.101 This, together with the creation of a Stability 
Council with limited powers, allowed for limited French success in what was always 
an issue of ensuring some form of a political counter weight to an independent Central 
Bank. The agreement to establish a Stability Council, despite its limited powers, was 
a further example of this preoccupation. Again it was a case of a compromise with 
little substance covering the deep differences between the two governments.
BSE Crisis
As the IGC convened in Turin the EU was reeling from the announcement by the 
British government that there might be a link between the mad cow disease and its 
human equivalent CJD. The central plank of the Union’s reaction was the imposition 
of a world-wide ban on British beef and by-products. The British government’s 
response was one of non-cooperation on EU affairs until the ban was lifted. In the 
House of Commons Prime Minister John Major said that there would be no progress 
on the IGC negotiations until the ban on the by-products was lifted and a framework 
laid out for the total lifting of the beef ban. He expected the Florence Summit of June 
1996 to be ‘dominated by this issue’ saying ‘it could not proceed with our normal 
cooperation’.103 On Thursday the May 23 at the close of the cabinet meeting the 
Foreign Secretary remarked on the government’s policy that ‘We do not know if this 
will run for days, ... even two to three months, perhaps even longer. The policy will 
continue until the objective achieved’.104
100 Peter Norman, ‘EU treaty: Germany drops objection to jobs chapter’, FT, 12/06/97; See Robert 
Taylor, 29/05/97.
101 Lionel Barber, ‘Stability pact: Paris and Bonn reach compromise again’, FT, 17/06/97; Lionel 
Barber, ‘Stability council’: Euro-zone watchdog to lose its teeth’, FT, 19/03/97.
102 Ibid.
103 EDB, N°6732 -  22/05/1996.
104 EDB, N°6735 -  25/05/1996.
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The effects of the British policy were evident in its refusal to sign the European 
Convention on Insolvency Procedures thereby preventing its ratification.105 Further 
examples of measures blocked included EU decisions on the elections in Albania and 
human rights in Burma, a declaration on political dialogue with Korea and a regulation 
on humanitarian aid.106 Further to this non-cooperation the British government issued 
proceedings in the European Court of Justice to have the Commission’s Decision
107annulled on the ground that there was no serious risk to human or animal health.
In preparing for the Florence Summit the Italian Presidency not only had the task of 
handing over the negotiations to the Irish Presidency but it was seeking to avoid a 
disaster at the summit while managing the frantic efforts to reach a compromise and 
restore normality to all the levels of EU decision making. Four days before the summit 
of 21 June at a meeting of Foreign Ministers, or their representatives, Rifkind said ‘that
10Rmuch work remains to be done’. In the end, it was a compromise circulated by the 
Presidency on the basis of the Commission’s proposal, a series of British proposals, 
and a last minute suggestion by John Major permitting beef exports to third countries 
that so wished, that led to Rifkind’s statement on Friday afternoon 21 June that ‘The 
policy of non-cooperation will cease now’.109
Despite the ending of the policy of non-cooperation by June the focus of the member 
governments had been shifted away from the IGC process as the Conference got under 
way. The repercussions of the beef crisis continued to be felt throughout the IGC 
process, further complicating the UK government’s relations with the other members. 
In turn it exacerbated the divisions within the Conservative party. At the height of the 
crisis in mid 1996 the morale of the anti-EU camp was boosted with the formation of a 
Referendum Party by a French MEP, Sir James Goldsmith, that supported a 
referendum of some form on the UK’s relations with the EU.110 This seemed to inspire 
certain elements within the Conservative party to make similar suggestions. Bill Cash, 
MP for Stafford, tabled a similar motion in the House of Commons, on a possible
105 EDB, N°6734 -  24/05/1996.
106 EDB, N°6736 -  28/05/1996.
107 ‘Beef Ban : UK Takes its Case to European Court’ Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Press 
Release 174/96, 24/05/96.
108 EDB, N°6750 -  17/06/1996.
109 See Florence, 21 and 22 June 1996.
110 Robert Peston, ‘Billionaire financier demands Tories and Labour pledge referendum on EU’, FT, 
30/08/95.
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referendum, with 74 Conservative MPs voting for the motion. Former Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher expressed support for Bill Cash’s cause donating a considerable 
sum of money to the European Foundation that was chaired by Cash. The 
government’s inability to secure a date for the lifting of the EU wide ban was a 
constant reminder to the Eurosceptics of what they considered as an ‘intrusive 
Brussels’.111 Previous suggestions from the Prime Minister that the conditions of the 
Florence plan would be satisfied by November 1996 gave rise to considerable criticism
119of the government during a House of Commons debate on 16 December.
Yet again on the defensive, and in an effort to appease the Eurosceptics, Major went on 
the offensive against the European Court of Justice’s ruling of the same month 
requiring the British government to implement a directive setting a work limit of 48
1 1  <3
hours per week for certain employees. Major remarked that there would be ‘no end’ 
to the IGC negotiations unless the employment decision making process was reformed. 
He called for an amendment of Article 118a with the introduction on unanimity to 
replace QMV as provided by Article 189c.114 He also suggested that the directive 
should be adopted according to Article 2 of the then Social Protocol thereby allowing 
Britain to opt out.115 In this instance, the government’s approach did not reach the 
same proportions as with BSE, the government continuing to negotiate and work at the 
IGC meetings while demanding changes. In the end the whole campaign lost steam, 
given the considerable flexibility within the directive, allowing employees to work 
longer hours if they so wished.116
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to provide an overview to the IGC process from the start of the 
Conference in Turin in March 1996 to its conclusion in Amsterdam sixteen months 
later in June 1997. After giving some background on the various levels at which the 
IGC negotiations were conducted, and the negotiating style of the three governments
111 Barry James, ‘U.K. Refuses To Endorse EU Steps to Rescue Beef Brussels Maintains Worldwide 
Embargo On British Exports’, IHT, 04/04/96, p .l.
112 See Hansard, Debates Column 634-646, 16 December 1996.
113 ‘Make it work in Europe’, FT, 14/11/96.
114 ‘Employment law: UK threatens EU clash’, FT, 13/11/96.
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to Ensure that A ll’, AE, 16/11/96.
116 See Giles Radice, ‘Disastrous reaction to work directive’, FT, 14/11/96.
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that are the focus of this thesis, namely Britain, France and Germany, the overview 
was broken down into two parts. Firstly, the issues that governments were committed 
to and which dominated the agenda were outlined. Secondly, the actual nature or style 
of the process was examined, as well as the key meetings and individuals throughout.
The chapter argued that with governments slow and unclear in both outlining their 
objectives and defining the mandate for the Conference, there was little direction on 
major issues such as WEU-EU relations and the institutional reform up until the end of 
1996. At times this early fog in the process persisted into the Dutch Presidency right 
up until Amsterdam. As described above and as becomes more apparent in the next 
section, this left governments either drifting into decisions which they did not intend, 
failing to contemplate the implications of their decisions or deciding to postpone an 
issue for another IGC. However, in the midst of this drift in the negotiations it was also 
possible to recognise the influential role played by the Dutch Presidency in the IGC.
A second argument, and one, which is equally important in understanding the process 
of the negotiations, formed the subject matter of the final section of the chapter. 
Outlining the context in which the negotiations took place helps explain why the 
process lacked direction at the times it did and why governments were distracted at 
critical stages that left them drifting into decisions. Indeed, the focus on qualifying for 
EMU, EMU and employment, the BSE crisis and the British and French general 
elections revealed not only the extent to which other issues overshadowed the IGC but 
also how the very structure and length of the process was determined by an issue 
totally unrelated to the IGC agenda, namely the timing of the British general election. 
The political context in which the IGC took place is something that is returned to 
periodically over the next section.
This chapter paves the way for a more detailed examination of the negotiations in the 
following section. Chapters III and IV in this section have attempted to provide some 
breadth to the analysis of both the pre-negotiations and in an overview to the 
negotiations. Both chapters have considered and examined the major issues that all the 
member governments were committed to from when they presented their position 
papers in late 1995 and early 1996 right through until Amsterdam.
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CHAPTER V 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INTRODUCTION
In the pre-negotiation stage institutional reform had been built up as one of the core 
issues for the IGC. Yet, there was little consensus on how this would be achieved with 
many governments failing to outline their objectives in any detail.1 This chapter aims 
to explain the negotiations on four of the main areas of institutional reform in the first 
pillar: the extension of QMV, a re-balancing of the voting arrangements in the Council, 
Commission re-sizing and the extension of co-decision.
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part briefly examines the underlying 
relationship between the three main areas of the chapter: extensions of QMV, vote re­
weighting in the Council, and Commission re-sizing. The second, third and fourth 
parts examine these three areas, firstly introducing the topic and the features of the 
negotiations before going on to outline the positions of the British, French and German 
governments. Finally each section ends with an examination of the negotiations, 
usually dividing them up between the Irish and Dutch Presidency, but, where relevant, 
referring to events under the Italian Presidency. The final part of the chapter examines 
co-decision, firstly outlining the features of the negotiations, extending on these 
through an examination of the process under the Irish and Dutch Presidencies. Given 
the lack of attention that member governments gave to co-decision the British, French 
and German governments’ positions are outlined as the negotiations are examined.
There were several strongly identifiable characteristics to the negotiations on these 
four areas concerning the institutions. Firstly given that enlargement failed to evolve 
into an overall theme to the negotiations, institutional issues did not fire governments’
1 See again chapter III, p. 69-72.
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emotions. Again, governments preferred to postpone making changes on the re-sizing 
of the Commission and re-weighting of the Council votes for another IGC. On these 
two issues in particular member governments had been reluctant to clearly define and 
outline their objectives. Very few papers were submitted. Secondly, the Irish 
Presidency was particularly ineffective across all four areas. This was due to the 
tendency for this Presidency to leave the more divisive and difficult issues to be 
tackled by the Dutch Presidency. In doing so it claimed that it was too early to push for 
change on such sensitive issues that would cause considerable problems for an 
embattled British Conservative government. However, at times, as will be argued in 
the following chapters, it suited the Irish government not to push a particular issue. 
The British Conservative government also presented the other governments with a 
ready made excuse for their own failure to outline their objectives up until December 
‘96.
This left the Dutch Presidency and the French government making most of the running 
on institutional reform with some, though limited, influence from the European 
Commission. These initiatives were very often to little avail and indeed, the French 
proposals, while sophisticated were usually met with hostility from the small Member 
States that considered them as attempts to undermine their influence in the future 
institutional structure. The German government’s position was also at odds with that of 
the French, most notably on Commission re-sizing and re-weighting of Council votes. 
Thirdly, it was not completely a situation where governments postponed reforms until 
a later IGC. Rather on co-decision, where there was a significant extension, it was 
more a case of the personal representatives and later the Heads of State and 
Government failing to attach importance to this issue, signing up to agreement without 
being fully aware of its contents and the implications of an outcome that was not 
intended.
1. LINKAGE
The Maastricht Treaty had tentatively placed institutional reform on the 1996 
Conference agenda through what was then Article 189b(8) TEC. As mentioned in 
chapter III, the European Council at Brussels and Ioannina placed it firmly on the
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agenda.2 This was unsurprising for two reasons. Firstly, at a constitutional IGC any 
outlining of policy objectives was flanked by changes to the institutions and their 
operations, as described in Chapter I. Secondly, attempts, though ineffective, to 
establish enlargement as the overall theme driving the negotiations raised the questions 
regarding the effectiveness of the institutional structure, with the need for change to 
cope with new members.
The pre-negotiations reflected the diversity among governments on the central issues 
of re-weighting votes in the Council of Ministers, restructuring the Commission with 
the objective of making it more efficient and extending the use of QMV. In turn there 
was not even agreement on the most fundamental feature of the negotiations on the 
institutions. The three most contentious issues that lay at the heart of the chapter on 
institutional reform were linked in such a way that progress on one depended on and 
influenced the other. The negotiations on re-weighting of Council votes, the 
restructuring of the Commission and the extension of QMV cannot be considered in 
isolation.
Senior members of the British negotiating delegation commented that the linkage 
between the three areas of reform did not come to the fore during the debate. Instead 
any possible linkage bubbled beneath the surface while the three issues of QMV, re­
weighting and Commission resizing were dealt with separately. Yet, for other member 
governments movement on one of the three issues was not possible without change in 
another. The Belgian delegation, and in particular Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene 
made continual references to the necessity of approaching the reform of each area, 
bearing in mind the two other issues.4 As mentioned below Dehaene was particularly 
adamant that any re-weighting of votes required an extension in the use of QMV. 
Similarly Werner Hoyer, Minister for European Affairs and the German government’s 
personal representative remarked on 13/14 January ‘97 that Germany could accept the 
extension of QMV with certain qualifications. This came in the form of linking the
2 See pp.64-66.
3 Interviews.
4 Ibid.
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extension to re-weighting and a change with subsidiarity.5 The varying perspectives on 
the underlying tenets of the debate on these three issues displayed a significant 
difference in understanding at a basic level. Linkage is a tactical matter in any 
negotiations, a British Conservative government being reluctant to see any progress on 
re-weighting of votes in the Council being linked to an extension of QMV, the former 
which it was interested in, the latter it opposed. However, it was not only a case of 
member governments having different preferences on linking issues, there was not 
even a consensus on how the negotiations proceeded on these three issues and how the 
different governments approached them.
2. QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING
Introduction
As has been the case at the IGC on the Single European Act and the Maastricht IGCs, 
a further extension of QMV was one of the major institutional issues on the 1996 
agenda. Again it was a case of providing for a more efficient process of taking 
decisions, especially in an enlarged Union. However, as mentioned in chapter III, 
enlargement failed to provide the spark that some government and the Reflection 
Group reports had suggested.6 The following consideration of the negotiations on this 
issue suggests three things. Firstly while all governments, except the British 
Conservatives, had described their positions as one favouring an extension in the areas 
of application of QMV, few were able to present detailed non-papers on the specific 
issues where QMV would be extended. This lack of clarity in member governments’ 
objectives was not so apparent until the arrival of the Labour government in Britain. 
The Labour government’s willingness to consider extending QMV further in the first 
pillar revealed the extent to which the other governments failed to sort out their 
priorities. Secondly, while governments failed to identify the difficulties within the 
German position on QMV until late in the process it was not simply a case of Kohl 
being unable to deliver. There was a general lack of consensus among governments. 
Thirdly, for the greater part of the negotiations there was little direction. The Irish 
Presidency failed to push the negotiations along. Therefore, it was left to the Dutch
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Presidency, using a Commission paper, to make some attempt to reach for a consensus, 
though with little success.
German Position
To start with, the distractions and pre-occupations of the Federal government seemed 
to mislead the other member governments. Initially the positions that came from the 
German delegation during the negotiations were for the most part consistent. On 24 
July 1996 the German delegation reiterated the previously stated position supporting 
the general extension of QMV with some exceptions. Throughout the debate various 
German sources described these exceptions; Articles 201 and 209 (finances), Article
7 Q235, tax and constitutional issues; Own Resources, and industrial policy; Article 
99(2) (indirect taxation) and 130s(2) (town and country planning).9
However, there seemed to be only a limited awareness from the other governments as 
regards the difficulty and divisions within the German position, particularly between 
the federal government and the Lander governments. This was unsurprising given that 
the German government failed to sort out its preferences. While there was a reasonably 
coherent line from the Auswartiges Amt., this did not reflect the positions of the other 
German ministries responsible for some of the issues where an extended use of QMV 
could apply.10 The Lander, which had their representatives on the German negotiating 
delegation were also opposed to having their influence and power in shaping German 
policy at future Council of Ministers meetings being undermined by QMV. The reason 
that these different strands were not so apparent to the German government relates to 
the negotiating style of the Germans. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the German 
approach throughout such a Conference is to allow for incoherency and contradiction 
between the different ministries and between the Lander and federal level. As the IGC 
would reach its climax at Amsterdam a more coherent and definite German position 
would evolve. Chancellor Kohl has, in the past, been instrumental in bringing together 
the different strands and presenting a strong German position. This was expected on 
QMV, both from within the German chancellery and the Auswartiges Amt. and more
7 Statement by Hoyer, 30 May 1996; Interviews.
8 Statement by von Dewitz, 24 July 1996; Interviews.
9 Statement by Hoyer, 5 May 1997; Interviews
10 Interviews.
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importantly from the other delegations in the negotiations. Kohl was expected to push 
on QMV."
In the end at Amsterdam there was confusion, surprise and dismay at Kohl’s inability 
and unwillingness to apply QMV on the more sensitive issues of ‘industrial policy, 
cultural policy, [and] mutual recognition of diplomas’. Kohl was too weak to deliver 
on QMV. He was unwilling to upset Lander that had already proven critical of the 
federal government’s approach on EMU in the preceding weeks, especially the 
attempts to re-value German Gold reserves.13 Indeed the last minute reversal and 
freezing by Kohl came after a meeting with Edmund Stoiber of Bavaria. Bavaria 
represented the Lander on the German delegation, while Stoiber, as mentioned in 
chapter III and IV, was particularly critical of the federal government’s policy on 
monetary union.14
British Position
The Conservative government stuck closely to its White Paper mandate, which 
claimed that no extension of QMV was necessary.15 The few occasions that the British 
government referred to QMV revealed nothing different from the White Paper. For 
example in the House of Commons debate on 30 October 1996 David Davis refuted 
claims that continued adherence to unanimity was ‘holding up Europe’. At the first 
meeting of EU Foreign Ministers under the Dutch Presidency on 13-14 January that 
discussed QMV Patijn in response to a question regarding the British position 
remarked that ‘he did not hear Mr Davis say today things totally different from what he 
has said until now’.16
The Conservative government also emphasised the lack of constructive negotiation on
1 7QMV. During the Irish Presidency the time given to QMV and certainly the progress
11 Ibid.
12 Lionel Barber, et al., ‘EU treaty: Leaders agree to delay institutional reforms’, FT  18/06/97; Mark 
Brennock ‘Conference fails to agree on essential reforms’, IT  19/06/97.
13 See again chapter IV, pp. 128-131 & chapter III pp.86-6.
14 Ibid.
15 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996.
16 ‘Patijn Group Raises Problem of Qualified Majority Vote and Composition o f European 
Commission’, AE, 15/1/97.
17 See c.627-628, 16 December 1996 Hansard', Malcolm Rifkind, c. 433, 12 December 1996; Also see 
CONF 3978/96.
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made on this topic was limited. Not only did the absence of any proposal, even a 
cautious one suggest so, but there was a distinct unwillingness among the Member
1 o
States to submit ‘ideas on where qualified majority voting should be extended,
The Conservative government recognised that this unwillingness stemmed from the 
expectations these same members held for a change in the British government before 
the conclusions at Amsterdam. There was also a feeling from within the British 
delegation that the British government was frozen out of any negotiations between the 
other delegations at this time. The Foreign Secretary claimed so, while negotiators 
from other delegations made similar reference to such a practice.19 This was a further 
display of the haphazard approach that was taken on negotiating. The Conservative 
government was removed from what little talk there was, while at the end of the 
process British government approval, whether Conservative or Labour was necessary 
to secure an eventual treaty.
The arrival of the Labour government certainly marked a change in the nature of the 
negotiations on QMV and the eventual treaty outcome. The new government accepted 
the need to extend QMV in areas such as ‘social, industrial, regional and 
environmental policy’, while maintaining unanimity on ‘fiscal policy, social security 
and budgetary questions’.20 This shift in the long held British position on QMV 
revealed the lack of clarity among the other member governments on the precise issues 
where QMV would be extended. The long-standing scapegoat that the other 
governments intermittently used to explain failures to reach agreement on a range of 
issues had now left. As one Spanish diplomat commented ‘All those countries which 
have been hiding behind the British will have to show their hands .... Now we are
• 91going to have some fun’. This ‘fun’ would reach a height, after Kohl’s suggestion 
that extensive changes on QMV may not be possible.
18 Malcolm Rifkind, Column 440 December 12 1996, Hansard Reports.
19 George Parker, ‘Rifkind says EU talks ‘on hold until election,’ FT, 28/12/96.
20 See Labour’s Strategy for a new Europe, 1995; See Lionel Barber & Neil Buckley, ‘European Union: 
Delight in Bmssels as Britain turns on charm’, FT, 06/05/97.
21 Lionel Barber, ‘New Labour, new Europe’, F T 06/05/97.
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French Position
As would be the case on several issues during the IGC, the manner in which the 
French delegation presented the government’s position would prove detrimental to the 
overall French objectives. This essentially related to the French style that made a 
proposal seem more like a fait accompli, rather than approaching the sensitivities of 
other states, notably the smaller members in a delicate and tactful manner. This only 
fostered a certain mistrust from the governments of the smaller Member States. There 
was a recognition within the French government of the need for change and the 
extension of QMV in pillar one. The extent of their commitment manifested itself in 
their willingness to apply its ambit to the more sensitive issues of culture, structural
O ')and cohesion funding and fiscal issues. The scepticism from the other member 
governments was due firstly to the French position that any extension of QMV would
O'Kequally require a re-weighting. As described below the French government’s 
suggestions on re-weighting were also received with much scepticism. For the 
governments of the smaller Member States the French proposals were perceived as 
favouring the larger members. Secondly, other delegations found it difficult to accept 
that the French government was genuine as regards extending the application of QMV, 
the French being labelled as naturally and continually opposed to QMV.24
The Negotiations
Irish Presidency
The lack of drive and, ultimately, progress during the Irish Presidency had been 
preceded with an initial approach under the Italian Presidency to tackle the matter on 
article-by-article basis. The Irish Presidency changed tactics, seeking to initiate 
discussion by submitting in mid-September an informal questionnaire to all the 
Member States requesting non-binding answers as to the new areas that would be 
covered by QMV. However, the responses were ‘partial and not encouraging’.25 One 
German observer commented on how each federal ministry perceived itself as the only 
one returning negative responses on matters within their jurisdiction, the extent of the
22 Interviews.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 McDonagh, 1998, p. 18.
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• Of\opposition only being realised on compiling of the answers by the Auswartiges Amt. 
Indeed, it was a case of the various sections of the national administrations protecting
11  • t  • »their own powers. Governments had declared that they were, in principle, in favour 
of more QMV but extensive reservations existed in practice. Member governments had 
not sorted out their priorities sufficiently to propose detailed measures in a non-paper. 
The British Conservatives had been right in their suggestion that there was a lack of 
clarity among governments on the specifics.
The discontinuity in the presidential approaches did little to facilitate for progress. As 
was often the case at the IGC the change in approach with each Presidency was close 
to starting from scratch. The Dutch Presidency was to later dispense with the idea of 
circulating a questionnaire on the basis that it was more worthwhile to pose more 
penetrating questions. The Italian Presidency had been asking penetrating questions 
almost a year earlier with its case-by-case approach. Such a chop and change approach 
only added to the disjointed nature of the process. The lack of progress was 
demonstrated in the Dublin draft with a mere two pages outlining two opposing views 
on the extension, followed by three suggestions on ‘the possible avenues of approach if
• 98progress is to be made on this issue’. After ten months it was still a case of making 
suggestio ns on the possible avenues of the approach. The Irish Presidency claimed it 
was futile to push the negotiations along, using as it so often did on institutional issues 
the rationale that any ambitious moves in this direction would be met with opposition 
from Westminster, and might even precipitate a crisis in the deeply divided 
Conservative government. However, as mentioned in chapter IV the Irish Presidency 
did not push what were reluctant governments, preferring to hide behind an embattled 
British government and hand over to the Dutch Presidency and leave it to present any 
detailed paper.
Dutch Presidency
The Dutch Presidency did present a non-paper on 11 February 1997 outlining its 
approach on extending QMV with a list of the possible areas where it could be 
applied.29 (This paper is discussed below) However, by the 40th anniversary of the
26 Interview.
27 See Devuyst, JEPP, 1998, p.627.
28 CONF/2500/96, p. 106.
29 For full details see CONF/3814/97.
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signing of the Treaty of Rome there was a noticeable change in Dutch presidential 
tactics as regards institutional reform and QMV. Van Mierlo at the ministerial session 
in Luxembourg on 29 and 30 March admitted that the institutional matters would most 
probably be decided by the heads of government and state. He said ‘The Heads of 
State and Government, who perhaps have more authority, will have to find a 
solution’. He spoke of handing to the European Council ‘manageable dilemmas’. 
This further epitomised the lack of direction in the process. The foreign ministers did 
not have the confidence to reach agreement. The very concept of ‘manageable 
dilemmas’ highlights the deadlock and the indirection in the process, an indirection 
that would only heighten given the pressure that had been put on a two-day council 
meeting.
Despite van Mierlo’s claims by the end of April, the Dutch Presidency presented a
1
further list on the areas of extension. Firstly, the April proposal rolled back from the 
February paper of QMV on any extension to the approximation of laws for the common 
market under Article 100 and actions outside the structural funds under Article 130b.32 
Secondly, there were only two areas where there was an extension in the use of QMV 
from the February paper. While in the February paper unanimity was the rule on quasi­
constitutional issues such as citizenship (Article 8e), rules governing languages of the 
institutions (Article 217), own resources (Article 201), accession of new Member States 
(Article O para.l), structural funds (Article 130d) and taxation (Article 99), the April 
paper applied majority voting to a new Article 99(2) on indirect taxation.33 The other 
proposed extension was to measures on social security under Article 51. This was 
further to the February paper’s proposals to extend on issues such as culture, industry, 
research and environmental taxation.34
Several points are worth noting here. Firstly, inspiration for the further extension to 
Article 51 and the creation of Article 99(2) came from a detailed Commission non- 
paper submitted on 8 April. The Commission was both organised in presenting a 
coherent position and influencing the Presidency to adopt two of its proposals.
30 EDB, N°6966 -  01/05/1997.
31 See CONF/3893/97, 30/04/97.
32 Ibid.
33 For further details see CONF/3814/97 Annex 1, pp. 1-2; CONF/3893/97, Annex p.2
34 Ibid.
35 See CONF/3860/97, 08/04/97.
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However, the Dutch Presidency’s was pushing against the odds on its proposed 
changes. Almost all governments were against extending QMV to taxation issues. As 
mentioned in chapter III on the pre-negotiations only Italy and Belgium referred to a 
possible extension of QMV to fiscal matters. Indeed the Italian government in the only 
detailed paper of its kind from any of the Member States during the Dutch Presidency 
restated its position on this.36 Both of the April proposals on Article 51 and 99(2) 
would fail to make the final treaty.
The lack of progress on where to extend continued up until Amsterdam, a ‘feeling of 
crisis’ being used to describe the meeting of Permanent Representatives on the 5-6 
June in Brussels, the negotiations on extending QMV being at a total impasse.37 This 
feeling of crisis would continue right up until the early hours of the morning in 
Amsterdam, as Kohl, and as already stated to the surprise of the other governments, 
succumbed to domestic pressure and back-tracked on an issue where he had led the 
charge in the past. Nevertheless, Kohl’s difficulties should not be over-emphasised. 
There was a general lack of consensus among the governments. Even by March ’97, 
the Austrian, Swedish, Spanish, and Danish governments was still referring to a case- 
by-case approach, while the Belgian, Irish, Luxembourg and Portuguese referred to a 
‘general’ extension. Again, there was no mention of the specifics. During the Dutch 
Presidency no government’s delegation except for the Italian submitted a detailed 
paper outlining where their government was willing to extend, and the Italian proposal 
of April ’97 was for the greater part similar to that of the Presidency from February of 
the same year and unlike the Commission proposal it had little influence on the 
Presidency’s list issued at the end of April. While Kohl had clearly outlined his 
opposition to any extension on issues such as culture (Article 128), industry (Article 130) 
and measures on professions in Member States (Article 57(2) there were a further 
thirteen articles that the Dutch Presidency had included in its February and April papers 
that failed to make it into the final draff.40 Therefore it was not just a case of the German
36 See CONF/3863/97, 08/04/97.
37 ER N°2230 -  07/06/97, pp.3-4.
38 See AE, 19/06/97.
39 See CEC, Note a la VAttention de Mmes et MM les Directeurs Generuax et Chefs de Service, SEC 
(97) 524, 12 March 1997.
40 Right o f movement and residence (Article 8a), measures in social security necessary to provide 
freedom o f movement (Article 51), social security (Article 121), Environment (Article 130s(2), 
Appointment o f the Secretary-General of the Council (Article 151(2), Determination o f classes o f action 
or proceedings heard by the Court o f First Instance and approval o f its Rules o f Procedure (Article 
168a(2)(4), Amendment to Title III o f the Statute of the Court o f Justice and adoption o f its Rules of
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government blocking an extension. Indeed eight of these had been dropped by draft treaty 
in early June, including the proposed new Article 99(2) on indirect taxation.41 This left 
the extension confined to imports of raw materials (Article 45(3), certain aspects relating 
to the right of establishment (Article 56(2), and on certain aspects of research Article 
130i&o. There are a further fourteen new first pillar provisions where QMV will apply.
3. RE-WEIGHTING
Introduction
The rationale behind a re-calibration of the Member States’ voting weights in the 
Council of Ministers, together with a resizing of the Commission was based on the 
argument that the current system was inappropriate and likely to paralyse the EU with 
the next enlargement. The addition of small and medium sized Member States would 
see a decline of representation in terms of population, i.e. the minimum percentage of the 
Union population needed to achieve a qualified majority decreases, undermining the 
influence of the bigger more populated Member States. As mentioned in chapter III 
such a situation, it was argued, would be undemocratic and unacceptable to the larger 
members.42
The following examination of the negotiations on re-weighting reveal features 
somewhat similar to the those on QMV. Firstly, there was little progress or direction in 
the process under the Irish Presidency. Again this reflected the lack of initiative from 
the member governments in presenting detailed papers outlining their objectives. 
Secondly, it was the Dutch Presidency and the French government that presented 
proposals in late May ‘97 in an attempt to make changes to the system. However, the 
French and Dutch attempts were met with considerable opposition and suspicion, most 
notably from the governments of the smaller Member States, which perceived these 
proposals as attempts to undermine their position in the Council of Ministers. Thirdly, 
as the Amsterdam Summit approached, and during the two-day meeting, there was a
Procedure (Article 188), Appointment of members of the Court of Auditors (Article 188b), Appointment 
o f members of the Economic and Social Committee (Article 194), Appointment o f members o f the 
Committee of the Regions (Article 198a), Approval of the Rules o f Procedure of the Committee o f the 
Regions (Article 198b), Financial Regulation (Article 209).
41 ‘Essential Elements’, AE, 05/6/1997.
42 See pp. 69-72.
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considerable degree of confusion as regards what was discussed and how the final 
decision was reached on postponing re-weighting for another IGC.
German Position
The German position was not straightforward. Instead, as with many other issues 
throughout the IGC, varying positions were expounded at the federal level. In the lead- 
up to the Florence Summit in June 1996 different German sources made it known that 
the introduction of a double majority was not a priority, pushing instead the concept of 
a blocking minority threshold, or a simple statement in the Treaty that a majority of the 
Union’s population should never be overruled.43 While Hoyer continued to refer to the 
restoration of the minimum minority needed for a qualified majority to the previous 
65% of the EC-12, change was evident by early April 1997 44 Foreign Minister Kinkel 
remarked that Germany could accept a population criterion of 60%. In the same 
statement he seemed to prepare for a double majority of states and population.45 Yet, 
certain Commission officials closely involved with the IGC process claimed that the 
German delegation was open throughout on opting either for a re-weighting or a 
double majority.46
British Position
The British Conservative administration favoured a straight re-weighting as opposed to 
a second population-related criterion.47 The Labour Party in its 1995 strategy paper for 
a new Europe while accepting some degree of ‘over-representation’ for smaller states 
claimed to equally support a direct re-weighting or a double majority of states and 
population. Though, on coming to office the Labour government had not arrived at a 
clearly-defined position. In its non-paper dated the 16 May 1997 outlining its bottom 
line on the IGC issues the government seemed unprepared. The paper stated the 
government ‘would not insist on a pro rata relationship between the weighting of votes
43 Statement by Hoyer, 2 May 1996; Statement by Hoyer, 30 May 1996; Statement by Von Plotz 
(member of IGC team), 7 June 1996. Interviews.
44 Statement by Hoyer, 18 February 1997, Interviews.
45 Statement by Kinkel, 7 April 1997, Interviews.
46 Interviews.
47 Ibid.
48 See Labour’s Strategy fo r a new Europe, p. 11
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and population’, while acknowledging that ‘we need a deal which is better than at 
present and which restores some of the democratic legitimacy lost over the years’.49
French Position
In its official paper in February 1996 the French government had not outlined a 
position.50 However, as the negotiations progressed the French position can be 
identified as having two central features. Firstly, whatever the outcome, maintaining a 
parity with Germany on vote re-weighting in the Council was essential. Secondly, as 
would be the case on Commission resizing there was an inherent tendency in the 
French proposals to promote the role of the larger Member States at the expense of the 
smaller. This left the French government pushing for a re-weighting in the later stages 
of the Conference.
The Negotiations
Irish Presidency
The absence of any in-depth negotiation during the Irish Presidency on re-weighting of 
voting in the Council was very much reflected in the Dublin draft treaty. The 
Presidency admitted in rather imprecise terms that only ‘aspects’ of re-weighting had 
so far been discussed at the Conference.51 This came as no surprise, since there was 
‘wide agreement among delegations’ that such matters ‘should be left with certain 
other sensitive institutional questions to be settled, perhaps together, towards the 
closing stages of the Conference’.52
The conclusions in the Dublin draft treaty were largely similar to those suggestions in 
the presidential note of 10 September.53 This note included an outline of the two 
general perspectives on re-weighting. The first suggested that no change was required 
since there was little proof of distortions between population and number of votes or, 
equally, that there existed a defined bloc of less populated states. The second approach
49 See Position o f New British Government on IGC Issues, Non-Paper, 16 May 1997.
50 See Memo, 1996.
51 CONF 2500/96, p. 110.
52 Ibid.
53 See CONF/3900/96.
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claimed that the current system could not be maintained, particularly with future 
enlargements, since the further increase in the number of less populated states would 
bring the population level required for a decision to be taken to an intolerable low. 
Both the September and December papers proceeded to outline the two options on the 
table for the Conference should the governments decide to amend. As outlined in 
government and institution position papers, and in the Reflection Group’s report a year 
earlier, the two options were a form of double majority in terms of vote and 
population, or the more direct amendment with an increase in vote numbers between 
the number of votes and population.54 Given the absence of negotiations or a 
willingness from the delegations to work on re-weighting the Presidency attempted to 
repackage the status of the negotiations to suggest progress, but was left restating and 
repeating, again reflecting the lack of direction at this stage. For example the Franco- 
German joint letter to the Dublin II European Council merely called for a review that 
would ‘guarantee a representative balance of Member States, particularly with a view 
to enlargement’.55 Again there was nothing specific in this request. This left the 
December draft repeating the pros and cons of the two possible approaches that could 
be taken by governments.56
Dutch Presidency
The drift in the negotiations on vote reforming in the Council in effect continued in the 
early stages of the Dutch Presidency. There was little attempt to provide direction on 
this issue either from the Dutch or any of the other member governments.57 The 
Presidency’s two papers on re-weighting in early February and April respectively, 
merely extended on the debate and outline as provided for in the Irish draft treaty. 
Again it was a case of repeating the options on the table, though the February draft did 
include tables outlining the evolution of qualified majority expressed as a percentage of 
the total population of the Union, and the evolution of blocking minority in terms of 
population, including extrapolations as regards the nature of the situation in a Union of 
twenty six.58
54 See Chapter III, pp.69-72.
55 See again Federal Government, 13 December 1996.
56 See CONF/2500/96, p. 109.
57 See CEC, Note a Vattention, 12 March 1997.
58 See CONF/3815/97.
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The Presidential note of 11 April called on the Foreign Ministers to focus again on the 
pros and cons of dual majority and re-weighting and the form that should be taken on 
either approach.59 However, the Presidency in the person of Hans van Mierlo, after the 
meeting of foreign ministers, placed the onus on the heads of government and state to 
resolve such matters, recognising the existing difficulties that required the authority 
from the highest level for the necessary changes to be made.60 This authority was to 
come at the crucial Noordwijk meeting on 23 May. It did not come in the sense of 
resolving the issues, rather it marked a climax in the indirection bringing to an end any 
realistic possibility of change, thereby leaving a postponement as the likely outcome.
Noordwiik -  Dutch & French Proposals
At Noordwijk the Presidency attempted to engender a consensus among the other 
governments on its proposal on re-weighting.61 Its re-weighted system gave the four 
larger Member States 25 votes; Spain 20; Netherlands 12; Greece, Belgium and 
Portugal 10; Austria and Sweden 8; Ireland, Finland, Denmark 6 and Luxembourg 3. It 
was a proposal that came in for heavy criticism from several of the other delegations.
The Belgian government was particularly aggrieved by the fact that The Netherlands 
would have an extra two votes more than Belgium in the Council of Ministers. The 
Dutch negotiating delegation did not expect or anticipate this reaction from the Belgian 
government and in particular that from the Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc
ff)Dehaene. The Dutch officials described it as a mathematical necessity that their 
government should receive twelve votes, given the formula that they chose on re­
weighting. The Belgium delegation’s grievance lay firstly in the manner in which the 
Dutch handled their proposal on re-weighting. Given the close cooperation that had 
proceeded over the previous months on the IGC, the Belgian Permanent 
Representative expected prior notification of the proposal. Belgian officials claimed 
that this notification should have come at the meeting between Dehaene and Kok 
several days prior to the actual release of the document.63 However, the Dutch Prime 
Minister was unlikely to have been aware of such a proposal. In fact such was the
59 See CONF/3858/97.
60 See, AE, 30/4/97.
61ER,'No. 2227, pp. 1-4.
62 Interviews.
63 Ibid.
Chapter V 154
confidence of the Dutch delegation on the reasonableness of the figures that they felt it 
was unnecessary to refer such a matter to their Prime Minister.64 This was despite the 
changes which the Dutch government had made to its internal organisation in an 
attempt to avoid similar mistakes as Maastricht’s Black Monday. Chapter IV 
mentioned how the arrangement was such that the Prime Minister’s office would be 
better informed of its officials’ operations on the IGC.65
The dispute continued with what was the main thrust of the Belgian government’s 
grievance with the Dutch proposal. Applying the formula the Dutch used on re­
weighting to each and every Member State required any German government to have a 
greater number of votes in the Council than the French. For the Belgian negotiators 
and government the Dutch proposal was unacceptable until the newly weighted figures 
reflected the population difference between France and Germany.66 Yet, the French 
and German governments had stated that should any form of re-weighting arise, both
fnMember States would have equal voting weight in the Council. The British 
Conservative government had also called for the voting power of the big four to 
remain equal. The Dutch respected this wish but claimed that it formed no basis for a 
similar arrangement between The Netherlands and Belgium.69
The extent of the gap between the two governments’ understanding of the situation 
was again evident, given that the Belgian government saw the Presidency’s proposal as 
a betrayal of the case for the smaller Member States. But for the Dutch negotiators the 
proposal, by giving more votes to The Netherlands, would strengthen the hand of the 
smaller states. This confusion and bad feeling on what had previously been close 
cooperation was a further example of the fluid nature of any division between the 
small and large Member States. While there was obviously no overt organisation of 
either the smaller Member States against the larger, or vice versa, it was also the case, 
by way of the above examples, that any attempts to do so would have been seriously 
undermined.
64 Ibid.
65 See again, pp. 120-1.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 See Partnership o f  nations, paragraph 25, 1996.
69 Interview.
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Both Belgian and Dutch officials claimed that it was the very close cooperation that 
had proceeded in the previous months on IGC matters that had given rise to a certain 
casualness on keeping the other side informed, working on the expectation that their 
support was guaranteed.70 While the Dutch government had been very keen to avoid a 
repeat of any of the diplomatic errors of the Maastricht IGC there was a recognition 
from officials that given the breadth of the agenda and the considerable work that 
remained in the other major chapters of JHA and CFSP that there was an inevitability
71that certain confusions and misunderstandings would arise.
The diversity of understandings and perceptions on the Presidency’s proposal 
continued. The Spanish government was equally dissatisfied with the figures, being 
granted five votes less than the four larger members on an issue where it had been 
sensitive about its status, leaving it with the an uneasy feeling that it could conclude 
with a bad deal all round, especially if it was also to lose a Commissioner.72 For 
officials in the British negotiating team the Dutch Presidency’s proposal was 
deliberately slow in the pace of its suggestions and nature of negotiation and secondly, 
in stark contrast to the Belgians it was considered as biased towards the smaller 
Member States. The suggestion was that the Dutch were most concerned with ensuring 
a greater influence for themselves in any future re-weighting.73
Chirac also tabled a proposal at Noordwijk that sought to strengthen the hand of the 
larger Member States. It gave the four big Member States 25 votes, Spain 20, The 
Netherlands 10; Greece, Belgium and Portugal 9; Austria and Sweden 7; Ireland, 
Finland, Denmark 5 and Luxembourg, 3.74 The French approach on institutional affairs 
continued to be greeted with suspicion from the smaller Member States. The French 
government claimed that it was not a matter of small versus large Member States. 
Instead the aim was to distribute extra votes to all Member States while at the same 
time arriving at an equilibrium between a blocking minority and a majority vote.75 This 
was in contrast to the approach taken by some of the other larger Member States, 
notably Italy, which in an earlier proposal had mooted the idea of raising the voting
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Interview.
73 Ibid.
74 ER, N°2227, p. 1-4.
75 Interviews.
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weight of the four most populous countries from 10 to 12 and from 8 to 9 for Spain,
7  Ci •while making no further changes. However, as is demonstrated in the following 
chapter on CFSP and as is shown below on Commission resizing, there was a deep 
agenda in the French proposals that sought to provide a greater role for what the 
French perceived as the ‘serious’ larger states. As was reflected in the run up to the 
Conference, it was this agenda that the smaller Member States feared, the Portuguese 
and Austrian papers going the furthest, claiming that there was a need to maintain this 
extra representation for smaller states.77
There was also a grievance within the French delegation regarding the approach the 
German government took on reforming the voting process. For some of the French 
negotiators the German government was exclusively interested in the system of double 
majority. This was presented as being small Member State friendly. Certain French 
officials claimed that the German approach placed greater emphasis on the second 
feature of the proposed system, namely the population criterion. The claim was that 
this was detrimental to the smaller members on two levels: firstly, it undermined their 
ability to defend and realise their interests, and secondly, it reduced their value and
75?effectiveness as allies to the other larger members. In the pre-negotiations the 
Finnish, Luxembourg and Swedish governments had also expressed opposition to a
7Qpopulation criterion. French concerns were less for the smaller Member States, but 
rather they feared that a double majority emphasising a population criterion would 
challenge the equal status between France and Germany in the Council voting system.
OA
Both the Quai d’Orsay and the Elysee were adamant on defending this parity. 
Amsterdam Approaches
Despite the negative feelings towards the Dutch proposal at Noordwijk it remained on 
the negotiating table being part of the Presidential draft in early June.81 Even by about 
the 13 June, when the Presidency had all but conceded that any change to the actual 
treaty was no longer possible, the Dutch stuck somewhat doggedly to their earlier 
position, again at the expense of causing further consternation from other Member
76 See CONF/3863/97, p.4.
77 See again Chapter III, p.71.
78 Interviews.
79 See again Chapter III, p.71.
80 Ibid.
81 See ‘Essential Elements’, AE, 5/06/97.
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States. With further revisions to the draft treaty the Presidency included a Protocol on 
the institutions after enlargement. It provided for the Dutch figures on the re-weighting 
to come into effect on addition of between two and six new members. A year before 
membership reached twenty another IGC would be convened to review the 
institutional structure and decision making process. The Luxembourg Prime Minister 
Jacques Poos rejected the first part of the proposal. By this stage the Dutch had 
antagonised both Benelux partners, despite the Belgian Prime Minister’s attempts to 
proclaim otherwise.82
The negotiations continued into Tuesday night at the Amsterdam Summit, with a 
heightening in the confusion and the diversity of perceptions. As before there was 
deadlock. The actual path towards the eventual protocol that leaves a re-weighting 
until the next enlargement and for another IGC was somewhat unclear. Firstly, there 
was a definite shift towards the double majority option. Chirac, as before was 
particularly opposed to this. (See above). Indeed he was surprised by this shift, given 
that, as the French had stated before, it was not in the interest of the smaller Member 
States to opt for the double majority. Yet, the smaller Member States remained 
suspicious of French motives. Despite this, Chirac claimed to have convinced the other 
governments of the dangers of this solution, including the deadlock given that a 
minority of Member States in a decision could be a majority population-wise.84 In the 
end it was Kohl who called for the eventual protocol postponing any change, followed 
by the British and then the French, along with the other governments. Jean Luc- 
Dehaene claimed that ‘France and Germany alone were opposed to the double key 
solution, with the way out of the impasse being a protocol temporarily freezing the 
problem’.85
There was time for further confusion at the Amsterdam Summit. For certain ministers 
and officials of the smaller Member States there were attempts by the governments of 
the larger Member States, particularly Italy, to settle the issue of re-weighting as 
separate from Commission re-sizing. Opposition to such manoeuvring came not only 
from the smaller Member States wishing to maintain the link between the two issues,
82 See ‘News of the week from’, AE, 16 to 22 June 1997.
83 See ‘Treaty o f Amsterdam’, AE, 17/06/97.
84 The fifteen reach consensus on “Amsterdam Treaty”, AE, 18/06/97.
85 Ibid.
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but any attempt by the larger members to seriously push this issue was undermined by 
the Italian government itself. Their initial support was withdrawn as the German 
government agreed to Spain having the same number of votes as the other large 
Member States.86
For the Finnish negotiators at Amsterdam, their President, Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister held the key that could have undone the deadlock on re-weighting and 
Commission resizing. They claimed that they had tacit agreement from the other 
delegations for a doubling in the number of Council votes for all Member States with 
the five largest states -  France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain receiving a further 
four votes. At the same time the future Commission would include one Commissioner
07
from each of the Member States. However, Finnish officials claimed that their Prime 
Minister failed to submit the proposal to the Dutch Presidency until midnight on the 
night of Tuesday 17 June. By that time Kok expressed a great tiredness from the 
previous hours of attempting to finalise a draft treaty, preferring to leave such a matter 
for a later date.88 The Dutch Presidency recognised attempts by the Finnish to push for 
change on institutional matters at a late stage, without being able to recall the details.89 
Few others involved at Amsterdam could recall the Finnish proposal or making any 
agreement to it.90 Again this reflected the confusion and what was poor preparation 
from both the Presidency and the Council Secretariat in keeping the member 
governments informed of what was on the table and the direction that the negotiations 
were taking.
4. COMMISSION RESIZING
Introduction
The rationale given by most governments in their official position papers on the eve of 
the IGC, and in the Reflection group report, for a reduction in the number of 
Commissioners related once again to the claim that in an enlarged Union a
86 Interviews.
87 Ibid.
88 See AE, 18/06/97.
89 Interviews.
90 Ibid.
Chapter V 159
continuation with the present approach on nominating Commissioners would lead to 
an over-sized and inefficient Commission. However, as mentioned, enlargement failed 
to provide the spark for governments to engage in ambitious change on extending 
QMV and re-weighting and it was a similar case on Commission re-sizing.
Firstly, there was little progress or direction on Commission resizing until the Dutch 
Presidency. Secondly, while the proposal from the European Commission in March 
1997 was quite similar to the final protocol at Amsterdam, it was the French delegation 
and the Dutch Presidency up until the Noordwijk meeting which pushed for a smaller 
Commission and the removal of the guaranteed representation for each Member State. 
Yet, it was the third feature of the negotiations on Commission re-sizing, namely the 
suspicion among the smaller Member States towards the French government’s motives 
for a smaller Commission, together with the vocal British and German opposition to 
relinquishing guaranteed representation, which left member governments postponing 
any change for another IGC through Protocol No.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
French Position
The French delegation adopted what was considered by the other delegations as an 
extreme position on Commission re-sizing.91 Firstly, Commission re-sizing was 
considered by the French President to be of critical importance.92 This re-sizing was to 
come in the form of a reduction in the number of Commissioners and a break from the 
previous approach of permanent representation for each Member State. While being an 
issue of importance for Chirac it was a matter that had been discussed among the 
various ministries for some time. There was broad support within the French 
administration for such a reform.93
British Position
An efficient Commission had been the approach the British Conservative government 
and the foreign office had manoeuvred themselves into in the pre-negotiation stage.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.; Also see ‘Mr. Bamier says that the European Commission should stick strictly to its role of 
execution’, yfE, 16/10/95 \Memo, 1996.
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The Conservatives up until the White Paper were prepared to give up one of their 
Commissioners.94 This changed with their March White paper. While the paper 
supported a reconsideration of the manner in which the Commissioners were appointed 
it also expressed support for the larger Member State’s maintaining their two 
Commissioners.95 During the negotiations the position was not to give on the second 
Commissioner but there was always the un-stated possibility of this changing in the 
future should the need arise, and something could be delivered in return, most likely a 
re-weighting, though this was not official policy.
From the new Labour government’s approach on Commission resizing it seemed that 
little preparation had been given to this matter. One Foreign Office official suggested, 
while Labour had seen the advantage of the two Commissioners policy when in 
opposition, their arrival to power with such a huge majority and with the prospects of 
being in power for a considerable time meant they began late in the day to reconsider 
the necessity of having two commissioners.96 Indeed its pre-negotiating paper 
recommended no changes as regards the number of Commissioners that came from the 
larger Member States. The May ‘97 position paper confirmed this. While claiming to 
understand the ‘positions of smaller countries’ as regards having a Commissioner the 
paper went on to say that the government ‘would not ask any country to give up its
• • 07  •Commissioner’. If it did come to Britain having to forgo a Commissioner then ‘a 
significant return’ would be required.98 This, it was proposed would come in the form 
of a re-weighting and a specific status for the remaining UK Commissioner such as a 
Vice President. The Labour government’s approach on this issue conflicts with the 
perception of British Foreign Office officials of institutional negotiations without any 
linkage, though admittedly this form of linkage from the Labour government obviously 
came very late in the negotiations.
94 Interviews.
95 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996.
96 Ibid.
97 See again Non-Paper, 16 May 1997, p.3.
98 Ibid.
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German Position
The German foreign ministry had been clear that the German government was 
unwilling to renounce on permanent representation. Werner Hoyer remarked that Bonn 
found the concept of a ‘Commission without a German Commissioner’ inconceivable 
going even further saying that ‘it would not be good, not even for the smaller 
countries’." Kinkel claimed that the German government considered it an imperative 
to have a Commissioner given its population and budgetary contribution.100 This was 
an understandable position. Indeed the fact that it was prepared to go down to one 
Commissioner was a major concession.
Negotiations
Irish Presidency
The Irish draft treaty provided a summary of the diverse range of positions that the 
Presidency had been aware of during its six months. It essentially repeated the issue at 
hand, namely the desire by a significant number of governments to reduce the size of 
the Commission on the grounds that the current system would become unmanageable 
with further enlargements. The two broad possibilities outlined by the December draft 
treaty were a Commission with a membership smaller than the number of Member 
States or with a number equal to the number of states.101 Within these two groups the 
draft suggested a number of further options: a fixed number somewhere between 10- 
20, a membership that worked on a rotational basis, senior and junior Commissioners
i mand two Vice Presidents with their own team of Commissioners. The Irish 
Presidency’s failure to push the agenda along on restructuring reflected the lack of 
consensus among the member governments to engage in a discussion at this stage. At 
the same time, as a small Member State it was not in the interest of an Irish 
government to push the debate on any reconsideration of the guaranteed representation 
in the Commission. As with WEU-EU relations, the Irish Presidency availed of the 
lack of willingness of the other member governments to engage in discussions and 
submit negotiating papers. It gladly side-stepped the issue.
99 Ibid. p.2
100 Statement by Kinkel, 6 April 1997.
101 CONF2500/96, p. 114
102 Ibid.
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Dutch Presidency
At the end of the March meeting (40th anniversary), van Mierlo claimed that there was 
a majority of Member States that were convinced that the present Commission 
structure and work practice was no longer viable. There was nothing new in such a 
claim. The Reflection Group report of December 1995, in essence, came to similar 
conclusions. Van Mierlo proceeded requesting the Commission to inform the IGC of 
the number of portfolios it felt necessary for its effective functioning. The Commission 
had made its position clear on several occasions both in its February 1996 opinion and 
in a March 1997 submission; one Commissioner per Member State with a procedure 
for reviewing the Commission’s membership above a certain number of Member 
States, with this procedure being triggered when the number exceeds 20. The 
eventual protocol attached to Amsterdam somewhat reflected these wishes.
During the Dutch Presidency the divisions between the French and German 
governments on the issues of Commissioners were all too obvious. The French 
government continued to push for a Commission of between ten and twelve, despite 
German opposition. In a letter dated 21 March 1997 to the Secretary-General of the 
Council, Jurgen Trumpf, the French Permanent Representative, Pierre de Boissieu, on 
behalf of the French delegation claimed that ‘An analysis of the Commission’s powers 
suggests that some ten functions, ... may be distinguished. France therefore proposes 
a Commission of 10 members, which would be raised to 12 in the event of there being 
more than 20 Member States’.104 Herve de Charette made similar claims.105 His Junior 
Minister Bamier also held to this line. In its proposal of a Commission of ten, the 
French negotiators were adamant that this ten need not necessarily include a 
Commissioner of French nationality.106 One of Chirac’s closest aids, when pushed by 
the Dutch Presidency on the matter, remarked that, ‘Even if  we would have eleven 
Luxembourgers that is fine with us but no one Commissioner per Member State’.107 
Though in practice it was highly unlikely that one of the ten at any one time would not 
have been French.
103 Commission Opinion, 1996 Para. 42; CONF 3839/97, p.4.
104 See CONF 3852/97, p.2
105 See AE, 25/03/97.
106 See ER, N°2221 -  03/05/97, p.4.
107 Interviews.
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The Dutch government in its official position paper on the institutions had declared 
itself willing to accept a reduction in the number of Commissioners to the extent of 
having fewer Commissioners per Member State on condition that all Member States 
renounced permanent representation.108 While the senior officials and politicians in the 
Dutch delegation were unsure of French motives on Commission re-sizing, there was a 
concerted attempt to work with the French delegation, and use the weight, and what 
Dutch officials considered as the credibility that a large Member State provides in 
attempting to slowly bring other governments on board. This was an approach that the 
Dutch Presidency was to use with more success on the third pillar, again involving the 
French government. The Dutch Foreign Minister, van Mierlo, termed this the ‘judo 
move’; guiding the weight of a large Member State along the lines of the Dutch 
Presidency’s objectives, in this case the mobilisation of support for a smaller 
Commission, in an attempt to foster further support for the Presidency’s objectives.109
The Presidency tabled a proposal on 24 April 1997 that went in some direction to 
renouncing a permanent representation to the Commission.110 It consisted of two 
options, a Commission of fifteen or a Commission of twenty. In both instances until 
the figures of either fifteen or twenty were reached the Commission would include a 
representative from each state. The difficulty and weakness of the proposal lay in the 
absence of any mechanism within the proposed amendments to Article 157 that would 
determine the distribution of positions after the number exceeded either the fifteen or 
twenty members and the guaranteed representation had been removed. The two 
proposed declarations that would be attached to the treaty merely called for any 
method that would be established at a future date to be constructed ‘by the principles 
of equality and alternation between Member States’.111 Again it was a case of avoiding 
the contentious issues, leaving them for the post-negotiation phase.
By early May the Dutch Presidency claimed to have the French government and the 
governments of the Benelux on side as regards renouncing claims on permanent 
representation. The Italian government also seemed to be prepared to remove the 
guarantee of permanent representation with its suggestions that any future Commission
108 See Fourth memorandum, 1995.
109 Interviews.
110 CONF 3887/97, 24/04/97, pp.4-5.
111 Ibid., Annex III, p.6.
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could be limited to either fifteen or twenty.112 The Spanish government which during 
the pre-negotiations had hinted at a future Commission with fewer Commissioners 
than Member States did not follow through on its earlier position. However, the 
credibility of the Presidency’s claims on the Benelux are questionable. The 
Luxembourg government had been very clear throughout that it would not be willing 
to forgo its right to a Commissioner, though it admitted that it would create problems 
in a Union of twenty five, but this was something that would be addressed at a later 
stage.113 At the Dublin summit in December, the Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc 
Dehaene was more flexible when he acknowledged that ‘Belgium could accept 
sacrifices concerning the composition of the European Commission’.114 Though, this 
was only if there was a general strengthening of the supranationality of the treaty.
In any case the Presidential and French momentum was stopped in its tracks at 
Noordwijk on 23 May. At this meeting Kohl was emphatic as regards the need for a 
permanent representation for Germany.115 This was a position that was quickly 
supported by most other governments. As mentioned in chapter III and as was 
reflected in the Commission’s internal review of government positions in mid-March, 
few governments except the Dutch, French and Belgian were interested in 
relinquishing guaranteed representation.116 Chirac abandoned the previous French 
government’s position, coming to an agreement with Kohl that effectively secured a 
presence for all Member States in the Commission. On the composition of the 
Commission and future enlargements three stages were proposed. The Commission 
was to remain at twenty up until the next enlargement. With the next enlargement there 
would be one Commissioner per Member State. With the arrival of further members 
the whole institutional structure would come under review.117 With the German 
government emphatic on maintaining a German presence in the Commission this 
legitimised the case for all other governments to follow with similar claims. Indeed the 
proposal at Noordwijk formed the eventual protocol at Amsterdam.
1,2 CONF/3863/97, p.2.
113 ‘Mr. Kasel summarizes Luxembourg’s Priorities’, AE, 5/02/97; Interviews.
114 See Ferdinando Riccardi, December 1996.
115 ER, N°2227, p. 1-4.
116 See CEC, Note a la I ’Attention, 12 March ’97; also see pp.71-2.
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Explaining French Motives
In one meeting at Noordwijk, Commission resizing had been effectively decided with a 
somewhat dramatic French U-turn and the collapse of the Dutch Presidency’s strategy. 
As mentioned in chapter IV, and as will be described in chapter VI and VII, this was 
all too typical of French foreign policy. While French positions were presented and 
supported in a very tight manner, just as on NATO reintegration they were prone to 
sudden shifts at the whim of the President and the Elysee.
The other member governments and institutions had been at odds as to the French 
motives on a ten-person Commission. The suggestions varied with claims from the 
Irish Presidency that the French government realised that its suggestions would not be 
acceptable to the other members. A Commission without a French commissioner 
would be much less effective and less well regarded in France and amongst the other 
members.118 The feeling within the British delegation ranged from dismissals as 
French gamesmanship to the belief that, while guaranteed representation may have 
been abandoned, a French permanent presence would be assured under a gentleman’s
119agreement.
Further suggestions from within the Commission itself proposed that the French have
1 9 0  ,at every IGC submitted an unrealistic proposal. This cultivates the image of the 
concerned European, and as the Member State willing to take the initiative and lead. 
Such an approach would also give the French command of the agenda, with its ideas 
and proposals marking the way for future change. This was the more positive tone 
from certain Commission officials. Others were more critical, being suspicious of the
191 •French position and its possibility to undermine the Commission. The manner in 
which the French government presented and handled such a sensitive issue did little to 
alleviate the suspicion, instead adding to the misunderstanding between the various 
governments.
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While it was highly likely that, as the British officials claimed, an agreement, either 
during or after the conclusions of the IGC, would provide the larger Member States 
with a continued but not necessarily a guaranteed representation, the French 
govemmenfs position up until Noordwijk may also have been shaped by the 
restructuring undertaken after the SEA on relations between French ministries and the 
European Commission. The French have been keen to develop closer links and contact 
between Commission officials at the level of General Directorate and level A 
administrators and French officials in Paris. In this way the French have a direct line 
and an established contact to the highest level of officials within the Commission. 
With the establishment of personal contacts and channels the post of Commissioner, 
while of political importance, was less essential in the everyday contacts between the
1 99 *Commission and Paris. Therefore should a period arise in the future when the 
French government may not have a French-nominated Commissioner in Brussels it 
would be less detrimental for the French than for the other larger Member States which 
have not undertaken a similar restructuring.
As was the case on the other institutional matters, there was the feeling from within the 
French foreign ministry that there was a failure on the French government’s part firstly 
to tactfully explain their proposals and generate support for them, particularly among 
the small Member States, and secondly to emphasis the benefits for all in downsizing 
the Commission.124 In a similar manner to re-weighting there was a frustration from 
some of the French Foreign Ministry officials involved in the IGC at the inability of 
the governments of the smaller Member States to recognise that with a larger 
Commission the justification for a treaty amendment to Article 189a (now Article 250) 
allowing the Council to change a Commission proposal by QMV was strengthened. 
There had also been suggestions in the pre-negotiation stage that even a one- 
Commissioner-per-Member-State would not be acceptable without a move to qualified 
majority voting within the Commission.125 Again for the French officials this 
undermined the role and power of the Commission and ultimately the position of 
influence and security that a smaller Member State sought to ensure for itself through a 
guaranteed presence in the Commission.
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This frustration for certain French officials was even greater given that the French 
claimed that it was the German government that pushed for an amendment to Article 
189a, a German government that continually cultivated the image and was generally 
considered as being small Member-State-friendly. The French government had a 
strong case here. While it wished for a smaller Commission, any amendments under 
Article 189a would continue to require unanimity. While the German government 
defended its right to appoint a Commissioner, it repeatedly called for the use of QMV 
on amending Commission proposals up until about the end of 1996. Hoyer first 
mentioned it on 3 June.126 On 7 June Von Plotz, as a member of the IGC team, 
defended the government’s position claiming that it did not seek to weaken the 
Commission. However, Hoyer failed to defend the proposal in a meeting with the 
European Parliament on 23 September. By the end of October he was less emphatic on 
the need for a change on Article 189a merely remarking that it was a principle that 
needed reconsideration.127
Summary
With the French and German governments adopting diverse positions and the British 
government, as with so many other issues in the IGC, at best distracted and more likely 
opposed to any change there was little leadership or common ground on which to build 
a consensus. The French proposals, which were the most ambitious and radical on the 
table, were viewed with suspicion by many of the other member delegations. There 
was little incentive for the other member delegations to push for a change to the 
permanent representation. In the midst of this lack of direction the Dutch Presidency 
sought to use the French momentum in an attempt to sell the idea of a smaller 
Commission without a representational guarantee. The Dutch Presidency, while being, 
to a certain degree, unsure of French aims, concluded that there was a genuine concern 
and belief that a smaller Commission would facilitate for a more efficient 
Commission.128 Yet, the Chirac U-turn together with the general apathy from the other 
governments unhinged the Dutch Presidency’s attempts at securing a smaller 
Commission, leaving the final treaty with a protocol suggesting that with the next
126 Interviews.
127 Ibid..
128 Ibid.
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enlargement one Commissioner per Member State would become the norm, provided
• 190there was some form of re-weighting.
5. EXTENSION OF CO-DECISION
Introduction
The potential strengthening of the role of the European Parliament in the first pillar 
with an extension in the application of co-decision was on the whole met with much 
surprise, even from within the European Parliament.130 It left the European Parliament 
being described as the ‘winner’ in the negotiations on institutional reform. Yet, the 
following examination of the negotiations reveals that, rather than there being a group 
of member governments or the Dutch Presidency to drive the negotiations along on 
extending co-decision, it was a topic that failed to engender much reaction among the 
negotiators on all three levels. All governments, in their pre-negotiating positions had 
described themselves as willing to consider an extension, except for the British 
Conservatives. Yet, the Danish, Irish, German, French, Swedish, Austrian and Italian
1 'i I #
governments had been completely unclear on how this would proceed. Despite this 
the personal Representatives, based on a paper from the Dutch Presidency were able to 
arrive without much disagreement at a final proposal that was passed on to Heads of 
State and Government at Amsterdam. However, at the European Council level little 
attention was given to this list of extension. Therefore governments drifted into 
agreement without being fully aware of its contents or implications on future decision 
making in the EU.
Negotiations
As the IGC proceeded the nature of the co-decision extension was gradually
established. In July 1996 the Commission, in accordance with Article 189b(8),
1
submitted a report on widening the scope of the co-decision procedure. Such a
129 See Protocol No. 7 -  Institutions with the Prospects o f Enlargement o f the European Union.
130 Interviews.
131 See Chapter III, pp.72-3.
132 See Commission, Opinion, 1996 Para. 22; ‘In its report on Co-decision, The Commission 
distinguishes the Legislative Areas (that must come under Co-decision) from the others’, AE, 
04/07/1996.
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widening in the scope was to apply to all legislative work of the Council as opposed to 
executive duties. The Commission claimed that instruments could be described as 
legislative in nature if they were directly based on the treaty, were binding, determined 
essential elements of Community action, and were general m scope.
The Irish Presidency proposed several options to the negotiators on extending: a case- 
by-case approach, a movement of issues dealt with under the cooperation procedure to 
co-decision, application to all measures adopted by QMV or a general extension of co­
decision to all legislative acts.134 The Dublin draft treaty showed that there had been 
little agreement on the extension by December but the Presidency recommended that 
the future discussions should proceed ‘by reference to accepted criteria as suggested by 
the Commission and the European Parliament rather than on a case-by-case basis’.135 
The pairing of Elmar Brok and Elisabeth Gigou had proven beneficial in that they 
made a more focused and structured presentation of the European Parliament’s opinion
1 *5 £
than the larger committee approach at Maastricht. The EP in its opinion paper had 
called for an extension of co-decision to all legislation, specifically mentioning the 
social spheres, employment, and certain aspects of taxation, the environment and 
common commercial policy.137 But, the role of the European Parliament should not be 
over-estimated. As mentioned, no officials from any of the member governments 
described the Parliament as exceptionally influential on any of the issues including co­
decision.138
The Dutch Presidency suggested that the starting point should be a consideration as to 
whether the co-decision procedure could be applied for adopting legislative acts 
currently subject to the cooperation procedure. In turn, the Presidency suggested 
extending the process to other areas. In both instances its suggestions included a list of 
the proposed areas of application.139 Examples of Articles where a move from 
cooperation procedure to co-decision procedure was suggested were Article 6 on 
discrimination, Article 75(1) and Article 84 on transport policy, Article 130s on
133 See CONF/388296.
134 ER, N° 2179, 29/11/96.
135 CONF 2500/96, p. 100.
136 Interviews.
137 See EP Opinion, March 1996.
138 Ibid.
139 CONF/3816/97, 11/02/97, p.2.
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environment and Article 118a on social policy.140 Other areas that formed a working 
basis for a potential extension were Article 43 on CAP, Article 51, 55, 57 and 100 on 
the internal market.141
This formed the working basis on an issue that raised little opposition, in principle, on 
an extension from the fourteen governments. The British negotiating delegation, as 
was the case throughout the Conservative government’s term, remained steadfast to its 
White Paper position expressing opposition to any extension of parliamentary powers. 
The Labour government in its pre-negotiation paper suggested that ‘All decisions taken 
on legislation by qualified majority vote ... should be subject to a simplified form of 
co-decision’. The German government through Von Plotz on 16/17 September 1996 
had already given support, in principle, to the Commission report on co-decision, 
while not agreeing with every element of the extension. Hoyer reiterated this position 
in the early stages of the Dutch Presidency, providing a more concrete list of areas for 
extension.142 Michel Bamier in the weeks preceding Amsterdam restated the French 
government’s support for an extension, within the context of an overall advancement 
on institutional matters.143
The agreement in principle, the presence of a rather clear position from the Dutch 
Presidency on the areas where such an extension would take effect, and the willingness 
to negotiate suggests that the process on widening co-decision’s application was well- 
ordered with a significant and adequate number of member governments aware of their 
goals and the direction of the negotiations. However, the success of co-decision and 
the ensuing perception of the European Parliament as a ‘winner’ was primarily a result 
of the lesser importance that the member governments attributed to co-decision.
It was this attitude that left it very open as to when and at what level the extension of 
co-decision was decided. Some officials, notably from the Finnish delegation and the 
Dutch Presidency, suggested that it had been decided by the end of February 1997, 
while others claimed discussions on the topic continued until well after this date. The 
Commission in its internal review of government positions in mid-March described the
140 Ibid., p.4
141 Ibid., p.5; See ‘Essential elements’, AE, 5/06/97; Also see CONF/3894/97, 30/04/97.
142 Statement by Hoyer 13/14 January 1997; Statement by Hoyer 18 February 1997.
143 ‘Extending co-decision depends on other institutional progress’, News report, 28/05/97.
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German, Spanish, French, Irish, Portuguese and Swedish governments as still being 
open to a case-by-case analysis on the whole issue, while there was no clear line form 
the Finnish and Italian governments.144 In fact, certain member governments were 
unaware of the content of the eventual treaty proposal. This was admitted by one Prime 
Minister at Amsterdam.145 Further examples suggest that co-decision was not given 
high priority among personal representatives and later Heads of State and Government. 
As Kohl pushed for a role back on QMV at Amsterdam at that time there was not a 
concerted effort from any of the governments to make the necessary changes to the 
articles on the co-decision list where QMV was no longer to apply. Therefore co­
decision has been extended on citizenship (Article 8a(2)), now Article 18(2), rules on 
social security for Community immigrant workers under then Article 51 (now Article 42) 
and Article 57(2) (now Article 47(2)) on professions in Member States, despite the use of 
unanimity under these articles. Member Governments were unaware of such a situation, 
not intending such an outcome to arise. Indeed, the British and French governments 
suggested change but at a later stage let it drop.146
This is not to suggest that it was a case of the newly elected French and British 
governments having a keen interest in co-decision. The Labour government in 
outlining the range of its positions on IGC issues in mid May ‘97 failed to mention co­
decision or the European Parliament. In effect, limited importance was attached to co­
decision. Throughout the sixteen months of negotiations it was an un-contentious issue 
where the Presidency expressed a confidence in drafting a list of areas to extend, while 
the other delegations agreed in principle without paying attention to the detail. At the 
highest level, among heads of state and government that hammered out the final 
package it was this lack of interest that facilitated for a successful extension rather than 
a genuine recognition of the implications of their decision.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to examine four key areas of negotiations on institutional reform: 
extension of QMV, a re-balancing of voting in the Council, Commission re-sizing and 
the extension of co-decision. Across these four areas a common set of features defining
144 See CEC, Note a I’attention, 12 March 1997.
145 Interviews.
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the nature of the negotiations was recognisable. Firstly governments were not inspired 
by institutional reform. In previous IGCs institutional reform has been primarily linked 
to policy reform at the IGC.147 While this was similarly the case at the 1996-97 
Conference, most governments in their official position papers on the eve of the IGC 
mentioned the need for institutional changes in preparation for enlargement. However, 
the bottom line was that there was an absence of consensus among governments on the 
timing and extent of enlargement for it to drive the negotiations on institutional reform.
This lack of inspiration from governments gave rise to the second defining feature. 
There was generally little negotiation or direction in the process up until December 
1996. This was reflected in the near absence of detailed submissions from delegations 
and in the failure of the Irish Presidency to take any initiative in pushing the process 
along. While both the Presidency and other delegations would claim that the time was 
not right to push for change on institutional matters given the likely opposition from an 
embattled British government, a deeply divided Conservative party presented itself as 
a useful excuse behind which governments could hide their own poorly defined 
positions. This lack of direction gave to the third finding of the chapter, which saw the 
Dutch Presidency being left with much to do if any agreements were to be reached. 
While initially the Presidency was a little slow, or even reluctant, to take any 
initiatives, along with the French government it was the most influential participant on 
institutional reform. Though, given that most governments even at this stage had still 
not sorted out their priorities and objectives, there was little possibility of any 
significant change on QMV, re-weighting or resizing.
On QMV there were only minor changes after a big role back on the Presidency’s 
earlier suggestions. On the re-weighting of Council votes and Commission re-sizing, 
the smaller Member States reacted negatively to the proposals. Indeed one Dutch 
official described the Belgian Prime Minister, Jean Luc Dehaene as being ‘furious’ 
with the Presidency’s proposals. The final decision on these two issues revealed the 
fourth feature of the negotiations, namely the tendency to postpone difficult decisions 
until a later IGC given the lack of consensus. Protocol No.7 does just that. The final
147 The negotiations on the SEA and the extension of QMV was also a recognition of the need for a 
greater use of majority voting given that there were two rounds of enlargement since the foundations of 
the Community.
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feature of the negotiating process on the institutional reform suggests that where there 
was a significant and recognisable change such as the extension of the co-decision 
procedure; it was less a case of governments intentionally setting out to make these 
changes, rather given the lack of importance attached to the issue they drifted into 
agreement without being fully aware of the implications or consequences of their 
decision. It was an unintended outcome.
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CHAPTER VI 
JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
INTRODUCTION
While the Maastricht Treaty did not specifically call for a review of the third pillar, as 
described in chapter III, the European Councils at Cannes and Madrid under the title of 
Europe and the Citizen referred to improving security within the EU.1 In turn, 
governments in their official position papers and Reflection Group considered changes 
to the third pillar. As the IGC concluded at Amsterdam the major reforms introduced 
in the treaty were on third pillar matters. This chapter aims to look at the negotiations 
behind some of these changes. It focuses on three major areas of reform: firstly, it 
outlines the negotiations behind the communitarisation of certain parts of the third 
pillar through the creation of an area of free movement and security under what is now 
Title IV TEC. Secondly, it examines the approach governments took on shaping the 
remainder of Article K, Title VI TEU in what were described as the flanking measures 
to Title IV, focusing in particular on judicial and police cooperation and anti-crime 
measures. Thirdly and finally, this chapter considers the incorporation of the Schengen 
acquis into the European Union, a process that was closely related to both of the 
previous issues. On all three areas there is firstly a re-cap on developments since 
Maastricht. This is, in most cases, followed by a consideration of the British, French 
and German government’s positions. Finally the negotiations are examined, usually 
focusing on the influential events under the Irish and Dutch Presidency, but also on the 
Italian when dealing with communitarisation.
From this analysis it is evident that the defining features that have been prevalent in the 
previous chapter are equally present throughout the negotiations on Justice and Home 
Affairs. This chapter presents several arguments. Firstly, on each of the three areas
1 See pp.64-9 & pp.78-80.
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member governments were slow to outline in detail their objectives. Indeed some 
failed to do so at all. Therefore, until late 1996 there was indirection in the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, this also provided the opportunity for the European 
Commission and the Council Secretariat to make a very direct input into the 
negotiations with what was the former’s most influential paper throughout the 
negotiations. Secondly, while the French government sought to shape the changes that 
the third pillar would undergo, it had not thought through its priorities on the pillar. 
Therefore at Amsterdam it found itself being presented with outcomes it had not 
intended or anticipated. The German government and its typically incoherent positions 
early on in the process matured on one or two occasions late on in the process, shifting 
the process in a different direction, demonstrating the fluid nature of the IGC. Thirdly, 
the Irish Presidency as before used the lack of initiatives from the other member 
governments as a justification for not pushing the process along on significant, but all 
too often controversial, issues. Yet, there were times, particularly on crime and 
security and police cooperation where the Irish Presidency’s drafting was very similar 
to the final treaty at Amsterdam. Fourthly when the Irish Presidency did not push the 
agenda along the Dutch proved to be both skilful and determined in concluding a 
package at Amsterdam that included significant changes. Indeed the Dutch Presidency 
was the most influential participant on JHA, particularly on Schengen.
1. COMMUNITARISATION OF THIRD PILLAR 
Background
At Maastricht, governments had come down in favour of an intergovernmental pillar 
on justice and home affairs. However, this in no way meant that governments had 
settled on the form of cooperation. It was as much a case of the pillared structure to the 
treaty being accepted by default at Maastricht as it being a reflection of the objectives 
of member governments. All governments except the Belgian felt that there was 
insufficient time to negotiate on an alternative before the conclusion of the IGC at 
Maastricht. As with CFSP, the success of the framework laid out in Maastricht would 
determine the extent of the member governments’ desire for change.
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Any assessment of justice and home affairs since Maastricht must also focus on Article 
100c TEC which had placed visa policy as part of the first pillar. It is possible to 
compare the success of the initiatives under Article 100c with the list under Article K.1 
of Maastricht. Shortly after Maastricht came into effect the Commission proposed a 
regulation on third country nationals in need of a visa on entering the Union.2 It 
contained a list of 129 countries and was to be adopted by the Council no later than 31 
December 1994. While not being adopted until September 1995 with a reduction in the 
number on the list to 101, it still was a reasonable success, though on a limited and 
relatively uncontroversial subject.
On the list of nine matters of common interest under Article K.1; asylum policy, 
border controls, immigration policy, drug addiction, fraud, judicial cooperation in civil 
and criminal matters, customs cooperation and police cooperation there was little 
success. Firstly, the only joint action to enter into effect by 1996 was one that aimed to 
ensure students from third countries residing in a Member State visa-free access 
throughout the Union.3 Member governments went for the ‘soft’ options such as 
resolutions, as opposed to taking joint actions. For example, there have been 
resolutions on the minimum guarantees for asylum procedures and burden sharing with 
regard to the admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis.4 
(June 1995) Yet, even member governments struggled to reach agreement on certain 
resolutions, most notably on the definition of a refugee, and a reinforcement in security 
of the external borders.5 Gavin Barrett remarks on Article K.1 that ‘Progress in this 
respect has compared very unfavourably with the level of activity which has been 
capable of being achieved in the context of the European Community’.6
As with CFSP and the first pillar there was room for much conflict between the third 
and first pillars. Doubt was expressed by some observers as to the clarity of the 
divisions between the intergovernmental procedures provided for the first six issues
2 OJC 11/6-15/1/1994.
3 OJ L 327 19/12/1994.
4 Emek M. Ufarer, ‘Europe’s search for policy: the harmonization o f asylum policy and European 
integration’, in Emek U?arer & Donald Puchala, Immigration into Western Societies: Problems and 
Policies, Pinter, 1997.
5 See Elspeth Guild & Jan Niessen, The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies o f  the European 
Union, Kluwer Law International, 1997.
6 See Gavin Barrett, ‘Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union -  An Overview 
and a Critique’, in Gavin Barrett (ed.) Justice Cooperation in the European Union, Dublin: Institute of 
European Affairs, 1997, p.17.
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under Article K.1 and what could be a role for the Community on the same issues. 
Panariello remarks that policy on asylum, crossing of external borders, drug addiction 
and fraud ‘were all to be found among the policies identified by the Commission in its 
1985 White Paper as matters which should be harmonized through Community 
legislation’. The Commission also claimed that one of the joint actions should have 
been dealt with by Article 100c. There were similar jurisdictional problems when it 
came to a new convention on controlling persons crossing external frontiers. Also the 
governments at Maastricht had not streamlined and codified the previous ad hoc 
procedures into an efficient system. Firstly, the Article K.4 committee which was to 
coordinate policy under the title and present opinions to the Council sat uneasily with 
the normal Community procedure which used COREPER. Secondly, while Maastricht 
was a form of codification of informal structures that had evolved over the 1970s and 
1980s, Justice and Interior Ministers were unaccustomed to the working methods and 
disciplines of the Council. The Commission was equally unsure of its role in an 
intergovernmental pillar and was reluctant to use its new powers of initiative in a 
robust manner.8
At the same time the flow of immigrants that came with the opening of frontiers on the 
EU’s Eastern flank at the end of the Cold War persisted. This coincided with a rise in 
the flow of asylum seekers from Africa and the South. The Yugoslav war and the flood 
of refugees brought home to the German government in particular the need for a more 
coherent approach on asylum and refugee policy. By 1992 the EU Member States were 
dealing with up on half a million refugee applications per year, a doubling in figures 
from 1988.9 The other EU mechanisms in place were proving ineffective. The Dublin 
Convention of June 1990 only dealt with procedural matters on applying for asylum 
determining which state should deal with the application. There was no harmonisation 
on substance. Indeed, by 1996 the Dutch and Irish governments still had not ratified 
the convention, while Finland, Austria and Sweden had not signed it. Given that there 
was no role for the ECJ to settle disputes over the interpretation of the Convention it
7 Philippe A. Weber-Panariello, The Integration o f Matters o f Justice and Home Affairs into Title VI o f  
the Treaty on European Union: A Step towards more Democracy, EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/32, 
p.33.
See John Adrian Fortescue, ‘First Experiences with Implementation of the Third Pillar Provisions’, in 
Roland Bieber & Jorg Monar (ed.), Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union: The Development 
o f  the Third Pillar, European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1995 (19-28).
9 Chris Bourdouvalis, ‘The European Union and the immigration problem: small steps and possible 
solutions’, in U 9 arer & Puchala, 1997.
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lacked uniformity across the Union. In turn this had lead to unilateral responses. The 
tightening of German criteria for asylum in July 1993 saw the number of asylum 
seekers plummeting from around 37,000 per month to 10,000.10 This proved somewhat 
ineffective since the problem shifted from Germany to the Netherlands. In any case 
1996 Germany still accepted more than half of all asylum-seekers in the EU and more 
than the entire United States.11
As was mentioned in chapter III on the pre-negotiations, this situation left all 
governments and the Reflection Group focusing on a change of some form to the third 
pillar. With the intergovernmental third pillar proving effective, the 1996 IGC 
presented an opportunity for those preferring a supranational approach to argue their 
case. This left a possible communitarisation of visa, asylum and immigration, in other 
words a transfer of these issues to the first pillar, at the heart of the debate on justice 
and home affairs. It should be noted at this stage that while Article 100c TEC dealt 
with visa policy it was limited by Article K.1 (2) and (3) TEU. These two articles dealt 
with the crossing by persons of external borders and immigration policy which also 
encompassed visa policy, hence the reference to communitarisation of visa policy and 
border control at the 1996 IGC.12
French Position
The French government did not have clear objectives on communitarisation. This was 
due to the divisions between the Elysee, the Quai d’Orsay, the Justice Ministry and the 
Ministry of the Interior, the change in government in June ‘97 as the Conference 
reached its climax, and finally it also reflected the French style of negotiating, 
emphasising the ‘grande ligne’ without having clear objectives on the detail.
The French government’s position on communitarisation evolved and changed during 
the negotiations. Initially the French government was very sure as regards the
10 Kohl described this move to a more restrictive approach ‘as an important precondition for the fact that 
Germany can fully participate in a common European immigration and asylum policy’. See U?arer 
E.M., ‘Europe’s search for policy: the harmonization o f asylum policy and European integration’, in 
U9 arer & Puchala, 1997. p.289 and ‘Kohl views 1993 achievements, 1994 tasks’, International 
Intelligence Report, January 3, 1994.
11 See U?arer, 1997.
12 For more details on this see Diarmaid McGuinness and Eileen Barrington, ‘Immigration, Visa and 
Border Control in the European Union’, in Barrett, 1997, pp. 155-171.
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communitarisation of the third pillar. Its February ‘96 memorandum setting out its 
guidelines for the 1996 IGC, rather than outlining communitarisation as a possibility, 
took it for granted that it would happen, focusing instead on the necessary security 
precautions to be adopted as and when asylum and immigration were brought within 
the Community sphere.13
During the Irish Presidency Michel Bamier presented a compromise approach on 
certain aspects of the third pillar to the National Assembly Delegation on the EU. He 
suggested creating what was described as a ‘pillar la ’, a compromise between 
maintaining the status quo on the 3rd pillar and a full move of key issues such as 
asylum, immigration and visa policy to the first pillar. He suggested fixing common 
objectives for Union action in six major areas: asylum, immigration, drugs, organised 
crime and money laundering, and terrorism. These policy areas would formulate the 
new pillar. While this proposal would not have been the same as placing these issues 
under the Community framework it proposed a dual right of initiative for both the 
Council and the Commission, with consultation of national parliaments.14 This position 
seemed to reflect the long-standing French resistance to supranational control. This 
new pillar would still in essence be an intergovernmental pillar with no role for the 
European Parliament or Court of Justice. However, the French government had not 
considered whether such an approach was workable. As one official in the Dutch 
Presidency remarked, there was no interest from any of the member governments to 
create another pillar, the general consensus being that since Maastricht, it had proved 
difficult to adapt to the third pillar structure, and a fourth would only have further 
complicated matters.
While this French proposal met a quick end, the French launched another in the early 
stages of the Dutch Presidency.15 As with its November paper this proposal attempted 
to present a balance between an intergovernmental approach and one providing for a 
greater role for the Community institutions and procedures. Yet, it reflected the 
contradictions within the French position, with the Foreign and Justice Ministries 
taking a more Community-oriented approach than the Interior Ministry. As is 
described below, these contradictions, along with a distracted Elysee, would result in
13 Le Figaro, 20 February 1996.
14 ‘Proposals by Benelux on Crossing of External Borders, Immigration and Asylum’, AE, 23/11/96.
15 See CONF/3824/97.
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the French accepting a much more communitarian package at Amsterdam than it 
advocated throughout the process.
German Position
Introduction
The entire workings of the third pillar was of considerable concern for the German 
government at both Lander and federal levels. The flood of refugees from the Balkans 
war brought home to the German government, in particular, the need for a common 
and co-ordinated approach on asylum and refugee policy. The extent to which certain 
Lander governments felt over-stretched was reflected in the decision by Bavaria and 
Baden-Wiirttemberg in November 1996 to send Bosnian refugees back home against 
their will.16 In late 1996 the German and Bosnian government signed an agreement to 
repatriate more than 300,000 refugees from the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Manfred 
Kanther (Interior Minister) estimated that up to 90,000 would be back in Bosnia by 30 
June 1997.
As on most other issues the German government did not have clear and stable 
objectives and priorities until late in the process. As with QMV the eventual German 
position would be met with surprise from the other member governments. The German 
delegation’s negotiating ability on asylum, visa and immigration was undermined by 
internal divisions within the Auswartiges Amt., between the Foreign and Interior 
Ministries and between Lander and federal level. These divisions are examined below. 
They suggest two things. Firstly, they left the German delegation ineffective for the 
greater part of the process. Secondly, as Kohl sought to bring the different strands of 
the German system together it was the Lander that proved effective in putting the 
brakes on any ambitious programme for communitarisation.
Auswartiees Amt.
At the general level there was agreement within the Auswartiges Amt. on the 
communitarisation of certain features of the third pillar. During the Italian Presidency 
Hoyer suggested that any transfer should focus on visa, asylum and immigration 
policy. (21 May 1996) While later welcoming the Irish Presidency’s approach, Hoyer
16 ‘German State Starts Sending Bosnian Refugees Home’, Reuters, 22/11/96.
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(27-28 January 1997) and Kinkel (24 February 1997) emphasised the importance of 
considering the issues which should be communitarised at the present time, in the 
future, and those which should remain in the Third Pillar but with more integrationist 
elements. Hoyer emphasised the necessity of granting the Court of Justice an extensive 
jurisdiction in the third pillar. The ECJ would have jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings on the legality of framework decisions, as well as on their validity and 
interpretation. It was recommended that national courts should be required to refer 
cases to the ECJ when this was necessary to enable them to pass judgement.17
Hoyer suggested that those areas transferred to the Community pillar would have to be 
subject to a dual right of initiative from the Member States and the Commission for a 
period of time. (27-28 January ‘97) Support for such an approach was also expressed 
by Kinkel after the Presidency’s February proposal. (24 February 1997) Hoyer, Kinkel 
and Silberberg, (member of the German delegation) also agreed on the immediate use 
of QMV on visa policy. (Hoyer 3-4 March 1997) (Kinkel 24 February 
1997)(Silberberg 8 April 1997)
Given the burdens that Germany had taken up after the Yugoslav crisis and the 
collapse of the Communist regimes to the East, the Auswartiges amt. and the federal 
government also placed a strong emphasis on a fairer system with a greater degree of 
burden sharing among Member States promoting a balance in receiving refugees and
1 Rdisplaced persons. However, there were divisions on the details with some officials, 
notably Silberberg, opposed to the suggestions coming from others in the Auswartiges 
Amt. on a minimum standard for the reception of asylum seekers to be part of the first 
pillar.
These contradictions over the details continued with fundamentally different positions 
within the Foreign Ministry on asylum law and policy. Hoyer on 24 September 1996 
called for the transfer of asylum law but not policy.19 He seemed to have changed his 
position, or at least was less clear for a time as to where asylum policy should lie. On 
the same day as the Irish Presidency’s proposal for a new title on an area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, in November ‘96 Hoyer welcomed the approach, going on to
17 Interviews.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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suggest that QMV should apply to asylum policy, but unanimity should apply to 
asylum law and customs cooperation. His suggestion that all Community instruments 
should be available in this new area would seem to suggest that asylum policy as well 
as the law should fall under the first pillar, though this was somewhat unclear.
This position not only conflicted with the stance he previously adopted but also with 
the other officials within the Auswartiges Amt. involved in the framing and co­
ordination of the German approach. On 24 February 1997 Kinkel was clear in his 
preference for the Dutch paper over the Irish approach, stating that the rules on 
external frontiers, visa policy, immigration, asylum policy, customs cooperation and 
the fight against racism and xenophobia, and fraud should be transferred to the 
Community pillar along with much of judicial cooperation. He even went as far as to 
suggest that there should be minimum criminal standards.20 Kinkel seemed more 
definite and confident of the need to have asylum policy as part of the first pillar.
On 8 April 1997 Silberberg outlined the difficulties that could arise with asylum 
issues.21 He suggested that while asylum policy would be transferred to the first pillar, 
any decisions would be taken by unanimity. Any use of QMV in the initial stages after 
the title came into effect could give rise to constitutional difficulties. This stands in 
direct contradiction to the confused positioning of Hoyer, who, while being sure of the 
need for asylum law to form part of the first pillar, wished for unanimity to apply to 
such matters and QMV to asylum policy, despite the lack of clarity on which pillar the 
latter would belong to.
There were also contradictions on the potential communitarisation of criminal law 
standards. Hoyer and Kinkel on 27-28 January and the 24 February 1997 respectively 
supported such harmonisation in any new article under the TEC.22 Hoyer repeated his 
position on 3-4 March favouring a communitarisation of all areas of customs 
cooperation including criminal aspects. The official submissions from the German 
delegation, though long winded and convoluted supported such a position, particularly
Chapter VI 183
the January ‘97 proposal.24 As before, Silberberg was to adopt a more cautious 
approach. He supported the communitarisation of customs cooperation but not to the 
same extent as including criminal aspects. The differences with Hoyer continued as 
the Minister for State circulated a draft article of the 4 March ’97 creating Community 
competence to combat cross-border crime. This included both criminal and civil 
judicial cooperation. Yet, Silberberg stated a month later that any new Article would 
have to be absolutely clear that there was no Community competence over police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.27 These differences within the Auswartiges 
Amt. hindered the German delegations negotiating ability. The German delegation 
failed to submit a detailed paper outlining clearly its position and the functioning of 
any new community title on asylum, immigration and visas. Instead there were only 
two very similar papers in October 1996 and January 1997 that dealt with a 
communitarisation of customs cooperation.
Interior Ministry
The divisions within the German position continued. The approach by the Ministry of 
the Interior on third pillar issues bore certain similarities to that of the approach from 
the British Conservative and Labour government. Its perspective on third pillar issues 
focused more on issues of law and order, being more restrictive rather than oriented 
towards an open concept of migration and the free movement of persons. This 
reluctance within the interior ministry was also due to the fact that the European 
orientation of the ministry is some way behind that of the other German ministries, 
given that it was the Ministry for Economic Affairs that was primarily concerned with 
the free movements up until the ratification of the Maastricht treaty.29
Lander
The Lander presented another perspective in the overall German position and one that 
would prove very influential as the Conference neared its end in Amsterdam. There 
had been tension within the Bundesrat as regards the best approach to be taken on 
asylum and immigration. In its pre-negotiation debates at the Berlin Conference on 15
See CONF 3938/96, 02/10/96 & CONF/3807/97, 29/01/97.
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September 1995 the majority of Ministers of the Lander for European Affairs 
expressed clear support for the communitarisation of immigration policy. However, 
this demand was not upheld, essentially because of the veto by Bavaria and Baden- 
Wurttemberg. This was reflected in the new resolution on reforming the Maastricht 
treaty.31
The determining influence of the Lander rested on two principles. The first has already 
been mentioned in the context of QMV. The Lander were sensitive as regards the 
erosion of their powers aiming to protect the regional levels of government from an 
undue centralisation of decision-making capacity. The second feature of Lander 
influence was specific to asylum and immigration. While the federal government 
determined the procedures for asylum entry and general immigration law and policy, it 
was the Lander that was required to take up the inevitable financial burden of 
admitting refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore it was keen to maintain some form 
of control on any new EU policy on asylum. The Lander influence was all the stronger, 
given that its representation on the German IGC delegation came from Bavaria and 
Baden-Wurttemberg, the two Lander most opposed to any form of communitarisation. 
Given that the Federal Government was pressurising the Lander to reduce spending in 
an effort to meet the EMU criteria, the state level of government was in a strong 
position in seeking its demands. As is shown below it was the Lander that brought the 
final twist to the German position.
British Position
The Conservative government in its White Paper addressed the problem of 
immigration, visa and asylum policy as an international one, requiring cooperation at 
many levels rather than exclusively the European. As with CFSP the White Paper 
referred to the successes of the Maastricht approach. This was similar to the attempt to 
talk up the success of the approach on CFSP with the aim of satisfying the advice 
given at Maastricht by the then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. Just as the British 
government had five years to prove that the intergovernmental approach on CFSP
30 ‘The Lander to present the Bundesrat with a Resolution Stipulating what they Expect from the 
Maastricht Revision - Differences between Lander over some Issues’, AE, 27/09/95.
31 Ibid.
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could work the same applied to the third pillar. Given the generally poor performances 
of the third pillar since Maastricht, as described above, the Conservative government 
was in a weak position to defend the status quo.
The UK delegation submitted a position paper on 23 September 1996 that closely 
reflected the White Paper objectives.32 Firstly there was no mention of any form of 
communitarisation. Secondly Article Ka sought to establish clear parameters of 
cooperation.33 The EU was only to be used in addressing serious threats or to take 
action where there were clear and identifiable benefits for EU citizens, following the 
guiding principles of subsidiarity. The paper emphasised that any action should have a 
cross-border element. Finally cooperation was not to be confined to EU Member States 
but rather extended to ‘establish close cooperation with the relevant authorities in third 
countries,...’.34
The Conservative government’s bottom line was to avoid any movement of 3rd pillar 
policies to the first. The Irish draft treaty was presented to the House of Commons with 
the Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind reiterating the government’s opposition to any 
communitarisation.35 The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary described the 
government’s position on this as unshakeable and they sought to highlight that it was 
not simply a case of British opposition but rather as the Irish Presidency’s Report 
stated ‘A number of Member States have indicated that they do not accept the transfer 
of any matter at present dealt with under Title VI to the Treaty on European Union’. 
The Prime Minister’s and Foreign Secretary’s reports on the actual Dublin II meeting 
were of a similar nature, describing the British opposition as regards any transfer to the 
first pillar as ‘unshakeable’.
The Labour Party in its 1995 strategy paper on Europe was also opposed to any
IQ
transfer of visa, asylum and immigration matters to the first pillar. For tactical 
electoral reasons the party did not spell out a very different approach on the EU to the
32 CONF/3913/96.
33 Ibid. Article Ka, p.6.
34 Ibid.
35 See Column 433, Hansard Reports, 12 December 1996.
36 CONF/2500/96, p.24
37 See, Hansard Reports, Cc. 433, 1996.
38 Labour Party, 1995, p. 15.
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Conservatives before the May general election. Nevertheless, the new British 
government revealed itself to be much more adaptive and flexible on this issue of 
communitarisation than the Conservatives. While preferring to keep cooperation on an 
intergovernmental basis, the new Foreign Secretary Robin Cook remarked that this 
issue was ‘not approach[ed] ... on the basis of “religious fundamentalism’”. The 
Labour government was prepared to approve closer cooperation among the other 
member governments should they so desire.
Neither the Conservative or Labour governments pushed for changes on the third 
pillar. The Conservatives government was largely responsive. While realising a 
defence of the status quo was difficult to justify, it proposed an improvement of the 
intergovernmental structure without any major changes and certainly without any form 
of communitarisation. The Labour government was equally un-enthused by the 
removal of internal borders and the establishment of a common policy on immigration, 
visa and asylum. However, rather than aiming to prevent such a creation it only sought 
to opt out.
Negotiations
Italian Presidency
From an early stage in the negotiations the Italian Presidency claimed that there was 
general support for placing some of the third pillar matters within the Community 
sphere. Yet, there were no detailed papers from any of the member governments that 
sought to outline what this precisely entailed. Instead there was little consensus among 
the governments on the specifics. At a meeting between personal representatives on 
April 1-2 Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Benelux called for greater application of 
QMV in the third pillar. The Portuguese were less enthusiastic, while the Swedes felt 
that only decisions on implementation should be taken by QMV. The role of the ECJ 
in the 3rd pillar proved equally contentious. Germany and the Benelux wished for a 
permanent and effective role. The Swedish and Irish delegations suggested a case-by- 
case approach, while the Spanish representative insisted that its role be limited to the 
communitarised areas.40 After a meeting of the representatives of the EU foreign
39 ‘Cook urges EU to set its sights on new goals’, FT, 16/06/97; Also Doug Henderson, Minister for 
Europe, ‘Britain and the EU - a fresh start’, Brussels, 05/0597.
40 ER, 2122, 05/04/97, pp.1-2.
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Ministers on 21 and 22 May ‘96 Fagiolo remarked on the third pillar that there were 
clearly ‘elements of common interest’ for all EU members with a ‘strong majority’ of 
delegations in favour of placing certain aspects under the Community system. He 
remarked that ‘There are three areas in particular, but they are not the only ones, in 
which there seems to be the greatest convergence among Member States for a transfer 
from the third pillar of the Treaty to the first pillar: visas, asylum and immigration’.41 
This was typical of a lot of the negotiations on communitarisation under both the 
Italian and Irish Presidencies. Both Presidencies repeated that there was consensus 
among the greater number or majority of Member States on the need for a transfer of 
visas, asylum and immigration, but few Member States presented detailed non-papers 
on the issue.
Irish Presidency
The Irish Presidency did not table any detailed paper on the third pillar in the early 
months. Indeed it would be November before it would make any such submission. 
This was due to the Irish government’s difficulties as regards its Common Travel Area 
with Britain and the possible effects a transfer of issues to the first pillar would have 
on this arrangement. (See Below) The Presidential papers from July and September 
repeated what had been discussed under the Italian Presidency, a general commitment 
from member governments to communitarisation and a co-ordinated fight against 
crime through a reformed third pillar.42
It was the Commission that made the first move with a detailed plan on 
communitarisation in its draft proposal on 18 September. It established an area of 
Freedom, Security, and Justice placed firmly within the first pillar. By incorporating 
matters of visas, asylum, and immigration policy into the TEC the Commission’s 
proposal also focused on drug trafficking and dependency, economic and financial 
crime and large scale fraud.43 However, the Commission failed to provide a clear 
structure on the role of the institutions. The Commission’s paper together with what 
the Presidency described as a ‘working paper’ from the Council Secretariat formed the 
basis for discussions at a meeting of the personal representatives at the end of
41 See CONF 3860/1/96, 17/06/96; Also see ‘Mr Fagiolo says a Majority o f Member States favour 
placing certain Third Pillar Matters under the Community System’, AE, 22/05/96.
42 See CONF/3866/96, 09/07/96; See CONF/3908/96, 18/09/96, p.6.
43 See CONF/3912/96, 18/09/96.
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September. It is important to stress here that the ‘working paper’ came direct from the 
Secretariat rather than it being a case of the Secretariat firstly writing a proposal, 
sending it to the Presidency for its comments before returning to the Secretariat for a 
re-write based on the Presidency’s suggestions. The Presidency was quite clear that ‘on 
the basis of those contributions’ from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, it 
was in a position, by the middle of November to complete its first detailed outline on 
reforming the third pillar.44
As with the Commission proposal, the Presidency’s paper suggested that the 
Community would deal with border controls, immigration policy and policy regarding 
nationals of 3rd countries, action in relation to drug abuse, and strengthened 
cooperation by customs authorities. The paper tentatively suggested that internal 
borders for visas should be abolished within one year of entry into force of the Treaty, 
two years for measures on asylum and three years for provisions on immigration.45 The 
Presidency’s paper also avoided making firm suggestions on the institutional 
framework for the new title. Again this was consistent with the Presidency’s tendency 
to dodge the whole issue of institutional reform across all three pillars. While the 
Commission’s proposal was influential on the general style and layout of the 
Presidency’s paper, the latter relied heavily on the Council Secretariat’s ‘working 
paper’ in outlining the specific details on what exactly the communitarisation of 
asylum, immigration and visa entailed 46
The personal representatives examined the Presidency’s paper at a meeting on 18 
November.47 At the meeting the representatives failed to reach agreement on the nature 
of the institutional changes needed to allow this new title to function effectively. 
Contention focused on the mode of decision making: QMV or unanimity, the right of 
initiative, a joint role by the Presidency - Commission, the Commission under 100c or 
the Commission and the Member States together, and finally the role of the national 
and European Parliaments in the policy-making process.48
44 CONF/3976/96, 11/11/96.
45 Ibid.
46 See in particular CONF/3908/96 & CONF/3976/96.
47 ‘Dorr Group Examines Different Issues Related to Third Pillar’, AE, 20/11/96; ER, N°2176 -  
20/11/96, pp. 1-2.
48 Ibid.
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By this stage the debate between the supranational and intergovernmental approaches 
to the third pillar was coming to life. On 22 November the Benelux countries 
introduced another detailed set of proposals on the 3rd pillar. They proposed a new 
treaty title called ‘The Crossing of External Borders, Immigration and Asylum’. The 
Benelux proposals provided for these matters to be dealt with under the Community 
framework. This was not surprising. The Benelux and the three members in their 
earlier position papers had expressed strong support for communitarisation and the 
extension of supranational control. Indeed, there was a throw back to the Maastricht 
struggle between supranational and intergovernmental control given that it was only 
the then Belgian government that supported the Dutch draft treaty that sought to 
replace the ‘temple’ with the ‘tree’ structure before being abandoned.
The Benelux text provided the European Parliament and the Court of Justice with a 
role in this new title.49 The proposal also suggested a new Title VI on ‘Police and 
Judicial Cooperation’ that would remain intergovernmental. This was a very detailed 
title calling for cooperation among the police forces under Europol, for cooperation on 
trials, and for multi-annual programmes on the priorities at that time. The ECJ would 
rule on disputes between Member States, or between Member States and the 
Commission. However, the report was unclear on the exact decision making method.50 
The Danish permanent representative and member of the IGC personal representatives 
group hit back on the Benelux’s pro-Community stance. In a position that was similar 
to the British Conservative stance, Niels Ersboell, the personal representative, said that 
his country could not accept giving certain policies under the third pillar a Community 
dimension, but that it would be possible to considerably improve the functioning of 
these policies even without transferring them to the first pillar of the Treaty.51 He 
agreed that intergovernmental cooperation under the third pillar needs to be ‘improved 
enormously’, noting that, for example, the Commission could be much more active in 
this field, without needmg to alter the Treaty.
49 See ‘Proposals by Benelux’, AE, 23/11/96.
50 Ibid.
51 ‘Denmark could not Agree to Issues under the Third Pillar becoming EU Competencies’, AE, 
21/11/96.
52 Ibid.
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It was at this time that the French government aired its proposal on an alternative 
pillar, making this suggestion from the premise that it sought to offer a way out from 
the two opposing approaches of a complete transfer of visa, immigration and asylum 
policy to the first pillar and a continuation of the intergovernmental approach of the 
third pillar. It was also a case of French attempts to head off a potentially strong role 
for the Court of Justice, European Parliament and Commission, while at the same time 
having a French paper forming the basis of a new treaty structure, though this failed to 
gain any support.
As the December draft approached, the Irish Presidency revealed that it was not going 
to push for any further negotiations on communitarisation. Noel Dorr remarked ‘we 
made substantial progress by working carefully in this field which deeply affects the 
sovereignty of the States’.53 At this stage in the negotiation process, Dorr said the main 
concern as regards the third pillar was whether further ideas needed to be put on the 
table than those presently under discussion in order to provide better machinery in the 
fight against crime. (See below).
The Irish draft pulled back from the November proposition that brought asylum, visa 
and immigration policy into the first pillar. It was open on whether the title would form 
part of the first or third pillar.54 This was a reflection of its ambivalence towards a new 
title that would remove internal border controls. With the British government adamant 
that it would not participate in such a project the Irish government was aware that this 
made its participation untenable since it would undermine the Common Travel Area 
between the two countries if the Irish were to be part of this new Area, though it did 
not oppose the transfer in principle.55 The draft under Article G was also open on the 
decision-making procedures for the title.56 Therefore, as had been so often the case on 
institutional matters, the Irish Presidency left the Dutch to table firm proposals on this 
issue. The only two changes of significance from the earlier presidential paper went 
some way to satisfying both French and German demands. Article A(2) allowed for 
‘the suspension of cooperation under the new title by a member due to maintenance of 
law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’. Secondly, on receiving
53 ‘Dorr Group Concludes Work’, AE, 4/12/96.
54 See CONF/2500/96, p.22.
55 See McDonagh, 1998, pp. 169-170.
56 See CONF/2500/96, p.28.
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asylum seekers and refugees into the EU it called for a balance of effort between 
Member States, a provision that the German government had been keen to have 
included.57
Dutch Presidency
IntroductionIn shaping the final package from January 1997 until the Amsterdam 
Summit, the Dutch Presidency and the French and German governments were 
particularly influential. The British and Irish governments were also successful in 
having a protocol written into the final treaty providing for an ‘opt-out’ on Title IV
CO
with the possibility of opting in at a later date. As was the case with the Schengen 
acquis these protocols were necessary in attempt to maintain the common travel area 
between the UK and Ireland. Similarly the Danish government’s wish not to be part of 
a visa, asylum and immigration policy or for that matter any part of the Schengen 
acquis that was in the first pillar was also recognised in a protocol attached to the final 
treaty.59
As suggested from the examination below, in the early stages the Dutch continued with 
the same uncertainty as the Irish Presidency regarding the location of the new title. A 
French proposal in February 1996 proved influential in shaping the Presidency’s 
March 1997 draft. Yet, the French negotiators objectives continued to be muddled due 
to domestic divisions, and they eventually agreed to a much more communitarian 
package than expected. While the German government’s position had been ambiguous 
and convoluted the influence of the Lander on the German government’s position was 
very apparent in the final stages at Amsterdam, rolling back on some of the new 
features proposed by the Dutch in one of their final drafts in early June ‘97.
Negotiations:- The Dutch Presidency placed particular importance on reforming the 
third pillar. There were three reasons that explain this approach. Firstly, there was, as 
mentioned, the influencing features from Maastricht. The Dutch government and 
senior officials to Michel Patijn saw the first pillar as the rightful place for justice and
57 Ibid., Article C(2)(b), p.25.
58 See Protocols No. 4 TEU.
59 See Protocols No. 5 TEU.
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home affairs.60 It was a case of unfinished business from Maastricht. Secondly Dutch 
foreign policy has traditionally placed a strong emphasis on cross-border cooperation 
on legal and judicial matters with the International Court of Justice sitting in The 
Hague. With the headquarters of Europol also in The Hague, the Dutch were keen to 
promote stronger cooperation on fighting crime, especially with the eventual removal 
of internal borders. Thirdly, apart from the genuine belief in the importance of 
supranational nature of cooperation on justice and home affairs, the Presidency and 
particularly the influential and skilful Michel Patijn and his closest officials Matthijs 
van Bonzel61 and Thomas de Bruijn62 realised that this was one area along with 
Schengen where the Dutch Presidency could make very noticeable progress and 
changes to the treaty. Therefore their motivations for change were to a certain degree 
shaped by their desires for a successful Presidency.
By the 10th ministerial session on 24 February the Dutch Presidency had not given any 
new direction to the placing of the new area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In its 
working paper for this meeting it merely stressed again the willingness of Member 
States to extend community procedures to the third pillar. The Dutch approach was 
divided into three parts. Part A and B outlined the general goal of developing the 
Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. The few changes that were 
introduced by the Dutch were typical of the fluid nature of the negotiations. For 
example, while the Irish draft was clear as regards the time-tabling of the 
implementation of the JHA amendments, the Dutch proposal was completely open on 
this matter. Similarly the Presidency confined itself to merely commenting on the 
large majority that preferred communitarisation without being more specific as to the 
nature of this support. Under Article H it attempted to outline a coherent decision 
making procedure, but loosely defined the role of the European Parliament and the 
Court of Justice.64 The Presidency’s paper was equally unclear in part C on the fight 
against crime, police and judicial cooperation and the approach to be taken under 
Article K.3 as regards decision making as well as the role for the Court of Justice.65
60 Interviews.
61 Member o f Dutch IGC team.
62 Director, Department of European Integration, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Hague.
63 See CONF/3823/97.
64 Ibid. Article H, p. 11.
65 Ibid., p. 17 & 18.
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After commending the Irish Presidency on its draft treaty, while at the same time 
calling for greater progress, the French delegation submitted a position paper on JHA, 
building on the Irish draft.66 The structure and language of the paper saw an emphasis 
being placed on community procedures but with a few notable exceptions. Firstly, the 
French called for a five-year period over which to establish the area of free movement
A7 tof persons, asylum and immigration. Secondly, while the procedures and conditions 
on establishing and maintaining such an area were set out in this new title the proposal 
did not specifically state that this title would form part of the first pillar. Other
• /TO
delegations were confused by the lack of clarity from the French. Though the 
decision to remove the internal borders after five years would be taken ‘on the basis of 
a detailed report by the Commission on implementation of the preparatory flanking 
measures’ relating to security and crime, it was one that was confined to a unanimous 
decision by the Council.69
A more Community-oriented approach was reflected in the dual initiative for the
70Member States and the Commission outlined in Article G of the paper. In acting on a 
proposal the Council was also required to consult the European Parliament.71 Further 
signs of a Communitarian approach can be found in the recommendation to normalise 
the use of QMV.72 Nevertheless, what the French gave with the right hand they took 
back with the left. The whole cooperation under the new title could be put on hold 
indefinitely for reasons of public policy or national security, echoes of the French 
approach on Schengen where the French have consistently used this guard in avoiding 
any implementation of the Schengen Convention it signed up to. Finally there was no 
role provided for the Court of Justice within this new title.
As mentioned this approach by the French reflected the divisions within the French 
government. While there was a strong emphasis from the foreign and justice ministries 
together with the on taking up a communitarian approach on JHA, the French position 
was not solid on this. The Ministry for Internal Affairs was reluctant to see any such
66 See AE, 16/12/96; CONF 3824/97.
67 CONF 3824/97, Article C(5).
68 Interviews.
69 CONF 3824/97, p.6, Author’s emphasis.
70 Ibid., p.7
71 T U iA
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extension while the Elysee also expressed reservations. There was disquiet from within 
the Interior Ministry regarding what was considered as an overly ambitious French 
approach that would be difficult to implement.73
When the Dutch Presidency brought forth its March draft the proposed new title on 
Freedom, Security and Justice was part of the first pillar. The Dutch draft picked up on 
several of the French suggestions. Concerned with security implications of free 
movement for all people, including third country nationals, the French paper suggested 
replacing the one,-two-and three-year transitional periods outlined in the Irish draft on 
Articles B (asylum) and Article C (visas) with a five-year period.74 The Dutch 
Presidency draft made this change. The Dutch Presidency, to the satisfaction of the 
French, also placed a greater emphasis on flanking measures and cooperation in 
fighting crime through Article A of the March draft.
The influence of the French proposal contrasts with that from the Italian delegation at 
this time which suggested dropping any time frame for implementing any new title, 
while at the same time calling for a greater emphasis on the protection of fundamental
7 ( \human rights and fighting fraud and drug addiction. It also called for the immediate 
use of QMV and co-decision in the title. These demands were ignored. While 
governments would eventually agree to the EP having a consultative role during the 
transitional period, with the Commission having a joint role with the member 
governments in launching initiatives there was little common ground for the immediate 
use of QMV or co-decision, except for the two areas on the list of third countries 
needing a visa on entering the Union and the rules on the format of these visas (Article
7762(2)(b)(I) and (iii), both issues having been dealt with previously under 100c TEC. 
Indeed, as is described below, the Germans would keep the whole issue of QMV and 
the transition period alive up until the final stages of the Conference.
As the negotiations reached their climax at Amsterdam, two changes in the domestic 
situation undermined the earlier French influence leaving them to accept a much more
73 Interview
74 See CONF/3824/97, p.2.
75 See CONF/2500/96 ADD.l, p.15.
76 See CONF/3840/97, 06/03/97, pp. 1-10.
77 See CEC, Note a Vattention, March 1997.
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pro-Community package under Title IV than would have been expected. Firstly, the 
Interior ministry was losing out to the more Community oriented stances of the Justice
t • • 70  . , # #
and Foreign Affairs ministry. Its influence was waning at the critical stage. Secondly, 
the French general elections had brought about a shock result. Chirac was in 
cohabitation with the new Socialist Prime Minister Jospin. French officials and 
officials from other delegations, especially the British referred to a lack of political
7 Q
leadership as Amsterdam approached. Jospin and Chirac were not focused on the 
detailed changes that the Dutch Presidency presented. This left the French drifting into 
an agreement on visa, asylum and immigration (Article 62 & 63) which were firmly 
placed in pillar one, which provided for a strong role for the Court of Justice, (Article 
68) and which had a weakened opt-out facility for national security and public policy 
reasons (Article 64(2) than the French originally desired. From the end of April ‘97 
onwards as the negotiators at the political levels -  the Heads of State and Government 
together with the Foreign Ministers -  began to take on a greater role in the 
negotiations, the French were not focused. They had failed to anticipate and recognise 
the more communitarian approaches of the Presidency’s proposals, signing up to a 
package with certain features that they had not intended.
While the attempts to shape the reforms to the third pillar culminated in an unintended 
outcome for the French government, the ambiguity that had shrouded the German 
position for much of the process began to lift. This revealed how fluid the negotiations 
were given that it caught the other governments by surprise. It was at this stage that the 
reticent Lander, as described above, proved influential. The Presidency’s March draft 
and those from early June provided for an automatic ending to the transitional period. 
At Amsterdam Kohl insisted on a decision by unanimity to end the five-year 
transitional period. The Lander sought to maintain control on any potential move to 
QMV and co-decision. Similarly the three year transitional period under Article G, as 
outlined in the Dutch draft of March ‘97 under which decisions would be taken by
SOunanimity, was extended to five years in the run up to Amsterdam. This was again 
due to pressure from the German government that was in turn under pressure from the
78 Interviews.
79 Ibid.
80 See ER, N° 2228, 1997, pp.1-2.
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Lander to maintain a greater deal of control on this policy area. The final wording of 
Article 67 reflected the Lander’ preferences.
Summary
The process of establishing a new title subject to some Community procedures and 
located within pillar I of the TEU was initially characterised by ambiguity. Member 
governments and the Irish Presidency were slow to provide the details on an issue that 
was repeatedly described as having the support of a large majority of governments. 
Chapter III on the pre-negotiations also mentioned how governments referred to the 
need and the possibility of transferring third pillar matters to the first, though their 
papers were unclear on what this precisely meant.82 The Commission and the Council 
Secretariat were the first to provide any details. In turn the Irish Presidency and more 
so the Dutch built on this. Yet, as the process neared its end, the uncertainty and 
divisions in the German governments objectives, which had hampered the delegations’ 
attempts to provide a coherent position earlier in the negotiations were replaced with a 
cautious welcome to the new title followed by Kohl’s insistence that more checks were 
in place over the transitional period. While the German position became clearer, the 
French contradictions persisted with domestic distractions proving costly as they 
agreed to the new Title IV on Freedom, Security and Justice.
2. CRIME AND SECURITY
Background
The growing pre-occupation with crime in the early 1990s was related yet again to the 
changes in Eastern Europe and the opening of the borders after the collapse of 
Communism. With the rising flows of people and of goods across the EU’s internal 
borders came a rise in transnational crime.83 This required closer cooperation among 
national law enforcement agencies and the transformation of the European Drugs Unit 
into EUROPOL supplementing the slow procedures of INTERPOL. The Maastricht 
treaty sought to give a basis to the informal cooperation among police forces,
81 See CONF/2500/96 ADD.l, p.21; CONF/4002/97 p.22; See “Treaty o f Amsterdam”, AE, 17/06/97.
82 See pp. 18-80.
83 See R. Clutterbuck, Terrorism Drugs & Crime in Europe after 1992, London: Routledge, pp. 108-118; 
M. Den Boer & N. Walker, ‘European Policing after 1992’, JCMS, 31:1, 1993.
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intelligence services, customs and immigration services and their supervising
Oyl
ministries that grew up in the 1970s and 1980s. More intensive patterns of working 
together, with new multilateral conventions and new institutions, necessitated 
government attention to reassure their publics about these new developments. As 
Guyomarch remarks
the government of almost every EU Member State has 
become increasingly afraid of its inability, acting alone, 
to deal with the effects of the removal of internal border 
controls on persons and goods and the ending of national 
controls on capital movements.
At the same time Anderson presents an elaborate argument outlining the limitations of 
the competence of the EU in criminal justice matters.85 Den Boer also referred to Title
o r
VI as a ‘compromised construction’. Therefore governments sought to address this 
issue of enhancing cooperation in the fight against crime at the IGC, though as 
mentioned in chapter III few governments had well defined objectives on how to go 
about making this reform.87
Introduction
The negotiations on crime and security received strong support from both the German 
and French governments, though there remained fundamental differences in their 
conceptions on the role for Europol. In turn the German government did not have the 
same influence in shaping the final package at a late stage in the negotiations as it did 
on communitarisation. Instead the two Presidencies, the Irish and the Dutch, were 
particularly influential in shaping the final amendments to Article K. As with the 
transfer of asylum, visa and immigration policies from the third to the first pillar it was 
very much a case of the Dutch Presidency preparing a package that both suited it 
domestically and which caught the French government by surprise.
84 See Malcolm Anderson and others, Policing the European Union: theory, law and practice (Oxford: 
OUP, 1995), ch.7.
85 M. Anderson & Monica den Boer (eds.) Policing Across National Boundaries, London: Pinter, 1994, 
Chapters 6 & 7.
86 Monica Den Boer, ‘Police Cooperation in the TEU: Tiger in a Trojan Horse?’, CMLR, 1995, 32, 
p.562.
*7 See pp.78-80.
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German Position
The German government’s coalition agreement from November 1994 on the third 
pillar focused in particular on completing and implementing the EUROPOL 
Convention. In outlining the government’s philosophy behind its priorities a secure
DO
Europe was mentioned that would be achieved by developing EUROPOL. In its 
official position submitted on the eve of Turin, the federal government again stressed 
the need for effective action on transnational crime and drug trafficking.89 This could 
only be secured via closer police cooperation that would eventually lead to a European 
force with operational powers.
On 4 March 1996 Hoyer circulated within the Auswartiges Amt. a draft article 
suggesting a Community competence to combat cross-border crime. He also suggested 
that it was essential to have a clear reference giving EUROPOL operational powers. 
This would be facilitated for via the approximation of laws.90 A similarly forward and 
ambitious approach was also expounded by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel the 
previous week. He suggested using QMV on such issues. However, there was the 
opposing view from within the Foreign Ministry, primarily headed by Silberberg. 
While he suggested that QMV should be used in such areas, he stated that the German 
approach should make it clear to the other delegations that there should be no future 
Community competence over police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.91
British Position
The approach taken by both the Conservative and Labour governments on 
communitarisation and the proposed dismantling of internal borders to establish an 
area of Freedom, Security and Justice constrained their approaches on policing and crime 
in two ways. Firstly, since the Conservative government for the greater part removed 
itself from the negotiations on communitarisation, its influence and the relevance of its 
position on the flanking measures that were being vigorously pursued by the French 
delegation was similarly reduced. The same was to apply to the Labour government.
88 See Point VIII, 11 November 1994.
89 See Germany's objectives, 26 March 1996.
90 Interviews.
91 Ibid.
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Secondly, given that both parties’ positions favoured an intergovernmental approach 
based on unanimity with Westminster in full control of British borders, their proposals on 
police cooperation were always going to be limited.
Both parties supported greater cooperation between national police forces. In 
outlining the successes of the third pillar, the Conservative’s 1996 White Paper 
concentrated on the signing of the Convention on Europol and the growing importance 
of Europol, but only in a support capacity to national police forces. Any cooperation 
would be on an intergovernmental basis. On the eve of Turin the government repeated 
its determination that any police cooperation would remain intergovernmental, an 
exclusive concern for the Member States. It continued to refuse to recognise and apply 
the Protocol to the Europol Convention providing a role for the Court of Justice. One 
British official commented that ‘We are looking for arguments of substance that 
demonstrate the need to include the court, not theological arguments that define 
positions ahead of the IGC’.94
French Position
As mentioned in the previous section the French government was particularly 
concerned with ensuring that there were sufficient measures to flank any removal of 
internal borders. These flanking measures would focus on two levels: the strengthening 
of the external borders and greater cooperation between the national police forces and 
Europol in the fight against crime.95 The periodic bombing in the heart of Paris in 1996 
had focused both the public and political elites’ attention on the need to combat 
international crime and terrorism.96
As with the British this cooperation was to proceed on an intergovernmental level with 
Europol acting in a support capacity. However, the French government expressed a 
willingness for the Commission to be given powers of initiative in this area, while
92 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996; Strategy fo r a New Europe, 1995, p. 15.
93 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996, paragraphs 52-53.
94 See Emma Tucker, ‘UK stonewalls over setting up Europol: British stance foreshadows battles at 
IGC’, FT, 20/03/96; European Parliament, Briefing No. 26: EUROPOL. Luxembourg: OOPEC, 1996; 
Interview.
95 See Memo, 1996.
96 See EIU Country Report - France - 1st Quarter 1997.
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acting in tandem with the Member States. It also proposed that national parliaments 
participate in the drafting of legislative texts together with the ‘High Parliamentary
• Q7
Council’ where the proposed legislation affects civil or criminal law. The extent of 
French concerns on ensuring close cooperation on fighting crime was reflected in their 
proposal that a principle under international law that allows acts to come into effect 
without waiting for the instruments of ratification to be deposited should be used in 
this context. Nevertheless, the French government’s ability to push the negotiations 
along on this subject was undermined by its approach on cross border cooperation up 
until this time. A series of high profile confrontations between the French police and 
politicians and their Belgian counterparts depicted the French as treating cooperation 
on combating crime as one way traffic, availing of hot pursuit into Belgium but failing 
to make the necessary legal changes allowing for hot pursuit by the Belgian authorities 
into French territory.98 This culminated in a somewhat bitter exchange between the 
French and Belgian interior ministers.99
Finally the French government and notably President Chirac were determined to 
strengthen any new title in the first pillar and what remained of an intergovernmental 
third pillar in the fight against drugs.100 However, as was the case in the transfer of 
asylum, immigration and visa issues to the first pillar, the French government had not 
clarified and worked through in detail how it wanted to deal with this issue. The Dutch 
Presidency proved skilful in capitalising on this lack of clarity, as is shown below.
Negotiations
Irish Presidency
Throughout the Italian Presidency and for the earlier part of the Irish the negotiations 
lacked direction. No delegation tabled a detailed non-paper and there were no notable 
discussions at either the personal representative level or among foreign ministers.
97 The French proposed that ‘High Parliamentary Council’ which would comprise two representatives 
from each Member State, together with an institutionalised COSAC, being consulted on all matters 
relating to the principle o f subsidiarity. See Memo, 1996.
98 Hot pursuit refers to the ability o f police officers to continue a pursuit o f a suspect that may have 
committed a crime in one Member State after the suspect has cross the border into another Member 
State.
99 See AE, 20/04/95; ‘Mr Pasqua Says France will Respect its International Commitments “Without 
Reserve’”, AE, 24/04/95; ‘Ministerial Meeting on Friday to be Dominated by Problems Encountered in 
the Implementation o f the Convention’, AE, 27/04/95.
100 Interviews.
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Nevertheless, while the Irish Presidency had hesitated on the location of any new title 
on Freedom, Security and Justice, it eventually proved very influential in shaping the 
core parts of what was left of pillar III. The Irish Presidency had geared itself towards 
improving the provisions on crime. The Taoiseach had listed the three goals of the 
Irish Presidency as being ‘safe streets, sound money and secure jobs’.101 The Foreign 
Minister promoted a similar theme on the lead up to the Presidency and throughout his 
office. He declared that ‘There are a great many items on the Union’s agenda, but we
1 AA
have chosen to devote special attention to two - employment and drugs’. He
1 AO
described these issues as ‘vital barometers of the Union’s wellbeing’. There was a 
strong consensus within the Irish Rainbow Coalition of Fine Gael, Labour and 
Democratic Left on the need to tackle an increasingly high level of organised crime in 
the capital city of Dublin. The shooting dead of a well-known and respected 
investigative journalist, Veronica Guerin in July 1996 focused public and media 
attention on the problem. Given the international nature of this crime, much of it drug 
related, the Irish government had a favourable domestic environment and an interest to 
push the debate forward on third pillar matters.
The fact that it was not until late November that the Presidency began to consider 
detailed and specific changes reveals the lack of initiative among the other delegations. 
Again it depicts how governments had not sorted out their objectives in any 
sufficiently detailed manner. Even by November only two delegations submitted 
papers of note, namely the Spanish, with their concerns on cooperation against 
terrorism and the Belgian delegation’s submission that was similar to the earlier 
Benelux memorandum with its more supranational emphasis. Articles K.la and K.lb 
of the Irish draft treaty dealing with the objectives of cooperation on crime & police 
cooperation respectively, remained largely unchanged until the final draft at 
Amsterdam. The Irish draft struck a balance providing for closer cooperation between 
national police forces while at the same time calling for this cooperation to involve 
Europol, with the latter’s powers being gradually increased over a five year period.104 
There was something in this for the French, British and Germans. However, consistent 
with the negotiations elsewhere on the treaty, the Irish Presidency avoided making
101 ‘Bruton keen to convey EU aims in simple terms’, IT, 03/07/96.
102 See again IT, 01/07/96.
103 Ibid.
104 See CONF/2500/96, Articles K .la & K.lb, pp.33-35.
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proposals on the institutional and decision-making issues in this area. Again it was left 
to the Dutch Presidency.
Dutch Presidency
The February proposal from the Dutch Presidency introduced cooperation between 
national judiciaries on criminal matters under Article K.lc. This formed Article K.3 in 
the March draft and the final treaty with its form and contents for the greater part 
remaining unchanged. The only three papers of detail came from the Italian, French 
and German delegations. The Italian paper focused on the institutional features of what 
remained of the third pillar. It called for the widespread use of QMV with a role for the 
Court of Justice similar to that under pillar I. The paper gave the Commission a right 
of initiative with a consultative role for the European Parliament.105 While there would 
be sufficient agreement among governments for the Commission to have a joint role of 
initiative, there was not sufficient support among governments for QMV to be used in 
the third pillar. The French paper as described below was clear that unanimity would 
remain the norm.106 The final treaty also provided the EP with a consultative role under 
Article 39 TEU reflecting the support that several governments gave to this idea in 
their official position papers at the start of the Conference. However, as was the case 
on extending the parliament’s powers on co-decision the issue of a consultative role in 
the third pillar raised little debate over the sixteen months.107 As for the Court of 
Justice, its specific role was part of a struggle between the French and Dutch approach 
on fighting crime, specifically drug-related crime.
The French continued their emphasis on the need for strong flanking measures in 
fighting crime, with closer cooperation between national police and judicial forces 
with Europol acting in a support capacity.108 Their paper recommended the continued 
use of unanimity; Article K.3 confining QMV to joint actions of an operational nature, 
though the same Article also provided the Commission with a joint initiative role and a 
consultative role for the European Parliament. Yet, it was at this stage that the 
contradictions and lack of clear objectives within the French position were most 
apparent. With its tough policy on drugs, the French paper set out a series of much
105 See CONF/3840/97, Article H, p.9.
106 See CEC, Note a Vattention, March ‘97.
107 Interviews.
108 See CONF 3824/97, pp. 12-13.
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stronger articles than the Dutch or Irish Presidency’s papers. The Dutch government 
was taking a more liberal line on the drugs issue, preferring to deal with it as a public 
health matter under Article 129, while keeping any criminal policy as an 
intergovernmental matter, This was consistent with a liberal Dutch domestic policy on 
drugs. A comparison between the French and Dutch papers highlight their different 
approaches. French amendments to Article A of the Irish draft called for measures in 
the fight against drug addiction as well as trafficking.109 The Dutch proposal confined 
itself to trafficking.110 While the French sought to replace Article E of the Irish draft 
which dealt with cooperation on drugs and drug-related crime with the ‘corresponding 
provisions in Articles A andK’, the Dutch paper simply dropped the Article.111 The 
trend continued throughout Article K. The French paper again called for ‘priority 
measures’ on drug consumption as well as trafficking.112 It also provided a detailed 
outline on the drugs policy to be adopted by the Member States.113 The final 
significant change proposed by the French paper came with Article K.4 which outlined 
a role for the European Court of Justice in regulating disputes between Member States 
on measures taken under Article K.114
However, the final result at Amsterdam was more of a victory for the Dutch 
Presidency than the French government. Firstly, the Dutch managed to confine 
references to criminal matters on drugs to the intergovernmental pillar of Title VI, 
rather than making reference to fighting the problem in Title IV as the French would 
have preferred. Secondly, the fight against drugs outlined in Title VI was confined to 
matters of trafficking rather than consumption. As mentioned the French were keen to 
tackle consumption as a criminal matter, the Dutch were not. Consumption was dealt 
with as a public health matter under Article 129 TEC. Therefore the Dutch Presidency 
was comfortable with the ECJ having a role under Article K. Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
Luxembourg, Portugal in their earlier position papers at the start of the negotiations 
had also briefly mentioned the possibility of the ECJ having a role in the third pillar,
109 Ibid, p.4
110 CONF/3 823/97, p.6.
111 CONF 3824/97, p.7.
112 Ibid, Article K & Article K .l.
113 Ibid, Article K.lb, p. 13
114 Ibid, pp. 16 & 17.
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while the Commission in March ’97 claimed that all governments except for the 
British and Greek were prepared to accept such an extension in the Court’s powers.115
While the role for the Court of Justice outlined in Amsterdam was optional, reflecting 
long term British preferences, the final treaty provided for a much stronger Court than 
the French had advocated back in February ‘97. Having already signed up to a 
potentially strong role for the Court under Title IV and having lost out on its objectives 
for a stronger drugs policy, the French failed to sign up to accepting the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction under Title IV (Article K). The divisions between the Foreign Ministry and 
the Interior Ministry over the whole restructuring of the third pillar, the preoccupation 
among the political elite to the surprise election result and in turn the poorly defined 
objectives, yet again left the French government with an outcome that it had not 
intended. France was not alone in balking at the changes on the table at Amsterdam. 
Despite the Commission’s earlier claims on the ECJ only Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands signed up for the Court’s role under Article 
35 TEU.
The German delegation submitted a paper somewhat late on in the negotiations on 9 
May.116 The paper focused specifically on police cooperation. As mentioned above, the 
German government attached particular importance to this issue. The proposal failed to 
change Article K.1 and K.2 of the Dutch Presidency’s March draft, which had in turn 
been closely modelled on the Irish Presidency’s conclusions. The German proposal 
went further than the second paragraph of Article K.2 (now Article 30 TEU) in 
providing powers for Europol. For example, the Germans wanted Europol to be able to 
obtain any information, from both public and non-public sources, on its own initiative 
in any of the Member States. It also sought to make it compulsory for Member States 
to distribute information among themselves and Europol. Most emphatic of all was its 
call for the Council not to merely ‘promote cooperation through Europol’ but to equip
117it with full operational powers. Such a call for a strong Europol at such a late stage 
in the negotiations was particularly unacceptable to both the French and British, which, 
as mentioned above, supported further police cooperation while emphasising that 
between national forces with Europol acting in support. Indeed Finland was the only
115 See CEC, Note a Vattention, 12 March 1997.
116 CONF/3910/97, 13/05/97.
117 Ibid., Article K. 2(1).
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other member government that had specifically called for a fully operational Europol 
in its position paper from March ‘96. The German paper proved ineffective.
3. SCHENGEN AND BORDER CONTROLS
Background
The Schengen Agreement made up of the original Convention signed on 14 June 1985 
and the Schengen Implementing Convention of 19 June 1990 ‘effectively acted as a 
substitute for reform at EU level in the area of border control’.118 The EU’s own 
External Borders Convention was deadlocked with disputes between Britain and Spain 
regarding Gibraltar, and disputes over the role of institutions. In some respects 
Schengen competed or overlapped with the structures under Pillar III, given that it 
aimed to create a common territory without border controls with harmonised rules on 
the crossing of common external frontiers, visa policy and movement of third country 
nationals inside the Schengen area. However, despite the fact that not all Member 
States were Schengen members, Articles 134 & 142 of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention required the Convention to be compatible with Community law while 
envisaging that the European Communities would eventually achieve an area without 
internal borders.
Within the Schengen Area there were considerable difficulties with implementing the 
agreements. The Benelux, Germany, Portugal and Spain implemented the agreement 
while the Nordic common transport area was in essence absorbed into the Schengen 
system by 1996. France, while being an original signatory, continually delayed 
implementation, as did Italy and Greece, given that they were frontline states with a 
poor system and record in monitoring their borders. The UK and Ireland continued to 
remain outside the area.
118 Gavin Barrett, 1997, p. 14. On Schengen see Monica den Boer (ed.), Schengen, Judicial Cooperation 
and Policy Cooperation, Maastricht: EIPA, 1997.
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Introduction
In the pre-negotiation stage (see Chapter III) there was little mention of bringing the 
Schengen acquis, or body of rules into the European Union. The Reflection Group 
mentioned the possibility but few official position papers referred to this, and those 
that did, were rather hesitant and unclear.119 Therefore the incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis into the European Union was not only the most significant change 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty but also one of the most unexpected. As the 
examination of the negotiations below shows, this was an issue on which the Dutch 
Presidency yet again dominated. The German government along with the Italians were 
the only other two members to come close to outlining in any detail their preferences 
on this issue. Even then there were the inevitable contradictions in the German 
position. Throughout the negotiations no member government submitted a Conference 
document on Schengen, except for the Dutch.120 Therefore until the Dutch Presidency 
there was almost a total absence of discussion on Schengen. The Dutch brought 
direction to, and skilfully conclude the incorporation of, what had been for the Dutch 
government a clearly established objective from the outset. Yet, this would come at the 
expense of any clarity as to what exactly the Schengen acquis entailed and without any 
appreciation of the consequences of such a move. This was a matter that the 
Presidency preferred to leave to the post-negotiations.
French Position
The French government was fundamentally ambiguous on Schengen. While the French 
had been part of the original group establishing Schengen, successive French 
governments failed to fully implement the Convention. This was due to several factors. 
Firstly, as mentioned in chapter IV, the French, while signing up to agreements and
191conventions, are less willing or, at times, able to implement these decisions. 
Secondly, the French government doubted the security and integrity of certain parts of 
the external borders, particularly the Italian and Spanish borders.122 Thirdly the French
1,9 See pp.78-80.
120 The Italian and German ideas did not make it into an actual position paper.
121 See pp. 104-5.
122 Interviews.
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• 191government expressed outright opposition to the Dutch government’s drugs policy. 
On the eve of the full implementation of the Schengen convention in June 1995, the 
French government unilaterally extended its period of non-implementation for a 
further six months. The wave of terrorist bomb attacks in Paris provided a weightier 
justification for the French government’s actions.124
As mentioned above, the French position throughout the IGC focused on the need for 
strong and effective external borders before it was possible to abolish internal borders. 
Adopting a similar approach and line as within the Schengen structure, the French 
made little running on a change in the status quo as regards incorporating the acquis. 
In its position paper (February 1996) at the start of the Conference it made no 
reference to Schengen and it did not submit any papers on the subject throughout the 
negotiations.
German Position
The German approach on Schengen was also loosely defined. There was no mention of 
any incorporation of Schengen in the federal government’s pre-negotiation position 
papers or in the position paper of the Lander.125 This was again a reflection of the lack 
of priority that was attached to such a move at that time. A similar state of affairs that 
existed on the third pillar was equally identifiable between the Interior, Justice and 
Foreign Ministries on Schengen. The Interior Ministry and the Lander governments 
expressed concern regarding the permeability of the external borders. The Interior 
Minister Kanther cited the Italian borders as a particularly weak point, while others 
including certain individuals in the SPD recommended the maintenance of border 
control with Austria, given that it was ‘under considerable migratory pressure’ with its 
four eastern European neighbours.126
123 ‘Cautious Progress by France towards Lifting Controls, Rapprochement over Drugs’, AE, 20/12/95; 
‘Belgian Interior Minister, Mr. Vande Lanotte, convokes the French ambassador following the words of 
President Chirac’, AE, 20/09/95.
124 ‘France reintroduces Controls, at Airports, o f Passengers Travelling in the Schengen Area’, AE, 
28/07/95.
125 Bundesrat. Enstchliefiung des Bundesrates, Forerungen der Lander zur Regierungskonferenz. 
Dmcksache 667/95, 1996; see, Germany’s Objectives, 1996.
126 See EU News of the Week, 15-21/05/95; EU News of the Week, 23-29/06/97.
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However, as the negotiations commenced support was expressed from within the 
Auswartiges Amt. for an incorporation of the acquis. Yet, the German government had 
not a clear objective as to how the acquis would be incorporated. Initially support was 
expressed for the phased approach on integrating the acquis as set out in the Dutch 
paper of 15 July 1996 (CONF/3872/96).127 Nevertheless, on 18 November 1996 Hoyer 
remarked that its incorporation should come by flexibility, rather than the third pillar, 
and its acquis should be left intact. Similarly, in a joint article in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine, 21 February 1997 and La Stampa 22 February 1997 the German and 
Italian Foreign Ministers remarked that, while it would be preferable to have everyone 
at the same level on Schengen, a flexibility mechanism might be necessary on 
incorporating into the treaty. At a later stage in the negotiations another German-Italian 
initiative focused on the pillar which the acquis would form part of. The first pillar was 
suggested on the basis that Schengen’s effectiveness and dynamism would be 
improved through the Community methods and procedures.128
British Position
The Conservative and Labour governments’ opposition to any incorporation stemmed 
from the myth on border control. Westminster’s exclusive domain on maintaining 
border control formed the backbone of both the Conservative and Labour 
governments’ approaches on the third pillar. This amounted to a myth in so far as 
much scepticism surrounded the actual benefits of such an approach on border
19Q • •controls. Yet, it was an issue that was pursued and defended by both parties in a 
strong fashion. There was a high degree of continuity between the two governments on 
this issue.
The Conservative government adopted the expected hard-line approach. At the 
parliamentary debate on 16 December 1996 on the Dublin II European Council 
meeting, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were at pains to reassure their own 
backbenchers, particularly the Eurosceptics, on their willingness to maintain control of 
UK borders. While the Prime Minister gave ‘categoric [SIC] assurance[s] on that 
point’, the Foreign Secretary remarked that the government did ‘not [have] the
127 Interviews.
128 ‘Germany And Italy Adopt A Common Position On The Schengen Agreements’, AE, 1/03/97.
129 See Britain: ‘The island view: Immigration controls: Britain and Schengen’, Economist, 07/06/97.
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slightest intention of conceding one inch’.130 As with the debate on the European 
Union four days prior, Rifkind was selective in his focus on the draft treaty remarking 
‘that if the Schengen agreement was ever incorporated into the European Union there 
would have to be “provision for opt-outs’”.131 However, from the Foreign Secretary’s 
comments and based on paragraph 51 of the government’s White Paper, it was clear 
that the Conservative government was prepared to allow for closer cooperation among 
the other member governments, while the British opted out. This line was again 
repeated by David Davis on his return from the 11 January ‘97 meeting of personal 
representatives. He welcomed ‘the fact that Mr. Patijn should have recognized that the 
United Kingdom should keep its right of control over its own borders,’ going on to 
claim that it ‘demonstrates that the other Member States recognize the importance that 
the United Kingdom attaches to retaining its border-controls’.132
The Labour party in its 1995 paper stated that ‘Labour does not believe that Britain
1 O'!
should participate in the Schengen Agreement’. The Labour government attempted 
to set its position off from the Conservatives by claiming that they would secure in 
writing what the Conservatives had failed to achieve after eighteen years in office. The 
new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, remarked on the Amsterdam summit, at the 
House of Commons debate on European Union on 9 June, that the Labour government 
would obtain ‘a legal basis beyond challenge in the European Court of Justice for 
Britain to maintain its external border controls, which the Conservative Government 
never secured in 18 years’.134 As he left for the Amsterdam Summit, Cook re­
emphasised the need for ‘a legally watertight provision for Britain’s external border 
controls and control of our immigration’, while Blair stressed the importance of the 
exemption being written into the treaty, declaring that without such a provision ‘our 
ability to control our own borders would be eliminated’.135 This determination would 
see it secure two opt-outs from both the relevant articles under Title IV and the 
Schengen Acquis.
130 Hansard Column 627,16/12/96.
131 Ibid. Column 434.
132 AE, 12/12/97.
133 Labour, 1995, p. 15.
134 See Column 806, Hansard Reports, 09/06/97.
135 ‘Britain: Cook urges EU to set its sights on new goals’, FT, 16/06/97; Hansard Reports, 18/06/97.
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The Labour government’s approach on border control was important in another sense, 
namely, defining their relations with the rest of the European partners. It has already 
been described how the Labour government’s arrival had been met with expectations 
from other member governments that there would be a significant change in the British
i  ' j / r  i  0*7
approach. Labour had been keen to satisfy those expectations. At the same time, 
as an inexperienced government party, it was equally keen to build on its image as a 
tough and serious negotiator.138 It had sought to set a somewhat similarly balanced 
approach during the election campaign.139 Negotiations on Schengen and border 
control were centre pieces of this balanced image, a marked contrast to the extreme 
approach of the previous Conservative administration.
Negotiations
The incorporation of Schengen was a Dutch-led campaign from the very outset of the 
negotiations, or more accurately, a campaign led by the Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, Michel Patijn. Similar reasons, as with its preoccupation on the 
transfer of asylum, visa and immigration to the first pillar, explain the Dutch approach. 
Those close to Michel Patijn expressed the view that the Dutch conception from the 
very foundation of Schengen was that it should eventually be incorporated into the 
EC/EU’s institutional structure.140 There was also the political mileage that would 
come with this achievement. In no other area of reform at the IGC did any single actor 
dominate a portfolio as the Dutch did with Schengen. As one British official remarked, 
‘The Dutch were in complete control of Schengen’. Indeed, this was acknowledged by 
all those interviewed.
Irish Presidency
The Dutch delegation on 15 July 1996 had submitted a proposal on incorporating 
Schengen into the European Union.141 In its proposal it suggested a three-stage approach 
to be followed in order not to force such incorporation into the Union. The proposal was
136 See again Barber & Buckley, FT, 06/05/97; Barber, 06/05/97; Tom Buerkle ‘Hopes Rise That Britain 
Will Warm To Europe’, IHT, 03/05/97.
137 See again Doug Henderson, ‘a fresh start’, 05/05/97.
138 Robert Peston, ‘Blair: British interests come ‘first, second and last” ’, FT, 10 May 1997; ‘Ending 
Britain’s self-imposed exclusion’, IHT, 23/05/97; ‘Britain Signals New Era With EU’, IHT, 06/05/97.
139 Robert Peston, ‘New stance: Labour leader scorns EU ‘superstate’” , FT, 22/04/97.
140 Interview.
141 CONF/3872/96.
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discussed at the personal representatives’ meeting of 18 November 1996. Yet, there was 
little willingness from the Irish Presidency to push the debate along on an issue where the 
difficulties were very apparent for the Irish government, given the common travel area 
between Ireland and Britain, and the position taken by the British Conservative 
government and the Labour party on Schengen. Ireland, along with Britain, was neither a 
member of Schengen nor was it supportive of its introduction into the European Union. 
Given that Ireland and Britain share a common travel area, it would have been 
inconceivable for the former to sign up to an acquis with the latter adamant on 
maintaining control of its borders. As mentioned above, an opt-out would be necessary.
The absence of any discussion on the incorporation of Schengen into the European Union 
up until the December draft was not solely due to a reluctance from the Irish Presidency. 
No other member government submitted a detailed paper on Schengen. The Italian 
Presidency, in its conclusions at Florence, had included an outline draft protocol on 
incorporating Schengen but it together with the Dutch proposal was barely discussed, and 
from accounts from certain officials they were barely aware of the presence of these 
documents.142 Indeed, Bobby McDonagh of the Irish Foreign Ministry remarked that ‘in 
the absence at that time of clear signals of interest from ... Member States* the one 
proposal that was submitted lay dormant’.143 In turn the draft treaty was left significantly 
devoid of any detail on a Schengen incorporation. It dealt with Schengen in two 
sentences, describing its possible incorporation as ‘An important issue requiring further 
consideration by the Conference’, going on to mention that ‘it might be done in a phased 
way with a provision for opt-outs’.144 To conclude, the Irish Presidency was content to 
use the lack of initiative from the other member governments in a manner that suited its 
own domestic situation.
Dutch Presidency
Holding the Presidency allowed Michel Patijn to build on the July 1996 proposal on 
Schengen. The Dutch success in having the acquis incorporated was due to several 
factors. Firstly, the Dutch were very particular in running the show. This was reflected in 
the tension that arose between the Presidency and the Council Secretariat. On the 
incorporation of the acquis the Dutch Presidency departed from the established
142 For Italian Presidency’s proposal see CONF 3860/1/96 ADD 1, p. 12-13.
143 See McDonagh, 1998, p. 174
144 CONF 2500/96, p.38.
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drafting practices: the Council Secretariat making the first draft, passing it to The 
Hague for the Presidency’s position and suggestions, before being returned to the 
Secretariat for the necessary changes to be incorporated. Certain Dutch officials 
suggested that the Secretariat was reluctant to agree to the approach proposed by the 
Presidency, in particular regarding the Schengen Secretariat being absorbed into the 
Council Secretariat.145 Therefore the Dutch did almost all the drafting on Schengen. 
The Presidency effectively froze out the Secretariat. The Council Secretariat 
acknowledged that this was the case, criticising the Presidency claiming that it was not 
receptive to its advice and was very often unavailable.146
Secondly, the Presidency moved very quickly to deal with any criticisms to its 
approach. There were efforts from within the British Foreign Office that sought to 
pressurise the newly appointed Foreign Secretary to urge his fellow foreign ministers 
to be more thorough in their approach on incorporating Schengen.147 The Irish Foreign 
Ministry similarly attempted to bring to the attention of the Presidency the potential 
negative implications of its actions as regards a grand incorporation, McDonagh 
remarking that ‘it was not clear at the outset how it would work in practice’.148 Yet, 
neither government was in a position to persuade, given that they would not be part of 
the new arrangement. Even when the British and Irish governments requested a copy 
of the Schengen Acquis, the Presidency, despite the difficulties in locating and 
assembling the document, forwarded a twenty thousand page copy of what it claimed
1 1  149to be the acquis.
On 4 February 1997 the Presidency tabled a non-paper that aimed to ‘examin[e] the 
techniques through which a possible incorporation could be achieved’.150 Two options 
existed. The ‘enabling clauses’ flexibility approach that was simultaneously being 
negotiated could be applied to the Schengen acquis, or what the Dutch termed the 
‘predetermined’ flexibility approach would see the full acquis being incorporated into the 
Union by means of a protocol. The Presidency’s commitment to incorporating the 
acquis was such that the draft protocol attached to the proposal included complicated
145 Interviews.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.; Also see McDonagh, 1998, p. 176.
148 Ibid.
149 tInterviews.
150 CONF/3 806/97.
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clauses, necessary to accommodate the Nordic Travel Area and the British and hence 
Irish resistance to abandoning frontier controls.151 This would be the approach that 
would eventually win favour in its final 5 May paper on Schengen.152 This paper was 
very similar to the final protocol that would be attached at Amsterdam, except for 
further additions on the role of the Court of Justice and the need for a separate 
agreement between Ireland, UK, Norway and Iceland.
The Dutch Presidency was able to maintain such tight control due to the lack of initiative 
from any other member government. There were no submissions during its Presidency 
proposing an alternative approach or suggesting a balanced consideration of the 
potential difficulties of the process e.g. the nature of the arrangements with Norway 
and Iceland on what exactly the Schengen acquis included. As with so many other 
issues at this IGC, few governments had clear objectives on the necessary detail on 
what they wanted. However, given that the Italian and German governments came the 
closest to presenting a detailed position, while Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and 
Spain had briefly acknowledged their support for the incorporation of the acquis in 
their earlier position papers during the pre-negotiations, the Dutch Presidency was able 
to use this tentative support, build on it through bilateral meetings with each delegation 
in the latter half of April ‘97 and bring all, except Britain, Denmark & Ireland along 
with its approach. The Greek government ratified the Schengen Convention on 11 June 
1997 and was comfortable with the Presidency’s approach, while as mentioned above, 
the Nordic bloc had been absorbed into the Schengen area.153 The French government 
as on the other issues in justice and home affairs signed up to the incorporation of the 
acquis, Chirac and Jospin distracted with their unexpected cohabitation and unaware, 
as with most of the other governments, of the domestic implications of the changes, 
namely the potential constitutional difficulties that would come with the ratification 
and implementation of these treaty amendments.
Member governments drifted along, or rather they were steered along, by a skilful 
Dutch Presidency into accepting what was the most significant amendment from the
151 Ibid. pp. 3-4 & 8-11; Also for succinct account see McDonagh, 1998, p.175. The Nordic Travel Area, 
which provided a common transport area and free movement between Nordic countries, included both 
Iceland and Norway, both of which are Schengen members but not members of the EU.
152 See CONF/3896/97.
153 SeeAE, 12/06/97; Athens Times, 12/06/97; Athens Times 13/06/97.
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1996-97 IGC. At no stage in the negotiations from January to June ‘97 did member 
governments establish what exactly the Schengen acquis entailed. Indeed officials 
within the Dutch Presidency admitted that when they requested a copy of the acquis 
from the Schengen Secretariat the latter were similarly unsure of what this included. 
Again, this was a reflection of the informal nature of cross border cooperation among 
police forces, immigration services and their supervising officials and ministries that 
had evolved over the previous decades. Indeed, 15 months after the Amsterdam Treaty 
had been signed and after most Parliaments had completed the process of ratification, 
the British Government in response to a strongly-worded House of Lords Committee 
Report on Justice and Home Affairs delivered declared that ‘It would...appear 
premature to publish a series of texts purporting to form the Schengen acquis',154 
Negotiations on what had been decided at Amsterdam continued well beyond the 
coming into force of the Treaty, without sufficient legal clarity on what had been 
decided on a late night in Florence on 21-22 June 1997.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter was divided into three sections that aimed to explain the negotiations on 
the communitarisation of asylum, immigration and visa policy, reforming crime and 
security in the third pillar, and the incorporation of the Schengen Acquis into the TEU. 
The central argument in this chapter was that across these three areas the negotiations 
were defined by ambiguity and indirection, which in turn gave rise to unexpected 
changes and outcomes, or the postponement of crucial issues until the implementation 
of the treaty.
On communitarisation and crime and security governments had been slow to provide 
detailed position papers building on their earlier more general support for change. On 
Schengen, only the Dutch government submitted a detailed plan early-on in the 
negotiations on incorporating the Schengen acquis. Therefore on the first two issues it 
was not until late in the Irish Presidency, towards the middle or end of November ’96, 
that the negotiations were given some direction. It is worth restating that, on 
communitarisation, the Commission and Council Secretariat led the way. The Irish 
Presidency built on this with a series of other proposals from the French, Benelux and
154 Para. 10 o f Government Response to Lords 31st Report, Sept. 1998.
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Danes. The Irish Presidency’s Articles K.1 and K.2 on the objectives of cooperation on 
crime and security and police cooperation would undergo little change over the Dutch 
Presidency and in the final treaty at Amsterdam.
The Irish Presidency had been reluctant to confirm the transfer of asylum, visa and 
immigration policies to the first pillar as well as putting forward proposals on the 
institutional set-up. This left the Dutch Presidency playing a crucial role on all three 
issues, but most particularly on the incorporation of the Schengen acquis. Even in 
early ‘97 there were few expectations of the Schengen acquis being incorporated into 
the treaties. What was even more unexpected was the manner in which this was 
achieved, with the Dutch in complete control, with what seemed like a deliberate 
policy of avoiding any consideration as to the contents of the acquis or the 
implications for the European Union or the Schengen area. These were matters that 
were left to be decided after the IGC had been signed and the treaty concluded. It was 
a case of postponement.
Schengen was not the only issue where governments stumbled into agreement, or, in 
the case of Schengen, were led into agreement without anticipating the consequences 
of their decisions. France and Germany were the other main players on reforming the 
third pillar. The internal divisions and contradictions in their positions proved 
particularly influential on the result at Amsterdam. For the French government these 
internal divisions left it signing up to a Title IV on visa and asylum, without fully 
appreciating or expecting such a strong role for the supranational institutions, 
particularly the Court of Justice. On title VI, while proving influential in the early 
stages of the Dutch Presidency, it was a similar case of domestic distractions that left 
the French again with a package of changes that it had not expected. For the German 
delegation it was more a case of proceeding through a thick fog for much of the 
negotiations with little input -  as was the case on other issues such as the extension of 
QMV -  before eventually arriving with a position largely shaped by the Lander which 
took the other governments by surprise.
The past two chapters on institutional reform and justice and home affairs have 
displayed, to varying extents, the four features of ambiguity, indirection, unintended 
outcomes and postponement. These four features reflected the incremental nature of
Chapter VI 216
the IGC process, governments slowly sorting out their priorities after a period of 
indirection. Yet, sometimes they failed to clearly define their objectives drifting into 
agreement or postponing for another time. It now only remains to examine how the 
negotiations on CFSP proceeded. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VII 
COMMON FOREIGN AND 
SECURITY POLICY
INTRODUCTION
Articles J.4(6) and Article J. 10 of the Maastricht Treaty were very clear in placing 
CFSP on the agenda of the 1996 IGC. The same two articles also reflected how 
Maastricht had postponed certain divisive issues such as WEU-EU relations and the 
application of Community procedures for another IGC. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to examine the negotiations on WEU-EU relations, common strategy, policy 
planning capability, Mr. CFSP, and decision making within the second pillar. This 
analysis is carried out by dividing the chapter into three sections. The first considers 
the relationship between the WEU and the EU. As with earlier chapters, the positions 
of the British, French, and German governments are initially outlined before 
examining the negotiations, usually from June 1997 onwards, though, where relevant, 
events under the Italian Presidency are referred to. The second section considers the 
negotiations on the proposed new machinery to CFSP; the Policy Planning unit, 
common strategy and Mr. CFSP. Both section one and two begin with an outline on 
the developments of CFSP since Maastricht. This provides a clearer understanding as 
to the shaping of the agenda and the positions that governments adopted. The third 
section examines the negotiations on decision making, focusing on QMV and its 
related issues. Each section outlines the features that underpinned the negotiations on 
each area. A pattern similar to the previous chapters can be identified.
Firstly, there was much postponement of discussions and taking of decisions on 
particularly difficult issues. It was a case of postponing either for a future IGC or until 
the implementation of the particular treaty article. Secondly, there was no member 
government, Presidency or group of governments that dominated the agenda. The 
French came the closest to attempting to steer the process along, most notably on the
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new machinery in the form of the PPU, High Representatives and common strategy. 
Nevertheless, a coherent French position was at times non-existent, as on the WEU, 
while its manoeuvring on the other issues raised considerable suspicion among the 
other members that the French were attempting to re-run parts of the failed Fouchet 
Plan from the 1960s. Thirdly, the French position was further weakened given that 
there was very little solid ground between the French and German governments across 
the pillar. Fourthly, given that there was little leadership, the process tended to lack 
direction in places, notably on extending QMV and WEU-EU relations.
1. NEGOTIATIONS ON WEU-EU RELATIONS 
Background
Article J.4(l) and (2) of the TEU widened Member State foreign policy cooperation to 
‘include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy . . .’. The WEU was designated as the institution 
that would ‘elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications’. This final version in the Maastricht Treaty reflected the 
underlying differences between the French, British and other member governments at 
this time. As already stated, Maastricht postponed dealing with these differences until 
a later date. In the period between the ratification and implementation of Maastricht to 
the convening of the 1996 IGC these differences evolved, shaping the approaches 
taken at the Conference.
At the time of the Maastricht IGC and up until 1993 the French approach on European 
security and defence was considerably influenced by Gaullist tendencies that have left 
successive governments hostile to a US-led NATO.1 There were several examples of 
this. Firstly, the Franco-German brigade formed in 1987 was expanded with the 
creation of the Eurocorps in the autumn of 1991.2 While the coips was to be used ‘for 
the common defence of the allies according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or of
1 See Yves Boyer, ‘WEU: A French perspective’, in Anne Deighton (ed) Western European Integration 
1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, Oxford, 1997, p. 63-71.
2 See G. Stein, ‘The Euro-Corps and future European Security Architecture’, European Security, 2:2, 
Summer 1993.
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the Brussels Treaty’ it did leave the way open for a European military structure outside 
that of NATO.3
Secondly, there was the initial competition between the WEU and NATO in 
responding to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The French in particular pushed for a 
response by the WEU. In July and August 1992 both organisations decided almost 
simultaneously to dispatch both naval and ground forces as part of a UN peacekeeping 
operation.4 Yet, it was French experiences in the Yugoslav crisis in particular, together 
with the Gulf War, that brought home to them the weaknesses of the WEU. Instead, 
the close cooperation with the British, as mentioned in chapter III, strengthened the 
logic of a rapprochement between WEU and NATO. At the same time preparations 
were underway for the reform of the French armed services closely modelled on the 
earlier British approach.5 France had also been edging closer to NATO. Under the 
Defence Minister, Francis Leotard, in April 1993 France decided to participate fully 
in NATO’s military committee on matters relating to NATO’s peacekeeping role. 
Mitterrand and the Elysee were somewhat more reluctant on this rapprochement with 
NATO.6 However, with the election of Jacques Chirac in May 1995, as France’s new 
President, there was a significant shift in the French government’s attitude towards 
NATO. This reached its height on 5 December 1995 with the announcement by the 
French government that it would join part of NATO’s military integrated structure.7 
Nevertheless, the French Defence Minister, Charles Millon, was to make clear that the
Q
French expected significant changes to NATO in return. Chirac was to do likewise in 
front of a joint session of the US Congress.9 This change required a genuine 
‘Europeanisation’ of the Alliance within both the command structure and 
operationally, with a more capable WEU.10 The French government was in a position 
of pursuing this ‘Europeanisation’ as the IGC commenced, and the French approach on
3 Communique, Franco-German Council, La Rochelle, May 1992.
4 See Yves Boyer, 1997, p. 65.
5 See Diego Ruiz palmer, ‘De Metz a Creil: les structures de commandment franfaises de l ’apres-guerre 
ffoide’, CREST, October 1995.
6 See ‘Transatlantic relations in the wake of the Brussels summit’, NATO Review  42:2, April 1994; See 
Mitterand’s interview on foreign policy to Le Figaro, 09/09/94.
7 See G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity 
and European Integration, Westview Press, 1998, p.82.
8 See Charles Millon, ‘France and the renovation o f the Atlantic Alliance’, NATO Review, May 1996; 
also see Herve de Charette, ‘France for a streamlined NATO: Setting the record straight’, IHT, 10/12/96.
9 See Chirac speech in February 1996, before a Joint Session o f the US Congress.
10 See Robert P. Grant, ‘France’s New Relationship with NATO’, Survival, 38:1, Spring 1996, 58-80; 
also see P.H. Gordon, ‘Recasting the Atlantic Alliance’, Survival, 38:1, Spring 1996.
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EU-WEU relations throughout the IGC was closely linked to its relations with 
NATO."
The change in the French government’s attitude towards NATO was made possible
given the favourable approach of the Clinton administration on the European Security
and Defence Initiative.12 At the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit Washington gave its
1 ^‘full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity’. The 
expectations from Washington was that greater integration among European 
governments would lead to greater burden sharing. Nevertheless, this defence initiative 
was in no way to undermine NATO, the US government’s two concerns being that, 
firstly, the European governments would arrive at NATO meetings presenting a pre­
determined position or a fait accompli to the North Americans, and secondly, that there 
could be an over emphasis on the EU’s role at the expense of other important allies, 
notably Turkey. While welcoming the French government’s rapprochement with 
NATO, the US government was wary of the latter’s motives. Indeed, the French 
government’s manoeuvring also placed the German government in a difficult position. 
While it saw no contradiction between strengthening the WEU and preserving the 
Atlantic Alliance, there was suspicion from Washington that the French might have 
been seeking to lure the Germans into structures, even within NATO, that might seek 
to undermine it.14 Therefore, the German government had to be careful in its balancing 
act between the Alliance and the WEU.
The British government’s approach on European security and defence matters in the 
post Maastricht years provided some reassurance for the US government. Three 
objectives are identifiable as regards the relationship between the EU, WEU and 
NATO.15 Firstly, NATO was to remain as the centre piece in pursuing British and 
European security and defence interests. Secondly, the British Conservative 
government was weary of the WEU undermining the role of NATO. It is possible to
11 On French relations with NATO see Jacques Isnard, ‘La France tente d’obtenir un grand 
commandement de l ’Otan’, Le Monde, 21-22/07/96; Jean-Dominique Merchet, ‘La France cherche un 
noveau poste a l ’OTAN’, Liberation, 23/09/96.
12 See Geoffrey van Orden, ‘An EU Perspective on the ESDI’, in Deighton, 1997, p. 125.
13 See Declaration o f Heads of State and Government, 10-11, January 1994.
14 See G. Wyn Rees, 1998, p.63; see G. Wyn Rees, ‘Constructing a European Defence Identity: The 
Perspective o f Britain, France and Germany’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2, 1996, pp. 231-246.
15 See Alyson Bailes ‘Western European Union and contemporary European Security: a British 
Perspective’, in Deighton, 1997, pp. 47-61; G.W. Rees, ‘Britain and the Western European Union’, 
European Security, 5:4, Winter 1996.
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identify two ways in which this could arise. There were the possibilities of continued 
attempts from other EU governments to foster closer relations between the two 
institutions with the eventual goal of integrating the WEU into the EU, providing the 
latter with a definite defence identity, and with a more influential role for the European 
Parliament and Commission. The British government also sought to avoid the position 
where the WEU would be recognised as the institution to deal with the softer features 
of security and defence, essentially those termed the Petersberg Tasks. This would 
have left NATO focusing almost exclusively on its collective defence function. Hence 
the British government’s insistence that NATO would assume the leadership in crisis 
management in Bosnia with the deployment of IFOR in 1995.16 Despite this reticence 
on the WEU’s relationship vis-a-vis NATO and the EU the British government’s third 
objective was to ensure that the operational capability of the institution was enhanced. 
This was to allow for the use of NATO assets in launching some European operations 
in the WEU forum such as evacuations or blockades. The North Atlantic Council in 
1994 had agreed to this based on the concept of ‘separable but not separate 
capabilities’.17 As the British government assumed the Presidency of the WEU in the 
beginning of 1996, it sought to maintain its balancing act between the WEU, EU and 
NATO, making practical suggestions in its Birmingham Declaration in May 1996 that 
sought to enhance the WEU’s operational features.18
The operational relations between the EU, WEU and NATO in the post-Maastricht 
phase also shaped the approach that the three governments adopted on defence matters 
at the IGC. As mentioned, the Gulf War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
demonstrated the limitations of the WEU to respond to high intensity conflicts, even in 
the form of crisis-management. Instead it was left the much more limited missions 
such as the creation of a civil administration in Mostar.19 At the same time NATO was 
proving itself to be reasonably successful in re-defining its role after the Cold War. In 
Bosnia it demonstrated that it had the ability to adapt to the task of peacekeeping, 
deploying military forces and on occasion using it in punishing Serb aggression in the
16 On the rejection o f the WEU assuming a similar role see Michael Portillo, WEU Assembly, Paris, 5 
December 1995 (FCO Verbatim No. 85, 5 December 1995).
17 See Declaration o f Heads of State and Government, 10-11, January 1994.
18 Alyson Bailes, 1997, pp.54-7.
19 See Richard G. Whitman, ‘Creating a Foreign Policy for Europe? Implementing the Common Foreign 
and Security from Maastricht to Amsterdam’, Australian Journal o f  International Affairs, 52:2, 1998; G. 
VanOrden, 1997, pp. 123-125.
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90Summer of 1995. The EU had also been reluctant in utilising its powers as provided 
by Maastricht. It was only in June 1996 that the EU under Article J.4(2) called on the 
WEU to prepare a plan to evacuate EU citizens whose safety is threatened in third 
countries.21 And the EU did not issue the WEU with an operational request until the 
closing stages of the IGC, in May 1997, with the EU advising the WEU to prepare 
itself for a military operation in the Great Lakes region, though in the end no action
99was taken. As mentioned, this only sought to prove for the German and British 
governments the primary position of NATO in providing for European security, with
• 90the French coming round to this way of thinking. It was against this background that 
governments began to negotiate yet again on WEU-EU relations.
Introduction
Bearing in mind the developments on defence matters since the TEU, the examination 
below of the negotiations on defence reveals the following features. Firstly, there were 
only two submissions of any note throughout the sixteen months of negotiations; the 
Finnish/Swedish paper on the Petersberg tasks and the paper outlining the details on 
phased integration of WEU from the French, German, Belgian, Spanish, Luxembourg 
and Italian delegations. Secondly, despite these proposals involving eight member 
governments, no government or coalition of governments pushed the negotiations on 
WEU-EU relations along. This was due to the divisions and inherent weakness within 
the group of six, most notably within and between the French and German government 
and within the Dutch government. Thirdly, while during the Italian Presidency the 
negotiations reflected little more than shadow-boxing, with much restatement and 
repetition of positions outlined earlier by member governments, the Irish Presidency, 
as a neutral state, was reluctant to push any negotiations in the direction of developing 
an EU defence capability. Therefore the Dutch Presidency was left to do a very similar 
job as it had done at Maastricht, namely drafting a delicately-worded clause that would
20 See K. Kaiser, ‘Reforming NATO’, Foreign Policy, No. 103, Summer 1996; P. Cornish ‘European 
Security: The end o f Architecture and the new NATO’, 72:4, October 1996; J. Solana ‘NATO’s role in 
Bosnia: Chartering a new course for the Alliance’, NATO Review, 44:2, March 1996.
21 Whitman, 1998.
22 Ibid.
23 See A. Moens ‘The European Security and Defence Identity and the non-concert o f Europe’, 
European Security, 2:4 Winter 1993; A. Moens ‘Behind complementarity and transparency: The politics 
o f the European security and defence identity’, Journal o f  European Integration, 16:1, 1992.
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mean different things to different governments, yet again disguising the fundamental 
differences and postponing EU-WEU and ultimately NATO relations for another IGC.
German Position
The German government in its pre-negotiation papers supported the gradual 
integration of the WEU in the medium term.24 The feeling within the German 
government and ministries as regards the integration of the WEU ranged from one of 
apathy to a more cautious welcoming of closer cooperation between the WEU and EU 
to, at times, an unchecked optimism. As would be the case on many issues throughout 
the IGC, this left the federal government’s position considerably disjointed.
In early 1994 the Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, had expressed annoyance with what 
he considered as Volke Rtihe’s interference on foreign affairs matters. This persisted 
up to the IGC with very divergent and openly contradictory positions on crucial issues 
such as NATO and EU enlargement. Riihe, as Defence Minister gave priority to 
NATO’s eastward expansion. Kinkel played down the necessity of NATO’s expansion 
for fear of upsetting Russia, placing greater emphasis on enlarging the EU. Though 
inter-ministerial disputes are a common feature of the German political landscape, this 
particular dispute not only undermined attempts to come up with a coherent position 
on the IGC, but since they were cross-party, it gave rise to tensions within the 
coalition.
As Defence Minister, Rtihe had been particularly successful, handling sensitive 
situations such as German involvement in Bosnia with considerable deftness. This 
success left Rtihe convinced of the utmost importance of NATO; hence his eagerness 
for its expansion, and his near indifference as to the possible integration of the WEU 
into the EU. This is not to suggest that the defence ministry as a whole was 
unconcerned with the WEU. In June 1995, Rtihe himself had remarked that the IGC 
‘should not preclude the higher aim of a Political Union and the development of a 
European defence’.26 However, he also said that ‘this cannot be achieved during the 
Intergovernmental Conference; we should proceed with realism and pragmatism’. Any
24 See Joint declaration of 15 July 1995; Freiburg Seminar, 27/02/96; Germany’s Objectives, 1996.
25 Michael Lindemann and Edward Mortimer ‘Front row defender -  Volker Riihe’, FT, 10/02/95.
26 ‘According to Mr. Riihe, the IGC has to open serious defence perspectives’ AE, 08/06/95.
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merger was for sometime in the future. During the negotiations Rtihe took somewhat 
of a back seat on any strengthening of relations between the EU and WEU.27
There were divisions within the Auswartiges Amt. between an Atlanticist and 
European approach on any proposed integration. The Atlanticists took up a cautious 
approach on integrating the WEU. They emphasised that it was necessary to make a 
distinction between the push to bring the Petersberg tasks into the EU, which was a 
question of the WEU using NATO assets, and the issue of collective responsibility, 
which was a matter for NATO. They claimed that it was necessary to make clear in the 
reformed treaty that the use of military means under CFSP was to be limited to the 
Petersberg tasks. While advocating that such facets of the WEU become an integral 
part of the EU, they did not advocate in any way support for the subordination of the 
WEU to EU.
Werner Hoyer, as State Minister and the Foreign Minister’s Personal Representative at 
the IGC, promoted what was a much more ambitious position and Europeanist 
approach supporting a complete integration of the WEU into the EU. Nevertheless, 
there were times when Hoyer contradicted his own position. On the 14 and 15 May 
1996 (respectively) Hoyer remarked that by integrating the WEU into the EU the 
revised treaty at the end of the IGC should include a clause providing for the collective
1 a
defence of the Union. This stood at odds with what the Atlanticists had expounded 
several weeks later, as described above, regarding the potential conflict between a 
principle of collective defence for the EU and that provided by Article V of NATO. In 
early 1997 Hoyer seemed to have recognised the delicacy of the situation. At the end 
of July of the previous year he had already called for a closer dialogue between the EU 
and NATO. In March 1997, when commenting on the common position under 
negotiation between the six member governments regarding the WEU’s integration, he 
remarked that Member States with Article V obligations would still need a NATO 
Council decision before committing non-EU NATO members. While once again 
emphasising that Article V needed to be addressed with great care, his position was 
still somewhat at odds with the caution expressed elsewhere.
27 Interviews.
28 Ibid.
29 t i ,,- A
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In its October ‘96 submission to the Conference the German delegation’s paper sat 
somewhere between the two camps.30 The WEU remained outside the EU, without an 
actual commitment to its integration, while there would be a ‘gradual framing of a 
common defence policy’. Yet, there were two features in the paper that reflected a 
more pro-WEU stance. Firstly, it stated that the European Council ‘shall define the 
principles of and guidelines for’ a Common Defence Policy that ‘shall also apply in 
relation to the WEU’.31 In defining ‘the principles and guidelines’ of the WEU the 
European Council was not confined exclusively to the Petersberg tasks. Its mandate 
would ‘apply especially to operations which fall within the range of responsibilities 
contained in the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU’, but not exclusively. Secondly, 
the German paper introduced constructive abstention in launching military operations. 
The proposed new Article presented the opportunity to launch a military operation by 
the WEU based on a decision of the Union taken by a qualified majority. Those who 
abstained from the decision would ‘not be obliged to participate in the implementation
-j o
of the decision’.
Throughout the Dutch Presidency the German position seemed to swing towards a 
phased integration, though, given the divisions within the German camp, it was not an 
approach that was pursued with vigour. There was not sufficient unity within the 
German position. In the last weeks of March and throughout April there were attempts 
from the Auswartiges Amt. to redress any possible negative effects the proposed 
integration of the WEU would have on NATO. Yet, this was as much an attempt to 
shore up the differences with a further series of reassurances rather than a coherent
• tViposition from the Auswartiges Amt. On the 40 anniversary of the Treaty of Rome 
Kinkel remarked that it was time for a clear step forward and for integration of the 
WEU into the EU. He claimed that non-NATO members of the EU should have no 
difficulty with Phases II or III of the phased integration. Phase III would give non­
members a full role in defending their own territory within a framework for EU 
defence.34 Hoyer followed suit on Kinkel’s emphasis, claiming that the proposal for 
WEU incorporation would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance rather than weaken it.
30 See CONF 3972/96, 30 October 1996.
31 Ibid., Annex, Article J.4(l), p.2.
32 Ibid., Article J.4(2), p.2.
33 Ibid., Annex, p.3.
34 Interviews.
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There was no ground for US concerns that future Baltic membership of the EU would 
lead to membership of NATO by the back door, or that there would be caucusing by 
the Europeans in NATO. Hoyer also remarked that the German government had 
discussed WEU incorporation with the Russians, the latter expressing no grave 
misgivings.35
British Position
The fundamental bases of the Conservative and Labour governments approach were 
the same; opposing the integration or subordination of the WEU into the EU. 
Nevertheless, the eventual changes introduced in the new treaty would not have been 
possible without the arrival of a Labour government. In both its White Paper and the 
Annex D to the paper the Conservative government was firm on the WEU remaining 
as a separate entity, a European pillar to NATO. However, in what was an official 
position that pandered considerably to the ‘Eurosceptics’ in the party there were 
positive elements which sought to have the WEU act ‘in a reinforced partnership with 
the European Union’. As mentioned above the Conservative government was 
interested in developing the operational capabilities of the WEU. Therefore its position 
paper also focused on the practicalities that would enhance the WEU’s planning 
capabilities, such as the creation of a WEU body at Head of State and Government 
level involving full members, associate members and observers that would meet back- 
to-back with Heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council.39
Despite these suggestions, a worsening in the government’s domestic situation with a 
continual erosion of its support and credibility in the face of an increasingly hostile and 
vocal group of ‘Eurosceptics’ left it unwilling to approach the negotiations on defence 
in a constructive and determined manner. One senior official described the actual 
mandate that was pursued throughout the negotiations as ‘no, no, no’ to any suggestion 
of change, including the language and not merely the actual procedures and policy. 
While the negotiations on defence matters were in any case limited, the Conservative
35 Ibid.
36 Partnership o f  Nations, 1996; Labour, Future o f  the European Union, 1995.
37 Also see Memorandum on the UK Government’s Approach to the Treatment o f  European Defence 
Issues a t the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Madrid, 14 November 1995.
38 A Partnership o f  Nations, 1996.
39 Ibid., Annex D.
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government failed to push for the limited but constructive changes on EU and WEU 
relations that the White Paper indicated. Given the sensitivities surrounding an issue 
such as defence there was little chance of a weakened government taking the lead and 
pushing for even practical and procedural changes. This would have given the 
‘Eurosceptics’ further grounds upon which to attack an embattled Conservative 
leadership.
The Labour government did show some change from its pre-negotiation position. 
Initially it concentrated on ‘strengthening the Western European Union as the 
European pillar of NATO’, focusing on the 1992 Petersberg Declaration and crisis 
intervention that would involve using NATO assets.40 The IGC was called upon to 
‘examine ways in which links between the two bodies could be improved’.41 In its 
non-paper after entering government it maintained its position as regards both 
organisations remaining separate, reaffirming its broader commitment for any 
development of an ESDI to be within NATO. However, the paper went further in that 
the government was ‘prepared to write Petersberg tasks into the Treaty and include 
among issues covered by CFSP, with WEU implementing decisions with defence 
implications’.42
French Position
The French government in its February 96 memorandum called for steps to be taken to 
bring the WEU under the aegis of the EU. Though, given the recent rapprochement of 
the Chirac and Juppe administration towards NATO, as described above, the French 
had not clearly established their objectives on EU-WEU relations. Initially the closer 
and better relations with NATO were considered as leaving the Chirac administration 
distracted and less concerned or focused on subordinating the WEU to the EU.43 A 
more sophisticated interpretation can be identified. Conscious of the potential domestic 
fallout from France’s rapprochement with NATO, Chirac needed to have something in 
return to show that there had been a genuine change in NATO. This would come in the 
leadership by the French government in devising a blueprint for WEU integration into
40 See Labour, The Future o f  the European Union, 1995, p. 15.
41 Ibid.
42 See Non-paper, 16 May 1997.
43 Ibid.
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EU, a recognition of the political, as opposed to the military, importance of the WEU 
in providing a European identity to NATO. The decision of the North Atlantic Council 
in Berlin in June 1996, that NATO would remain ‘one system capable of performing 
multiple functions’ avoiding the creation of separate command arrangements for 
European-only operations, seriously undermined French attempts to bring the same 
military prowess to the WEU as NATO.44 However, the European identity that a closer 
relationship between the EU and WEU would bring was politically important for the 
Chirac government. Therefore the French government’s momentum on integrating 
WEU was directly proportionate to the success of its NATO policy. The latter had 
already begun to falter in the latter half of 1996 with the public dispute between Chirac 
and Clinton over the transfer of leadership of NATO’s southern command to a 
European individual and the French preference for an enlargement of NATO to more 
than three states. Indeed, Chirac’s manoeuvring on the Southern Command was 
particularly disruptive to the gradual and meticulous approach from French politicians 
and officials on bringing France back into NATO. Chirac upset this approach. In turn 
the French did not push for the subordination of the WEU into the EU. With the 
collapse of the RPR and UDF government at the national elections on 6 June, it was 
difficult to recognise a clear line from the French on WEU-EU-NATO relations. The 
relationship with NATO continued to deteriorate up until the NATO summit in July 
1997.45
Negotiations
Italian Presidency
It was at this stage that the first of only two substantial documents relating to EU 
defence matters and the WEU was submitted by the Swedish and Finnish 
governments.46 The paper ruled out any incorporation of the WEU but called for a 
strengthening in links between with the EU with the latter through the former taking on 
a greater role in crisis management, conflict prevention and armed peacekeeping.
44 Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996.
45 Ronald Tiersky, ‘French Gamesmanship and NATO’s Future: The Context o f “AFSOUTH”’, French 
Politics & Society, 15:2, Spring 1997; Paul Taylor, ‘Chirac tells Clinton NATO Command Issue 
“Capital”, Reuters, 02/12/96; Emmanuel Jarry ‘Chirac says Europeanising NATO still difficult’, 
Reuters, 03/12/96; John Vinocur ‘Fellow Europeans Steer Clear o f French Contrariness at Madrid 
Summit’ IHT, 10/07/97.
46 ‘The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension towards an Enhanced EU role in crisis 
Management’, Memorandum From Finland And Sweden, 25 April 1996.
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These suggestions would be carried in various forms in Presidential papers up until 
their eventual incorporation in the Amsterdam Treaty, reflecting the consensus among 
governments on this issue, though in an internal Commission document in March 
1997, while all governments agreed on their incorporation, none expanded on what this 
exactly entailed.47
Returning to WEU-EU relations, the lack of any development beyond the positions 
outlined by the governments on the eve of the negotiations was reflected in the 
Presidential notes at the end of April. The Presidential note of 26 April was detailed 
and included proposed treaty amendments. Given the early stages of the negotiations 
these merely reflected the variety of options that lay open to governments. On the 
gradual integration of the WEU and EU there was the suggestion of an amendment to 
the then Article J.4(2) with an addition to the words ‘which is an integral part of the 
development of the Union’, to the effect of integrating the WEU into the EU.48 The 
paper also held as an option, somewhat similar to the later German proposal, that the 
European Council would provide guidelines along which the WEU would act. A 
further suggestion was to replace the word ‘request’ under Article J.4(2) with ‘instruct’ 
or ‘can instruct’.
The paper was stark as regards the implications of a full integration of the WEU; the 
EU assuming all the functions of the WEU with the prior relations between the WEU 
and NATO being replaced by those between the EU and NATO.49 However, the paper 
reflected the possible alternatives within this option. While incorporating Article 5 of 
the Brussels Treaty, it held open the possibility of non-participation by those members 
who did not wish to be part of any collective defence. A final approach suggested that 
rather than incorporating various articles of the Brussels Treaty, a distinction would be 
made as regards the Petersberg tasks and that of collective defence, the former being 
incorporated into Article J.4, while the latter was annexed to the treaty by means of a 
protocol.50
47 See CEC, Note A Vattention, 12 March ’97.
48 CONF/3829/96, p.3.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p.6.
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The Presidency’s second paper of the same date was again a case of outlining a variety 
of options, that at times bordered on semantics. On Article J.4(l) it suggested that the 
wording ‘eventual framing of a common defence policy’ allowed for the 
‘implementation of this action’ to be put off, given the presence of the word ‘eventual’. 
It proposed the deletion of the word ‘eventual’ and for reasons of consistency with the 
WEU declaration from Maastricht suggested that any new Article should be clear that 
it was a common defence policy that would be established ‘within the European 
Union’. It was similar reasons of clarity and precision that lay behind its suggestion 
that the wording ‘which might in time lead to a common defence’ be replaced by ‘with 
a view to a common defence’, being described as ‘replacement of a possibility by an 
objective’.51 The Presidency’s paper continued to focus on less contentious issues of 
clarify existing texts e.g. suggesting an extended Article J.4(4) to cover neutral states 
and a clarification of Article J.4(5) to ensure that any closer cooperation between two 
or more Member States was confined to defence matters, as opposed to all security 
issues.52
By the 15 May 1996 the personal representatives had completed their overview of the 
three major chapters as outlined by the Presidency.53 At the same meeting the role of 
the WEU and its status vis-a-vis the EU were discussed. Again it was a case of 
outlining a range of possibilities e.g. a subordination of the WEU to the EU, a less 
ambitious strengthening of the relationship between the two, or the inclusion of the 
objective of the WEU’s integration, but with an open time frame. On a more positive 
note the neutral countries reiterated their willingness to co-operate and contribute in 
varying ways to the working of the WEU. Fagiolo, as the chairman of the IGC 
personal representatives for the Italian Presidency described this as ‘a very great 
opening’.54 However, as was generally the case during the Italian Presidency no 
delegation, except for the Finnish and Swedish submitted a detailed paper on their 
objectives.
51 CONF 3828/96, 26/04/96, p. 2.
52 Ibid., p.4.
*E D B , N°6728, 15/05/96.
54 EDB, N°6729, 16/05/96.
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Irish Presidency
The Irish government was in a difficult position on defence matters, being neither a 
member of NATO nor of the WEU. As a neutral state it was not in the interests of the 
government to vigorously pursue reforms or push for the integration of the WEU. At 
the same time, it had to discharge its presidential duties and avoid any clear pursuit of 
a national interest. The Irish government had been under considerable domestic 
pressure. The Foreign Minister, after repeated accusations from opposition parties that 
the Labour Party and the government as a whole were weakening the Irish position on 
neutrality, hinted at the possible necessity to veto any attempts to integrate the WEU.55 
Yet, the Irish government and the neutrals as a whole where not keen to vigorously 
defend their position preferring to let the British make the running.56 In the end the 
Irish Presidency would strike a balance between these two competing pressures in the 
Dublin draft, but a balance that suited both it and the British government.
The Irish Presidency, like the Italian, issued notes outlining the options for the EU in 
security and defence matters focusing on the Petersberg tasks and their consequences 
for the EU/WEU relationship.57 On Article J.4(l) the Presidency’s notes of July 1996 
reflected that there were three proposals on replacing the phrase ‘which might in time 
lead to a common defence’. They included ‘with a view to a common defence’, 
‘leading in time to a common defence’, and ‘in the perspective of a common
CO •
defence’. This continued emphasis on the wording of the ambition to a common 
defence was a reminder of the extent of the shadow-boxing within the negotiations on 
this issue and the lack of direction on the real issue of EU-WEU relations. Of more 
substance in the Presidential paper was the presence of only one possibility as regards 
changing Article J.4(2). In its description of ‘decisions and actions ... which have 
defence implications’, the paper included ‘decisions of the Union on humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management’.59 The Irish Presidency ignored the 
other tasks from the Petersberg Declaration. Paragraph II.4 and 1.2 of the Declaration 
also mentions ‘tasks of combat forces’ and ‘conflict prevention’, issues that cut close 
to the sensitivities of neutral Member States. On the bigger question of EU and WEU
55 Mark Brennock, ‘FF says Spring undermining neutrality’, IT, 16/04/97; Patrick Smyth ‘Spring warns 
Irish veto on EU merger with WEU’, IT, 26/03/97.
56 Interviews.
57 CONF/3869/96, 16/07/96.
58 Ibid., p.2.
59 Ibid., p.3.
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relations, two alternatives were suggested that again seemed to reflect an Irish 
preference as regards the pretext on how the negotiations should proceed from here on, 
rather than reflecting other governments’ preferences, though it was difficult for the 
Presidency to recognise these preferences given the delegations continuing failure to 
outline them. Firstly, there was the suggestion of a mere fostering of closer relations or 
secondly, the protocol option on a mutual defence commitment that left Member States 
opting in.60
On the basis of a meeting between personal representatives on 22/23 July, the 
Presidency drafted a further paper at the end of September.61 There were few changes. 
The new wording of Article J.4(6) called on the EU to ‘foster closer institutional 
relations with the Western European Union . . . ’, the only change coming with the word 
‘institutional’, (emphasis added) The Presidency claimed that ‘this formulation reflects 
comments expressed on the previous version of the text’. However, it equally reflected 
the lack of any change from the previous discussions among personal representatives. 
It made similar reference to the protocol on collective defence commitments.
After the Dublin I summit on 5 October the role of the WEU arose for discussion 
several days later. While Noel Dorr commented that the Presidency felt ‘encouraged 
... to draw up texts as refined as possible’ by early December, the draft treaty only 
tentatively suggested changes, and the proposals put forward were very similar to the 
earlier papers. The Presidency opted for a 'progressive framing of a common defence 
policy in the perspective of  a common defence.’ It also extended on its incorporation 
of Petersberg tasks to include ‘combat forces in crisis management’. On Article J.4(2) 
it was still a case of ‘closer institutional relations’. As mentioned above, this wording 
suited the British Conservatives, and the Danes who were not full members of the 
WEU, along with the neutrals; Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland.
Dutch Presidency
The Dutch Presidency’s non-paper of 4 March demonstrated further the drift in the 
negotiations.63 It called for the submission of proposals on CFSP for a meeting of
60 Ibid.
61 See CONF/3936/96.
62 CONF/2500/96, pp.83-89.
63 See CONF/3833/97, 04/03/97.
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personal representatives on 10-11 March. Despite it being almost three months since 
the presentation of the Irish draft, it continued to form the basis for discussion at a 
meeting in mid-March. Nevertheless, this prompting from the Dutch led to the second 
substantial proposal of the negotiations on defence matters. The French government’s 
proposal of 10 March supported by the Germans presented a more definite approach to 
EU/WEU relations.64 The French proposal formed the basis for the three-phase 
approach that was supported by six Member State governments. Klaus Kinkel on 
behalf of the six members of France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and Belgium 
submitted the detailed outline of the plan to the Dutch Presidency on 21 March.65 In 
the first phase the WEU’s independence would be maintained, but closer cooperation 
would be encouraged and facilitated by WEU participation in the centre for analysis 
and prevention of crisis. In the second phase the EU would mandate the WEU to 
conduct Petersberg missions. In the third phase there would be a complete integration 
of the WEU into the EU.
The Dutch government, as it was holding the Presidency, felt itself unable to lend its 
name to this document. This was also a reflection of the divisions within the Dutch 
government and Foreign and Defence Ministries that were somewhat similar to those 
that divided the Auswartiges Amt. The strong Atlanticist feelings of the political 
directorate of the Foreign Ministry seemed more dominant at this stage in the IGC. 
Further to this the VVD party (right wing liberals) within the coalition drew back from 
the government’s earlier position paper supporting a gradual integration of the WEU.66 
This was particularly evident during certain budgetary debates in the Dutch parliament 
where certain members of the VVD, claimed that the WEU could in effect be 
abandoned or its development forgotten.67 Therefore the proposal would lack the 
Dutch Presidential drive that had proven so influential in the other chapters of reform.
In turn, the French and German governments were not in a position to push the plan 
along; the French being somewhat in a mess with Chirac upsetting the delicate 
approach on NATO reintegration, which had a negative impact on the other part of the 
plan which was to use an integrated WEU as proof of a Europeanisation of the Atlantic
64 EDB, N°6931, 10/03/97; See CONF/3855/97, 24/03/97.
65 CONF/3855/97; See Philippe Lemaitre, ‘Les quinze debattent de la mise en place d’une politique de 
defense commune’, Le Monde, 25/03/97.
66 Dutch Government Memorandum, 30/03/95; From Madrid to Turin, March 1996.
67 Interviews.
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Alliance. The long-standing divisions within the Auswartiges Amt. between an 
Atlanticist and Europeanist approach undermined German attempts to take the lead on 
the initiative, especially with Kohl in such a weak domestic position. This, therefore, 
left Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain to promote the plan. Spain, as a relatively 
new member of WEU, lacked influence.68 The first two, while founding members, are 
militarily weak and were not in a position to make a credible call for an integrated 
WEU and a fully operational defence arm for the EU. Indeed, the Belgian 
government’s intentions were questionable. One senior Belgian official claimed that 
the proposal on integration was as much an effort to pressurise the governments of the 
neutrals and Britain, the aim being to win concessions elsewhere, while presenting a 
blueprint for something that would be fought for again sometime in the future.69 
Doubts can also be expressed as regards the Italian government’s commitment on this 
issue. In an early proposal from the Italian delegation in October ‘96 it ‘referred only 
to the 1 prospect of eventual integration’. The same proposal did refer to a possible 
protocol that would set out the phases in integrating the WEU. However, it failed to 
provide any details on this phased integration. Further to this, it also referred to 
possibly postponing the whole issue of integrating the WEU for another IGC in 2002 
based on a report from the Council to the European Council.71
The outline for integration met further criticisms. The WEU Assembly questioned the 
motives and effectiveness of the proposal on phased integration. In a report on the 
WEU and the IGC, it criticised the proposal for arriving too late in the negotiations. It 
went on to argue that a submission earlier in the process would have facilitated for a 
compromise with those members opposed to phased incorporation. In Paris on the 3 
June the Assembly’s President, Lluis Maria de Puig at the opening of the Spring 
session described that six’s initiative as ‘ill-timed’. He criticised the drafters of the 
proposal to integrate the WEU as being unrealistic saying their approach was 
obviously going to arouse opposition which could have been limited if the document 
had been ‘more modest’.74
68 Interviews.
69 Ibid.
70 See CONF/3965/96, 25/10/96, Article J.4, p.6.
71 Ibid.
72 See EDB, N°6979, 23/05/97.
73 EDB, N°6987, 04/06/97.
74 Ibid.
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Despite these problems and criticisms, the Dutch draft of late March somewhat 
reflected these latest manoeuvres on integrating the WEU. On the relationship between 
the WEU and the EU there was a marked change from the Irish draft. Article J.6(2)
nc
referred to ‘the objective of gradual integration of the WEU into the Union’. This 
contrasts with the Irish version that has the WEU merely ‘foster[ing] closer 
institutional relations with [EU]’.76At the ministerial meeting in the Hague on 20 May 
van Mierlo broke down the positions on the WEU-EU relationship into three 
groupings. The first group (Benelux, Spain, Portugal and Greece) wanted an objective 
of integrating the WEU into the EU in the future. Notably among this group, only The 
Netherlands and to a some extent Spain had both the tradition and capability of 
projecting a considerable military force. The second group (France, Germany and 
Italy) wanted the treaty to decide the stages involved in the integration. The third group 
that wished to maintain the status quo was made up of the UK and Denmark, and the 
four neutrals.77
Even had there been a significant push from the French and Germans along with the 
Benelux, Italians and Spanish for a detailed plan in the treaty outlining the steps to the 
full integration of the WEU, the British government, with the neutrals and Denmark 
hiding behind it always posed an obstacle. The Labour government in its May non­
paper claimed to be ‘nervous of loose talk of the EU becoming a defence 
organisation’.78 In a letter from its embassy in The Hague to the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry it reiterated its opposition to the EU becoming a defence unit. It argued that
7Qmembers should and would act consistently in both organisations. The letter called 
for a replacement of the aspiration of Article J.6(2) TEU with a more concrete outline 
as regards using the WEU as an operational defence capability, the aim being to 
prevent integration but not to undermine the WEU or the EU’s ability to use it.80 Again 
this was consistent with the balancing act between the EU, WEU and NATO.
The British government had some reason to be concerned. The Presidency, in its final 
drafts on 5 and 13 June respectively, continued to refer to the goal of the gradual 
integration of the WEU into the EU, while referring to the ‘important contribution’ of
75 ER, N°2210, 26/03/97 p.14.
76 See CONF/2500/96, p.84.
77 ER N° 2225 pp. 1-2, 21/05/97.
78 See Non-Paper, 16/05/97, p.2.
79 Interview; Letter from British Ambassador to The Netherlands, 5 June 1997.
80 Ibid.
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the six Member State’s proposal on phased integration of the WEU within a fixed 
timetable. The Presidency remarked that it was considering ‘an appropriate approach
o 1
allowing for elements to be taken up that appear in this contribution’. It was only 
over lunch on Tuesday 17 June that the Presidential draft replaced the phrase ‘the goal 
being gradual integration’ with a less emphatic wording that closely resembled the 
final version. Article 17(1) postponed the WEU-EU-NATO debate for yet another 
IGC. It represented another balance behind which the fundamental differences 
remained concealed. For the British government, the neutrals and Denmark, the fact 
that pursuant to Article 17(1) any integration remains only a possibility, with the 
eventual decision resting with the European Council, guaranteed the separate identity 
of each organisation. The Protocol to Article 17 and the Declaration on the WEU only 
sought to enhance the effectiveness of relations between the EU and NATO in the 
framing of a European Security and Defence Identity, rather than outlining the stages 
to an eventual integration. For those members proposing the phased integration the 
eventual results at Amsterdam did reflect a setback from the earlier position suggested 
by the Presidency at the end of March, but they perceived the same treaty articles, 
protocol and declaration as another step along a difficult path to eventual integration.
The other changes introduced at Amsterdam by Article 17 can be traced to the variety 
of options outlined in the early Italian and Irish Presidency’s papers; the replacement 
of the word ‘gradual framing of a common defence policy’ with ‘progressive framing’. 
It was no longer a case of ‘which might in time lead . . . ’, rather it ‘might lead’ to a 
common defence. This pondering with what were little more than cosmetic changes 
continued in the weeks preceding the Amsterdam meeting, the Presidency in its draft 
treaties making reference to the various word options.84 The broader array of 
Petersberg tasks, including missions involving ‘combat forces’ that had been present in 
the Irish draft were maintained under Article 17(2). Finally it was the European 
Council that would set these guidelines for the WEU with all Member States entitled to 
participate in their implementation.
81 See ‘Essential Elements’, AE, 13/06/97.
82 Interviews.
83 Ibid.
84 See AE, 05/06/97; AE, 13/06/97.
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2. CFSP PROCEDURES
Background
In 1992, after the conclusion of the IGC on EPU, the then British Foreign Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, remarked that ‘We have four years to demonstrate that the 
intergovernmental model can work’.85 As the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 
November 1993, the Belgian Presidency set about to meet this challenge, asking the
or
Council of Ministers to outline the basis for taking joint actions in five areas. 
However, this initial impetus was to be lost through 1994. Instead governments 
continued to show a preference for taking initiatives unilaterally or as part of an ad hoc 
cooperation. Examples included the formation of the Contact group on Bosnia, that 
essentially left Britain, Germany, France and Italy setting the EU policy on the former 
Yugoslavia. The Greek government’s position on the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and the French initiatives on Rwanda further undermined the development 
of a common foreign policy. What would become apparent with the implementation of 
the second pillar was the extent of ‘the credibility gap between the ambition of the
• • R7vocabulary and the reality of practical policy’.
The absence of a substantive debate on long-term foreign policy options left the 
process as a reactive rather than a pro-active one. The greater number of the thirty- 
seven joint actions adopted from 1994 to 1996 were mostly reactions to situations in 
the Balkans, Middle East or Africa, failing to deliver on the wishes of the European 
Council in Lisbon in June 1992 for a process that was less reactive to situations being 
more active and influential in shaping the international environment and setting a 
policy.88 Very often member governments simply failed to respond or responded in a 
way that was inappropriate. For example, the EU failed to reach common positions on 
key issues such as the escalation of violence in Algeria, while it took the Union over a 
month to respond and define its position -  eventually only in the form of a Declaration
85 Anthony Forster & William Wallace, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: A New Policy or Just a 
New Name?’, in Wallace & Wallace, 1996, p. 431.
86 See Roy Ginsberg, ‘The EU’s CFSP: the Politics of Procedure’, in Martin Holland (ed.) Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: The Records and Reforms, Pinter, 1997; Gunter Burghardt, ‘The Potential 
and Limits o f CFSP: What Comes Next?’, in Elfriede Regelsberger et al. (eds.) Foreign Policy o f  the 
European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
87 Burghardt, in Regelsberger, et al. (eds.), 1997, p. 326.
88 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 1992; Whitman, 1998.
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-  to the use of troops by the Russian Federation in Chechnya in December 1994.89 
Perhaps an even more dramatic example of the limitations of the process was the 
failure of the EU in April 1997 to reach a common position on a resolution proposing 
the condemnation of China before the UN Commission on Human Rights.90 What 
were primarily French objections, though Spain, Italy and Germany had raised earlier 
objections to the Dutch led initiative, brought the credibility of the CFSP process to a 
head.
In other instances, initiatives under the second pillar appeared to compete with similar 
types of action that could be taken under the first pillar, or, in the words of one 
commentator some joint actions ‘simply ... provide[d] a CFSP label to what would be 
largely possible to achieve with Community instruments ... with limited added 
value’.91 Examples included joint actions increasing humanitarian aid in the former 
Yugoslavia, providing financial support for a Palestinian police force, and on anti­
personnel mines. At the same time, the financing of joint actions led to further 
competition between the first and second pillars. With Article J. 11 (2) TEU requiring 
the European Community’s budget to deal with the administrative costs of CFSP there 
was the possibility of the European Parliament exerting a greater influence than that 
catered for in Article J.7 TEU. Indeed, the extent of this influence was exacerbated 
with greater, than originally expected, use of the Community’s budget for operational 
spending.92 This lead to a growing concern among the more intergovernmental
Q 'i
Member States of a ‘contamination’ of the workings of the second pillar by the first.
In the run up to the IGC, the member governments responded to this situation with a 
series of proposals, either through the Reflection Group, or, in their official position 
papers that aimed to improve the machinery of the second pillar, in an effort to make 
future policy initiatives more effective.94 Three of the more significant suggestions 
were the proposed introduction of the common strategy, another policy instrument that 
would function alongside the already present joint actions and common positions; the
89 See Whitman, 1998, p. 170.
90 Patrick Smyth, ‘Condemnation of French move to block motion’, IT, 07/04/97.
91 Burghardt, in Regelsberger, et al., 1997, p.330.
92 Elfriede Regelsberger,4 The Institutional Setup and Functioning o f  EPC/CFSP\ in Regelsberger et al., 
1997, p. 81
93 See Ginsberg, 1997.
94 See again pp.73-7.
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creation of the office of ‘Mr/Ms. CFSP’, an appointed representative that would raise 
the profile and visibility of CFSP; and the strengthening of the focus on planning and 
prevention with a new unit that would provide the future CFSP with a more pro-active 
ability allowing it to move away from its reactive past.
Introduction
The negotiations on the three issues are considered separately below. Across all three 
areas it is possible to identify common features running through the process. Firstly on 
the policy-planning capability and the common strategy, member governments failed 
to define their objectives with any detail. Therefore the negotiations proceeded without 
any government, or the Presidency bringing, key issues to the centre of the discussions. 
Since the negotiations avoided what would have been divisive issues, it was yet again 
a case of postponing confronting these matters, not until another IGC, but rather until 
the post-negotiating phase when the new tools would be called into use. Secondly the 
French government was the most active member on these issues, particularly on the 
common strategy and the High Representative which were French-led. Yet, this gave 
rise to problems. Just as there had been deep suspicion among the smaller Member 
States regarding many of the French proposals floated on institutional reform, there 
were similar suspicions that the French proposals on CFSP also sought to undermine 
the standing of the smaller states, carrying echoes of the failed Fouchet plan from the 
1960s. Thirdly, as was generally the case during the negotiations the French and 
German government were at odds with obviously different approaches on reforming 
the CFSP machinery, which reflected their fundamental differences on CFSP.
Policy-Planning Capability
German Position
While there was widespread support from the various levels in the German policy­
making process for a planning unit, little came from the various German sources as 
regards the detailed characteristics of such a unit. The Auswartiges Amt. avoided 
making any specific reference to the actual numbers that would go to make up the unit. 
It was at best vague, though it was possible to recognise potential tensions within the 
ministry. A senior official remarked on 11 July 1996 that the unit would be made up of
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one secondee from each Member State.95 While Hoyer had remarked on 6 May that the 
unit should be made up of officials from the Member States, the Council Secretariat 
and the Commission, he called for, at a later stage, a unit that would be small and 
flexible, designed to strengthen continuity and react quickly.96 He also seemed to be 
suggesting that there would be a certain degree of flexibility on the actual numbers 
involved in the unit at any one time. He stated that the Secretariat should be able to 
draft in experts from Member States when needed.
British Position
The British Conservative government set out its position in July 1996 with a note to 
the other delegations.97 The government was clear that any new policy-planning unit 
would include only five or six officials from the Foreign Ministries of the Member 
States, the Commission and the WEU. It did not at this stage specify as to the Member 
States that would contribute such officials.
French Position
The French government equally supported the formation of this new unit but, as 
described below, the approach it adopted on the unit as a separate entity and as regards 
its relationship with the High Representative gave rise to suspicion and grievances 
from other governments.98
Negotiations
As mentioned in Chapter III, the proposed introduction of a planning unit was for the 
greater part welcomed by most member governments. However, the difficulty for 
member governments, as on most IGC issues, was expanding on this support in 
principle with a greater clarity on the details. The four functions outlined in the Irish 
Presidency’s note of 16 July for the policy-planning and early warning unit remained 
essentially the same in the final version at Amsterdam.99 Over a further year of 
negotiations there were few new ideas on strengthening and widening the functions of 
the prospective unit. There was also little attempt to address in a more precise manner
95 Interview.
96 Ibid.
97 CONF/3 894/96
98 See Freiburg seminar, 1996; Interviews.
99 See CONF/3869/96, p.2.
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the actual breakdown of the numbers that would make up the unit. Indeed the 
Presidency’s draft text of 16 July merely stated that ‘the Secretariat may draw on 
personnel from the Member States, the Commission [and the WEU]’.100 The 
Commission in a submission at the same time was equally imprecise, suggesting that 
the unit be ‘made up of balanced contributions from the Member States and the 
Commission, as well as the Council Secretariat itself.101
On the basis of discussions in late July the Presidency paper at the end of September 
suggested an alternative approach, with a new Article under title V that left the unit 
‘under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the Council’.102 The council 
would decide ‘on the remit and staffing at a later date.103 This was somewhat similar to 
the Italian proposal in early October of that year.104 The other notable change in the 
Presidency’s paper was the inclusion of the Commission as a possible source for the 
unit’s staff. By the Irish draft in December there was a subtle change in the wording on 
staffing. While again there were no specifics as regards the number in the unit, the 
previously loose language that said the policy-planning capability ‘may draw’ from the 
above list was replaced by the definite ‘shall consist of personnel drawn from the 
General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU’.105 (author’s 
emphasis)
Under the Dutch Presidency discussion of the specific make-up and number was 
similarly avoided.106 In the Commission’s internal review of member governments’ 
positions in mid-March there was no reference to the number that would form the
1 0 7unit. The absence of any substantial negotiation on what was later to amount to a 
crucial and divisive issue reinforced several features of the negotiations. For example, 
as was the case on the extension of the powers of the European Parliament, there was 
little awareness among negotiators, foreign ministers and Heads of State and
100 Ibid.
101 CONF/3889/96, 25/07/96.
102 In the previous July paper the Secretary General was also described as being responsible but not by 
means of a separate article but rather based on the Declaration.
103 See CONF/3935/96, p.3
104 See Article J.5b, CONF/3965/96, 25/10/96, p.8.
105 See CONF/2500/96, p.74.
106 ER N°2210 -  26/03/97, p. 17.
107 CEC, Note a Vattention, 12 March 1997.
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Government alike of the significance and implications of such an issue as the make-up 
of the unit.
The failure of the negotiators to confront these issues and reach agreement disguised 
deep divisions and different perceptions. French and British Foreign Office officials 
suggested that there was a consensus among the delegations regarding the necessity for 
the unit, based on the recognition of the need to strengthen the effectiveness of
1 ORCFSP. The same officials suggested that their understanding of effectiveness was a 
PPU with a small staff dominated by the larger Member States.109 Indeed the British 
were clear in outlining their position on this. There was a considerable degree of 
frustration with what they considered as the self-serving interests of the smaller 
Member States that were raised after Amsterdam in an attempt to secure a position in 
the unit.110 The feeling was that this did not serve the best interests of an effective 
CFSP. Nevertheless, this was interpreted by governments of the smaller Member 
States, supported by Germany, as French and British attempts to undermine their 
interests, the larger Member States shutting them out of a potentially dynamic unit. 
These tensions and differences were not addressed during the negotiations even though 
the details on the staffing of the unit are crucial to its functioning and effectiveness. 
Again they were postponed not for another IGC but until it was time to establish the 
PPU.
Common Strategy
The French led negotiations on a Common Strategy and Mr. CFSP were similarly 
disjointed. Firstly, the French government and the negotiating delegation were unclear 
as to what a Common Strategy entailed.111 Secondly, and as was the case with the 
French government throughout the IGC, the manner in which they presented their 
position did little to allay any possible suspicions and potential misunderstandings 
from other governments. The paper of 10 March 1997 that made the first reference to 
Common Strategies was in name Franco-German, though written by the French. Given 
that it sought to introduce a new category of decisions, the French and German
108 Interviews.
109 Ibid.
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governments should have briefed the other delegations beforehand. Hoyer recognised 
this, when on the same date, he remarked that the Franco-German draft should not be 
seen as an exercise excluding others. All Member States were welcome to
119contribute. At such a late stage in the negotiations, certain governments felt this 
approach was too complex, with the addition of the common strategies to the joint 
actions and common positions.113
The French delegation’s ability to push its agenda on the Common Strategies was not 
helped by the uncertain position within the German government on this and other 
CFSP matters. The French had little option but to take the lead given the divisions 
within the federal government.114 The inability of the French and German governments 
to construct a genuine and united common position on Common Strategies was due to 
the differences in their respective approaches on such strategies. For the German 
government a common strategy would allow for decisions on broad guidelines to be 
taken at Council level by QMV.115 This was unacceptable for the French emphasis on 
European Council and unanimity. As one German official put it, it would be 
inconceivable for a French Foreign Minister to report to his President that France had 
been outvoted on a foreign policy matter in the Council of Ministers.
It is difficult to identify any political leadership from the Conservative government on 
this issue. By this stage the general election was less than six weeks off. The Labour 
government had no stance on this issue. However, officials within the FCO were clear 
on their objectives; to maintain unanimity in creating these strategies and to tie the 
French and German governments to a tight and limited definition.116 This they claimed 
to have achieved with Article 13 Title V TEU. The same officials understood a 
Common Strategy to be little more than a joint action. Their understanding, yet again, 
differed from both the German and French. The French Foreign Ministry considers the 
Common Strategy as a useful introduction with the possibility of evolving into
• 1 17something like a foreign policy doctrine for the EU. As with the policy-planning and 
early-warning capability, governments avoided any detailed and thorough debate,
112 Statement by Hoyer, 10 March 1996, Bonn.
113 ER, N° 2226, 24/05/97, pp. 1-4.
114 Interviews.
115 Ibid.
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firstly, on the wisdom of introducing another form of decision and secondly, on the 
function of this new tool. The Member States signed up to another unclear and ill- 
defined amendment, with their own separate sets of understandings. It is left to the 
post-negotiation and implementation phase to define in any precise terms this new
1 1 o
concept of a Common Strategy.
Mr. CFSP/High Representative
French Position
The appointment of a Monsieur/Madame PESC or a High Representative of the Union 
was a long-standing French proposal.119 This figure would be appointed for between 
three to five years, having both an organisational and representative role in the area of 
the CFSP. While the Council Secretariat would be strengthened to provide assistance
1 90for such an individual, the European Council would appoint and dismiss the person.
In its IGC memorandum the French government suggested that this figure would
191replace the existing rotating six-month Presidency. In its June paper the government 
had rolled back from this more extreme position, emphasising that the new office 
‘must not upset the present institutional balances or undermine the powers conferred 
on the various institutions of the Union . . .’ with ‘basic responsibility’ remaining with 
the Presidency. At the same time, the French were adamant that the office would be 
held by a high profile figure, an individual with political clout rather than an official: 
‘the High Representative must be a figure of authority and credibility ... That is why 
care should be taken to select a person of real stature, not to say international
1 99renown’. The French government felt this was necessary, given that the same 
proposal provided for the possibility of the High Representative participating in 
negotiations with third countries, as well as follow up function on the implementation
1 99of joint actions. French officials denied that the government had already established 
that this was a job for former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing.124
118 For Common Strategies see Article 13 Title V TEU.
119 See Monar, 1997, p.423.
120 See Memo, 1996.
121 Ibid.
122 CONF/3863/96.
123 Ibid., p.4
124 Interviews.
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As on other, issues the French government’s lack of tact on presenting its proposals 
was met with suspicion from the smaller Member States. Despite changing its position 
at a later stage, the French government had initially proposed to replace the six-month
• 1 ^ c
rotating Presidency with a ‘High Representative of the Union’. Throughout the IGC 
it remained critical of the Troika.126 This amounted to an implicit, and at times explicit, 
charge that the smaller Member States in the Presidency were unable to provide
197  •effective leadership in CFSP. This left the governments of several of the smaller 
Member States with the impression that the objective was to sideline their participation 
in crucial areas.
This suspicion and confusion regarding French motives was further heightened given 
French criticism of the Commission’s role in the second pillar. In the lead-up to the 
IGC and throughout the negotiations, the French government claimed that the 
Commission had at times been slow to implement Council decisions taken under 
CFSP, citing examples from Bosnia. They sought an article that would tighten the 
overall pillar structure requiring the Commission to improve its role of applying 
Council policy.128 Again the reaction from the smaller Member States was sceptical 
with a strong desire not to see the Commission challenged.
German Position
The German government had not been enthusiastic about the concept of a High 
Representative. In its pre-negotiation papers it avoided the issue, with only a vague 
reference to a ‘new post’ in the joint Franco-German statement at Freiburg in February 
‘96. This reflected Franco-German differences on the whole approach to the post. The 
German government wished the new job to be filled by an official rather than a 
potentially high-powered political figure. The rationale behind this was to avoid any 
potentially damaging competition that may have upset the institutional balance, 
undermining the role of the Presidency. However, for officials within the French 
Foreign Ministry, it was a case of the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, being 
determined not to see any political figure take up a position that may have competed 
with his office. There was unity and consistency within the German approach. On
125 See Memo, 1996.
126 See AE, 26/04/95; Memo, 1996; AE, 10/12/96.
127 Ibid; Interview.
128 See Freiburg summit, 1996.
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repeated occasions Hoyer and Kinkel along with other senior officials on the 
negotiating delegation (Brewer, Kolsch) claimed that the Council Secretary General 
could be appointed as the High Representative if given a deputy.129
British Position
Together with the policy-planning capability the British Conservative government 
displayed a genuine interest in some form of representation for the second pillar. In 
their White Paper they described themselves as ‘ready to look at the idea of appointing 
a single figure to represent the foreign policy of the Union to the outside World’.130 In 
a further submission in late July, the British government said that the High 
Representative would have the rank of Secretary General. He would report to the 
Council, working closely with the Presidency and the Political Committee. As with the 
German government, the British were concerned that any new position would be 
firmly rooted in existing structures, the Presidency remaining in overall charge. The 
primary function of the Representative was the formulation and preparation of 
questions relating to CFSP discussed by the General Affairs Council. As with the 
French proposal, representation abroad of agreed EU policies, monitoring 
implementation of agreed measures and conducting political dialogue with third
1 "X1countries were other possible functions. The Labour government’s pre-negotiation 
paper made no mention of any representation on the second pillar.132 However, its non­
paper on the IGC in late May ‘97 suggested that it was close to the Conservative 
government’s position. The only reference it made to the High Representative was to 
make clear that the position would be under Council control.
Negotiations
Initial Presidential papers from the Italians repeated the variety of options open to 
governments to strengthen the visibility and coherency of CFSP; a reinforcement of 
the powers of the Presidency, a tandem representation by the Presidency and the 
Commission, a Mr. CFSP, either an official or a political figure, and finally an 
American style National Security Council made up of representatives from the
129 Interview; Statement by Hoyer 6 May, 22 July & 8 October 1996, Statement by Kinkel 28 October 
1996; Also see ‘Mr Rifkind voices doubts about “Constructive Abstention” and says “Mr CFSP” should 
be a Senior Official’, AE, 5/03/96.
130 See Partnership o f  nations, 1996.
131 Ibid.
132 See Labour, 1995.
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Presidency, Mr. CFSP, the Commission and the WEU. (Italian proposal)133 In its first 
paper the Irish Presidency continued with the same openness on the possibilities; a 
Secretary-General responsible for CFSP, a High Representative, or a special 
representative/envoy depending on the circumstances.134 However, its October paper -  
after a series of submissions from the French, Germans and the Commission, which 
had adopted a favourable position on the Secretary-General being responsible for 
CFSP ‘under the authority of the Presidency’ -  provided for the Secretary-General 
of the Council to ‘assist the Presidency in preparing the work of the Council and in co­
ordinating and following-up implementation of policy decisions’. It also provided for 
the appointment of ‘a special representative’ on ‘particular policy issues’. The contents
I  'JiT
of the December draft were largely similar.
The Dutch Presidency did make two significant changes to the approach in its March 
amendments. Firstly, the Secretary-General was to be appointed for a five-year term. 
Secondly, this was a decision that would be taken by qualified majority by the Council,
• 117as opposed to the European Council. There were further changes right up to the 
Amsterdam Summit. The French government proved somewhat effective in salvaging 
what it could from its preferred approach of creating a high-profile position. Firstly, 
specific reference was made in the final treaty to the position of High Representative. 
Secondly, while, as previously suggested, this position would be held by the Secretary- 
General of the Council, the introduction of a deputy Secretary-General ‘responsible for 
the running of the General Secretariat’ raised the Secretary-General’s profile from a 
mere manager of the daily affairs of the Council.138
Yet, the suspicion from the other member governments as regards French motives and 
objectives undermined the original French preference and, more importantly, it did 
little to foster further discussion on the more precise functions of the eventual High 
Representative. The lack of support from the German government has been mentioned, 
while chapter III on the government positions on this issue before the IGC revealed the 
near total-absence of support for a high-profile figure. The Italians were the only other
133 CONF/3825/96, 24/04/96, p. 1-2.
134 CONF/3868/96, 16/07/96, p.4.
135 CONF/3889/96, 25/07/96, Annex p.l
136 See CONF/2500/96, Article J.8b, p. 73.
137 See Article J.14, CONF/2500/96 ADD.l, p. 42.
138 See Article 18, Title V, TEU; Article 207 TEC.
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government that would have brought greater weight and legitimacy to the French 
position. They had held a similar position in the pre-negotiations on the need for a 
political figure.139
3. DECISIONMAKING
Introduction
The reform of the decision-making process was essentially a question about extending 
the use of QMV. The Maastricht Treaty under Article J.3 had been very tentative in 
providing for QMV. Under Article J.3(l) the Council decided by consensus whether ‘a 
matter should be the subject of joint action’. Even after deciding in principle on the 
need for a joint action, a consensus was still required in defining the scope, objectives, 
duration and means of implementation of this joint action. In fact under Article J.3(2), 
a unanimous decision was required ‘in defining those matters on which decisions are 
to be taken by a qualified majority’. As described in Chapter III on the pre­
negotiations, there was a feeling among many governments that the second pillar had 
not facilitated for an effective foreign policy given this almost total reliance on 
unanimity. However, given the sensitive nature of foreign policy, any reform of 
decision-making could not be confined to a question of extending QMV. The very 
mention of QMV brought a whole series of other possibilities to the fore.
The negotiations on decision making in the second pillar had two distinct features. 
While it was usually a case that the lack of direction in the negotiations persisted up 
until December 1996 or the early stages of the Dutch Presidency, the opposite was the 
case with decision-making procedures on CFSP. The components were already in 
place by December 1996 and there was little substantive negotiation from January 
1997 to the conclusion of the Conference at Amsterdam. From an early stage it was 
evident that the framework that would be put in place would be one that had a piece of 
everything: unanimity, QMV, enhanced cooperation in the form of constructive 
abstention, and, in ‘worst-case scenarios’, an emergency brake in the form of the 
‘Luxembourg Compromise’. This reflected the variety of options mentioned in
139 See p.76.
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government’s official position papers at the start of the Conference.140 Secondly, given 
that no government submitted a detailed paper on the extension of QMV or its related 
features the Irish Presidency was reasonably skilful in using the meetings between the 
personal representatives along with their presidential papers to arrive at a compromise 
that had something for everyone.
German Position
The push for some form of extension of QMV came in particular from the Germans, 
though, as mentioned in chapter III, Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Italy and The 
Netherlands had expressed a similar support in their position papers in early ‘96.141 
There was a sense of frustration within the federal government on the success of CFSP 
since its foundation in Maastricht.142 Officials within the Auswartiges Amt. vented a 
more specific annoyance towards the approach of Greek governments on EU relations 
with Turkey, and its attitude during the Yugoslav war, especially on the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.143 This left the various factions within the federal 
government and ministries presenting a united front supporting a greater use of QMV. 
On several occasions during 1996 Hoyer and Kinkel along with other members of the 
negotiating team promoted what can be described as QMV with a German 
mechanism.144 This sought to normalise decision-making by QMV, excluding matters 
of defence, but if one Member State called for unanimity it would only be possible to 
reject this request if a qualified majority opposed.
From government papers before the commencement of the IGC at Turin, it was 
apparent that the Germans would ideally prefer not to incorporate an opting-out clause 
into the second pillar. Nevertheless, at an early stage in the negotiations, Hoyer 
acknowledged that constructive abstention was worth considering further.145 Later 
statements from the Auswartiges Amt. provided the details on the German position.
140 Ibid
141 Judy Dempsey and Michael Lindemann, ‘CDU seeks majority voting in EU foreign policy’, FT, 14 
June 1995.
142
143
Interviews.
Ibid.
144 Statements by Hoyer, 6 May 1996; Von Plotz, 6 June 1996; Hoyer, 23 July 1996; Hoyer, 8 October 
1996; Kinkel, 28 October 1996.
145 Statement, Hoyer, 6 May 1996.
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Constructive abstention would only apply when decisions were taken by consensus.146 
While a Member State could opt out from being part of a particular decision, this was 
on condition that the same Member States provided political and financial solidarity.147 
Most importantly, and reiterated by Hoyer in early October, was the bottom line that 
whatever the abstention arrangements, they should not prevent the adoption of 
decisions.148
British Position
The British Conservative government was clear as regards its opposition to any use of 
QMV or constructive abstention. The White Paper claimed that ‘CFSP will only carry 
weight internationally if it represents a genuinely common policy, not a majority 
one’.149 The Labour party initially held a somewhat similar line believing ‘... that 
decisions must continue to be taken by unanimity’, while opposing ‘proposals to allow 
some Member States to opt out of some joint actions’.150 However, it was to change its 
position in government. The strong desire to break with the Conservative past and 
pursue a ‘constructive engagement’ provided it with a degree of flexibility that was 
unavailable to the Major government, given the internal divisions. Its bottom line 
sought to maintain the national veto with QMV usage curtailed to implementation and 
those decisions flowing from the what the British officials perceived as the tightly 
defined Common Strategy. At a meeting of Foreign Ministers in The Hague on 20 
May 1997, Robin Cook claimed that the UK was ‘interested in constructive 
abstention’.151
French Position
Initially the French government presented a position on extending QMV that to some 
extent mirrored that of the German Federal government. There was a general 
consensus within the government that the limited use of QMV contributed to CFSP’s
146 Statement by Von Plotz, 6 June 1996 & Wemer Hoyer, 23 July 1996,
147 Ibid.
148 Statement by Wemer Hoyer, 8 October 1996.
149 Ibid.
150 See Labour, 1995. p. 14
151 ‘Conclave o f Foreign Ministers sheds Light on CFSP -  Total Stalemate Remains on Integration of 
WEU’, AE, 21/0597.
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poor operational record.152 The French government’s concerns on the more precise 
details of the extension were reflected at the Freiburg meeting on CFSP between Mr 
Klaus Kinkel and Mr Herve de Charette on 27 February 1996. The proposals of this
meeting would bear much similarity with the eventual changes made at Amsterdam.
1However, the French February memorandum failed to make any reference to QMV.
Of particular importance for the French government was the limitation ‘of recourse to 
qualified majority voting for decisions at the implementation stage’.154 The 
Auswartiges Amt. was fully aware of the need for the French President to have the 
final word on setting policy.155 It was unacceptable to the French government that the 
French Foreign Minister could at a future date be outvoted on substantive matters of 
CFSP.156
Negotiations
The reforms laid down in the Irish draft treaty of December ‘96 in essence completed 
the negotiations on the decision-making mechanism for pillar II. The Presidential notes 
of 16 July 1996 contained the variety of options that would provide the mix for the 
eventual framework; an initial statement that abstention does not prevent the adoption 
of a decision, the initial steps towards a generalisation of the application of QMV and a
1 C *7
constructive abstention clause. The September paper considered the possibility of 
extending the use of QMV by combining it ‘with an explicit recognition of a Member 
State’s right to invoke an essential national interest in order to oppose the use of QMV 
in a specific case’, with three alternatives as to what would happen should such an 
incident arise.158 The December draft incorporated the third of these options, providing 
Foreign Ministers with the possibility to vote by qualified majority to refer the matter 
for decision to Heads of State or Government. Therefore under Article J.8a of the Irish 
draft unanimity remained the norm with QMV confined largely to measures 
implementing previously agreed decisions, though a consensus was not required when
152 Interviews.
153 See Memo, 1996.
154 See Freiburg Summit, 1996.
155 Interview
156 See ‘Mr Bamier Favours Maintaining Unanimity In CFSP, But With “Flexibility”, AE, 10/07/95; 
‘European Commission Distances Itself from Mr Chirac’s Idea of Giving European Council “A Face 
And A Voice”, AE, 01/09/95.
157 CONF/3868/96, p.7-8.
158 CONF/3935/96, 30/09/96, p.9.
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deciding to take a decision by QMV, as was the case under Maastricht. Finally, 
constructive abstention allowed for enhanced cooperation among member 
governments. To conclude the December draft allowed for enhanced cooperation to be 
decided by a qualified majority while there was the emergency brake with the 
codification of what was de facto the Luxembourg compromise.159 There were only 
two further changes of a technical nature in the final draft at Amsterdam.
Initially the March draft from the Dutch Presidency broke the link between the 
proposed new use of QMV and the escape clause based on the national interest. With 
the arrival of the common strategy to the negotiating table QMV was to be used when 
taking decisions implementing common positions or joint actions, and for ‘all 
decisions taken in the framework of a common strategies’.160 [sic] However, while 
QMV applied to all decisions except those setting out common strategies, common 
positions and joint actions the Dutch draft removed the safety mechanism of the 
national veto, preventing its use in specific circumstances for reasons of national 
policy.
The very presence of QMV with constructive abstention in the Irish draft and, more so, 
the Dutch Presidency’s decision to remove the Luxembourg compromise with its 
March draft, reflected the extent to which the British delegation was isolated from the 
negotiations at this time. The Conservative government had been clear in its opposition 
to any form of QMV or constructive abstention.161 There had been no change in this 
position; rather there was no political direction outlining a constructive response to 
these Presidential drafts despite the fact that the March draft had left open the use of 
constructive abstention on defence and military matters.162 The arrival of the Labour 
government restored a sense of political leadership and this manifested itself in the 
restoration of the ‘Luxembourg compromise’ in the Presidential note at the end of 
May. There were no further attempts to change the substance of the Dublin draft. The 
two technical changes referred to above firstly included a clarification on where 
exactly QMV would apply, namely decisions flowing from a common strategy, and on 
measures implementing joint actions or common positions, (Article 23(2) and secondly
159 See CONF/2500/96, Article J.8, p.78.
160 CONF/2500/96 ADD.l, Article J.12, p.41.
161 See Partnership o f  Nations, 1996.
162 Ibid.
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a sentence making clear that the QMV provision did not apply to military or defence 
matters.
CONCLUSIONS
This is the final chapter in the group of three case-studies. It was divided into three 
sections which examined the negotiations on the WEU, the reform to the CFSP 
machinery and finally reforms to the decision-making process. As has been the case 
throughout the two previous chapters on institutions and justice and home affairs a 
similar set of features defined the negotiations on CFSP. There was ambiguity in 
governments objectives, in turn a lack of direction in the negotiations, and eventual 
postponement.
Several arguments have been presented around these features. Firstly, there was no 
government or Presidency to push the negotiations on integrating the WEU into the 
EU. Instead, with a steadfast opposition to such a proposal from the British and 
neutrals, along with divided and ambiguous positions held by the French and German 
governments, the process drifted along to the inevitable postponement to another IGC. 
There were similar examples of postponing divisive issues on the make up of the 
newly-created PPU and the meaning and objective of the common strategy. Member 
governments will return to these questions as these treaty provisions and protocols are 
implemented.
Secondly, it was difficult for delegations to negotiate the details on the reforms to the 
machinery of CFSP, given their suspicions to what many perceived, particularly the 
smaller Member States, as French attempts to repackage and re-float ideas from the 
1960s Fouchet Plan. With the French pushing the hardest to introduce these new 
changes, there was a deep assumption within the French government’s thinking that a 
‘serious’ CFSP would only be possible with a ‘serious’ group of Member States 
making most of the decisions. Such a group did not include Luxembourg, Belgium or 
the reticent neutrals.
Thirdly, on the decision-making process within CFSP the German government 
emphasised the need for a general extension of QMV, except on defence and military 
matters. However, the German delegation knew that the French could not accept a
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general extension of QMV beyond implementing measures. Given that the French and 
German governments were in agreement on very few issues on CFSP, the Germans 
were reluctant to push on QMV. Despite the absence of detailed non-papers from any 
of the government by December 1996, the Irish Presidency had an almost complete 
new article in place, leaving the Dutch Presidency with little to do.
This chapter brings to a close the analysis of the negotiations at the 1996-97 
Intergovernmental Conference of the European. It is now necessary to return to the 
three objectives as outlined in the introduction, and to present the findings of this 
research based on these objectives. The final chapter in Section IV takes up this 
challenge, bringing together the threads of the various arguments presented over the 
three preceding sections.
PART I V -  CONC
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INTRODUCTION
The primary aim of this thesis has been to examine the process of negotiations at the 
1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union. Chapters III, IV, V, VI 
and VII sought to provide a comprehensive explanation of the negotiations, from the 
very conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty to the conclusion of the IGC in Amsterdam in 
June 1997. This explanation was provided by examining the agenda setting process, 
followed by a general introduction and overview of the whole negotiation process, 
before proceeding with a detailed analysis on the institutions, justice and home affairs, 
and the common foreign and security policy. The second aim was to identify the key 
participants or players throughout the negotiations. The analysis of the process across 
the same five chapters in section II and III, notably section III, referred to the key 
participants at the various stages in the process and on the various issues. The third 
objective was to define and identify the characteristics of an IGC as it evolved from the 
first Conference on the ECSC in 1952. Chapters I and II began this examination and 
the conclusions will bring it to a close.
The central argument of the thesis, as set out in the introduction and built on in chapter 
II at the end of the first section, was that the 1996-97 IGC negotiations were an 
incremental process with four defining features: ambiguity or lack of clarity among 
governments on their objectives, lack of direction on certain issues, unintended 
outcomes for governments, and a tendency to postpone divisive issues either for 
another IGC or until the implementation of the treaty reforms. The member 
governments were involved in an incremental process, with governments either slowly 
sorting out their priorities, with later positions contradicting earlier ones as they edge 
their way to a final package at Amsterdam or, in certain instances failing to sort out 
their priorities and drifting into agreement or postponing for another time. The second
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argument related again to the 1996-97 IGC process and the key players across the 
various issues on the Conference agenda. It was argued that on certain issues no 
government delegations nor the Presidency were pushing the negotiations. Hence the 
drift or lack of direction. However, while all delegations played a role in the IGC, the 
most influential participants, providing initiative were principally the Dutch 
Presidency and the French government and, to a more limited extent, the British and 
German governments along with the Irish Presidency, the Commission and Council 
Secretariat. The third line of argument that was presented in Section II of the thesis 
suggested that an IGC is an evolving process that has been gradually institutionalised 
into the European Union.
This chapter aims to bring together these arguments that have been developed 
throughout the thesis and make a series of conclusions. In doing so it is divided into 
five sections. The first section returns to the process of negotiations at the 1996-97 
Conference summarising on the presence and the circumstances providing for the four 
features as outlined. The second section draws together conclusions on the second 
objective and argument of the thesis relating to participation at the IGC. In turn, the 
third section considers the usefulness of the liberal intergovemmentalist and 
neofunctionalist perspectives in providing an adequate explanation of the IGC 
negotiations. Both perspectives are unable to provide a satisfactory account of the 
process. Instead, as the four defining features of the negotiations suggest it was an 
incremental process, an incrementalism that differed from that inherent within 
neofunctionalism. The fourth section considers what this IGC tells us about the 
evolutionary process of the Conference and its future role in European integration. 
Since the fourth section concludes that there has been a further institutionalisation of 
the IGC, the final section examines the implications of this on the entire process of 
European integration.
1. FIRST OBJECTIVE -  NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE
1996-97 IGC
It is essential in understanding the process of an IGC that it is examined from 
beginning to end. Stubb remarks that ‘Assessing an IGC by looking only at the final 
bargain which takes place among the Heads of State or Government in a European
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Council is like evaluating a pyramid by looking at the final stone in its construction’.1 
This thesis set out to provide as broad an assessment as possible, while not 
compromising on the depth of the analysis. The breadth was achieved by examining 
the setting of the agenda from the conclusion of Maastricht onwards, examining most 
of the major issues that governments focused upon, (Chapter III) while following up 
with an overview on the whole process, as well as focusing on the detailed 
negotiations on the three major areas on the agenda. As regards the participants in the 
process, an overview of their positions on all major issues on the agenda was presented 
in Chapter III, while the rest of the thesis looked in detail at Britain, France and 
Germany, while always conscious of the influence of the other players on a specific 
issue. In carrying out what aimed to be a comprehensive consideration of the IGC four 
features underpinned the whole process.
Unclear/Ambiguous Objectives
Taking a holistic approach, there was no clearly established or accepted ‘grand’ 
objective for the Conference. There was nothing that all governments agreed to as 
driving the process. Again, this is somewhat in keeping with previous IGCs, as 
mentioned in chapter II. Enlargement came the closest to providing this ‘grand idea’. 
Yet, there was no consensus on the two fundamentals of an enlargement process; when 
it would take place, and the extent of the intake of new members.2 Nowhere were the 
consequences of this more apparent than on reforming the institutions. Much of the 
institutional reform had been billed by governments in their position papers as 
necessary to maintain an efficient and workable institutional mechanism in an enlarged 
Union. Though, on those very issues directly associated with this, namely Commission 
re-sizing and a re-weighting of votes in the Council, governments failed to make the 
changes.
Leading on from this absence of an overall theme and as a consequence of the post- 
Maastricht process, governments embarked on an IGC with a large and unwieldy 
agenda and with poorly defined objectives on the range of issues. However, given that 
it was still early days in an IGC, that was expected to continue until after the British
1 Stubb, 1998, p.264
2 See Chapter III, pp.63-4.
3 See again, chapter III, 69-72.
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general elections which had to be held within the first six months of 1997, there was 
time for governments to sort out their priorities into well-defined objectives. While 
there were some examples of this, it was not a consistent feature of the negotiations. 
There were repeated instances across the three major issues on the institutions, JHA 
and CFSP where governments objectives were notably unclear. On QMV, many 
governments had expressed support for an extension, yet few governments submitted 
any non-paper detailing the specific issues they were willing to extend on. Indeed, the 
German government was particularly unclear on its objectives, catching the other 
governments by surprise. A similar situation persisted on Commission re-sizing and re­
weighting of votes, particularly the latter. While most governments’ papers referred to 
the need for change there were few submissions, except notably from the French and 
the Dutch Presidency that aimed to give effect to these ideas, adding detail to the 
general commitments. This was a little less the case on the partial transfer of third 
pillar issues to the first, though again it was a case of most governments being unsure 
as to what the communitarisation of immigration, asylum and visa policy entailed. On 
Schengen, only the Dutch in their capacity as a negotiating delegation submitted a 
detailed paper outlining two possible approaches on incorporating the acquis. Yet, this 
was the single biggest change introduced by the Amsterdam treaty.
Lack of Direction
As a consequence of this absence of clarity, the process was often marked by 
indirection. There were several features to this indirection. Firstly, it was most notable 
during the Irish Presidency. During the first two and half months of the IGC which 
proceeded under the Italian Presidency, there were limited expectations for clearly 
defined and outlined objectives. It was still early days in the process. Though, the 
mandate handed to the Irish Presidency at Florence in June 1996 called for the 
Presidency to have in place a draft treaty by the end of that year. Therefore the failure 
of governments to take initiatives and submit detailed proposals at a time when the 
Irish Presidency suggested that they were moving into the real negotiations meant that 
the indirection was more apparent. On issues such as the institutions, particularly 
Commission re-sizing and re-weighting of Council votes along with WEU-EU 
relations and Schengen, there was little to no negotiations. In other words there was no 
further progress on these issues from what governments had already suggested. There
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may have been repetition and restatement of previous positions but no change in the 
status of the negotiations.
Secondly, while this lack of direction in the negotiations was due to the failure of 
member governments to launch detailed initiatives it also reflected the approach of the 
Irish Presidency on these issues. On repeated occasions it failed or avoided instigating 
debate and pushing the negotiations along in a manner that the Dutch Presidency took 
upon itself. This was particularly noticeable on matters relating to institutions and 
decision making, both within the first pillar and the third pillar, and on defence aspects 
of CFSP. The rationale justifying this approach focused on what was termed in chapter 
IV as the ‘British situation’. Officials within the Irish Presidency claimed that the time 
was not ripe for either its Presidential papers or a draft treaty to make proposals on 
such sensitive issues. The argument, as mentioned throughout the thesis, was that the 
member governments were aware that this would be met with considerable opposition 
from the British Conservative government with the potential of precipitating further 
crisis within an already embattled Conservative administration. Given the expectations 
for an election victory by a more accommodating and reasonable Labour party, a delay 
in negotiating on these sensitive issues until a new British government arrived was 
presented as an astute and necessary negotiating tactic.
Nevertheless, this did not offer a completely plausible explanation for the indirection 
on these issues. There were two further explanations. Firstly, member governments 
used the British, or rather the confrontational attitude of the British Conservatives, as 
described in chapter II and elsewhere, presented the other governments with an excuse 
for failing to outline their own priorities. This was most apparent on extending QMV, 
the more accommodating approach of the Labour government revealing the extent to 
which the other governments had failed to define their positions. Secondly, the Irish 
Presidency was in a sense relieved with the other delegations’ reluctance to provide 
any initiative. As mentioned in the various chapters it suited the Irish Presidency that 
there was little movement on Schengen, integrating the WEU and Commission re­
sizing. Ireland is not a member of either Schengen or the WEU, and as a small 
Member State it was not in its interests to push on a Commission re-sizing.
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There were exceptions to this form of indirection. On the decision-making process in 
CFSP and police cooperation it was during the Irish Presidency that the complex set­
up was pieced together with the December draft proving almost identical to that at 
Amsterdam. There was also little change on the softer ‘issues’ such as transparency, 
equality and human rights from the December draft. Finally the indirection in the 
negotiations sometimes persisted right throughout the early months of 1997. For 
example, this was the case with the re-weighting of Council votes. It was not until the 
end of May at the Noordwijk European Council meeting that detailed proposals were 
tabled.
Unintended Outcomes
Given that member governments often held unclear and contradictory objectives, in a 
process that at times lacked direction, it left some governments drifting into agreement 
without fully appreciating both the precise contents of that which they had agreed to, 
and the domestic implications of their decision. In other words, for some governments 
the outcomes with certain treaty articles were something that were not intended or 
anticipated. For example, the extension of co-decision was not considered as a high 
priority issue by many of the governments or their delegations. Therefore a package 
was put together by the personal representatives without a great deal of difficulty. 
However, Heads of State and Governments’ failure to give the necessary attention to 
the list of new areas where the procedure would apply meant that on several articles 
where co-decision applied, unanimity as opposed to QMV was to be used in the 
Council of Ministers, a situation that no government delegation claimed was planned 
or expected.
On the third pillar, notably the role of supranational institutions in the new Title IV 
TEC and the reformed Article K TEU the French government, while being one of the 
most active in tabling detailed proposals ended up accepting changes without 
appreciating their domestic implications. As mentioned, this, in some respect, reflects 
the French style of negotiating, signing up to agreements with little reflection on their 
implementation. But, it was also a case of a government not intending the negotiations 
to be taken in a more Community-oriented direction. Internal divisions within the 
French position and domestic distractions after the general election result in early June
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left the French drifting into an agreement. Schengen was another example of where the 
absence of well-defined objectives from member governments, along with the Dutch 
Presidency’s control on this issue, left nearly all governments signing up to an 
agreement with little reflection on the significance and implications of incorporating 
the acquis. Indeed, there was not even a consensus on what the acquis entailed. It was 
an outcome that few governments had anticipated or expected right up until the early 
stages of the Dutch Presidency.
Drawing a comparison between the formal close of the negotiations of the previous 
IGC at Maastricht in December 1991 and the final outcome at Amsterdam in June ’97, 
there was also a considerable gap between what governments had then intended the 
1996 IGC to be about, and what came to dominate the agenda and the significant 
changes in the final treaty. Article J.4(6) and J.10 TEU had called for a reassessment of 
the relationship between EU and WEU, while Article 189b TEC paved the way for 
institutional matters. The three chapters from section III and the final treaty of 
Amsterdam revealed the extent to which justice and home affairs, together with 
Schengen, formed the major changes in the final treaty. Indeed chapter IV also 
mentioned how other minor issues that Maastricht intended the 1996 IGC to deal with 
were barely mentioned throughout the sixteen months, notably tourism, energy and 
civil protection.4
Postponement
While governments drifted into some agreements without appreciating their potentially 
significant implications, on other issues they avoided taking decisions, preferring 
instead to postpone them for another IGC or for some time during the post-negotiation 
phase, just as previous IGCs had done. Chapter IV mentioned how participants, 
sometimes even before the IGC was underway, would refer to another IGC or 
‘Maastricht III’ that could negotiate and take decisions on those issues that the 1996- 
97 IGC failed to reach agreement on. In a style somewhat similar to Articles J.6(4) and 
Article J.10 of the Maastricht amendments, Protocol No.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
made reference to a future IGC after postponing any change on Commission re-sizing 
or a re-weighting of votes in the Council. This was the most clear-cut postponement of
4 See p. 110.
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a contentious issue for another Conference. However, there were other more subtle 
examples. The relatively minor changes introduced by Article 17 on WEU-EU 
relations builds on the delicate wording of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. It 
amounts to an effective postponement of any change for another IGC on the current 
EU-WEU-NATO relations. Article 17 disguises the fundamental differences between 
governments on a European defence identity. There is the vague commitment to 
‘closer institutional relations with WEU’ but integration is termed a ‘possibility’ just as 
‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy’ ‘might lead to a common 
defence’. At Maastricht, it was ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence’. (Article J.4(l) This debate is primed 
for another IGC.
The other form of postponement was until the post-negotiation phase when the 
implementation of the treaty would begin. It was a case of governments avoiding 
confronting, negotiating and deciding on crucial components of a particular issue. 
There were several examples. On the policy-planning capability governments avoided 
a specific consideration on the staffing of the unit, particularly on the size of this unit. 
Given that any new unit aimed to make CFSP more efficient, and given that the size of 
the unit would influence its functions, governments should have addressed this during 
the negotiations. Instead, Amsterdam concluded with governments having conflicting 
conceptions of how this new unit would operate and what an efficient CFSP entailed. 
It was a somewhat similar situation with the common strategy. There was no attempt 
to define in any specific terms what a common strategy entailed or what its objectives 
were. As was the case with the introduction of the joint action at Maastricht, this is 
something that will be decided as governments embark on using the new strategy. Just 
as they held different conceptions on the PPU, and in some ways with Mr. CFSP, so 
too when Amsterdam concluded, the British, French and German governments each 
had its own idea of what a common strategy would be.
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2. SECOND OBJECTIVE -  KEY PLAYERS IN THE PROCESS
Chapter II referred to the fluidity as regards participation at previous IGCs.5 It 
mentioned how it was necessary to extend a focus beyond member governments to 
include other actors such as the European institutions, the Presidency and the Council 
Secretariat. This proved particularly important for this IGC.
Presidencies
The second objective of the thesis was to identify the key participants or players during 
the negotiations. If one were to identify what could be described as a key player in the 
1996-97 process, the Dutch Presidency would come closest to qualifying as this. As 
was mentioned and demonstrated on the three areas of reform; institutions, JHA and 
CFSP, the Presidency chairs the meetings at all three levels, and most importantly for 
the IGC at the level of personal representatives. In turn, the Presidency sets the agenda 
for these meetings, usually presenting position papers which it drafts with the aid of 
the Council Secretariat. The Dutch Presidency can be described as a key player in two 
senses, firstly in launching key initiatives, particularly on institutional reform and the 
third pillar and secondly in that it was reasonably skilful in using the Office to good 
effect in leaving a very definite mark across the treaty, notably on the third pillar and 
Schengen.
The Dutch Presidency was particularly active on the more sensitive issues, but these 
were issues that the government was generally interested in. On Commission re-sizing 
it sought to use French support in pushing for an end to guaranteed representation for 
each Member State. This was a policy objective that the Dutch government’s official 
position paper also supported. The Dutch government was also keen on re-weighting 
the votes in the Council. Even here, despite the lack of initiatives from the member 
governments in outlining their preferences, the Presidency pushed for change, though 
its proposal, somewhat similar to that on it’s the structure of the treaty during the 1991 
IGC, provided for more division than consensus. It also pushed on extending QMV in 
the first pillar.
5 See pp.37-46.
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The Dutch Presidency, in what their Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo described as 
the ‘judo move’, was particularly astute at using the French government’s support for 
changes on the third pillar as a basis upon which to push for even more ambitious 
reform. The Presidency’s approach on incorporating the Schengen acquis reflected the 
measures which the Dutch government was prepared to take in pursuing what was yet 
again a stated government policy. Schengen had received so little attention up until the 
end of 1996 that many officials at that time considered it inconceivable that the final 
treaty would provide for its absorption into the EU. The Dutch went to extraordinary 
lengths to achieve their objectives; freezing out and ignoring the advice of the Council 
Secretariat, and reacting swiftly to quell the calls from the Irish and British 
governments for a more measured consideration of the feasibility of such a change. 
The Presidency generally handled the process in such a way that there was almost a 
total absence of consideration or consensus on the actual contents of the acquis or the 
implications of its incorporation on the functioning of the two pillars, the first and the 
third of the Treaties and, at the same time, the Schengen area which included non-EU 
members. However, the Dutch Presidency was much less influential on CFSP. This 
was due to internal divisions within the government, most particularly over the future 
role of the WEU.
It is also possible to interpret the Irish governments use of the Office of Presidency as 
somewhat skilful even though much of the lack of direction in the negotiations was 
during the second half of 1996, with the Irish Presidency to some degree responsible 
for this. Firstly, it did present a draft treaty by December ’96, as required by the 
Florence European Council. Secondly, there were issues where the Presidency’s draft 
was similar to the final text at Amsterdam, most notably on police cooperation and 
decision making in CFSP. Thirdly, and most importantly, as already mentioned in this 
chapter the Presidency used both the lack of initiative from the other member 
governments and what has been described as the ‘British situation’ to good effect in 
excusing its failure to provide any direction on issues that the Irish government was 
not keen on. (See above) This was skilful in that the Irish Presidency was able to do 
this while at the same time being generally considered a success by all the other
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member governments and the institutions, except for the French Foreign Ministry 
which had grave misgivings on the Irish performance.6
French Government
After the Dutch Presidency, or at times along with the Presidency, the French 
government was another key player, being very active in taking initiatives and in 
attempting to steer the process along its desired path. Despite the French delegation’s 
energy in submitting proposals and new ideas, the general result at Amsterdam did 
little to suggest a French success. There were several reasons. Firstly, it relates to the 
style of French foreign policy. French officials admitted that too often their proposals 
were presented almost as a fait accompli, failing to acknowledge the sensitivities of 
other member governments.7 The governments of the smaller Member States and the 
Commission officials gave a similar assessment. Secondly, there was a deep-seated 
suspicion, again principally from the small Member States as regards the motives and 
objectives of several French proposals. For the smaller states these proposals 
constituted a concerted attempt to undermine their status and influence in the European 
Union. It was not surprising that the French proposals were interpreted in such a way. 
Their papers on re-sizing of the Commission and re-weighting of votes sought to 
remove the guaranteed representation for each state in nominating a Commissioner, 
but it was likely that in practice the larger would always be in a position to make an 
appointment. At the same time the larger Member States would have a stronger hand in 
the Council. On CFSP, French criticism of the Troika and the Commission, along with 
its suggestions for a strong representative figure for the pillar again unnerved the 
smaller Member States. These proposals from the French smacked of the failed 
Fouchet Plan and there was certainly a deep-seated assumption within the French 
delegation and from the Foreign Ministry that CFSP should be run by the larger
Q
Member States. Therefore the French proposals ran into considerable and determined 
suspicion that undermined their efforts to engender support for their ideas. Thirdly, the 
internal divisions within the government between the Interior Ministry and the Elysee 
and Foreign Ministry, together with the domestic distractions after the surprise general 
election result in the run up to Amsterdam, meant that the French failed to grasp the
6 Interviews; also see p. 120.
7 Interviews.
8 French officials made this very clear during interviews.
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detail of the changes introduced in the Dutch Presidency on the third pillar. Again this 
was an issue on which the French had been pushing, with several earlier papers.
German Government
The previous three chapters suggest that the occasions when the German government 
had a visible influence on the direction of the negotiations usually came as the 
negotiations reached a close. This, in some respects, reflected the nature of the German 
foreign policy process as described in chapter IV. On the greater number of issues 
discussed in this thesis, it was difficult to recognise what could be described as a 
coherent German position that was carried throughout the process. Instead, there were 
open divisions within the Auswartiges Amt., between the federal ministries and 
between the government at the federal and Lander levels. However, as the process 
neared Amsterdam, a clearer line came from the various positions that had earlier 
contradicted and competed with each other. As with the extension of QMV and the 
formation of a new title on asylum, immigration and visa policy, the position 
eventually taken up by the Germans was not what the other member governments had 
anticipated. Domestic constraints had left Kohl with few alternatives. As mentioned, 
this reflected the fluid nature of the process while at the same time the German 
government was usually successful in gaining the concessions it demanded, though it 
did have the notable failure with its proposals on Europol in early May ’97.
Franco-German Axis
Chapter II referred to the contradictions in the Franco-German partnership that at the 
same time has seen both governments taking on a leadership role at an IGC, though, at 
times, their differences were more apparent than their joint leadership.9 As far as key 
participants are concerned, this IGC is noted not only for the gap in French and 
German objectives but also for the failure of either government to present common 
positions. There is little need to repeat the detail of the differences, as the previous 
three chapters have expanded on them. On these three issues there were only two 
occasions when the French and Germans attempted to present a common front. Both of 
these came on CFSP matters. The first was on the blueprint for the phased integration
9 See pp.44-46.
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of the WEU which also included Spain, Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium. As 
mentioned, there was no determined or co-ordinated attempt from any of the 
signatories of this paper to promote this proposal. Both the French and German 
governments had their domestic difficulties, while, at the same time there remained 
their fundamental differences as regards their perception of the future role and 
relationship between the EU-WEU and NATO. The other area of focus for Franco- 
German cooperation was on the machinery of CFSP, notably the common strategy. 
Again there were difficulties. The Germans were reluctant partners in what was a 
French-led idea.10 They were weary of French attempts to re-float ideas from its 
Fouchet Plan that had the potential to upset the institutional workings of the second 
pillar. On institutional reform the differences between the French and German 
approaches were always going to be apparent, given that on Commission re-sizing and 
the re-weighting of Council votes, French ideas were rejected outright by the German 
government as completely unfeasible.
At the official levels within the Quai d’Orsay and the Auswartiges Amt., there were 
few attempts to deny that there was little Franco-German cooperation on the IGC. This 
was particularly expressed from within the French Foreign Ministry. One high level 
official described Franco-German relations ‘as a marriage of convenience’.11 There 
was not even the same amount of rhetoric of cooperation or, at least it did not take on 
the same profile as in previous IGCs. The French expressed particular difficulties in 
completing the Kohl-Chirac letter on the eve of the Dublin II Summit.12 This was 
reflected in the final letter, where there were clear contradictions. On Justice and Home 
Affairs the letter initially called for ‘a Community policy on external borders, visas, 
immigration, asylum and customs cooperation’, while later describing ‘Cooperation on 
justice and home affairs [as] a relatively new area in which further experience is 
required before we can ultimately decide where communitarization [SIC] would 
provide the best answer to a problem’.13 On police cooperation the same letter referred 
imprecisely to a future Europol with operational powers, though it failed to outline 
what was meant by this term, reflecting French difficulties with such a concept.14 
Foreign Ministers Herve de Charette and Klaus Kinkel also spoke of joint initiatives
10 Interview
11 Ibid.
12 Press and Information Office o f the Federal Government, 13 December 1996.
13 Ibid.
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and common positions at the start of the Dutch Presidency, with the Franco-German 
‘determination to work on the major deadlines’ taking ‘the form of precise actions ... 
expressing common views on other aspects of the IGC’.15 Yet, these ‘common views’ 
did not materialise. Instead, the final stage to the IGC in the run-up to Amsterdam was 
marked by a return to a similar tension and suspicion between the two governments as 
had been the case with the election of President Chirac and an RPR-led national 
assembly during the pre-negotiations. However, on this occasion Bonn’s concern was 
focused on the new Socialist government of Lionel Jospin. (See chapter IV) While the 
faces had changed, the primary concern remained the same, namely France’s 
commitment to EMU.
British Government
Just as the German and French governments struggled with a difficult and constraining 
domestic environment the British Conservative government had an even graver 
domestic situation.16 This severely limited the role of the British delegation in the 
negotiations. On nearly all issues they stuck very close to their March ‘96 White Paper. 
Indeed this left the Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind to suggest that they were being 
left out of some of the negotiations. This was also reflected at the official level within 
the British IGC delegation. Yet, as mentioned in Chapter IV and throughout the thesis, 
this did not mean that the British government did not shape the process. While it may 
have been the case that they provided little influence on the specific IGC issues, the 
political situation in Britain determined the very structure and length of the process. 
On repeated occasions, officials from the Irish Presidency or the other delegations 
would refer to waiting until after the British elections before it would be possible to 
seriously discuss certain issues, most notably institutional reform. Others suggested 
that the negotiations could have been concluded much earlier but for the fact that 
member governments were waiting for a change in the British administration in the 
hope of concluding with significant changes to the treaty. When the Blair 
administration did arrive it showed itself to be influential in several regards. Firstly, 
the good-will which, came with its ‘constructive engagement’, at times exposed the 
lack of consensus and failure of the other governments to define their positions. This
14 Ibid.
15 AE, 20/01/97.
16 See again chapter III, pp.84-86 & chapter IV, pp. 126-7.
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was particularly apparent on extending QMV. Secondly, the Labour government was 
able to deliver on policies that shared similarities with the previous Conservative 
administration e.g. on the WEU and maintaining control of its borders, while, at the 
same time, being more accommodating agreeing to other changes such as the 
incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the EU along with the Schengen acquis.
Council Secretariat, Commission and European Parliament
The thesis did not set out specifically to examine the role of these three actors in the 
IGC. This requires further and more focused research. Nevertheless, it is worth making 
a few comments on their influence in the process. As already mentioned in chapter II, 
the Council Secretariat in most cases works closely with the Presidency and, given that 
the Presidencies, notably the Dutch, played such an important role in this IGC, this 
also left the Secretariat’s officials in an influential position, since they assisted in the 
drafting of proposals. As the Presidency changed hands three times over the sixteen 
months of negotiations, the presence of the Secretariat in the background provided 
some continuity in what has been the longest IGC so far. Indeed, Commission officials 
claimed that the Irish Presidency was over dependent on the Council.17 While the 
Presidency denied this, Bobby McDonagh acknowledged that they ‘worked very 
closely with the Council Secretariat’.18 The one clear example of direct input from the 
secretariat during the Irish Presidency was the detailed outline on what exactly a 
transfer of asylum, immigration and visa policy to the first pillar entailed. This, 
together with the Commission’s paper, formed the basis for the Presidency’s proposal 
on communitarisation, the latter openly acknowledging this. During the Dutch 
Presidency, the extent of the Council Secretariat’s determination to shape the final 
outcome was revealed on the incorporation of the Schengen acquis. The Dutch 
Presidency claimed that it had to break with the normal drafting procedures involving 
the Secretariat because the latter refused to incorporate the former’s suggestions.
The Commission had its representative, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, attending the weekly 
meetings with the personal representatives of the Foreign Ministers, while Jacques 
Santer attended the European Councils at Turin, Florence, Dublin in October ‘96,
17 Interviews.
18 McDonagh, 1998, p. 77.
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Dublin in December ‘96, Noordwijk in May ’97, and then finally Amsterdam. 
However, the Commission’s role during the sixteen months, and indeed in the pre­
negotiations was rather limited. As mentioned in chapter III, this somewhat reflected 
the new style of the Santer Commission. Having said that, the Commission’s influence 
cannot be discounted. The Commission did table several influential papers on the 
transfer of third pillar issues to the first, Commission re-sizing, and extension of 
qualified majority voting. These proposals came at a time when there was little 
initiative from the member governments. Indeed, this was somewhat similar to the 
situation at the SEA when governments were initially reluctant to submit proposals.19 
As mentioned, the Commission’s detailed proposal on communitarisation back in 
September 1996 was actually the first of its kind and it prepared the ground for the 
Irish Presidency. The Dutch also acknowledged the inspiration that the Commission’s 
April ‘97 paper on extending QMV, provided the Presidency in drafting a later 
proposal, though the Commission’s suggestions were eventually dropped. Finally as 
mentioned in chapter V Protocol No.7 which postponed Commission resizing for 
another IGC, resembled that which the Commission proposed in March ‘97.
It is important to stress again, as mentioned in chapter IV and the final section of 
chapter V, that there was little evidence to suggest that the European Parliament had an 
influential role across the range of issues examined during the negotiations, even when 
it came to the extension of co-decision. The EP failed to get observer status during the 
negotiations, and, as one member of a negotiating team commented ‘The European
Parliament made occasional guest appearances, but their input in the actual IGC was
00very limited’. The Parliament was able to play a more active role in the pre­
negotiations, having two very able representatives in Elmar Brok and Elisabeth Guigou 
on the Reflection Group.21
19 On Commission at SEA, See again pp. 38-41.
20 See Stubb, 1998, p. 19.
21 See chapter III, pp.96-98.
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3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
These summaries on the defining features that underpinned the IGC and the role and 
behaviour of the participants during the negotiations bring to a conclusion the first two 
objectives of the thesis. At this stage it is necessary to consider the theoretical 
implications of these findings. Just as chapter II focused on how both 
intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism had been used to explain the previous IGC 
processes, identifying the weaknesses of the two theoretical perspectives, the following 
section considers how well the same approaches explain this IGC. The following 
analysis reveals that, just as with the earlier IGCs, both perspectives fail to adequately 
explain the 1996-97 negotiations. This, together with the findings from the first and 
second objective, suggests that the 1996-97 IGC can best be described as an 
incremental process.
Intergovemmentalism
Chapter II outlined the central features of Andrew Moravcsik’s intergovemmentalist 
approach, focusing on his most recent explanation of European integration, including 
the Rome, SEA and Maastricht IGCs. In examining its effectiveness on the 1996-97 
IGC, it is necessary to briefly recap on these features, while at the same time, taking 
into account the recent intergovemmentalist description of the negotiations behind the 
Amsterdam treaty by Moravcsik & Nicolaidis.22
• Firstly and most importantly, Moravcsik’s liberal Intergovemmentalism is an 
interpretation based on a rationalist framework. An IGC proceeds on the basis of 
governments making rational choices and decisions.
• Secondly, the process of negotiations involves several stages, each following on 
from the other; national preference formation is followed by interstate bargaining 
which concludes with a policy agreement or in Moravcsik’s words a ‘substantive
22 Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicola'idis, ‘Explaining the Amsterdam Treaty: Interests, Influence 
and Institutions’, JCMS, 37:1, 1999.
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bargain’ which in turn opens up the way for a potential pooling of sovereignty in 
international institutions.
• Thirdly, as Member States engaged in this rational intergovernmental process, 
Moravcsik claimed that each state can be considered as a unitary actor. He 
described the negotiations as processes where governments pursue their well- 
defined ‘national preferences’ with ‘the maximum efficiency afforded by available 
political means’. On the outcome of the negotiations he claims that ‘negotiation 
agreements appear to be efficient... because preferences were transparent’.24
• Fourthly, given that it is a well-ordered, rational process with governments 
pursuing clearly-defined objectives, it was also a case of governments being aware 
of the consequences and implications, and therefore the precise content of their 
decisions and agreements. This extended both to changes on policy and the 
institutions. It is worth repeating Moravcsik’s words on this. He claims that ‘the 
historical record reveals that the consequences of major decisions were in fact 
foreseen and desired by national governments’, going onto say that ‘even where 
this was not the case, my analysis reveals, nearly all government were generally 
well aware of the likely short -  and long term policy consequences of integration, 
good and bad’.25
• Fifthly, throughout this process of European integration and more specifically 
throughout the IGCs, it was a process where intergovernmental actors i.e. Member 
States, dominated as opposed to the supranational institutions such as the European 
Parliament and Commission.
There was little evidence throughout the IGC that in anyway lent support to these 
characteristics, except to a limited extent on the fifth in the above list. One of the 
defining features of the IGC, both in the pre-negotiations and throughout the 
negotiations on CFSP, JHA and the institutions, was the regular failure of governments 
to provide detailed outlines of their objectives. Therefore, it was difficult to identify
23 Moravcsik, 1998, p.473.
24 Ibid., p.481.
25 Ibid., p.491.
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what Moravcsik would describe as the ‘national preference’. Even when governments 
did sort out their objectives, this often did not happen until well into the sixteen 
months of negotiation. This was particularly the case with the German federal 
government’s positions on QMV and the transfer of immigration, asylum and visa 
policy to the first pillar. This was a reflection of the style of German foreign policy 
formation and the specific domestic circumstances that shaped the government’s 
positions.26
The French government’s ‘national preference’ was also somewhat fluid but in a 
different manner from the Germans. The French u-tumed on their original position on 
Commission re-sizing, while having unclear and contradictory aims on justice and 
home affairs. On the EU-WEU relationship French objectives were fundamentally 
unclear. Therefore, not only was it difficult to recognise a ‘national preference’ where 
governments had a clear line on an issue, but when this did occur, it very often evolved 
during the process rather than being defined before hand. Moravcsik was clear, that 
before engaging in negotiations, governments defined their positions. Equally it was 
not a case of a substantive bargain being struck and then followed by a final stage to 
the negotiations which considered the necessary institutional changes. For example, as 
Chapter IV on CFSP attempted to demonstrate, governments had all but agreed on the 
new institutional and decision-making set-up on CFSP by December 1996, apart from 
some minor details, while they remained far apart on making changes on security and 
defence policy. Similarly extending co-decision and the role of the European 
Parliament was a process that some suggested neared completion in the early stages of 
the Dutch Presidency. The reason that little negotiation took place on the institutional 
structure under the reformed third pillar and institutional changes on the first was due 
to other factors, such as the expectations for a new British government and the 
approach taken by the Irish Presidency in leaving these sensitive issues for the Dutch 
Presidency, rather than it being a case of governments deliberately waiting to strike a 
bargain on substantive issues. As mentioned on several occasions, the negotiations did 
not proceed in such an ordered manner.
There was equally little evidence to support the third feature of Moravcsik’s theory on 
the unitary nature of the state as a negotiator engaged in concluding efficient
26 See chapter VII, pp. 179-183.
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agreements. At this IGC, as in previous, internal divisions within member governments 
were crucial in shaping the negotiations and the final treaty amendments. Moravcsik 
claims that, even when a state is disaggregated with competing and contradictory 
positions being promoted from different agents of the state the unitary actor perception 
of the state still applied if divisions did not ‘significantly alter their respective 
influence on the national negotiating position’.27 He also overplays the importance of 
the ‘umcity’ of the negotiations. This related to ensuring that the negotiations took 
place within a single structure, overseen by the Foreign Ministers. While this may have 
given the perception of each state functioning as a unitary actor, such were the 
intensities of the competing and contradictory positions within some governments that, 
on certain issues, it was not clear what was the national negotiating position, if indeed 
there was one at all. For example, the divisions within the Auswartiges Amt., between 
the Auswartiges Amt. and the Interior Ministry, and between the federal government 
and the Lander governments left the German delegation failing to present any detailed 
position paper on the communitarisation of the third pillar throughout the negotiations. 
It was not until the closing stages of the negotiations that the Lander made their 
influence felt, though they were represented on the German negotiating delegation 
throughout. However, up until this time it was difficult to identify who had the upper- 
hand. Moravcsik and Nicolai'dis fail to acknowledge the complexities and differences 
within the German position when they claim that Germany ‘was the most adamant 
promoter of EU involvement’ in immigration matters.29 This may have been the case, 
but it did not mean that it had a clearly defined set of objectives that it pursued in an 
efficient manner. The same two authors make a similar mistake regarding the French 
position on the WEU, their mistake being failure to recognise the complexities and 
confusion within the French government’s position as regards NATO-WEU-EU 
relations, as described in Chapter VII.30
Where there was a definite government line it was often undermined by internal 
differences. For example the divisions between the French Interior, Justice and Foreign 
Ministries on the communitarisation of the third pillar undermined what was a clear 
line by the government on their drugs policy. In the end the French failed to deliver on
27 Ibid., p.23.
28 See Moravcsik & Nicolai’dis, 1999, p. 66; See McDonagh, 1998, p.208.
29 Moravcsik & Nicolai’dis, 1999, p. 63.
30 Ibid.
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their ambitious drugs policy while accepting a stronger Community approach than they 
had aimed for on the new title IV on Freedom, Justice and Security, and the reformed 
Title VI on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. There were other 
examples of a government of a state failing to act as a unitary actor. For example the 
hostility and doubt that had opened up in the Dutch government, particularly amongst 
the right wing liberals -  VVD, as regards the role of the WEU in a European defence 
identity undermined the governments earlier outlined policy on WEU-EU.31
Moravcsik refers to how governments during the negotiations on his five case studies 
which included the IGCs on the Rome Treaties, the SEA and Maastricht pursued their 
‘transparent preferences’ with ‘maximum efficiency’. The absence of ‘transparent 
preferences’ has already been dealt with above. In turn, given the failure of 
governments to define their preferences or objectives, it was difficult for them to 
pursue them with ‘maximum efficiency’. Indeed as the second defining feature of the 
IGC negotiations suggested, rather than governments taking initiatives and pursuing 
their objectives, there was often a drift or lack of direction in the process, with little 
negotiation. Terms such as ‘maximum efficiency’ and ‘stable weighted objectives’ 
reflect the rationalist nature of Moravcsik’s perspective, a rational perspective which 
has so far proven unsuitable in explaining this IGC.
A fourth significant conclusion that Moravcsik drew from his five case studies 
suggested that member governments were very much aware of not only the content of 
their agreements but also they had ‘foreseen and desired’ the consequences of their 
decisions. The third defining feature on unintended outcomes of this IGC suggests 
otherwise. Governments stumbled into certain agreements with little or no 
contemplation of the consequences of their decisions. Nowhere was this more apparent 
than on the incorporation of the Schengen acquis. Firstly, it was almost impossible for 
governments to assess the implications of such a move, given that there was not even 
agreement on the content of the acquis or where the different components of the acquis 
would be placed, in the first or the third pillar. Secondly, Schengen was a separate 
structure with some EU members, Ireland and Britain not being Schengen participants 
while non-EU members such as Iceland and Norway were members. In turn there had 
been little debate leading up to the IGC and right and throughout the Dutch Presidency
31 See chapter VII, p.232.
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in January ‘97 on the possibility of absorbing the acquis into the Union. Again this 
reflects the absence of any weighty consideration of the implications of such a ‘major 
decision’. Thirdly, the Dutch Presidency managed the whole incorporation in such a 
way that they suppressed any attempts by the Council Secretariat, and the Irish and 
British governments that emphasised the potential negative implications of the Dutch 
Presidency’s actions, one official remarking that ‘it was not clear at the outset how it 
would work in practice’.32 For Michel Patijn the primary objective was that 
Amsterdam provide for an incorporation. All other matters were of secondary 
importance.
There were other situations where governments made agreements without appreciating 
what it was that they were agreeing to. The French signed up to the final set of 
amendments on the transfer of third pillar matters to the first without fully 
comprehending the extent of the role for supranational institutions and procedures. It 
was only in the post-negotiating phase that the French realised what they had agreed 
to, and how the outcome was not as they had anticipated.33 It was a similar situation 
with the reformed Title VI on judicial and police cooperation on criminal matters. It 
was not an outcome that the French had intended. As mentioned they pushed for a 
strong and broad emphasis on fighting drugs trafficking and addiction, with a very 
definite but limited role for the Court of Justice. They found themselves agreeing to a 
package that provided for a much stronger role for the Court of Justice while being 
much weaker on a drugs policy. It was also very apparent that governments were 
unaware of the details as regards the extension of co-decision. Their failure to make 
the necessary changes on its application to correspond with the reduction in the 
extension of QMV highlights the extent to which they were not focused on the issue. 
Again, if governments were not even aware of the details of an issue, it was even more 
unlikely that they had thought through the likely implications of the agreement on 
future process of decision-making across the various policy sectors of the European 
Union.
The fifth conclusion which Moravcsik drew from his five case studies related to the 
key players in the process of European integration. Moravcsik claims that his research
32 See McDonagh, 1988, p. 176.
33 Interviews.
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shows that the European Parliament and Commission had a rather limited role in 
earlier IGCs. Moravcsik and Nicolai'dis give similar assessments of this IGC. They 
claim that at the IGC there was Tittle evidence that either the Commission or 
Parliament provided either initiatives or compromise proposals that where unique and 
thereby altered the outcome of the negotiations’.34 Despite the fact that this thesis 
focuses primarily on the role of the governments in what is, in any case, an 
intergovernmental process, it is not possible to simply dismiss the role of players other 
than the Member States. Firstly, as mentioned above the Commission tabled several 
papers on the transfer of third pillar issues to the first, Commission re-sizing, and the 
extension of QMV. While it is largely irrelevant whether the contents of the paper are, 
in the words of Moravcsik and Nicolai'dis ‘unique’, since it is not always necessary for 
a proposal to be unique so as to be influential, the Commission’s detailed proposal on 
communitarisation back in September 1996 was actually the first of its kind. Secondly, 
it is not simply a case of supranational actors such as the Commission or Parliament 
having a role vis-a-vis the intergovernmental actors in the form of member 
governments. It was more sophisticated than this. As argued, the influence of the 
Council Secretariat needs to be recognised and further researched, given that it makes 
the first draft of a proposal before sending it to the Presidency for the latter’s input. 
Finally, the Office of the Presidency needs also to be considered as an actor in its own 
right during an IGC. The influential role of the Dutch Presidency and to a lesser extent 
the Irish Presidency again brings another dimension to the debate on influential players 
at an IGC.
Neofunctionalism
Taking the two central features of the neofimctionalist perspective, firstly, a process of 
spill-over ‘whereby successful integration in an area of lesser salience would lead to a 
series of further integrative measures in linked areas’35 (author’s emphasis), and 
secondly, the central role that the European Commission would play in this process, it 
is difficult to find any use for this perspective in explaining the 1996-97 IGC. While it 
was possible for Delors to refer to the internal market leading to the Single European 
Act which in turn ‘prompted the implementation of common policies in related fields’
34 Moravcsik & Nicolai’dis, 1999, p. 70.
35 Taylor, 1983, p.9.
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with monetary union ‘promoting] economic union with the same spill-over effect’, the 
same cannot be said for this IGC.36 This relates to the central difference between this 
IGC and all previous Constitutional IGCs. Article N(2) TEU did not refer loosely to a 
possible IGC in the future as was the case with Article 102a of the SEA or for that 
matter Protocol No.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty. It called for an IGC to commence in
1996. By this reason alone it cannot be proposed that the 1996 IGC came about as a 
result of a spill-over from integration in a previous sector.
Just as a neofunctionalist perspective fails to explain why the 1996 IGC was convened 
it similarly fails to explain the shaping of the agenda, and outcome of the negotiations. 
Taking the three major issues which this thesis focused upon: CFSP, JHA and 
institutions, their presence on the agenda and the approach that governments adopted 
on these same issues was not due to what could be described as a spill-over from 
another sector of integration. Firstly, CFSP and in particular, WEU-EU relations were 
on the agenda because of Articles J.10 and J.4(6) respectively. Again, as described in 
Chapter III, it was the Maastricht Treaty that shaped the agenda rather than a spill-over 
effect. Secondly, on the specific proposals that were proposed e.g. a policy planning 
capability, a Mr. CFSP, a common strategy and the greater use of QMV it was not a 
case of governments conceiving of these as the next necessary steps to be taken in 
response to the closer integration from Maastricht. Instead, it was a case of attempting 
to enhance the CFSP’s machinery in response to its poor performance after Maastricht.
A similar explanation can be given of the proposals to move asylum, immigration and 
visa policy from the third to the first pillar. As described in Chapter VI, under Article 
K.l TEU, there had been little progress in advancing cooperation on these three policy 
issues. Governments were not responding to the need for further integration based on 
the success of earlier cooperation. Therefore, the eventual creation of a new Title IV on 
visa, asylum and immigration in the first pillar was also not a consequence of a spill­
over. Nevertheless, it can be suggested that there was a tentative link, or what could be 
described as a spill-over, from what would amount to greater integration on asylum, 
visa and immigration policy under Title IV and the changes on judicial and police 
cooperation on criminal matters, in what remained of Article K Title VI. Given that 
under Title IV an area of Freedom, Justice and Security, was to be established with the
36 Jacques Delors, ‘A New Frontier Takes Shape’, Europe Magazine, December 1990.
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eventual removal of all internal borders after a transitional period (Article 61 TEC), it 
could be argued that closer cooperation and integration on another sector, namely 
fighting crime, was necessary. However, as mentioned in the introduction to ‘Crime 
and Security’ in Chapter VI there was already a recognition among governments of the 
need for better cooperation on crime irrespective of the proposal to create a new area of 
freedom, security and Justice. While a neofunctionalist perspective on the approach 
taken on judicial and police cooperation makes some headway the same cannot be said 
for Schengen. There was little mention of incorporating the Schengen acquis until the 
Dutch Presidency in January 1997. The Dutch were not responding to what could be 
described as a spill-over rather they had their own set of reasons for promoting 
Schengen, as described in chapter VII.
Finally on institutional reform in the first pillar, the proposed re-weighting of Council 
votes and the possible reduction in the number of Commissioners were not in any way 
linked to new policy initiatives under the Treaty of Rome. Again, it was not a case of 
integration in a policy sector spilling over into the institutional sector. Instead, it was a 
tentative reference under Article 189b in Maastricht, which was built upon by European 
Councils at Brussels and Ioannina, which placed these issues firmly on the agenda, on 
the basis that change was required to ensure that there was an efficient institutional 
framework after the future enlargement. On the extension of QMV and co-decision, it 
is possible to make another tentative suggestion that the cooperation on those issues 
where there was no QMV or co-decision had left governments recognising the 
necessity for change. Therefore, integration on a previous policy sector, while not 
spilling over into another policy sector, spills over into the institutional workings of the 
original policy. Yet, there are difficulties with this argument. Firstly, there was very 
little change as regards the extension of QMV, hence in the end there was little spill­
over and secondly one of the defining features of the negotiations on co-decision was 
the lack of attention that member governments gave to this issue. It was not a case of 
governments considering it necessary or inevitable change, reacting to a spill-over. 
Briefly looking at the other issues on the IGC agenda such as employment, 
transparency, human rights, equality, as Chapter III argued these issues were on the 
agenda as a response to the Maastricht ratification crisis, an attempt to make the treaty 
more relevant to the citizen. As was generally the case across all of the issues, it is 
difficult to recognise any evidence of spill-over.
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The second central feature of neofunctionalism provided an important role for the 
European Commission in this process of spill over. While the Commission and to a 
lesser extent the European Parliament played this role during the SEA IGC, its role 
was much more limited at this IGC, as mentioned above. Christiansen and Jorgensen 
attempt to argue that it had a much more influential role in the negotiations, yet they 
fail to present any convincing evidence to support their claims, being confined to 
merely remarking on how it took a much more low key approach than at Maastricht, 
promoted the Conference to the general public ‘receiving] some 4000 NGO 
submissions to the talks’ and had a technical expertise that made it ‘disproportionately 
important in influencing the shape of the draft treaties’.37 They claimed that the 
‘Commission worked closely with the Council staff to ensure a smooth running of the 
proceedings’.38 The contrary was the case. Commission officials commented how the 
Council Secretariat jealously guarded its privileged position as writer of the
o n
Presidency’s proposals.
As mentioned in Chapter II, during the IGC on the SEA, the Commission was 
successful in working closely with business groups, a partnership which was influential 
in shaping the internal market programme, largely through the European Round Table 
in the earlier period from 1982-84, though also during the IGC. Again this delivered on 
the neofunctionalist predictions of loyalties shifting to the supranational institutions 
such as the Commission. However, as was the case with the Maastricht IGC the 
Commission did not play such a role at the 1996-97 negotiations. Indeed while a host 
of interest groups submitted papers to the Reflection Group on the IGC, there was no 
evidence to suggest that any particular group or groups had a noticeably influential role 
on the process or outcome of the negotiations.40
An Incremental Process
While Moravcsik’s intergovemmentalist perspective claims that ‘European integration 
resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders’, and
37 Christiansen & J0 rgensen, 1998, p.449.
38 Ibid.
39 Interviews.
40 In none of over forty interviews could any of the interviewees recall an interest group having an 
influence on the process.
Chapter VIII- Conclusions 282
neofunctionalism claims that integration in one sector inevitably or eventually gives 
rise to or spills-over into another with the Commission taking a lead role, the findings 
of this thesis has suggested something much different. Firstly, on participation at the 
Conference, member governments dominated, while the Commission on a few isolated 
issues was influential. It was the Office of the Presidency that presented the Dutch and 
to some extent the Irish governments with the opportunity to be in the driving seat. 
Secondly, the four defining features of the negotiations, as summarised above, reflected 
the extent to which the 1996-97 IGC was an incremental process. It was a case of 
muddling through. The negotiations did not proceed on the basis of clarity. Some 
governments on certain issues did not know what they wanted. At other times, few or 
no governments had thought through their objectives and how to achieve them. In turn 
there was indirection in the process. This was particularly the case up until December 
‘96, though it persisted on some issues right up until the Noordwijk meeting in May 
‘97, e.g. on re-weighting of Council votes. The combination of unclear objectives and 
considerable domestic distractions left some governments, and on certain issues, all 
governments, drifting into agreements that they had neither intended nor adequately 
considered. On other occasions governments reached for postponement for another IGC 
or until the post-negotiations/implementation phase.
Given that the neofunctionalist explanation and predictions for European integration 
have a strong element of incrementalism running through them, it is necessary to re­
emphasis the subtle but important differences between the kind of incrementalism as 
used to describe the IGCs in this thesis and that within neofunctionalism. Initially, it 
could be said that there are strong similarities. For example, while Ernst Haas 
remarked on the role that elites played in the ‘expansive logic of sector integration’,41 
he also claimed that progress within this process of political integration was not 
dependent on such support since ‘sector integration ... begets its own impetus ... even 
in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies’.42 In other 
words the spill-over to new areas was somewhat automatic, the integration process 
edging along in an incremental manner, with officials and politicians not always 
comprehending the dynamics of this change. There was a strong emphasis throughout 
sections II and III of this thesis on governments entering into decisions and reaching
41 Ibid., esp. p.292.
42 Ibid. p.297.
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outcomes that they had not intended, similar to Haas’s claims on neofunctionalism. 
However, there is a very important difference between these two forms of 
incrementalism. Haas claimed that ‘the end result of a process of political integration is 
a new political community, superimposed over the preexisting ones’.43 Haas’s 
incremental process had direction, an end result that would eventually be reached. The 
incrementalism described in this thesis, as one of the four defining features 
emphasised, does not imply an actual direction in the process of European integration, 
but rather the emphasis is on a policy drift.
Yet, Leon Lindberg’s strand of neofunctionalism also avoided focusing on ‘an end 
point’ to this incremental process.44 Therefore, it would seem possible that the form of 
incrementalism described in this thesis, while being fundamentally different to Haas is 
more compatible with Lindberg’s thinking. But there are several further subtle 
distinctions. While Lindberg may not have focused on where this incremental process 
would finally end, there was the still the underlying assumption that this was a process 
that had direction. For example, in describing ‘political integration’ he, as with Haas, 
referred to political actors that would ‘shift their expectations and political activities to 
a new center’.45 He referred to ‘the logic of integration’46, while the concluding 
chapters of Lindberg and Scheingold’s 1970 work sought to explore whether the 
‘Community [was] likely to continue to grow’, and in what manner.47
There was also the assumption that ‘central institutions’ such as the Commission 
would evolve and play a key role in the process.48 Again, given that these institutions 
were there ‘to represent the common interests’ the process had a sense of direction. 
The incrementalism described in this thesis does not place such an emphasis on the 
‘Community method’ of integration, with the Commission having a lead or vital role. 
As described throughout, the Commission during this IGC was one of several players, 
within an EU of 15 members that is considerably different from that anticipated by
43 Haas, 1958, p.16.
44 Lindberg, 1963, pp. 3-13; see also Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p.24 & p. 109.
45 Lindberg, 1963, p.5.
46 Ibid. p.252.
47 Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p.250.
48 Lindberg, 1963, p.252; also see Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970 p .l 17.
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either Lindberg and Haas. Indeed, Lindberg touched on how ‘by increasing the 
membership of the Community ... the integrative processes might be slowed down’.49
The notion of spill-over also lends this sense of direction to the incremental process of 
neofunctionalism. Integration, or as Taylor described it, ‘successful integration’ would 
culminate in a series of further integrative steps in linked areas.50 There was a logic to 
the process, whether this integration would occur automatically or needed to be 
activated is not important in this instance as both forms are different from the concept 
of incrementalism as used in the thesis. In his conclusions to his 1963 book Lindberg 
remarks on how ‘an ever-widening circle of actors finds this system [of spill-over] to 
be an effective, logical, and appropriate framework in which to pursue its goals . . .’.51 
Again there is the assumption of direction in his claims. While Lindberg later referred 
to the notion of ‘spill-back’ and ‘output failure’, their effects on the process of 
integration should not be overstated.52 ‘Output failure’ occurred when ‘a commitment 
was accepted but where the [Community] system was unable to produce an acceptable 
set of policies and rules’ while ‘spill-back’ referred to ‘a situation in which there is a 
withdrawal from a set of specific obligations’ with ‘the scope of Community action 
and its institutional capacities decreasing]’. While output failure was more a 
reflection of a slow-down in integration on a particular area, rather than a lack of 
direction in the whole process, the implications of ‘spill-back’ on the direction of 
integration seemed much more negative. However, Lindberg and Scheingold were 
quick to acknowledge that ‘While spill-back does entail risks for the system as a 
whole, it is likely to be limited to the specific rules in question’.54 Therefore, the 
crucial role of spill-over in providing direction to the process of integration continued. 
As the previous section in this chapter has sought to demonstrate there was little 
evidence to suggest that spill-over had any significant influence in setting the agenda 
for the Conference or determining the final outcomes in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
There was not a similar form of linkage between related areas underpinning the 
incrementalism described in this thesis. In turn, there was little in the way of direction 
in this kind of incremental process.
49 Lindberg, 1963, p.294.
50 Taylor, 1983, p.9.
51 Lindberg, 1963, p.293.
52 See Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 137.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
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4. THIRD OBJECTIVE -  EVOLUTION AND 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE IGC
Chapter I set out to define an IGC. There have been no previous attempts to make such 
a comprehensive definition of this process. The chapter concluded that there were three 
types of IGC; legal, specific and constitutional. The constitutional IGC was most 
relevant for this thesis and therefore Chapter I took a more detailed look at this type of 
Conference. This depicted a process that had evolved since the first IGC on the 
European Coal and Steel Community up until the Maastricht Conferences. The final 
part of this chapter and the thesis considers whether the 1996-97 Intergovernmental 
Conference of the European Union marks another step in the evolution of this process.
The conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty revealed the extent to which there had been an 
institutionalisation or regularisation of the Conference into the European Union. Article 
N(2) specified when the next IGC would take place, the third IGC within a ten year 
period. This was the significant difference between this IGC and previous 
constitutional IGCs. The Amsterdam treaty continues with this institutionalisation of 
the process, but there have been two significant departures. Firstly, the new Article 48 
which replaces Article N does not include a specific reference as to when the next IGC 
would start. Instead, Protocol No.7 on the institutions referred to a future ‘conference 
of members of governments of the Member States’ that would carry out a 
‘comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition and 
functioning of the institutions’ a year before the membership of the EU exceeds 
twenty.55 Again it was open as regards the timing of the Conference, though it did state 
that this Conference should be convened ‘at least one year before the membership of 
the European Union’. The problems over the ratification of Maastricht had made the 
1996 start date for this IGC wholly unsuitable. Governments did not want to be faced 
with similar difficulties at a future IGC.
The second difference from Maastricht is that Protocol No.7 merely refers to a future 
IGC on institutional matters. Therefore should the next IGC deal exclusively with these 
two institutional matters of Commission re-sizing and re-weighting of Council votes, it 
cannot be described as a constitutional IGC. By definition a constitutional IGC has
55 Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect o f enlargement o f the European Union, Treaty of  
Amsterdam.
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three defining features. Firstly, it aims to make a series of treaty changes. Secondly, 
these changes set out policy objectives to be pursued or implemented after ratification. 
Thirdly, these policy objectives are flanked with reformed institutional procedures to 
facilitate for their implementation. Protocol No.7 only makes reference to the first and 
third features. Therefore should this future IGC restrict itself to these institutional 
questions it amounts to a ‘specific’ IGC as opposed to a constitutional. Yet, it is still 
possible that while protocol No.7 would form the premise for a future IGC since it 
would be convened under Article 48, there would be much room for other issues to 
form part of the mandate and find their way on to the negotiating agenda, taking what 
may have been intended to be a specific IGC to the level of a constitutional 
Conference. Indeed at the time of writing the British government was pressing for 
another Conference to begin in March 2000 and end in September of the same year, 
dealing with the institutional matters as recommended by protocol No.7, while 
returning to the discussions on the relationship between the EU-WEU.56 This would 
qualify as a constitutional IGC. The French government has also mooted the possibility 
of a limited IGC from about October to December 2000 with a bigger IGC with a full 
agenda sometime in 2002-3.
The constitutional IGC is now becoming a regular part of the EU. It is no longer the 
exceptional event. Instead it is part of the ‘normal’ EU business, as described in chapter 
II and as this IGC reinforces. Forster and Wallace remark that ‘IGCs in the Community 
policy process seem to be following the path that meetings of heads of government 
took, from exceptional events to an increasingly institutionalized element in the 
negotiation of the major package deal’.57 However, as suggested in Chapter II and 
reflected in the analysis of previous IGCs and in turn through the primary and 
secondary objectives of the thesis, while there has been an institutionalisation of the 
constitutional IGC, it remains considerably unregulated as regards the manner in which 
it should proceed. As demonstrated, this allows for a considerable degree of fluidity, 
both in the sense of participation at an IGC and secondly, in the nature of the 
negotiation process. Dinan captures this fluidity when he describes IGCs as ‘inherently 
unwieldy’.58
56 Interviews.
57 Anthony Forster & William Wallace, ‘The IGCs and the Renegotiation o f European Order After the 
Cold War’, Laurent & Maresceau, The State o f  the EU Vol. 4, p.341.
58 See Dinan in Laurent & Maresceau, 1998, p.38.
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While doubts were expressed at the end of the Amsterdam European Council on the 
entire approach of the IGC and whether this was the mechanism that should continue to 
be used in reforming the treaties, it is highly unlikely that it will be dropped or 
replaced.59 The suggested alternatives have included a constituent assembly or an 
independent group of ‘Wise men’ that would identify the areas for reform, presenting a 
series of amendments which governments would then decide upon, as opposed to 
negotiate upon. There is one convincing reason why none of these options will replace 
the IGC. This is a process of constitutional reform. No other level of decision-making 
shapes the European Union more than amending the primary law. Governments will 
not delegate this responsibility to either a group of individuals or the European 
Parliament and Commission or indeed have the recommendations of any of these 
bodies restricting its role in the process in such a formal and obvious manner. Dinan 
suggests that the solution to the unwieldy and inefficient nature of the IGC is for the 
Conference to return to its ‘former role as a means of ratifying agreement already 
reached by the member states on specific issues’.60 However, Dinan misses the point 
here, since this kind of an IGC, termed by this thesis in chapter II as a ‘specific IGC’ 
has always existed along-side the constitutional IGC, rather than the latter gradually 
assuming the role of the former.
While Dinan suggests that there should be a change in the role of the IGC others claim 
that there will be move away from the traditional preoccupation of a constitutional 
IGC, namely outlining a set of policy initiatives flanked by institutional reform through 
a series of treaty reforms. Moravcsik & Nicolai'dis claim that the primary focus of 
future IGCs ‘will be on the construction of a legitimate constitutional order for policy- 
making’, as opposed to the expansion of common policies.61 Ludlow makes a 
somewhat similar suggestion saying that the EU has moved into the age of the ‘system
f%0 »managers’ away from the previous ‘system building’. These suggestions amount to 
little more than tenuous predictions. Firstly, it is somewhat artificial to make such a 
distinction between building a constitutional order and the expansion of common
59 See ‘Severe Judgement’, AE, 19/06/97.
60 See Dinan in Laurent & Maresceau, 1998, p.38.
61 See Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolai'dis, ‘Keynote Article: Federal Ideals and Constitutional 
Realities in the Amsterdam Treaty’, in Geoffrey Edwards and Georg Wiessala, The European Union 
1997: Annual Review o f  Activities, Blackwell, 1997, p.34.
62 P. Ludlow, ‘The Intergovernmental Conference: An Evaluation’, Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies, unpublished mimeo.
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policies. The two are not mutually exclusive. Future IGCs can deal with both tasks. 
Indeed this would not be something new. All previous IGCs have to some degree 
focused on managing the system as well as ‘system building’. The institutional reforms 
that flanked the policy initiatives at earlier Conferences have shaped the basis of the 
constantly evolving constitutional order, while treaty amendments such as those dealing 
with citizenship of the Union, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, reflect a pre­
occupation with the legitimacy of this order. Secondly, Article 48, the treaty provision 
that refers to the IGC, remains open as regards the subject matter of any future 
negotiations. It is not possible to comment accurately on the future focus of a 
constitutional IGC until the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty gets underway. 
To describe Amsterdam as being a harbinger for future IGCs less concerned with the 
expansion of common policies, as Moravcsik and Nicolai'dis do, fails to recognise the 
potentially significant policy changes that came with this treaty, notably the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis, and the new chapters on employment and 
fundamental rights and non-discrimination. Therefore, for the foreseeable future there 
is every likelihood that the traditional form of the constitutional IGC will continue.
As to the process of negotiations at these future IGCs, while the 1996-97 Conference 
did have its unique features, the most apparent being that its timing was specifically 
provided for at Maastricht, it was not dissimilar to previous Conferences to the extent 
that there was ambiguity, indirection, unintended outcomes and postponements in the 
negotiations. Again, this relates to the special nature of EU IGCs, as referred to 
throughout, namely the lack of a well defined structure to the negotiations, with 
member governments embarking on this constitutional reform process without a 
‘grand-design’ for the evolving EU. It is likely that these defining features will persist 
with future IGCs.
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
While the primary aim of this thesis has been to explain the 1996-97 IGC negotiations, 
it would be incomplete without some consideration of the implications of its findings 
on the process of European integration. This is even more necessary, given that this 
chapter has criticised both the intergovemmentalist and neo functionalist attempts to 
explain this, and previous IGCs. Also, given that the thesis concludes that there
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continues to be an institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC into the European 
Union, with the further use of this reform procedure in the near future, it is worthwhile 
to consider how this will shape integration.
Before considering the implications of the thesis findings it is necessary to stand back 
and place the constitutional IGC in context with the European Union as a whole. The 
EU is a multi-level entity. The process of integration takes place in different forms at 
these different levels within the European Union, and the IGC forms part of one level. 
This notion of a multi-level Union takes on several forms. For some, such as Gary 
Marks, it is ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers -  supranational, national, regional, and local . . . ’. In other words the 
EU is one component or level in this system of governance. Others, notably Wallace 
and Peterson place a stronger emphasis on multi-levels within the European Union. 
This is more relevant for this thesis. Wallace distinguishes between four ‘different 
clusters of EC policymaking’: constituent, with high level bargaining leaving ‘the rules 
and priorities of the system ... under negotiation’; redistributive, that leaves ‘system- 
wide organizations and political coalitions clashing] over structural costs and 
benefits’; distributive, where policy networks are created between ‘sectoral 
organizations ... and with sections of the political legislature and executive’; and 
regulatory, which Wallace describes as ‘being characterized by disaggregated 
decisions, legal or quasi-legal processes, and specialized interests’.64
John Peterson provides a similarly descriptive account of the various levels of analysis 
in EU decision-making. He refers to three levels: super-systemic, where history- 
making decisions are taken by the European Council, member governments in an IGC 
or by the European Court of Justice that ‘alter the Union’s legislative procedures, 
rebalance the relative powers of EU institutions, or change the EU’s remit’; systemic, 
where policy-setting decisions are taken, with the Council of Ministers and COREPER 
being the dominant actors, while the European Commission plays a crucial role, but 
not what Peterson would describe as a dominant role; and finally the sub-
63 Gary Marks, ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’, in Alan W. Cafruny & Glenda 
G. Rosenthal, The State o f  the European Community Vol. 2 The Maastricht Debates and Beyond. 
Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1993 pp. 391-410, esp. p. 392.
64 See William Wallace, in H. Wallace et al., 1983, pp. 403-36; William Wallace, ‘Government without 
Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium’, in Wallace and Wallace (eds.), 1996, pp.439-460, esp. p. 446.
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systemic/meso-level, where policy is shaped by actors that are ‘formally ‘non- 
political’: the Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs), national civil servants and 
private actors who bargain with each other in various types of committee or Council 
working groups’.65
Taking Wallace’s and Peterson’s models, the institutionalised IGC forms part of the 
constituent level of the former and the super-systemic of the latter. The IGC can be 
considered as part of one of the levels of policy-making in a multilevel EU. Therefore, 
to understand the implications of the thesis findings on European integration as a 
whole, it is firstly necessary to consider the effects on policy-making at the lower 
levels of the European Union. It would be too much to draw conclusions about the 
entire process of integration based purely on the IGCs without considering the effects 
of the incrementalism on the other levels within the EU.
While this thesis has referred to the relatively well-established processes of policy­
making at the lower levels in the European Union, it is the series of treaty amendments 
of the constitutional IGCs that sets the framework within which decisions at the lower 
levels are taken, namely the redistributive, distributive and regulatory levels or the 
systemic and sub-systemic levels. Therefore, the incrementalism at the constituent and 
super-systemic levels has a ripple effect, shaping the parameters within which EU 
policy and integration proceeds at the other levels. This leaves a strong element of 
incrementalism running through the entire process of European integration and not just 
within the level of the IGC. In other words, the incrementalism used to describe the 
1996-97 IGC, with the four defining features of ambiguity, lack of direction, 
unintended outcomes and postponement, features that were also present at previous 
Conferences, shapes European integration on all levels of the EU.
In turn, the effects of this incrementalism are reflected in the general character of the 
European Union when looking the entity as a whole, taking all levels into account. The 
EU does not fit traditional conceptions of international cooperation and sovereignty.66
65 See John Peterson, ‘Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework for analysis’, 
JEPP, 2:1, March 1995, pp.69-93, esp. pp. 71-76.
66 See J. Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions o f International Relations 
Theory’, Review o f  International Political Economy, 1:1, Spring, 1994; John Ruggie (ed.) 1993 
Multilateralism Matters: the theory and Practices o f  an Institutional Form, New York Columbia 
University Press 1993.
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Sbragia remarks that the EU is a ‘political entity that does not fit any accepted category 
of governance’. Wallace describes it as ‘less than a federation, more than a regime’ 
with Amsterdam ‘register[ing] the contradiction of a European political system which 
has moved far beyond traditional concepts of sovereignty, without developing a
/TO
consensus on what is emerging in its place’. Neither Member Governments nor the 
institutions have a clear idea as to where the EU is going. The process of European 
integration rather than being driven by well-defined objectives and a clear direction is 
better defined by an incrementalism that tends towards a policy drift leaving the EU as 
‘an incomplete political system’ or a ‘quasi-state’.69 As Forster and Wallace remark 
‘Among the most deeply rooted characteristics of European policymaking have been 
settled preferences for incrementalism over strategic review.70
The institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC reinforces the incremental element in 
the entire process of European integration. It will mean more of the same for the EU. 
Member governments will be continually called upon to renegotiate on the rules of 
policy-making and the agenda of integration in what is a state-to-state process of 
negotiation. They are locked into a process of Intergovernmental Conferences. 
Therefore, governments are caught between acting for a sovereign state and as an actor 
in a confederation. Indeed, they play both roles at once. Without a grand plan on what 
is emerging governments are left muddling through the constitutional reform process, 
proceeding in an unclear and convoluted manner, neither fully aware of their 
objectives or the implications of their decisions until the decisions are implemented in 
the post-negotiations phase at some of the lower levels of policy-making. In turn, just 
as governments and the European institutions are sorting out the implications of the 
decisions and amendments of a previous IGC, the same governments are preparing to 
embark on yet another set of reforms. In an EU of rational actors and coherent 
governments the process of integration would proceed on the basis of strategic 
objectives. This is not the case. Instead, domestically constrained coalition 
governments, and ministries with their own well-developed and often contradictory 
interests are left making incremental changes. However, while this may leave the EU 
as a ‘quasi-state’ displaying little direction Forster and Wallace remark optimistically,
67 William Wallace, 1983, p.403.
68 Wallace, Summer 1999, p. 19.
69 See William Wallace in Wallace et al., 1996, p.451.
70 Forster & Wallace, in Laurent & Maresceau, p.342.
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that ‘As with so much in the history of European integration, the observer is struck at 
once by the fragility of the moving consensus and by the recognition that it 
nevertheless continues to move’.71
CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter sought to bring to a close the primary and secondary arguments that 
have been developed throughout the thesis; namely that the negotiations at the 1996-97 
IGC were of an incremental nature with the Dutch Presidency taking the lead role in 
the process. This in turn allowed for three further sets of conclusions to be made, 
firstly regarding the theoretical explanations of the 1996-97 IGC, secondly on the 
future role of the IGC and thirdly on European integration in general. On the 
theoretical explanations of the 1996-97 IGC it was argued that the neither Moravcsik’s 
intergovemmentalism nor Haas and Lindberg’s neofunctionalism provided a sufficient 
explanation of the negotiations at this IGC. Despite the incremental nature of the 
neofunctionalist explanation of European integration it was shown that this form of 
incrementalism differed considerably from that which defined the negotiations at the 
IGC. On the future role of the IGC this chapter concluded that there continues to be an 
institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC. It is now a regular part of the EU, with 
two further Conferences expected within a five-year period.
The institutionalisation or regularisation of an incremental process such as the 
constitutional IGC set the thesis up for a final and tentative consideration on the 
implications that this holds for European integration. While being important to 
recognise that integration proceeds in a different manner across the various levels of 
the European Union it was argued that that the treaty amendments from an IGC set the 
framework within which the other levels operate. Therefore, the incrementalism from 
the IGC process extends beyond this level of decision-making, to shape the entire 
process of European integration. The effects of this incrementalism are reflected in the 
character of the EU. As an entity that does not fit traditional conceptions of 
international cooperation and sovereignty it continues to evolve with neither Member 
Governments nor institutions having well defined objectives of what is being 
constructed. The institutionalisation of the constitutional IGC looks set to continue this
71 Forster & Wallace, p.352.
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process of incrementalism, with European integration continuing to edge or drift along 
in an uncertain manner.
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The European Parliament
Elmar Brok MEP (European People’s Party)
Elisabeth Guigou MEP (Socialists)
1 This list is based on that provided by McDonagh, 1998 p.231.
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Members of the IGC Group of Personal Representatives
Ministers of State
Wemer Hoyer (Germany)
Michel Bamier1 (France)
Michiel Patijn (Chairman, January to June 1997; The Netherlands) 
Fransisco Seixas da Costa (Portugal)
Gunnar Lund (Sweden)
Member of the European Commission
Marcelino Oreja Aguirre
Permanent Representatives
Philippe de Schouteete de Tervant (Belgium)
Javier Elorza Cavengt (Spain)
Jean-Jacques Kasel (Luxembourg)
Manfred Scheich (Austria)
Antii Satuli (Finland)
Stephen Wall2 (United Kingdom)
Others
Niels Ersboell (Denmark)
Yannis Kranidiotis MEP3 (Greece)
Noel Dorr (Chairman, July to December; Ireland)
Silvio Fagiolo (Chairman, March to June 1996; Italy)
1 Later replaced by the French Permanent Representative, Pierre de Boisieu.
2 Later replaced by Doug Henderson, Minister of State after the Labour entered government after the 
May ’97 elections.
3 Later replaced by Stelios Perrakis, Secretary General for European Affairs at the Greek Foreign 
Ministry.
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Table of Key Documents Submitted During IGC
Justice and Home Affairs Institutions CFSP
1. Ireland -  Drugs & social 1. Irish Presidency - 1. France -  Mr. CFSP -
Exclusion -  CONF Codecision - CONF/3 863/96
/3854/96. CONF/3974/96 2. Irish Presidency -
2. Irish Presidency - 2. Irish Presidency - CONF/3868/96
CONF/3 866/96 Codecision, Flexibility 3. Irish Presidency -
3. The Netherlands - & National Parliaments CONF/3 869/96
Incorporating Schengen - - CONF/3985/96 4. Finland & Sweden -
CONF/3 872/96 3. Irish Presidency - Petersberg Tasks -
4. Benelux - CONF/3900/96 CONF/3 873/96
Communitarisation - 4. Irish Presidency - 5. Commission -
CONF/3909/96 CONF/3 908/96 CONF/3 889/96
5. Commission - 5. Dutch Presidency - 6. Britain - Mr. CFSP -
Communitarisation - QMV - CONF/3814/97 CONF/3 893/96
CONF/3 912/96 6. Dutch Presidency - 7. Britain -  Policy Planning
6. Britain -  reforming third QMV - CONF/3 815/97 - CONF/3894/96
pillar-CONF/3918/96 7. Dutch Presidency - 8. Irish Presidency -
7. Spain-CONF/3925/96 QMV - CONF/3 816/97 CONF/393 5/96
8. Germany -  First Pillar & 8. Commission - 9. Irish Presidency -
Customs Co-operation - CONF/3 839/97 CONF/3936/96
CONF/3938/96 9. France -  Restructuring 10. Sweden & Finland -
9. Irish Presidency -  New of Commission - CONF/3946/96
Title-CONF/3976/96 CONF/3 852/97 11 Italy-CONF/3965/96
10. Irish Presidency - 10. Dutch Presidency- 12. Greece -  CONF/3970/96
CONF/3977/96 Commission - 13 Germany -  Solidarity
11 Denmark -  Fraud - CONF/3856/97 Clause - CONF/3971/96
3981/96 11 Commission - 14. Germany -  Security &
12. Belgium -  Police Co- CONF/3 860/97 Defence CONF/3972/96
operation -  3986/96 12. Italy-CONF/3863/97 15. Dutch Presidency -
13. Irish Presidency -  Crime - 13. Dutch Presidency - CONF/3 833/97
CONF/3989/96 Commission - 16. Group of Six -  WEU -
14. Dutch Presidency- CONF/3 887/97 CONF/3 855/97
CONF/3 803/97 14. Dutch Presidency - 17. Dutch Presidency -
15. Dutch Presidency - Codecision - CONF/3 859/97
Schengen -CONF/3806/97 CONF/3 894/97 18. Dutch Presidency -
16. Germany -  First Pillar & 15. France - European CONF/3889/97
Customs Co-operation - Parliament - 19. European Parliament -
CONF/3807/97 CONF/3902/97 CONF/3 885/97
l /. commission - zu. Italy 6c bpam -
CONF/3 817/97 Equality Representation in
18. France -  CONF/3824/97 International
19. Dutch Presidency - New 1. Spain-CONF/3928/96 Organisations -
Title - CONF/3 828/97 2. Austria - CONF/3908/97
20. Italy -  CONF/3840/97 CONF/3 841/96
21. Italy -  CONF/3863/97 3. Sweden -
22. Greece-CONF/3870/97 CONF/3 898/96
23. Ireland -  Social Exclusion 4. Belgium -
-  CONF/3 873/97 CONF/998/96
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24. Dutch Presidency -
Schengen -  CONF/3896/97
25. Germany -  CONF/3910/97
26. Finland -  CONF/3923/97
5
6
7.
8.
Austria -
CONF/3 843/97 
Spain - CONF/3 846/97 
Finland -  
CONF/3907/97 
Dutch Presidency -  
CONF/3 827/97
Employment Chapter Human Rights Subsidiarity
1. Austria - CONF/3840/96 1. Austria - 1. Irish Presidency -
2. Sweden - CONF/3 842/96 CONF/3 880/96
CONF/3 859/REV 1/96 2. Irish Presidency - 2. Britain - CONF/3896/96
3. Denmark - CONF//3864/6 CONF/3879/96 3. Germany -
4. Irish Presidency - 3. Spain-CONF/3930/96 CONF/3 897/96
CONF/3 865/96 4. Italy & Austria - 4. Germany -
5. Belgium - CONF/3873/96 CONF/3 940/96 CONF/3 953/96
6. European Parliament - 5. Austria - 5. Denmark -
CONF/3891/96 CONF/3 842/96 CONF/3982/96
7. Sweden-CONF/3921/96 6. Irish Presidency - 6. Irish Presidency -
8. Irish Presidency - CONF/3945/96 CONF/3944/96
CONF/3923/96 7. Germany - 7. Britain -  CONF/3947/96
9. Spain - CONF/3927/96 CONF/3952/96 8. France - CONF/3990/96
10. Austria - CONF/3975/96 8. Dutch Presidency - 9. Netherlands -
CONF/3 818/97 CONF/3831/96
9. Italy-CONF/3832/97 10. Britain - CONF/3851/97
10. European Parliament 11. Dutch Presidency -
- CONF/3883/97 CONF/3 877/97
12. Dutch Presidency -
CONF/3897397
13 Britain - CONF/3909/97
Flexibility
Transparency (Treaty National Parliament
1. France & Germany - Articles & Access to
CONF/3 955/96 Documents) 1. Britain -  CONF/3961/96
2. Irish Presidency - 3914/96 2. Irish Presidency -
3. Irish Presidency - 3957/96 1. Sweden - CONF/3948/96
4. Portugal - CONF/3999/96 CONF/3853/96 3. Irish Presidency -
5. Italy-CONF/3801/97 2. Sweden - CONF/3873/96
6. Dutch Presidency CONF/3 859/96 4. Britain-CONF/3871/96
CONF/3 802/97 3. Britain - 5. Denmark -
7. Commission - CONF/3 8 85/96 CONF/3915/97
CONF/3805/97 4. Sweden -
8. Dutch Presidency - CONF/3 899/96 European Court
CONF/3 813/97 5. Denmark -
9. Dutch Presidency - CONF/3905/96 1. Britain -  CONF/3883/96
CONF/3 83 5/97 6. Irish Presidency - 2. Britain -  CONF/3 825/97
10. Greece - CONF/3 866/97 CONF/3 875/96 3. Dutch Presidency -
7. Irish Presidency - CONF/3 836/97
CONF/3943/96 4. Britain - CONF/3844/97
5. France - CONF/3853/97
6. Dutch Presidency -
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Environment 8. Dutch Presidency - CONF/3 898/97
Simplification of Treaty 7. Dutch Presidency -
1. Austria -  CONF/3852/96 -  CONF/3838/97 CONF/3 899/97
2. Denmark -  CONF/3904/96 9. Finland -
3. Irish Presidency - CONF/3 865/97
CONF/3907/96 10. Dutch Presidency -
4. Austria -  CONF/3917/96 Quality of Legislation -
5. Britain-CONF/3919/96 CONF/3 878/97
6. Sweden -  CONF/3922/96 11. Dutch Presidency -
7. Irish Presidency - Simplification of Treaty
CONF/3 958/96 -  CONF/3901/97
8. Germany -  CONF/3966/96
9. Finland -  CONF/3969/96
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Chronological overview of 1996-97 IGC
• 7 December ‘95 -  Chirac and Kohl meet in Baden-Baden to discuss a joint 
initiative.
• 15-16 December ’95 -  Madrid European Council.
• 26 February ’96 -  Council of EU foreign ministers meeting - Split over 
preparations for Turin Summit.
• 27 February ‘96 -  Franco-German meeting in Freiburg to prepare for the IGC
• 9-10 March ‘96 -  Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Palermo - Still 
unclear on mandate for IGC and involvement of European Parliament
• 21 March ‘96 -  Sweden has a new prime minister. Calls for a new Swedish model 
to fight unemployment and revive the economy.
• 28 March ‘96 -  British Government releases its package to restore confidence in 
beef sector and in an attempt to have the export ban imposed on British beef lifted. 
British Policy of non co-operation to come into effect.
• 29 March ‘96 -  IGC convened & mandate presented.
• 1-2 April ‘96 -  First meeting of Personal Representatives in Brussels. Chairman 
Fagiolo described it as encouraging. Discuss 3rd Pillar reform.
• 15-16 April ‘96 -  Personal representatives meeting - discussed employment, 
environment, energy, civil protection and tourism, subsidiarity and transparency.
• 21 April ‘96 -  Italy has a new centre left government headed by Romano Prodi.
• 22 April ‘96 -  Foreign Affairs meeting in Luxembourg. Same programme and 
result as personal representatives from 15-16 April.
• 2-3 May ’96 -  Personal representatives meet in Brussels. Discuss QMV, 
Commission, ECJ and flexibility.
• 5 May ‘96 -  Spain’s new Prime Minister is sworn in. His conservative government 
describe participation in EMU as a national objective.
• 7 May ‘96 -  Personal Representatives discuss CFSP.
• 14 May ‘96 -  Defence and Security discussed - role of WEU.
• 15 May ‘96 -  Kohl in extraordinary meeting with the Commission. Recognition of 
Germany’s problems in meeting EMU deadline.
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• 6 June ‘96 -  Chirac and Kohl meet in Paris. Express concern as regards the lack of 
progress in negotiations.
• 21-22 June ‘96 -  Florence European Summit. European Council calls for the Irish 
Presidency to prepare a draft treaty. British policy of non co-operation comes to an 
end as compromise on BSE crisis is reached.
• 7-8 September ‘96 -  Meeting of EU foreign ministers in Tralee. Unclear as to 
whether there would be an extraordinary meeting in October as called for by 
France.
• 5 October ‘96 -  Special Meeting of the European Council at Dublin Castle. A non 
binding meeting with Member States expressing particular concern on Justice and 
Home Affairs. Irish presidency refers to its approximation of texts approach.
• 29 October ‘96 -  Joint Contribution by de Charette and Kinkel on reinforced co­
operation.
• 18-19 November ’96 -  Personal representatives meet in Brussels discuss justice 
and home affairs and the possibility of introducing Community methods for certain 
aspects of 3rd pillar.
• 3 December ’96 -  Last meeting of personal representatives under the Irish 
Presidency. Chairman Noel Dorr remarks that there would be no surprises in the 
draft treaty due for release on 5 December ’96.
• 4-5 December ’96 -  Irish Presidency releases its draft treaty.
• 9 December ‘96 -  Franco-German Summit meeting in Nuremberg, submit joint 
letter.
• 13-14 December ‘96 -  Dublin European Council. Apart form presenting and 
discussing the draft treaty the Irish Presidency also presented the framework for the 
Growth and Stability Pact along with Dublin Declaration on Employment both of 
which formed the basis for resolutions on growth, stability and employment at the 
Amsterdam European Council.
• 20 January ‘97 -  Foreign Ministers meet and re-cap on institutional matters.
• 27-28 January ’97 -  Personal Representatives in Brussels - Co-operation between 
police forces and courts under pillar III. Patijn remarks that ‘The Intergovernmental 
Conference is moving, we have entered the final stage’.
• 10-11 February ’97 -  Personal Representatives of Foreign Affairs - discussed the 
possibility of incorporating Schengen into treaty. Patijn described this issue as a 
‘complex’ one.
• 17-18 February ’97 -  Negotiations among personal representatives on 
institutional matters.
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• 24 February ‘97 -  General Affairs Council meeting - Justice and Home Affairs -  
text for area of freedom, security and justice. Dutch propose and present to the 
other members a draft on the 3rd pillar.
• 1 March ‘97 -  Germany and Italy adopt a Common position on 3rd pillar and 
Schengen.
• 3-4 March ‘97 -  Personal Representatives meet and discuss on Justice and Home 
Affairs. France stresses link between free movement and flanking measures.
• 10 March ‘97- Franco-German initiative on CFSP, including the phased 
integration of the WEU into the EU and the creation of the Common Strategy.
• 10-11 March ‘97 - Personal Representatives discuss the possible extension of 
QMV and the prospects of merger between EU and WEU.
• 25 March ‘97 -  40th anniversary of treaty signing. Presidency hopes to complete 
the reform of the 2nd and 3rd pillars within a month leaving institutional matters for 
the final days.
• 6-7 April ’97 -  Foreign Ministers in Noordwijk -  little progress on reforming EU 
institutions.
• 9 April ’97 -  Kohl and Chirac meet in Bonn. Reaffirmed commitment to EMU 
timetable.
• 29-30 April ’97 -  Foreign Affairs Council. IGC one of the topics. Focus on CFSP, 
relations between EU and WEU, re-weighting of votes within Council, 
composition of Commission. Restatement of earlier positions with little progress.
• 1 May ’97 -  Labour party sweep to victory in British general election, promising a 
‘constructive engagement’ with its EU partners.
• 5 May ’97 -  Personal Representatives meeting in Brussels. Henderson as the new 
personal representative to the British Foreign Secretary outlines government’s new 
approach on Employment Chapter, human rights and non-discrimination, extension 
of QMV in areas related to the Internal Market e.g. research, regional and industrial 
policy. Veto to remain on fiscal policy, social security and budgetary questions.
• 14 May ’97 -  Austrian Foreign Minister tells the Austrian parliament that the 
government would not tolerate Austria losing a place at the Commission. Similar 
position to other small Member States.
• 20 May ’97 -  Meeting of foreign ministers in The Hague, still disagreement on all 
three areas of CFSP, institutional reform and third pillar matters.
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• 23 May ’97 -  Informal summit meeting of EU leaders in Noordwijk. Particularly 
influential meeting on re-weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers and 
Commission resizing.
• 26-28 May ’97 -  Meeting of personal representatives. Discussion on 3rd pillar.
• 30 May ’97 -  Dutch release a draft treaty.
• 2-3 June’97 -  Foreign Affairs Ministers meet in Luxembourg and discuss draft 
texts.
• 5 June ’97 -  Socialist victory in French general election
• 5-6 June ’97 -  Meeting of personal representatives in Brussels. Feeling of crisis 
expressed on institutional reform.
• 18 June ’97 -  Fifteen close to consensus on treaty
• 21-22 June ’97 -  Florence European Council -  Amsterdam Treaty agreed.
